Speed was 137 knots. And the question was whether or not we had the lowest speed that the crew achieved. I will tell you that the speed was significantly below 137 knots and we are not talking about a few knots. We still have to corroborate some information. This was a preliminary read. The 137 knots came from the crew conversation about their approach speed. We need to take a closer look at the raw data on the Flight Data Recorder as well as corroborate that with radar and air traffic information to make sure that we have a very precise speed. Again, we are not talking about a few knots here or there. We are talking about a significant amount of speed below 137. If i could ask you to raise your hand to be acknowledged and
identify yourself and your outlet that would make this a lot easier. Yes, sir. [ inaudible ]. The question is, could we provide additional explanation about the Stick Shaker Activation and the go around. What i shared with you was prior to impact there was a stick sh
Last flight of HS 121 Trident 1 Papa India on 18 June 1972 – The Island island.lk - get the latest breaking news, showbiz & celebrity photos, sport news & rumours, viral videos and top stories from island.lk Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday newspapers.
suhartono who broke the story and we are joined by cnn aviation analyst peter goals. alan, tell us more about what you discovered. this is a very critical flight because all of the flight crew survived unlike what happened the next day, but they had an identical failure. shortly after takeoff all of these alarms start going off and they get what s called a stick shaker which indicates it s a very dire situation that an aerodynamic stall is occurring. they re going through checklists. they can t figure out what s going on and after a little bit of altitude the plane starts trying to dive on its own. very stunning sort of thing that was confusing. the gentleman in the jump seat is the one who suggested after a period of multiple dives to shut off the motor that was pushing the plane down, and ended up saving them. my goodness. peter, when you hear this
lot of opportunities and certainly should have a lot of incentive to make sure that that never happened again. but what we re learning now is that the repair, if you will, or the fix was continue to certify a page or two, make some changes in the manual, not many, and call for the pilots to have an hour or so of what we call desktop training or computer training. the pilots were not instructed, the airlines were not instructed to put their pilots through any simulator training where you d have hands on feeling of this stick shaker when this system went off that malfunctioned, the system as we ve talked about many times of pushing the nose down when the pilot at a time when the pilot s trying to pull the nose up. so that s going to be looked at as well. who made that decision, what was it based on? and one of the other things they ll be looking at are the risk factors. one thing that you never want to have in aviation because aviation is so safe because of redundancies, you know, ther