back this morning. we now have university virginia miller center presidential recordings program chair mark silverstone thank you for joining us on the 60th anniversary of the cuban missile crisis to be here to you. so let's start today about, you know, october 16th, 1962 is when president john f kennedy was shown the photographs taken by u-2 plane over what exactly did these pictures show? they revealed the existence of soviet ballistic missiles that were capable of carrying nuclear warheads. and that was a really thing, especially since president kennedy twice the previous month said that if soviets had decided to place offensive weapons systems in cuba, the gravest issues would arise. so kennedy had essentially laid down his red line twice. once on september 4th, because there was chatter in washington. the soviets were bringing missiles into, cuba, and there were pictures that they were those missiles happened to be surface to air missiles. but what was dangerous were the ballistic missiles that could land on the united states. and there were two kinds that the soviets trying to bring in medium range ballistic missiles with, a radius of about 1100 miles or so, and intermedia range ballistic missiles, which would have covered almost the entire united states. and so when kennedy was shown pictures of these likely installations that were going up on the 16th of october, 1962, that was gravely concerning. and so he decided to gather together the senior officials in his defense state intelligence as well as others who he was particularly close to try to figure out what do about it. and fortunately, kennedy, he was able to keep this under wraps for roughly a week. so it was a tuesday when he found out kennedy would not go public with this until the following. when he delivered this televised address to the american people, laying out what the soviets had done, what he proposed to do about it, which was to impose a blockade of cuba in an effort to to get those missiles crated and then moved of off of of. that's a that's a tough ask. and so for the next several days, from the 22nd, all the way up to the end of the crisis on october 28th, there was a lot of diplomatic wrangling, threats, bargaining, back channel diplomacy to try to figure out how to get the weapons off and, what to give khrushchev essential in return as a diplomatic bargain. so it's a couple of things. first of all, we're showing a map. this is on atomic archive dot com to show that range mentioned and so it does show that just a 1200 mile range from cuba could it's almost like looks like a half or so of the united and then again that 2500 mile range missile gets everything but perhaps you northern california in you know the upper pacific northwest and. so i just wanted to make sure people could what that range like but let's back a second the state of the cold war because all this is happening the cold war. can you just kind of contextualize this crisis within the cold war? sure. and within kennedy's as well, which is significant. so the cold war been raging. there are debates that continue to go on about when the cold war began. but certainly since the 1940s, there was this contest ideological well as geographical between two systems, the capitalist open system largely and a much more close to authoritarian totalitarian system led by the soviet union. and over the course of the late 1940s and into the 1950s, both sides emerged as armed camps, particularly in western, where you had the north treaty organization. nato's represent most of the western democracies, and then the warsaw pact, headed by the soviet union along with its satellites in eastern europe, facing off against the cold war had, expanded throughout the 1950s around the world particularly asia. and when china became communist in 1949, that was seen as grave blow to the west that same year when the soviet union detonated its first atomic device that also a grave blow because the west no longer had a monopoly on atomic weapons. and during the course of the 1950s, both sides set out to try to their power territory territorially as well as as militarily. by the late 1950s, there was a real concern about missiles and is particularly true after launch of sputnik in october 1957, which that the soviets had this ballistic capability, a a missile could circle the globe, could land on the united states and the us didn't have that. and so beginning in october 1957, although it started befo that, there was a real push on to try to enhance the west's nato's capabilities to counter that soviet offensive threat. and so deals are struck with a variety of european countries, particularly turkey and then italy, subsequent to place intermediate range ballistic missiles on the rim of the soviet union. so what we start to see are these two armed camps with missiles facing off against each other throughout the latter part of the fifties. and that's what kennedy is confronted with once he becomes president in 61. so that's kind of militarily what's going on, but specifically in the caribbean, fidel had deposed fulgencio batista, who had been the dictator in cuba in early 1959. and the next several months had made increasing ugly charge statements indicating. his displeasure with the united states, although there were some possibility that there might be a rapprochement at the eisenhower administration, became very concerned about what it saw a leftist turn the cuban revolution and during the part of the year and then into 1960 the eisenhower administration prepared plans to overthrow castro. those don't get implemented during the eisenhower administration. so they fall on kennedy's desk when he becomes president in january of 1961. and it's one of the first things that kennedy has to has to deal with what to do about these plans, should he implement this program, if he does, should be implemented just as eisenhower proposed it, should he change it? and over the course of the next months, kennedy decides to change a little bit, which are affected its prospects a little. but the upshot is that there was an effort to try to depose in april of 1961 that we usually refer to as the bay of pigs debacle. really? right. because he sent a bunch of exile cubans. yeah. to go to cuba to try to overthrow. exactly. overthrow. exactly. it was a plan that was essentially run by the cia, not by the defense department. it was a brilliant as people have referred to it, a zillion things went wrong. and we could we could get into that. but one of the the implication of that that failed failed coup is kennedy got a real black eye he took responsibility for it saying that he was the the chief executive of us government and it was his responsibility. but he was very upset. the variety of facets of his of his government, whh also implications for the way he would handle national security affairs going further. but it set the stage for continuing u.s. displeasure with castro for the next several years. and by the end of 1961, there a full blown sabotage. beyond sabotage, a plan ultimately to to destabilize and to assassinate fidel castro, to overthrow that government. castro knew about it. the soviets knew about it. and arguably, one of the reasons why those soviet ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads went into cuba was to try to protect the cuban, because there was a real concern throughout late 61 into 62 that if the united states wasn't going to try it again and it might at least others who would try it again. so that's one of the reasons why we think they kind of bonded together. russia and cuba. it russia and cuba. yes. so let ask you, the group of advisors became a big part this cuban missile crisis. right. can you talk about the group? what's its name was on it? sure. so it's referred to as xcom, the executive committee of the national security council, which was kind of a rump organization of the national security council, the most national security officials in the us government. so you have secretary of defense robert mcnamara, secretary of state dean rusk of central intelligence, john