the field at williamsburg. they all had a lot to learn. as the union forces followed up on that success at williamsburg and followed joe johnston's forces retreating up the peninsula, they encountered one of the rainiest months of may on record. and they struggled with maps, u.s. army topographic service maps that bore little if any relation to reality. mcclellan received a note from colonel george stoneman whose cavalry found him at new kent courthouse on the 10th of may. solomon says, the map is wrong with regard that this road and every road! mcclellan then sent a telegram up to edwin stanton at the war department saying that he has absolutely no information in detail of the country to our front and we are trying to simply grope our way. please send ten topographical engineers to my headquarters right away. and my nominee as man of the year has been criticized for not moving faster up the peninsula. i want you to take just a second. take a look at this. he wasn't getting much help from the local population. union officers were already writing home about the confederate soldiers are not too much of a problem. the confederate women are hard. they're difficult to deal with. they threw stones at us as we marched through williamsburg. think about this. no adequate roads. poor maps. awful weather. how could he have moved much faster? and yet despite all these challenges, by the end of may, they're just outside richmond. you've all heard the anecdote about being so close when the wind is coming from the west they could hear the church bells chiming the time in richmond. not altogether certain that's right. but they were pretty close. richmond airport, seven pines along the richmond york river railroad, the station there, fair oaks station, that was in union hands. today we call it sandston. mechanicsville. the meadow bridges, they were all in union hands. by the end of may. and so joe johnston with his back to the wall so to speak said, look, i can't retreat any further. i'm at the last defensible terrain, i guess if i can't retreat, i'll just attack. so, on the 31st of may, he does just that. he attacks those federal forces that were in positions south of the river. assuming that those north of the river wouldn't be able to come to the assistance of that portion of the union army to the south. it was not a bad plan, but it was a complex plan and dealing with on-the-job training generals like pete longstreet who managed to get lost with a good segment of the attack force on the 31st of may, it really didn't go long for joe johnston, it took an even nastier turn when he got blown off his horse by union fire and badly winded. nevertheless the less the 1st of june the confederates continue to make assault but by this time the union force has been reinforced, bull sumner, edwin "bow" sumner comes down the grapevine bridge north of the river and reinforces the federals to the south and you have a pitched battle at what we call seven pines. probably the biggest single effect of this fight was one a lot more confederate soldiers and union soldiers learned about the difficulty of fighting in virginia. it didn't look anything like the paintings they had seen of the area. no. it's messy in virginia. and they learned how difficult it could be. and second and most important, robert edward lee was appointed as commander of the confederate forces defending richmond, and it would be this general lee that would make some critical decisions. first he's going to improve the enforcement -- the entrenchments around richmond. second he's going to bring stonewall jackson's very effective but still rather small force from the shenandoah valley to reinforce the defenses of richmond, that he would send his young cavalry chief jeb stewart on a reconnaissance that two inform him as to the extent and location of the mcclellan's union forces and having done all that he initiated the series of pounding, direct, and very, very bloody assaults aimed at pushing the union forces away. on the 26th of june, beaver dam creek near mechanicsville, 27th of june gaines million. 29th of june, savages station. 30th of june, glendale. and finally, on the 1st of july, the terrible battle at malverne hill. in the course of one week the battle of the seven days, robert e. lee would lose 20,000 casualties. a fourth of his army. in doing so, he was somewhat disappointed that he didn't get the resounding victory that he'd planned for. he wrote his wife our success has not been as great or as complete as i could have desired, and in his official report to the confederate war department he stated under ordinary circumstances the federal army should have been destroyed. this is a word you see in lee's communications throughout the war, destroyed. oddly enough, it's that word that so frequently emanated from abraham lincoln, i want the rebel army destroyed. not discouraged. destroyed! but the army of the potomac was not destroyed. in fact, it continued to be quite a potent force. and although they had suffered themselves nearly as many casualties as the confederates, 15,000, a distinguished historian that we just heard from in his marvelous book entitled "battle cry freedom" said that although mcclellan's men had fought with admirable courage during this week of battles, mcclellan was a whipped man mentally. following the extremely bloody battle at glendale on the 30th which confederate staff officer alexander said this was our alexander said this was our best opportunity to destroy the army. but as bob crick reminded us, it was not really a good dayall day for stonewall jackson who had a part to play and decided not to. the union general, mcclellan, after glendale, sent this message to the war department. notice the tone. i shall do my best to save the army. but we know that well before the battles of glendale and malverne hill, george mcclellan's conception of how victory could be won was badly shaken. this ld historian once again provides his insights into the character of this general who was actually just too closely wedded to his preconceived notions of how war should be fought. in a chapter with a marvelous title "billy yanks chickahogany blues" the historian writes, the failure of mcclellan's peninsula campaign was not alone a military failure. it represented also the downfall of the limited war for limited ends that mcclellan favored. from now on the north would fight not to preserve the old union but to destroy it and build a new one on its ashes. a concept