Barbara, is herself a noted scholar sft kennedy era and clan. Shes also the director of president ial studies here at the Miller Center. She is a very seasoned export, oral historian as well as written historian. And for many years she helped lead the Oral History Program here at the Miller Center which was one of the signature undertakings that we do in interviewing the leading members of president ial administrations from the ford years on up until the present. Or at least i should say the recent past. We have completed oral histories under her leadership and Russell Riley of every administration through the george w. Bush administration and we are planning to lay seeing to the Obama Administration and well find out what the Trump Administration what their attitude is towards being interviewed for oral history when we get to that. In any case, barbara is going to take us forward and ill turn things over to her. Thanks so much, will. And of course to mel and stephanie for conceptualizing and organizing and executing such a timely yet history based battle conference this year. And of course this is the very essence of Miller Center scholarship and programming. I am delighted to moderate this 11 00 panel. Well go to about 1 00 and well do this intro halves. First session is Miller Center colleague to myself mark silver stone associate professor at the Miller Center and chairs the Recordings Program which and lysing, transcripts and annotates the secret white house tapes, particularly from the Kennedy Johnson and nixon administrations. And if you watch the ken burns vietnam series youll have seen marcs names prom nately displayed in the credits because they were crucial from providing clips to jock son and nixon years but kennedy as well. Marc is Foreign Policy focusing on the cold war and especially one element of the hot war, vietnam in that era, and particularly the kennedy and Johns Johnson policy towards it. My favorite of many plib cages is his book a companion to john f. Kennedy, which sounds like a girlfriend but some of that is covered in that volume. But seriously it is a major work that hes edited, every topic related to jfk life and career and particularly his presidency and i rely on it almost exclusively as im preparing to speak about president kennedy. And i think think of tim naftali as my colleague even though he preceded me at the Miller Center for several years where he served as director of the kremlin Decision Making progress. Then tim at the Nixon Library has become a clinical professor of history and Public Service nyu. Hes coauthor many books ks but one for today called crushness cold war with alexander for san co. And if like me you are a fan of cnn documentaries, you will readily recognize tim as the starve many of them. I highly recommend to all of you here today if you havent read them already, the four e saes for this panel are compelling. And i want to begin with mark, and actually begin with the end of his essay, which is a set of conclusions that he draws on jfks role and behavior in the cuban missile crisis, and most importantly for our conference here over the several days, to draw out the lessons of jfks role and behavior in the cuban missile crisis for current issues. And then after mark does that, then well turn to tim and hell over some lessons as well from the khrushchev side, from the russian side. With that, let me turn to mark. Sure. Good morning, good late morning to everybody. And thanks again to mel and to will for the opportunity to participate in this looking out at the audience, any number of people who have written Copious Amounts on the cuban missile crisis and i have not. So i have learned from all you. But i appreciate the opportunity to try to distill a little bit of what i have learned and to offer again some lessons on how that may bear on counntemporary matters. John f. Kennedy had already learned important lessons by the time he had to confront moist comissiles to cuba. Several of these lessons matters were process, and they would be ee membersly in cuban crisis in 1962. Many over cuba, failed operation at the bay of pigs which meant these lessons were especially hard earned. They were not without qualification but by and large th they ended up serving the country and him well. But i want to tausche ouch on e presidency which the president did not translate into useful in sight and which contributed to onset of the missile crisis itself. The first of these lessons involved not the more constructive ones related to personnel and process, but to the negative ones related to policy and actually policy pronouncement to be excessively ill lit tive, i suppose. While planning for the over throw of fidel castro had gaertded a pretty full head of steam during the last year of the eisenhower administration, kennedy rhetoric at the tail end of the 1960 Election Campaign came pretty close to operationalizing it. His provocative language in october of 1960 which called for more aggressive action to undermine the cuban regime might have helped him win votes less than three weeks later. He certainly needed it. But it raised the political cost of canceling what would become the bay of pigs operation were he to have done so had he become whether he became president. So heres the first case in the trajectory toward october of 1962 where i think words really mattered. While this public pronouncement narrowed kennedy room foreman youve tear on cuba once he became president , the failure of his administration to consider more recreate tive policy measures stem from the absence of a searching conversation about the relative dangers that cuba posed. Was castro really a dagger to the heart . Or was he more a thorn in the flesh as Senate Foreign relations chair bill full bright had suggested . That conversation never really took place. While kennedy