mccone and you have deputies for several of them as well so you have george ball who's the number two at the state department? you have roswell kilpatrick. who's the number at the defense department. you have others kind of coming in and out. the attorney general, robert f kennedy, was a member of that. and then kennedy brought in the president john f kennedy brought in others were particularly important to him because they either expertise in soviet affairs or they were particularly sensitive to the president's mind and could help him explore his desires. so by i mean ted sorensen, who his counselor speechwriter had been with kennedy longer than anybody in the upper reaches of government had worked with kennedy. when kennedy became, a senator in in 52, 53. but you also have llewellyn thompson, who was the previous u.s. ambassador to the soviet, who is now considered an ambassador at large. but he was the guy who kennedy turn to again and again as. well, as another figure, charles boland chip boland, also a previous to the soviet union, to try to figure out what khrushchev was up to, why the devil would do this. and one of the features of the secret, this secret portion of the missile crisis. right. we often referred to it as the 13 days of the crisis. well, about six or seven of those days were were days that only the united states knew about the public. cuban missile crisis lasts from the 22nd of october to the 28th. so about a week public, about a week. right. and kennedy again and again is trying to. why devil would he do this? i mean, it's almost a an exact quote and kennedy fixes. one or a couple of reasons but primarily for him it's about berlin that khrushchev is trying to put these missiles into cuba to leverage the united to sign a peace that would turn the sovereignty of berlin in and in west berlin. you still had the three occupying western powers left over from world two to get them out of there. and it had been a thorn khrushchev's side as well as a side of the east germans that rectified to an extent with the creation of the building of the berlin wall. and in august of 1961. but was still unsatisfactory. khrushchev there were still all kinds hassles that that were going on visa issues, transit between the various sides. and khrushchev said, and again, particularly in 1962, starting in the summer 62, we're going to settle this by november. so by hook or crook as yeah, this is going to this is to go to east germany and once once he sees that the missiles are in cuba and reflects all of the signals that he's getting khrushchev and berlin, he ps two and two together and says that's what it is he's changing the nuclear balance so that he can put the united states in a box and resolve east germany and throughout the rest of the show. we're going to be listening to recordings that the listener from the cuban missile in real time. but we will also be opening up the phone lines. i want to go ahead and give you the numbers so you can start dialing in with your thoughts about the cuban crisis or your questions for mark silverstone. the numbers, again, if you're on the eastern or central time, 202748 8000, if you're in mountain pacific time zones 202748 8000, one. and if you lived through it, if you remember the cuban missile crisis. want you to call 202748 8002. so we talked about that xcom the group of advisors and i want to play some tape taking you in to the white house to hear of the deliberations in october. october 1962. but president kennedy and those advisors and again, these audio tapes are compiled by university of virginia's miller center. for the black male threat. not only over the operational or the fact that i had mentioned that our video in the firsthi is a comment on urban warfare or some that we have call about to over the earth a very very stng statement of what weapons are expressed by a political for freedom for for a lot of our prior approval for or very long career for u.s. troops or for. which they don't really. so that was the air force general, curtis lemay. and he said, you're in a pretty bad. so you know what role did general lemay play in the crisis and what was kennedy kennedy's relationship with the joint chiefs of staff. so right. lemay was the force chief of staff. and the clip that we all just heard comes from essentially the third day of the crisis, october 19, 1962, after kennedy as really kind of moved toward position of imposing blockade, it was largely a consensus position by then, although there would still be some wrangling for the next couple of days. but lemay and joint chiefs including the chairman of the joint chiefs maxwell taylor, were set against it. they thought as as we heard in the clip that that this is pretty weak response at another point in that conversation, lemay actually says that this is as bad as the appeasement at munich. and those are fighting words for jfk, whose father, joseph kennedy was the us ambassador to court of saint james during the 1930s. and and hitler's provocations and then assault in late 1930, 1940. and appeasement. and joe kennedy kind of got mixed together in popular conversation and. it's it is indicative of relationship that the challenging relationship i would say that kennedy had with the chiefs and the by by and large military relations were not at their best throughout the course of 1961, particularly of the bay of pigs. and what happened there, many thinking that kennedy should have essentially gone in and those cuban fighters who were valiantly trying to castro and claim country back and kennedy changed the way they would go. he wanted to downplay u.s. responsibility for certainly any any indication that the united was supporting these refugees, even though the the evidence to that effect was was numerous and was flowing freely in the papers beforehand. so they were dumbfounded, really, that wouldn't do anything about it. and he took a real hit with the joint chiefs, not publicly. publicly, his approval ratings went through the roof. they above 80%. but again, again, the chiefs thought that kennedy when push came to shove, would not act to defeat u.s. net national interests and was not only with cuba, it was with laos was the other major nationalist crisis kennedy faced in his presidency. when the chiefs, as well as outgoing president dwight eisenhower, were recommending that if things look really bad and it looked like the communists really were going to take over in laos, then the united states should act. unilag morally, militarily to forestall that which eisenhower also had that military background that made him a little bit more. he was with the joint chiefs in wanting be a more aggressive. absolutely kennedy had a military background to a lieutenant junior grade in the in the south pacific in world war two. he understood what combat was all about and because his position he also had questions about the wisdom the brass above him so he had kind the junior officers skepticism some about those in charge and th h some skeptics about this whippersnapper young president and that lasted throughout the course of 1961 throughout a variety of additional concerns the the berlin wall being one of them. so by the time that we get to 1962 they have had several experiences which to them have kind of muddied the waters they're not particularly comfortable with each other kennedy does not what he has seen in terms of plans for essentially a nuclear conflagration. if the soviets try to take berlin what as a result, what happens if there's a major escalation and single integrated operational plan from 1962 that essentially let everything go? i mean, fire all. and not only that, the soviets, but at the chinese as well. and kennedy was just beside himself. we call ourselves the human race after after hearing these plans. so he had some real questions. the military and the joint chiefs themselves. so we're going to get some more recordings. but i want to take a some calls now. we have in baton rouge, louisiana. john, what do you remember about the cuban missile crisis? yes. thank you for taking my call. appreciate