so dear to men like mcclellan when eventually reconciliation some sort of gentleman's agreement was being washed away by increasing tides of blood, tens of thousands of casualties and millions of broken hearts. and, of course, it was some of mcclellan's old comrades from the old army who had presented mack and abraham lincoln with so many problems during those battles and oft repeated anecdote had lincoln speaking with the tired now general winfield scott during a visit to the military academy at west point in the late spring of 1862. and lincoln is said to have asked this question -- general scott, why is it that you were once able to take the city of mexico in three months with just 5,000 men and we've been unable to take richmond with 100,000 men? i will tell you, relied general scott. the men who took us into mexico city are the same men who are keeping us out of richmond. as mcclellan withdrew down the james and occupied berkeley and the westover plantations, he was prepared to reinitiate offensive operations. as you know, this would not happen. mcclellan was ordered to move his army to northern virginia in the next month. now, i can see that by the clock on my wall and the watch on my wrist i'm dangerously close to using up more than my time. how much time do i have, john? five minutes max. so, let me hustle, hurry through the remainder of my points. mcclellan at this point had established himself as the architect of a grand army. but he would exceed this in the next month after the army of virginia under john pope was destroyed at second manassas and retreated pell-mell toward washington. once again the president had to rely on the one general he knew who could build an army from scratch and so he did. he called mcclellan back. he reorganized the army of the potomac. and he moved subsequent to the battle of second manassas into maryland where lee had taken his army in northern virginia. on the 13th of september, 1862, he came across a marvelous he came across a marvelous coup special order 1891 outlining how lee was conducting his campaign. mcclellan has sent this message down to washington, lee has made a gross mistake. i have his plans. i'm going to defeat him. i'll send you trophies. and then came in rapid succession the battle for the south mountain on the 14th of december where mcclellan's battle went into battle cheering, less than two weeks after they'd been defeated at second manassas. they seized passes over the south mountain and fought lee on the bloodiest civil day in the civil war, along antiem creek. he should have soundly defeated lee's army. part of his army wasn't even employed. that would be fitzjohn porter's fifth corps. but later on the 17th as they held a little council of war many of the generals said let's go after lee again. remember, general, my corps represents the last reserve of the last army between lee's great force and our nation's capital. and that's really all it took. there was no more attack. soon after the battle was concluded at sharpsburg, lincoln gave up trying to urge mcclellan to destroy lee's army rapidly. he came up there. had this meeting that was captured by the famous photograph, yes, yes, i understand we'll move into virginia as soon as i get my horses shod properly and my men back in proper uniform. they followed the virginians south to the potomac in late october and, in fact, when positioned to undertake a vigorous campaign in the spring of 1863. that was enough for lincoln. on the 7th of november, he relieved mcclellan of command. and on the 11th of november, mcclellan's train pulled out. his duty with the u.s. army was over. so, why am i recommending him as a person of the year? huh? well, because this general built the army of the potomac, not once, but twice. this general infused it with a spirit that would carry it through three successive commanders. this is the army that took the most casualties, this is the army that took lee's surrender. and i believe as their first great commander, mcclellan helped that to happen in that first year of 1862. so, if we could find a copy of a "time" magazine -- for 1863, i think you'd see george mcclellan as our person of the year. thank you very much. [ applause ] [ applause ] i think we have time according to wade for one quick question. susan? >> isn't it true that after the war ended when someone asked general lee who his favorite general was on the union side that he said mcclellan? >> i'm not so certain that it was his favorite general. i think at one point a lot of confederates thought he was the most dangerous. the most dangerous of the federal generals because he had a more fulsome understanding of the art of war as had been explained by prince chamonix of the napoleonic school. general lee later said after three or four changes in the commander of the army of the potomac, i fear that they will eventually appoint someone in command that i don't under. command that i don't understand. thank you so much. >> okay, gang, it's quarter of three. let's take 15 minutes and let's be in your seats ready to go at 3:00. on american history tv all day live coverage from the library of virginia of a discussion on the person of the year 1862. five historians presenting their case and nominating individuals for person of the year 1862. we have heard from four of the historians so far and here are the nominations, robert crick nominated, thomas stonewall jackson. robert crick was the former head of fredericksburg battlefield. we heard from david blithe who dominated frederick douglass. james mcpherson nominated admiral david farragut and you heard the nomination of george b. mcclellan. we're going to open up our phone lines for your thoughts and your comments and questions about the day and hear your comments for john mountcastle as well. a couple of ways you can participate by phone, the numbers are 202-3885. and also for the mountain and pacific it's 585-3886. we wanted to remind you in case you missed today's procedure at the library of virginia, we will reair all of this in its entirety including the phone segments this evening at 6:00 p.m. eastern and 1:00 a.m. eastern on sunday morning. that's ahead of us. also this afternoon if you don't get through on the phones if you want to make a comment at twitter.com you can do that and the handle we're using for twitter is totw1862. and also on facebook, facebook.com/cspan. before we speak to john mountcastle. a tweet from tammy price. she says her choice for person of