did all the series of meetings large and small with those planning the bay of pigs and military officials they resolved largely around matters of tactics and operational dpee tails as opposed to the broader strategic implications of the operation or even the underlying assumptions that full bright had alluded to. So both pronouncement and policy, statements about the necessity of moving against castro as well as policy that was in trained to effect it made it more likely that kennedy would mount some aggressive operation to undermine the castro regime once he became president. The persistence of that policy and even the intensification of it after the bay of pigs would later contribute to the onset of the missile crisis itself. As i mentioned in the paper and as tim and others here at the conference have docked so well, it was hardly the only reason for the missile deployment and the crisis that it sparked. But by the fall of 1961, castro commandsing more and more attention from the Kennedy Administration which was devoting increasingly greater resources to under mining the cuban regime. And as those efforts of subversion and saba talking came to look both menacing to havana and most could i they helped push khrushchev to action which helped them deployment of Nuclear Missiles to the island. In the course of that deployment kennedys overt rhetoric as well as covert action would again complicate his presidency and again raise the stakes of not following through on his stated intentions. In effort to once more derive political benefit from a policy statement on cuba, kennedy declared in september 1962 two months before the midterm elections that the introduction of offensive weapon systems to the island would result in the gravest of circumstances. Fef effectively establishing a public red line for all to see. So both Administration Policy and pronouncements about it continued to heighten the drama surrounding cuba, which helped to shape khrushchev and then kennedy responses to vems on the island. But if kennedy failed to recognize or consider how these statements and activities might box himself into situations that created real risks for his presidency, as well as for the nation and the word, he nonetheless took positive steps to ensure that the way he managed National Security policy gave him at least a better shot at getting good advice and making wiser judgments. Those measures involved changes in personnel and process and both proved helpful. For one, the aides he trusted most, particularly his Brother Robert attorney general, would play lagger roles and bobby would serve as chief conduit for the president s private conversations with moscow. They were not all to the good but certainly helped to convey key bits of information at key moments of the crisis. Kennedy would also systemize policy making more effectively helping to improve the flow of information into the white house. And in effort to really scrub the options for addressing the soviet missile deployment, kennedy encouraged extended kfshss between military aides shielded from public view before settling on an approach that gave himself and his adversary time to reflect on the magnitude of what lay before them and to figure out how they might unity the knot of war. But perhaps paramount importance was the sheer judgment of the president himself. Who after initially lurching toward a military response, considered less than ideal chances for success, its potential impact on allies and add ver sarryes and zealotry of those around him particularly in the military who accepted it as only option. So if there is to be a heroic narrative within the cold war about leaders that took chances who face down the hawks calling for war, and who ultimately preferred that his kids be read rather than dead, kennedy should take at least one turn in that starring role which i would say he continued to eastern through subsequent efforts at arms control, and through his attempts to modulate the cold war, at least rhetorically through his American University address. So can elements of this heroic narrative spawn another one . How can this useful lessons for u. S. Russian relations . Here are a few thoughts. On the matter of rhetoric, as i mentioned in my written piece and this morning, red lines can be trouble. They were for kennedy who felt constrained by the Politics Associated with them. Perhaps President Trumps holy different posture towards russia means hes less likely to make them with regard to developments in hue crane or in the ball particulars. He certainly hasnt thrown down any such marker with regard to interference in domestic politics. Its ease year to see him doing so with regard to north korea or iran. And with syria he essentially acknowledged obama red line and acted upon it. But given his lack of rhetorical discipline, his disdain for convention and free willing use of new media, its probably more likely than that hell give ultimately, very differently than kennedy did. Playing for time and keeping the conversation going. These lessons from the missile crisis are particularly relevant for crisis situations. Though they are suggestive of the value of maintaining contact and cultivating contact more broadly. Jaw jaw is better than raw raw as church hill is alleged to have said. Natural condition of conflict, which preand postdates the cold war, i would hope that the virtues of democracy of enhancing ones capacity for empathy another quality that we stoesh yat with kennedy would commend themselves to leaders on both sides. Finally on the matter of combine the democracy with force. It certainly complicates the narrative. The heroic narrative, if you will, that we have heard for a while. To acknowledge that khrushchev had agreed to pack up the missiles before hearing that jfk was willing to make the missile trade tra