it. and i want educate all the people that don't know in that era what happened. i do. i remember vaguely the missile crisis, kenneth. cuba was the united states. we used to go there and gamble like, you know, cuba was our country until castro power. all right. let castro took power. all hell broke loose and kennedy and castro got into and that's all it took. and then the russian like the united states, he took it back, you know, situation came to cuba, went against kennedy and brought all these missiles and all these things. annow it's the same things that happened in ukraine. we had bold man called castro there with slogan in those states raul when the united states same thing is happening in the ukraine right n russia russia is supposed to be united staty but think about what's going on. the united states, you know, remember i do. i was there. we have chaos, danger, nuclear war. take it from there. now it's you can make your own decisions. you can understand. we are and we are ukraine. all our troops there, we're going to bring nuclear missiles there. what do you think? russia, right. russia's wrong. united states are right. it's wrong. it's the look. what's going on. now. you can say russia is not going to think we have nuclear weapons in ukraine. so take from there and states sylvester's. mr. stallone was a very intelligent, intelligent man. he knew everything about and what he said was all true, 100%. all right. let's our guests respond to that comment. well, certainly there's a concern about ukraine and as many commentators have observed, this may be one of the more dangerous moments, world history since in october 1962, an and i would i would just say that in october of 62, for a variety of reasons, kennedy and khrushchev were able to find way to a resolution largely because of some of the signaling that they were doing to other the ability to have back converse stations, to try better understand bottom lines, opportunities for for concluding the crisis peefully. but it was a nr run thing there were seven moments where things could have gone very differently and i would say that today a little is a little different. i want we actually received a text message in the text message simply says secretary i think they prime minister khrushchev was much, much better. man than putin and you know the we've heard from a lot of callers today that say just khrushchev and his relationship with united states was much different than putin his relationship with the united. can you explain what that difference is? well i'm not a putin expert or even necessarily a christian expert, but there are histories different. and khrushchev lived through the horrors of the 1930s, the 1943 world war two. he what that what war meant when it came to this. the soviet union. and i think he was a little bit chastened, probably more than a little chastened as a result. khrushchev and putin grew up in in very eras. but i would say that at the challenges that that kennedy and khrushchev were facing at that time as the leaders of their respective countries were enormous, yet they both worked their way toward some kind of an accommodation, understanding that there was some flexibility that had in their positions. this was not the time that that that cuba had been a flashpoint in in the kennedy administration. i think in some. the current crisis is more intractable. i think the positions have have hardened a little bit. and it it may be tougher to come to a conclusion particularly because there's a shooting war going on that just wasn't the case. yes, of course. major rudolf anderson died on october 27. is his u-2 plane was shot down. some other american fliers had been killed as well by during the crisis. but but the great conflagration in between the united states and the soviet union did not happen in the challenge was to make sure that it wouldn't happen. let's take caller. this is mick in courtley in ohio. what is your comment or question? mick? yes. good morning, folks, for taking my call. i just tuned in so forgive if i missed the stream of consciousness here. i think one thing there's so much to unpack, but i think we're on the threshold of disaster here much than in october 62. it's not being reported by the mainstream media, of course. a lot of bellicose propaganda against russia, all pro ukraine. and there's a back story. a lot more to it going back to the crimea situation and also our overthrow of democratically elected of ukraine. we've been with the neo cons in the neo libs the same cheerleaders or chicken hawks who got us into iraq and several other middle eastern countries illegally and immorally. they're behind this also. people like victoria nuland, jake sullivan, they're all proteges of the neo cons. caller caller where are you getting your information about, you know, the root causes of the russia conflict? well, some veterans, retired military, cia analysts on youtube and substack, because i don't feel the mainstream media is giving us the truth. did you have anything you want to add to that? i would just say that in 1962, the media landscape was very different and, that it was possible what was developing in cuba to to develop without a lot of eyeballs placed on it. so the kennedy is able to deliberate essentially in secret for six days or so about what to do. it discovered that the soviets were placing medium range missiles in cuba intended to place intermediate range missiles in cuba. when you showed the map before 2400 miles and so in an extraordinary turn of events they have time to work through a solution without the prying eyes, the world and even large parts of the us government. and that's not the case. there is a lot more transparency today through the kind of media that that all know. and so things moved a little bit more slowly. in 1962, there a little bit more opportunity for and of course the shooting war hadn't hadn't started and. i think that's in the end what really the world from something that could have been absolutely horrific and and that was the challenge to prevent the missiles from to begin with because knew when it would stop. you don't want to try to find that out and so the challenge for kennedy and khrushchev was to kind of bargain their way towards some type of of resolution with each side giving in a little bit. and that's ultimately how the crisis got resolved. and i want to we're going to listen to some more those recordings talk about the miller center's presidential recording project. what it and how do you even have these tapes. yeah. well we, we all have them. i mean, they're they're they're tapes that were made. and it's not just by the kennedy administration. administration is going back to franklin roosevelt also these tapes roosevelt, truman, eisenhower, kennedy, johnson and richard nixon. those are the six presidencies that for which we have these these secret tapes, tapes that were made surreptitiously, that that only a handful of people knew about the president, one or two advisers, and then technical experts at. the at the white house and we that they were made largely on the instruction of the presidents themselves and would be useful later on in helping them then write their their memoirs. certainly. but there's also some indication that times they were used in real time in conversation. other officials, you would hear lyndon johnson, perhaps reading part of a transcript from from a that that had been made on on his orders. so the miller center has been doing this work on these presidential recordings since 1998. it's an extraordinary and we publish these through the university of virginia press and we are moving through them methodically and the kennedy tapes were the first ones that we had transcribed back in the latter part of the 20th century. and we continue to transcribe them into the 21st. and so they provide this really extraordinary window onto what happens in the white house at the very highest councils of power. what was the president thinking? who he talking to? what kind of advice he getting? was he getting warned not to do something? was he encouraged, do certain things? what did he say? and, you know, invariably there's a question. didn't he realize, that that, you know, he had pushed the button so that he knew what he was saying was being taped. and there's an element of that. and certainly, i would say early on in some of the conversations, and particularly for kennedy, who had actually physically activate a switch to turn the machine on a machine that captures. 