Facing opprobrium after the 2021 coup, the junta in Naypyitaw has deepened its relationship with the Kremlin to relieve international pressure. Powers wishing to see Myanmar return to democracy should not try to break these ties but rather redouble their targeted sanctions and embargo efforts.
Facing opprobrium after the 2021 coup, the junta in Naypyitaw has deepened its relationship with the Kremlin to relieve international pressure. Powers wishing to see Myanmar return to democracy should not try to break these ties but rather redouble their targeted sanctions and embargo efforts.
The numerous ethnic armed groups fighting Myanmar’s regime have taken different tacks after the 2021 coup. Some are aiding the parallel government; others are not. With civil strife set to continue for some time, donors should concentrate on mitigating war’s effects on the population.
What’s new? Following vote cancellations in conflict-affected areas of Rakhine state during the 8 November general election, Japan has helped broker an informal ceasefire between Myanmar’s military and the Arakan Army in order to hold supplementary elections. Both sides say they are in favour, but the civilian government is reluctant.
Why does it matter? The initiative has halted almost two years of intense fighting and enabled dialogue to resume for the first time since December 2019. Negotiations over elections could be a stepping stone to a formal ceasefire, but the process remains fragile, particularly without civilian government buy-in.
What should be done? The Arakan Army should release three National League for Democracy candidates it has detained. The civilian government should support elections and – if the Arakan Army lets the captives go – drop its designation as a terrorist organisation. The Tatmadaw should stop insisting that the Arakan Army leave Rakh