the year 1862 would be frederick douglass although i think lincoln would be better for this year than for last year. you may recall we covered this event last year and abraham lincoln was choice for person of the year 1861. john mountcastle joins us from the library of virginia. mr. mountcastle, a pretty compelling case for general george b. mcclellan in 1862, and we have a lot of phone callers waiting to hear from you, let's go first to norman in east lansing, michigan, good afternoon. >> caller: good afternoon. dr. mountcastle, do you think if lincoln would have just let mcclellan stick to his plan and not interfere like a good leader should, that mcclellan's strategy would have actually won the war? and also why do you think mcclellan gets such a bad rap amongst your fellow historians? >> norman, that's two key questions, i think. first, the president was under tremendous pressure not strictly in a strategic sense but most assuredly in a political sense being battered on several sides, there had been success as we heard earlier, along mississippi, they captured new orleans and certainly in the upper reaches of the cumberland tennessee river by forces led by men like ulysses grant, shiloh was a union victory even before the peninsula campaign started. so it was not just an issue of letting mcclellan do what the general does best, ie, conduct campaign strategy, but in truth trying to reassure the public in general, the congress in particular, and to an extent those people who controlled the information flow to the public. in those days the newspaper editors around the united states that there was a viable plan and that this was going to result in victory in a short period of time. another thing to remember that in 1862 the united states had not initiated conscription as yet. there was no draft. all the soldiers in blue were volunteers. and we know from our u.s. history that volunteerism will carry an army into a war but not necessarily carry it throughout a war. and so the pressure to bring it to a swift conclusion was there always. as to regards your second question, why does mcclellan not rate any higher among historians. well, i think we have certainly the benefit of hindsight as to compare it with who. if that question were asked by some means of magic we were writing history in 1863 compared to irvin mcdowell who lost the first battle of bull run, mcclellan was a great success. that's why he was elevated to the position. compared to generals who were politically appointed, those that were defeated left and right in the shenandoah valley, people like nathaniel banks, defeated by -- and fremont defeated by stonewall jackson, mcclellan was a profession. but later when compared to people like ulysses s. grant, sherman who split the confederacy in two, mcclellan does not compare as favorably as those men, who took their west point training and their prewar experiences and brought forth a winning combination. although -- >> our guest is john mountcastle, go ahead, finish your thought. i'm sorry. >> i would say that the spirit that he engendered in the fighting soldiers within the army of the potomac while not 100% in favor of mcclellan was so strong that they never truly forgot him. and in that regard he was regarded by many of his contemporaries than better in history. >> john mountcastle teaches civil war history and a former chief of the military history. here's katherine, next up. >> caller: i'm from cleveland, ohio, and i'm 11 years old, i think general mcclellan was disrespectful -- >> katherine, it's a little difficult to hear you. if you're on a speakerphone can you pick up it's tough for us to hear. >> caller: i heard that george b. mcclellan was very disrespectful to abraham lincoln. he told his wife the president was an idiot and that he was no more than a well-meaning baboon. is this true? >> george mcclellan had, you know, prewar experience with abe lincoln when mcclellan was vice president of illinois central railroad and abe lincoln was a lawyer working on cases for the railroad. and they actually spent time together traveling to different points along the railroad working on court cases to get rights-of-way and so forth. and he managed to get along fine with lincoln during that period and he enjoyed abe lincoln's propensity to entertain people around a fire in a little tavern or a hostel around the way with anecdotes based on his experience as a backwoods lawyer. but when lincoln was elevated to president and mcclellan became his subordinate, then the essential, social impediments if you will that mcclellan took with him from his upper middle-class background began to show. and he began to regard lincoln as an interloper. we would not i think in our u.s. history see this again in such a striking degree until general george douglas macarthur in the korean war lost faith in harry truman, whose senior rank in the u.s. army had been captain of artillery in world war i as macarthur had been before world war ii the chief of staff and then subsequently the commander of all army forces in the pacific and again in korea. when the generals forget that in our country the constitution requires that we support the constitution but we also follow the orders of our civilian heads, they are -- they're going to eventually come to ruin and that's what happened to george mcclellan. >> about five more minutes before the program resumes there at the library of virginia. a couple more callers for john mountcastle. here's kevin in los angeles, welcome. >> caller: hello, general. i want to ask one question. you mentioned that he was the -- an observer in the crimean war. how much of an impact observing the crimean war have on him? what did he see? what did he experience? >> thanks, kevin, that's a great question. because it wasn't that easy for the americans to get into the area of operations. the french and british were not especially enthused over the idea of a bunch of american army officers coming into the midst of an operation that was not going particularly well, and so they had to fight to get first to the battle area, and then second to get the kind of information that they felt would be useful to the united states army. an army that, remember, at the start of the civil war only amounted to 18,000 people in total, and of that, maybe 1,500 officers and the rest enlisted soldiers spread from coast to coast in little garrisons and places like fort sumter and fort monroe, and the city of san francisco and so forth.