248 hours of his conversation with aides and that's a lot of time but as we've come to realize and a small part of this as i said before, we've been doing this since 1998. it's to hear kennedy and his advisors grapple their way toward the conclusion, if it's even possible, these crises in real time with nobody else in the room, knowing that they were being taped and we believe at times kind of forgetting that he was grabbing all this stuff on tape. it's a it's an image seizing window into decision at the highest levels. so on that note, we're going to listen to another now. i do for those are audio only we are showing if you can find video either in real time on on our website our app or you can go back later. these are, you know, recordings from 1962. they aren't the clearest audio, but they're the best we can do. but on the video. you also can see the and read the transcript. so let's go now this recording is from october 22nd, 1962. it's consulting with former dwight eisenhower. and the tape starts with ike. that's president eisenhower. ike asking what time will make a tv later that night. there's something to be said. 7:00. then we're going to go to the un with a that opposition will be e withdrawal with these that there to assist adlai so that get somebody who's had some experience that's very good yea well i thank have told me and i will i have first of i think king the argument yeah this it's tough to i say we will i don't know we may get into the invasion business before the days are out but of course military we got to clean up things do now. that's right. because i you you've made up your md got to visit right. the only real way to get rid of it, of course, is ousting by having to be concerned with the world. and berlin wondering why you've got these little, little whe. berlin is the i suppose that's it may be the what they going to try to trade off might but i, i personally i just don't quite go along with that thinking i idea that got them from here to do what they want but they figured it is good for them. and i don't believe they relate one situation with another. neral what about if the soviet union that khrushchev announces tomorrow, which i thk you will, that if we attack cuba it's going to be nuclear war and what's your judgment as to the chances they'll fire these things off if we invade cuba? oh, i don't believe that. you know, they will have a word. you would take that risk if the situation comes out of a matter of fact, no. can you do you if this thing is such a serious thing, you're on our right that we're going to be and we know what's good thing now. all right. we got to do something i don't think may make these people will shoot them all. i just don't believe wrong at all right what this i wanto keep my own people very alert yeah. so hang on tight until our general right that. so that sounded like a phone call eisenhower and kennedy it highlighted what you talked about earlier was eisenhower was among military officials really to push kennedy to be aggressive towards cuba. yeah, i would say that that eisenhower certainly support kennedy's diplomacy here in this regard i think what is particularly striking for me is the difference between eisenhower and kennedy in their thinking about why these missiles are there in the first place and kennedy this is really about berlin. this is another play to try to put pressure on the western powers at time when khrushchev, nikita khrushchev, the soviet premier was working with the east germans to try to essentially consolidate berlin as part of of east germany and eject the western powers western, powers that had been there by right since the end of world war two. and kennedy coming back to berlin again and again and again for eisenhower. that just wasn't it at all. it's the soviets, as we heard him say. it will probe wherever the opportunity arises. and so throughout these these conversations, we really hear kennedy thinking about cuba, berlin together and it's it's this this crisis that he fears khrushchev is is maintaining that he is going to sign a separate and turn it all over to to the east germans. and that's just a real for the western powers. and i want to ask you what you know quickly. what was the relationship kennedy and eisenhower? did they were they birds? was it just. yeah, i wouldn't say that were. but they had a a long standing maybe not so long standing, but certainly for the previous few years, a healthy contempt maybe too strong. but they were wary of each other. i mean, eisenhower really didn't think a whole lot initially. that young whippersnapper and kennedy thought eisenhower was was pretty crusty and set in his ways and they they did not get all that well, although particularly after kennedy first met eisenhower during the transition period, he came away more impressed with with ike and his command of the global situation. but they had their challenges. they were from different political parties and that in and of itself created some tension between the two. eisenhower is out. the outgoing president. he had served his two terms. so he couldn't come back again. but he was clearly the most important in the republican party. and so he was a force to be to contend with and here is john f kennedy, who was this junior great officer in, world war two. eisenhower was the five star general. you know, planning operation overlord and the invasion of d-day. it's quite a disparity in rank, certainly at that time and in stature and and there are several eisenhower or kennedy conversations and they come through really clearly, because this is a telephone conversation. and unlike some of the others which are room conversations where the mikes themselves pick up the sound, but but they developed a way to kind of work together. and eisenhower is supportive of kennedy throughout the crisis. and let's bring before get back to a couple of phone calls. i do to play another recording. this one is a conversation between president kennedy and democratic senator richard. and this is also. october 22nd before jfk addresses the nation, quote, adamantly, i said, but i would like. i'm asking you to be faithful the war all thend expect to hear and. expect cold. but you're involved in this blocka. khrushchev said that even if it goes start rather than make it forever. and for more information about what he's going to do about cuba and youanmake sure that point that they come to and if they do that you should be drpeif you want around miami some other place and we do go ahead that was a very minimal affair that we would right now. and the terribly captivated cuba versus thehat reassembled hour us to invade cuba. that's one of the problems we've got to have more of to service over to prove beyond what expericed in the last 48 hours. we have to bring troops om the west coast and to assemble force, which would give us the united of men parcipate someday. and that's why i want to check th ware out of sen that buthat position be cuba in the next year 24 or 48 out i it y very well come to that before the end of the week but we are moving all the forces we have necessary part ofsito the area around cuba the to so it's 90 minutes before that speech that president kennedy take makes to the country on tv about his decision to blockade. tell us what's going on in the room between him and senator russell. so it's not just senator russell. it's the congressional. so essentially the senior most figures in congress, 20 of them, have have gathered with kennedy and russell is a democrat, is a democrat from georgia and member of kennedy's own party. and kennedy is briefing them on. what's about happen if that congress