. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . if my memory serves me correctly, once the new relief agency started, foye which i believe there was definitely a need, the voluntary giving to the red cross plum netted. hoover was worried about the long-term implications of turning away from volunteer, self-help, community organizations, helping your neighbors and being your brother's keeper. he was worried if it all just became subsumed or replaced by deps upon a bureaucratic regime. those are some of the ways that it affected his response to the flood and later the depression. >> i'm not a historian. i was born in 1948, the middle of the 20th century. some of us think, and i didn't think much about world war i. could this period of time be another 100 year period where we will go through more turmoil and 100 years from now, they'll be looking back at this time period in not exactly the same way but in a somewhat similar way as we are looking back at 20s and 1916. maybe in 2116 people will see things more clearly where we can't see it now, because we are in the middle of turmoil. that's what i was -- that's what i'm thinking. i don't know what your thoughts on this are. >> i think someone said history is a conversation without end. so when famous anniversaries come around, we just went through the 150 tanniversary period for the civil war. now, we are in world war i. we have had various remembrances of pearl harbor and world war ii. it is a natural tendency to look back and see what is clearer to us now or what seems more salient to us now than did to the people that lives through it. it cuts both ways. we can miss things they experienced. they, living in the midst of it, may not have seen the long-term implications. i don't think they did. we can look back and say one of the things that happened was the birth of this impulse of often american-led humanitarianism. it becomes not only governmental but nongovernmental. now, we have this worldwide array of rad incompetent response to any kind of natural or man-made catastrophe. that was not built into the world system in 1914 as i emphasized earlier. what he was doing was unprecedented, specially in the scale, an entire dealing with an entire nation under enemy occupation. it was a remarkable thing. i am not sure it would have happened had he not been there to make it happen. i had my doubts as to whether that belgian relief would have happened if he had started it a year or two later. in those first months of the war, a couple important features to stress. one, the expectation of a short war. so if it didn't end by the fall, surely it would end in the spring of 1915 and the new harvest would come in and everyone could get back to norm. the harvest was disrupted in the summer of 1914. millions and millions of men were taken awhich fray from the and put in uniform. there was destruction of property in northern belgium and so on. the germans were sinking british ships trying to starve them out. no one could perceive it was going to go on. food will win the war. the american people were mobilized when we entered the war to conserve food. farmers were supposed to plant more to keep them in the war and not collapsing. as that war went on, the hatreds become deeper. they called the hunger. i am not taking one side or the other. it is just way it happened. i don't think that given the psychology of 1916, let's say, that the idea a neutral organization going in would have been so acceptable. it was a near thing anyway. there were many british, churchill and the admiralty and several others, were opposed to it. one reason it happened, the expectation of a short war and the residual kind of sense that wars are limited and not yet total unlimited war. thirdly, the desire to keep the united states happy. the united states was in neutral. i'm convinced that one reason the british permitted hoover to carry on and bring food through the british lines into german-held territory was precisely that belgium was a little cause. they had been terribly treated by the haan as they called the germans. the british knew this. they knew if they pulled the plug on this, american public opinion might turn anti-british at a time when the british and the french were trying to buy food and ammunitions from the united states. the british had a motive to permit this to happen from offending uncle sam. as the war went on, we would not have seen it. churchill was no longer at admiralty. he was prime minister. his argument was the most humane thing to do was to win the war quickly and not let the germans off the hook at all. that's a world war ii story. so i do think we will continue and i'm glad we have the opportunities to continue. different things come into view. i think it's a very appropriate thing to have in this case a four or five, six-year maybe even centennial remembrance where different things can be brought back to light and people can reflect. i think that's built into the study of history. >> and into our society as a whole. my dad was from southeast missouri. those old farmers did not like hoover at all. they thought he caused the depression. history changes things, i guess, when you look back. >> hoover never quite overcame the great burden that fell when he was tagged as the man who did nothing, a very unfair subscription to him but that's another lecture perhaps. he did somewhat recover m. i would say he earned respect again. harry truman can be given some respect for that by giving hoover a public role. he lived long enough that people could see he wasn't the cause of the depression. it wasn't some kind of benevolent hoover making this happen or hoover simply being uncaring. he did live long enough to gain some measure of respect. as time goes by, we can be a little more detached about it and weigh things more adequately. >> i think we might have time for one more question. >> you mentioned earlier that hoover supported the tree of versailles and the league of nations. what role do you think he believed the league of nations might have had in place of relief organizations, if any? >> i don't know about the relief aspect. he was very -- he did not like the treaty of ver ssailles in a lot of ways. he felt the key necessary thing to accomplish was to get europe back on its feet economically. i don't think he had the wilsonian confidence in collective security. it was built into the mechanism of peace. if we can get m p about restori restoring order and economy and peace making and have a settled framework for going forward, some of the wounds can heal and europe can be productive economically and so on. he felt at that time that this was not only simply in america's interest but america needed a healthy europe. i think later on, he tended to think that the united states could be more self-sufficient, if necessary, vis-a-vis europe. because of what he had seen in europe in 1918, he very much doubted that they were going to come out fr the better in world war ii. he had a lot of objections. he thought if we intervened that our own freedoms would be at risk if we had to become a kind of -- he would use the word totalitarian state to defeat a totalitarian state. he worried about the long-range implications of a total