khrushchev called for on the 12th day of the missile crisis. That shouldnt negate the value for khrushchev own purposes for allowing him to paper over having to reverse course. But it does suggest the prospect both prompted his initial offer to remove the missiles in return for a pledge, then forego public call for missile swap when it seemed that war really was eminent. This said, this kind of thing could easily resulted in Armed Conflict and nuclear Armed Conflict as well as mike dobbs has written. So while kennedy mobilization of force really does seem to have made his democracy more effective, well need to be more gran yoully in what form, and what context and what implications it should be similarly mobilized if its to play a role in a more come temporary scenario in which americans and russians finds themselves eye ball to eye ball. Thanks. [ applause ]ball to eye ball. Thanks. [ applause ]ball. Thanks. [ applause ] well, tims essay has a ee vn evocative title it called grab god by the beard. Thanks barbara and thanks mel for inviting me back. Its nice to be home. We heard a lot about the long did your ray. Im a short did your ray historian. In part because i drink a lot of expresso. [ laughter ] but in part im going to play on a word that my former colleague and friend, present colleague, which mark mentioned which was granular. What we have for the 60s is a granular understanding of this period, both because of the american side, the tapes, which i spent some time with here, and on the soviet side. So we have the capacity of understanding the International Politics and domestic politics of that period in a way that is not true of every period in International Politics. So well, as youve just benefited from that in listening to marc, im going to try to do the same on the soviet side. Now to lay the basis for this period, i want to mention or remind you have a few things. Because of the structure of this conference, we sort of jumped over korea. I believe that korean war is fundamental to understanding the militarization of the cold war. You want to talk about possibilities, you dont have the korean war and i think theres a change in the nature of the competition between the soviets and the United States. So perhaps in the q a we can talk about korea. Korea is extremely important. But there are two other things that are extraordinarily important that are happening in the world that are going to shape the environment that kennedy and khrushchev are seeking to manage. One is the decolonization of what i guess mou first called third world, the developing world. Thats a very important event and that is an independent variable from the u. S. soviet relationship but it opens up the possibility for the soviets and khrushchev to khrushchev sees it as a source of opportunity. The other is a soviet achievement and thats sputnik. That changes the nature of the strategic relationship between the United States and soviet union. As frank mentioned, once the American Homeland gets threatened, that raises questions about the extent to which extended deterrence is real. Real americans, as frank said, real americans actually put new york at risk for the sake of paris and that happens because of sputnik. So you have these two destabilizing events that happen, that are happening in the 50s and its that world that khrushchev and kennedy are seeking to manage. Now, khrushchevs approach to that world is not what americans anticipated. The sense that kennedy has coming into office is that there is so much Nuclear Danger about that wise statesmanship involves reducing the threat of nuclear war, but as we will as we see with khrushchev, khrushchev is all about disruption. Hes a disruptor. He is interested in crisis. And its why hes interested in crisis that i think is the essence of understanding his behavior not simply in 1961, but in 1962. So let me talk to you about a summit conference in 1961 that people dont talk about. The one that everybody talks about is vienna. Im working on a book about kennedy. I want to add the 5,300th book on kennedy, why not. And for me, the more interesting summit conference is the degaul kennedy conference because degaul and kennedy are very explicit about their understanding of the world. And they share a lot. Degaulles argument is, and its an argument that has a relevance today. His argument is when you deal with a disruptor, you should ignore them. He says let khrushchev hyper ventilate about berlin. Hes going to do nothing. He doesnt have the power to do anything and the only thing you can do is actually increase his desire to disrupt by engaging him. Engagement is a mistake with a disruptor. And kennedys argument is well, i cant take that chance. Hes already threatened us in 58 and if he does it again, it means hes seeking something or it means that there is something internal in the soviet system that is forcing him or the soviet empire, that is forcing him to do that and i have to take that seriously because he could Risk Nuclear War out of his, out of the urgency to change the status quo in Central Europe. And degaulle said no, i disagree with you completely. He said you know what, let the soviets sign a peace treaty with east germany. Doesnt matter. Its just a peace of paper between two communists. Kennedy says i dont agree with that at all. Because that would shift a sense of opportunity, burden and power to east berlin which might lead to even more risk taking in europe. Its that basic debate which you will see over and over again about Different Countries and different leaders. Do you leave them alone or do you engage. Is the engagement, the decision to engage, somehow threatening to your own standing, whether at home or abroad. Now, it turns out that degaulle was wrong and we really only knew how wrong degaulle was when we saw the soviet materials about 15