is out of session. so they came back to washington and here they are. kennedy's is delivering the news of what united states has found in cuba and the administration proposes to do about it, which is essentially to impose this blockade this this quarantine and to try to force khrushchev take the missiles off the island. and it is a passage ific response right. it's not a belligerent response, although a blockade is technically an act of war and it keeps supplies explained it keeps supplies from getting to cuba like kind of ices them out. yes particularly if the supplies would help prepare those missiles to be launched and it wasn't clear the us at that time the reading state of these missiles we know now that the medium ballistic missiles were or would soon be essentially ready to go the blockade that kennedy announced then would impose starting at 10 a.m. on the 24th. so this is this is a conversation taking place at 5:30 p.m. on the 22nd in another day and a half or so, a blockade is going to be imposed to try to prevent more weapons, materials for those weapons from coming in. and essentially what they do is freeze out the range ballistic missiles, longer range missiles, but there are still some missiles already there. and that is supposed to essentially give them time to try to get missiles off the island diplomacy. and we see again and again kennedy reaching for measures short of war because once the bullets start flying and the missiles start flying, no one knows where things stop. and that is his great concern is that this is going to be some type of runaway conflict with nuclear weapons and nobody wants to see that. and kennedy, probably foremost among the people with he was deliberating, was most sensitive to that. and again and again and again reached for solutions to take a possible conflagration off the table. i would hedge a little bit with that there were others who also were strongly supportive of adlai stevenson in the u.s. ambassador to the united nations for. one probably the most important. and even ted sorenson, kennedy counselor. but we see kennedy again, again trying to create an opportunity for the two sides to think their way through this conflict so the bombs don't start. and that's the challenge, certainly beginning on october 22nd, when kennedy and team went public with the fact the soviets had placed these ballistic missiles in cuba 90 miles from america shores. and and as we hear in the conversation, russell is, of the mind, you got to you've got to do something about this now. and saying it takes while to do sothing about this as. as hgoes on and on. they to assemble a strike force that's to take probably about a to assemble ke force and so to get those people ready, you know, there are several moves that have to be made. and in the interim, then kennedy is going to try to engage in this process bargaining to try to get the missiles out. so i want to show on the screen, it's helpful for me to see this blockade line, the ships. this is the website for, the 14th day, which is a very book about the cuban missile. and they have this map that shows where american were positioned to create that. it was called a quarantine, i guess, to avoid using the word blockade, which is considered an act of war. but basically the positioned all these ships to keep supplies from getting to cuba. yeah so let's go to calls now gary is in sterling, virginia. gary, what's your question or comment? thank you. i was a student and, first grade elementary school where the captain the major and a colonel showed up at the door and the girl in the front right hand rose. and i thought, why she's screaming and then the teacher called her up the front of the class and she told the class that she was sorry she wasn't going to be able to be with us any more. and then the found out later her father was a u2 pilot who got shot down over cuba. and i remember ike very well his ship of state was headed keel plank of common sense and up to the gunnels. it with reason and ballast. it was logic. thank you very much for your time and you did mention there were some casualties. was it worth it on both sides or so? rudolf anderson was shot down on the 27th conducting a u-2 overflight of of cuba, and he was shot down with a surface to air missile at between 70 and 80,000 feet. and that a particularly dangerous moment in the crisis because now there was a clear fatality as a result of, hostile fire and were getting to a point where we're kennedy was receiving increase pressure to to move on cuba and a strike was being assembled he recognized implications of that if they did on cuba, it is possible that the shooting might have been extensive. some of those weapons that they that were ready might have been fired off. there was a fear that with everybody focused on what was happening in caribbean, the soviets would then the east germans would then go and move on berlin and take berlin, which is a concern throughout the entirety of the crisis. we heard some more earlier about concerns regarding berlin. so this is a particularly dangerous moment. this this 27th of october or perhaps the most dangerous moment of the cold war. it's it's people like, david coleman, who's work on the 14th day is is so important our understanding of what happened in the crisis to reveal how close the world came really to to a conflagration. next caller is jeffrey. pittsburgh, pennsylvania. go ahead, jeffrey. yes, please. please, please talk about the two letters that the kennedy administration received from khrushchev during the missile crisis and kennedy's decision to respond to the second letter and not the first. that seemed to be one of the more brilliant decisions that was made, but as the crisis was unfolding. thank you. it's a good question. the callers to this moment, the tip of october, as well as the 27th of october, when the states is is moving toward moving toward a situation where there a possibility for for some kind of a deal that. there was always an interest in trying to make sure that soviets got the get the missiles off of the island and the united states in turn would make sure that essentially cuba sovereignty was protected and that the could be resolved essentially peacefully by the time that the united states receives this first notice from khrushchev on the night of the 26 of october, indicating that there might be might be an opportunity to resolve to resolve the crisis, that the would withdraw the miil by time of t 2h, the following. khrushchev essentially has upped his demands and is calling for the removal of not just the blockade cuba, but is calling for the removal of. western missiles that been placed around the soviet natal missiles that were turkey as as in italy. and that's a that's a really dangerous moment for the kennedy administration. are they going to get involved in this kind of missile for missile trade? it was something that had occurred to the administra ation earlier in the crisis. in fact, the presence of these naito missiles kind of ringing the soviet kennedy understood how that could be provocation to khrushchev. and so there's. by the by the 27th, when khrushchev when a note comes in from khrushchev indicating that these missiles are to withdrawn for kennedy, that's kind of that's kind of upping upping the demands of the crisis. and it a more more dangerous situation. and so that will make the rest of the 27th of october a really challenging day. what you do about these these demands. do you seed do you try to kind of bargain those missiles out or do you try to stick with an original, original plan and just try to focus on on the soviet missiles there and kind of preserve cuba sovereignty? there's not going to be an invasion. and it's a really day, the 27th of october. so i'm on website of the jfk where they've translated and put up translations of letters. and so this is a of that letter from khrushchev to president kennedy on october 27th, 1962. and i'm to scroll down to what you just referenced. and he says. khrushchev writes, i make this proposal. we are willing to remove from cuba