war on the american system if we were to go back. he also felt that europe was just really still hopelessly immeshed in these age-old rivalries and the united states had very limited ability to navigate through and make it better. he had gotten burned by what he saw in world war i. >> do you think the isolationism that the united states quickly reverted back to played a role with that as well, with the european issues going on? really, relief efforts and that really couldn't be taken over by any one individually. >> i don't know how he thought about the relief in terms of the league of nation's apparatus. he saw there were many flaws to the treaty. his essential point was, at first, he wanted the league of nation without any amendments and reservations. he finally said that's the price for getting this thing done. we have to get back to normal. europe has to think that way. for a time, in the 20s, europe did seem to be moving in constructive paths and so forth. we look now back at it all through the world war ii period and we think it was all inevitable, that it was going to happen again. hoover, by the standards of 1920, was a moderate progressive. he thought of himself as a progressive republican. he had worked for woodrow wilson in wartime service on a nonpartisan basis. some democrats, franklin roosevelt, wanted hoover to run as a democrat in 1920 to be wilson's air. such was hoover's nonpartisan reputation. i don't want to give you the feeling that hoover was an embittered isolationist. he thought it was in our interest that europe get back to normal and the treaty could be a step in that direction. he was a strong believer as president and before in disarmament treaties. he thought it was a terrible waste of resources to build up great armies and weapons of war. he was a birth right quaker. it was an influence on him. part of the quaker faith is to be a peacemaker. some of that shows if you look in hoover's attitude toward the world and toward what he saw as constructive accomplishment. therefore, he was distant from europe but it got deeper as time went by. he was very opposed to what he thought was british manipulation of american public opinion before pearl harbor. he was fighting for america to withdraw. he wanted aid to britain but he didn't want america to give aid to britain in a way he thought would engulf us in a naval war with the germans or suck us into the war. so he sensed, his argument was, his claim was, that roosevelt was trying to maneuver us toward eventual intervention. hoover, of course, was opposed to that once the conflict came. hoover patriotically supported the war effort. he always thought it probably could have -- the way things happened, could have been avoided. he had that great sense in his later life that europe was -- the united states was not going to go over to europe and make it all a wonderful place. he had a sense of the limits of what american power could do as a government. that didn't mean that you should avoid humanitarian work, however. he would support that and did support that. but that was not a government action, you see. >> kind of like that two-year, kind of get back on your feet and we are gone. the idea that that's really what we should be doing. >> he even said in 1917, just about the time we were about to enter the war. he said it was a necessity. he said, i'm a quaker but not a peace at any price quaker. he didn't want the united states to enter world war i. he said, in alliances with anybody. he even then distrusted the european powers and thought they were going to try to manipulate us into their systems of alliances and so on. it is interesting. woodrow wilson referred to our come patriots in the war as the associated power. didn't like to use the word theal plword allies. that was the british, french. wilson had a certain desire for american flexibility and detachment from what was perceived as this more ras of old europe. hoover saw that way was in the war. he was really annoyed at a lot of them and felt the overriding purpose he had was to save the people and get beyond the snare of too much government to government involvement. >> thank you very much, dr. nash. i know there are more questions out in the audience. i saw some of you about to get up as well. i believe that if you can stay for a little bit longer, if you want to come down and ask your questions. some of you have brought your books with you. i did not ask beforehand. i might have a pen it you are willing to sign a couple of books. >> i would be happy to, certainly. >> some members of the audience would certainly appreciate it. audience, we thank you all for coming out this evening. as dr. nash mentioned, there is -- i just wrote it down too. that history fins to continues conversation and you would enjoy this conversation and apply it to our present day and drew lessons out of hoover's life particularly, the importance of humanitarian effort is a wonderful thing. on behalf of the national archives, would you please join me in thanking dr. george nash. you are watching american history tv covering history c-span style with tours of museum, archival film, eyewitness accounts and discussions about historian and teachers. you can watch us every weekend, during congressional break and holidays too. for more information, visit c-span.org/history. this week on c-span in prime time, tonight at 8:00 eastern, hear from some of the democrats vying to lead the party. including ray buckley, chair of the new hampshire democratic party, jamie harrison, chair of south carolina's democratic party and representative keith elson from minnesota. >> you know in 2014, we hit a 70-year low in voter turnout, 36%. the democratic caucus is smaller than any time since truman. in this last election, we hit a 20-year low in the presidential term. we got a lot of rebuilding to do. >> tuesday night at 8:00, president barack obama and japanese prime minister, shinzo abe visit the american navel base at pearl harbor. mr. abay is te is the first to the site. a review of house and senate hearings from 2016 on topics including the flint michigan water crisis and the wells fargo unauthorized account scandal. >> you found out that one of your divisions had created 2 million fake accounts and fired thousands of employees for improper behavior and had cheated thousands of your own customers and you didn't even once consider firing her ahead of her retirement? >> thursday, at 8:00 p.m. eastern, we remember some of the political figures that passed away in 2016, including former first lady, nancy reagan and supreme court just sis, anton anyone scalia and friday night at 8:00, our program continues with shimon peres, muhammad ali and john glenn. this week in prime time on c-span. we continue with another session from the 40th anniversary of the harry s truman scholarship symposium. madeline a madeline albright speaks with historian michael beschloss. we begin with remarks from harry truman's grandfather. the newest member of the truman foundation board of trustees, no stranger to the foundation, clifton truman daniel is the oldest grandson of president harry truman, the honorary chairman of the board of the truman library institute, the nonprofit partner to the truman