january of 1862 and met with the president and the cabinet, laid out his plan for the capture of the confederate capital here in richmond and the defeat of the confederate forces defending richmond. he told them that his plan would involve defeating the enemy s capacity to make war and he would do so through the use of maneuver as opposed to costly headlong assaults against confederate bastions. the seizure of what was known as strategic points by the napoleonic scholars of the day would enable him to grab the initiative and force the confederates to respond to his initiatives. and what he laid out then was a giant flanking attack. not a headlong assault from washington right down the telegraph road along the line of richmond, fredericksburg railroad to richmond. no. no, he would go down the chesapeake bay after touching base at fortress monroe in hampton which never, ever surrendered to the confederates, his plan was then to move up to the rappahannock and then move inland.
the field at williamsburg. they all had a lot to learn. as the union forces followed up on that success at williamsburg and followed joe johnston s forces retreating up the peninsula, they encountered one of the rainiest months of may on record. and they struggled with maps, u.s. army topographic service maps that bore little if any relation to reality. mcclellan received a note from colonel george stoneman whose cavalry found him at new kent courthouse on the 10th of may. solomon says, the map is wrong with regard that this road and every road! mcclellan then sent a telegram up to edwin stanton at the war department saying that he has absolutely no information in detail of the country to our front and we are trying to simply grope our way. please send ten topographical engineers to my headquarters right away. and my nominee as man of the year has been criticized for not moving faster up the peninsula. i want you to take just a second. take a look at this. he wasn t getting m
forces up the york river toward west point to seize an advanced logistical base and then he sent other forces out towards williamsburg on the 5th of may those forces collided with confederate rear guard, people like longstreet, hill. and all of the union army held the field at williamsburg at the end of the day as the sun was going down and mcclellan could send another dispatch to washington in which he says among all of my generals, hancock was superb. winfield scott hancock was superb. giving hancock, of course, that hancock was superb that would last the rest of the war, all the generals north and south came out of that experience understanding that leading a troop of cavalry in texas in 1858 was a lot different than commanding a division of 6,000 soldiers all of whom are looking to you for guidance, inspiration, and development on the field at williamsburg. they all had a lot to learn. as the union forces followed up on that success at williamsburg and followed joe johnst
just that. he attacks those federal forces that were in positions south of the river. assuming that those north of the river wouldn t be able to come to the assistance of that portion of the union army to the south. it was not a bad plan, but it was a complex plan and dealing with on-the-job training generals like pete longstreet who managed to get lost with a good segment of the attack force on the 31st of may, it really didn t go long for joe johnston, it took an even nastier turn when he got blown off his horse badly injured. nevertheless the less the 1st of june the confederates continue to make assault but by this time the union force has been reinforced, bull sumner, edwin bow sumner comes down the grapevine bridge north of the river and reinforces the federals to the south and you have a pitched battle at what we call seven pines. probably the biggest single effect of this fight was one a lot more confederate soldiers and union soldiers learned about the difficulty o