the means which you regard as offensive. we are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the nations your representatives will make a declaration to effect that the united states for its part considering the uneasy miss and anxiety of the soviet will remove its analogous means from turkey and so that when that is made, so this letter, though, is not public. how many people know about this in real time? well, so the soviets made their declaration publicly and that was and that the problem because the communication the 26th was a private communication and so kennedy is thinking well maybe we can we can actually come to some resolution for this crisis. but by the time that the soviets go public, kennedy recognizes that the ground has shifted and that a lot of people will see this as a fair trade. the united states has the soviet union with with intermediate range missiles and. the soviets have placed medium and and supposedly intermediate ballistic missiles in cuba as well, has not come. but but the presumption is that the launchers were there. the presumption is that the missiles would soon be there as well if they were not there already. and it kind of looked like a -- for tat situation. and kennedy recognized the compelling logic then of of some kind of a trade. he also that those those missiles that that the naito had placed in turkey and italy would soon be obsolete anyway because more from his perspective would be launched or submarine missiles which would provide better deterrent against the soviets opposed to these missiles in turkey and in italy were above ground, fixed above ground. they took a long time to to fuel and prepare and they were essentially sitting ducks. and so there had been all kinds of talk of months and months, really, about what to do about these to get them out. and the italians were interested in in making a move on that. but the not so much and so kennedy. from 61 to 62 a siege to those missiles going but he certainly by the time of this this crisis here recognizes them as the provocation that they were and now there's this possibility of a quid pro quo. right that the soviets take their missiles out of cuba if west takes its missiles out of of turkey and italy. and so russia proposes this and i, i won't read from it, but i'm going to show the actual that kennedy sends in return. so if russia proposed it publicly in its october 27th letter was, kennedy's response when he basically, all right, looks like we got a deal. is that public? because i i've read that. but the turkey quid pro quo was as publicly stated as some of the other things were to help resolve crisis. but can you help. well, the turkey quid quo is public because. it's made out the open on on radio moscow. and so that's something that kennedy has to confront. and their challenge that the challenge for xcom well as kennedy is to try to get khrushchev back to the pledge from the previous night that he would withdraw his missiles that the united states would not invade that there would some kind of pacific resolute action to the crisis to try to get him back to where he was the previous day. and so that's what kennedy is trying to work out with colleagues on the can you essentially ignore this second communication from khrushchev and focus on the first communique and make sure that that that khrushchev understands that and ultimately by the night of the 27th when things are getting really pretty and we're maybe a couple of days away from a shooting war, the communication goes out from the kennedy administration. the purpose in the person of of kennedy, the attorney general, president's brother, to soviet ambassador anatoly dobrynin, that there won't be a quid pro quo, won't be a specific understanding but but those missiles, the soviets found to be offensive ringing them those will be gone. they couldn't construe it as a quid pro quo, but yes, in 4 to 5 months, those were were likely to be gone and ultimate. we know that that's what what transpired even though that wasn't publicly part of the deal. got it. so much to learn. i'm enjoying this history lesson. and let's go back to the phone lines. norman, in notre dame, indiana, what do you remember? i was a navy pilot and hawaii and we had airplane loaded with all kinds of top secret material. and as soon as a landing strip was secure on cuba, we were going to be bringing all of this stuff in there. we were all around me and all the air force to puerto rico to bermuda, all around and ended up in military base of tampa bay. so i believe that there was a strike force on board ready to go. that's what confuses me in this presentation. and also, i like to have the comments. ed, explain what actually deterred them and the outcome of not invading cuba. so heard from more than one member of the military who said were scrambling. we were headed to cuba when caller earlier said we were almost. so what was it that it was a slow walk. was it was were the military really trying to get 90,000 troops to cuba just in case. can you tell? yeah, i wouldn't say it was a slow walk. i think were they were trying to move as as as as they could in conversations that we have that we don't have time to play their 43 hours of conversations about the missile crisis. it's extraordinary. there are a bunch in which kennedy is speaking with particularly maxwell taylor, chairman of the joint chiefs, about the time it would take to ready a strike force, a full strike force on cuba which would involve 90,000 troops initially and then upwards of 250,000 after that. it was going to take while to get that force ready, particularly since many troops were coming from the west coast, but they were moving into position. there was some question about how soon would they be ready to do it. here they are. you know on the the 27th, maybe the 29th, the 30th or so that that strike force might be ready. 30th of the first. and and the potential mayhem as a result was was quite so. so the military moving as quickly as they could. kennedy recognized that the time for action was was closing. if he was going to act before before type of conflagration. and so by the 27th, he is moving quickly to try to make some of deal with with khrushchev to get those missiles out convey that understanding that there is a whole lot of pressure on him to move and take those missiles out by force. and if he did. so who knows what that would have resulted in. so want to remember our phone that remind our phone lines are open. if you're on the east coast or in the central time zone. 202748 8000 mt. or pacific time. 202748 8001. and if you remember the cuban missile crisis, call us at 202748 8002 before we go to, more of your calls. let's do another snippet of audio. this one is one of the dicier moments during the crisis. it's from october 27th, that day, just a lot happened on october 27th. in this one is jfk okay. i'm sorry. this is from october 25th. october 25th. jfk and his advisors are discussing stopping a passenger ship that is, i guess, approaching that line, that blockade line. so let's listen. what are we getting? let's put it down on possible what their response was over there back have to. let go of else themselves. but earlier today you wrote to the. or anybody and i think the only argument for not tracking it actually is yo can where we have attempted the car tomorw morning on a ship or exist and the russians to stay out of area there we get an answer from them or not or they're going to pick up some -- tomorrow. you got. to start with that or regardless if i can say yes, a series of variables that walk away at a certain could indicate we acted irresponsibly despite the fact that the day three you understand what actually have proved you were very. so we're talking about a cruise ship. do you know more about this ship and what would have been the of enforcing the blockade by you know stopping this ship possibly the ship? well, i'm that's always a danger. and there were ships that that the united states allowed to go through the blockade, some that it didn't. and in fact, some ended up turning down and turning back and the ships that were carrying the the the i-beams beams did end up turning and went back to the soviet union so that ultimately what what remained cuba were the medium range ballistic missiles. so in effect, the the blockade its purpose but it didn't necessarily the construction on the medium range ballistic missiles that were on the island getting them getting them ready to fire. so much of this day, the 25th, is really focused on to do about these ships that are approaching the blockade lines, some of which were were soviet bloc, some which were not. but they were steaming into cuba do do make show of force and to your adversary that, you're willing to do this. do you let some ships go because it's unclear whether or there may be some type of provocation results. and if the bullets to fire, where does that then leave? so this is a particularly dangerous and the administration is making calculations in real time. okay. well let some ships go. we won't let other ships go. will board some. we'll check them out. we won't import others. and it's this process of signaling that's going on for much of the day of the 25th. so this is the day after the quarantine has been put in place. and there there's not a whole lot of conversation at, least from kennedy's tapes during day on 25th, about how to actually resolve the crisis. it is about what's happening at this this that that the united has imposed, which initially is 800 miles out from and then gets brought back 500 miles to provide sides with a little bit more opportunity to think things through. where they want to go with this the the more that those those the further out the line is perhaps the safer it is for the united states, because soviet fliers can't reach it and closer it is to cuba. it gives both sides a chance. think a little bit more. and that's the process bargaining that was going on throughout this crisis. let's another call. we have mo's moses in detroit. moles. you through the cuban missile crisis. what do you to share with us? yes, i was living in chicago doing a cuban missile crisis and they the u.s. plan was planning a lot of great naval air base joint units in. we couldn't go to work for a whole week and it was more scare a moment in the history of my life conceding when it was turning ships around and knew no cuba straight. my and my. and we it because we couldn't go to work. well, they had chicago locked down. nothing was moving. not because they had a rail system. and on the ground system to hit all that stuff shut down. and that's what he was trying plan it out out of. great lake, down close lake, michigan. you could see them. you could them and you could hear the boom, the playing. and we were watching the tv. we watch outside and see them from time. and that's that was really scary. but. khrushchev kennedy was a young, weak president. he had mentioned it. he was young and weak and he's trying to pull that over. is he? no, that's what i about it. all right. thank you for. your thoughts? i wanted to. two things that the caller said. number one, how much of an impact on day to day life did this create for, you know, americans that weren't connected to the military. and then the second thing is, how did this kennedy stature the coming out of the cuban missile. first question first. it certainly people a lot of pause during during the period from 22nd until the crisis was resolved on on the 20/28 really. there were some reports of panic buying in stores. very concerning for people wondering where they might be, when all of this is over. more so for the administration members of the administration who recognized the dangers that they were facing. but it was a rough time. i mean, you had and we see the pictures of people huddled around television sets watching kennedy's address at 7:00 on the night of october 22nd. the crisis had public at that time, and it was a scary as both sides recognized the rhetoric is is reay lligerent and that's very especially when you're talking about nuclear. this is a tough in the cold war. it was not, you know, the gorbachev of years later on. this was this khrushchev and and these were the soviets from from era. and kennedy did not to back down publicly and behind the scenes we that he was taking all kinds of steps to try to manage this crisis so. so it was it was very much of a public from the 22nd to the 28th. and then once it gets resolved there is all kind of laurels get, you know, despair endorsed and draped over over kennedy for for doing it so so successfully with such skill seemingly. people didn't know what was going on behind behind scenes. it sure looks like that there was a tremendous diplomat act that he had pulled off to get these missiles off of cuba. there's a non invasion pledge and that's really quite extraordinary. let's take another caller now. this is vera. vera is calling from here in, washington, d.c.. vera, what do you want to share about your memories of the cuban missile crisis? well, thank you for having this fascinating program. i am chicago originally, and i came to washington straight out of college, but from illinois and, living in an academic setting most of my life stevenson was so revered and i as i recall during, the democratic convention, stevenson still had a following. and kennedy his relationship with kennedy wasn't so great. and many of us were very disappointed that stevenson wasn't selected as secretary of state much later, i was also involved the psychology of tyranny negotiation. i knew people were researching that and the story there was that we had. stevenson thank for the final agreement. the final what would you say? compromise this that got us out. but i hear he was on the x committee. i didn't get what that was. he wasn't part of the inner circle. um, but also some thought that in kennedy's inaugural address, whether it was swords or quoting statements of that, we must never negotiate fear, but we should never to negotiate. whether that was stevenson's quoting stevenson or not. but anyway, i'd love to know when they were at the final decision, which was so complicated. as you say. what kind of a role did he have so? can you talk about that? because i've seen in my research and things like that that you know, there are different things that were written about adlai stevenson involvement. but he did on october 25th, i think had this speech that that got a lot of attention this on the jfk library website. it says, you know, us. this is one. here it is. he says it says during the debate in the security council, this is the un security council, the normally courteous u.s. ambassador, adlai stevenson, aggressively confronted his soviet union counterpart, bulgarian zorin, with photograph evidence of the missiles in cuba. that's from october 25th. and it's also read that he also might have been the one to suggest the exchange. so what can you fill in for us? stevenson ultimately becomes a really important figure in all this. as say he comes out pretty forcefully the 25th and kennedy is really pleased watching that and says boy, i didn't know that adlai actually had it in him, but adlai is one of the ones who is most concerned with trying to resolve this conflict peacefully. in fact, he's really the only one on the first day of the crisis the 16th into the 17th of of october who will try figure oua specific wayo lve it. everybody else, including kennedy is thinkinth at some point they're goi tgo in and get those missiles out. they're just going to do it and. and titely, we know that kennedy himself gravitates toward that more peaceful solution. but adelies is really pushing that. the time, pushing diplomacy, pushing diplomacy. and so he becomes really something something of a hero in the end, even though the administration ultimate, lee, kind of paints adlai stevenson as more willing to cave to the soviets than the tough kennedys were, and that gets publicized in some of the literature post-crisis. there is a fairly famous piece that that gets run in the saturday evening post in which adlai, looks like, because that's the information that the the authors stuart allsop and charles bartlett bartlet particular are being really kind of a kennedy crony. we're getting from the kennedy people themselves including jfk, that adlai was was weaker than the others. he was willing to cave and the kennedys stood tough. and yet it's it's the diplomatic solution that that adlai is is pushing that ultimately kennedy will reach for making sure that the bullets don't fly. first, just briefly, because i'm curious, why did it sounds like president kennedy kind of threw adlai stevenson under the bus in some of the. is that because to the criticism for the quid pro quo that he ultimately went. yeah, absolutely. that that there's a essentially trade that's going on. but that if it becomes public, that's not going to really good for president kennedy's political. and so he keeps that under wraps. there's an instruction that goes out from bobby kennedy to anatoly dobrynin on the night of the 27th that there is no quid pro quo. you are not to understand that these two things are linked that. these missiles ringing the soviet union in turkey and italy are going to be withdrawn for the withdrawal of soviet missiles in cuba. but but understand that in 4 to 5 months or so, those missiles will probably be out. it's kind of it's a it's a phased withdrawal. they're not supposed to be tied together. and and that's essentially how the crisis gets resolved. but it can't be spoken of out at the time. let's go some more recordings. this one is from october 27th. that the busy day and this is when moscow floats. the idea of the of soviet missiles, cuba for nato's missiles in turkey. and then we'll president kennedy and his advisors about that area. khrushchev told president kennedy mysterious expert as they try to compare it. association with place center. and there we got a little of paper look what you've seen of this this is an accurate provocative policy this administration. i don't i think a difficult thing to change it over. i think that's your first indication of word to later test. i would answer saying i would prefer to deal wit your your interesting proposal for us. we are concerned about the interest in support of opposition on the surface of the first place as far as the effectiveness others and also the term of useful number one and number two, which more sway their motivations. so that's an excerpt of their discussion when moscow floats the idea of a trade but we're going to do one more excerpt. this is debate between kennedy, his advisers, over whether should go forward with trading the missiles in cuba foral in turkey. because we go on the of a trade strike evidence. so if there were we end up with the still in cuba there was planes so on these earlier in the show you know talkout our technicians playing very silly this return i guess thinking about what we're going to have to do with asia which is five sorties in seven days and possibly an invasion, all because we take this a rotary we all can't go from the plus up the flow. that's what's going to happen there when they got there later. that was pretty good proposition. hear ourselves if we get to specifically for the decline when we do something adverse from having to come back and first saying this morning return over a 12 or 14 year old better to serious. got to make it clear this letter section of work that they're all creating. there's no question about that. and question whether they're just you. otherwise, you come back and say, well, we've come to better with the opinion of our own about. and then on the verge of yes or it was all very character specific in this case, the space station where. for that i think we ought to make that question expression o work station section work. so you my question is do other. otherwise you can take us out for for various work or. so can you talk. they're going they're saying this deal. i thought it was really interesting when president said, you know, if allow this to get the bloodshed, people aren't going to be so in standing up to cuba once it once people actually start dying. right. and i thought was, you know, pretty accurate. what the back channels that kennedy had to khrushchev and how did that shape the decision making during this time. so there were a couple of back channels of formal informal as well information that that got to kennedy with a variety of officials who were in washington and these were backchannels that the administration had used really from from the early months of of the kennedy presidency. so they were they were used to working these officials and some folks were were involved with the g, the g, r, u, and some folks were were embassy officials. but it's to try to work some kind of diplomatic solution. this conflict before the bullets started to fly in and the bombs started to drop. so it's it's part of dance that the two sides were doing. how do you resolve this without people and part of kennedy's strategy here was to play for time, have these conversations make it clear to the other side what. your bottom line is try to get the other side to reason with you and come back away from the abyss, which is what they were both staring into. if that gordian knot as khrushchev described it did not get untied. and with each day that the crisis lasted, they closer to that conflagration because the strike force that was being assembled in florida was going to be closer being ready. the missiles of the missiles were going to be closer to being ready. and then if if the strike force was launched, conceivable that there might have been some type of soviet reprisal. so that's really dangerous. and so kennedy is trying to trying to get to that point where can make some kind of a deal to to resolve the and and these moments on 27th are the climax of the whole thing really. so we've been talking, of course, all morning about the cuban crisis. but you are you have a new book about jfk in that's going to be released in about a month on november 15. tell us about that book and what it what kennedy, what you reveal about kennedy? well, it's something i'd been interested in a long time on on kennedy's plans for vietnam, because he's. he's saddled with vietnam from earliest part of his administration. and the challenge is to to figure out what to do about it, a crisis that was growing more in tractable by the day particularly as the united states had some more challenges with its with its own ally good and gm. so what what kennedy is is essentially looking do and it's declared publicly in october 1963 is that the united states is to get out of vietnam by 1965 after having committed itself and sending in 16,000 military advisors during the course, kennedy's presidency. and that's an extraordinary given that a little bit under 700 had been in there previously. so the question for historians for a long time really has been what was kennedy's plans for vietnam? what were they was was he fully to getting the troops out? come may or was he trying to bargain in in vietnam to make sure that the the vietnamese who were were in south vietnam the time were not able to to undermine the regime of inside gm and kennedy had all kinds of troubles with the gm regime. so it's it's hard to know exactly things would have gone out. but ultimately deal to get the united states out that kennedy is moving toward gets reversed by johnson in 1964 and the troops stay. and the question ultimately, how many more troops are going to get in ultimately leading to the bullets flying a big war in 1965? well we've been thank you so much this morning. we've been talking with mark silverstein own. he's the program chair of the university virginia miller center on presidential recordings. i want to make sure that all of listeners and viewers know that there's a special episode of c-span presidential recordings podcast. it's now available with even audio clips from those fateful 13 days in october over during the cuban missile crisis. find and follow c-span presidential recordings all right. so today are going to talk about as you see, the intersection of topics of sex and politics