walter: the timing of this symposium is intentional. 75 years ago next week general recalledr at war"'s from retirement to u.s. service starting him on a road to find both him and asia for many years to come. in asia as in much of the world 1945 is yesterday. the modernrstand world, you have to understand -- or understand much of the modern to understande the stories that we will be exploring today. in the memorial building next us the general is buried with his wife jean, and we have two floors of exhibits on his life times. we also have a temporary exhibit on the liberation of the philippines which i encourage you to explore, take time during our breaks and the museum. both will be open until 5:00 today. this sim foes yum is another great partnership providing key support to the mac arthur programs.nd its i'd like to recognize them for their support. we have several board members here. i'd like to recognize them for support. i also would like to recognize my crack staff who are here frankly helped make this happen. i may be the guy up here giving remarks butg without their hard work, professionalism and dedication, we wouldn't be here today and we wouldn't be having the program that we're going to have. jim, amanneddia, corey, robert, you could please give them a round of applause. [applause] christopher: at this time i'm to bring jim forward who will emcee us for the rest of the day. again, welcome and let's have a day. jim all right! welcome, y'all. glad you all could make it. is our 15th symposium. we started about 75 when we started putting on the occupation of japan symposiums. and over the past 50 years we've about 15 of them. all of them have always turned because wegreat bring people that tend to use the archives. and that's the thing about macarthur when he set this place up. he wanted it to be a free and open access to all of the materials he had, as well he wanted the macarthur memorial to be a place for free and open and debate about things that were as well as putting a no price tag entry on ,he "macarthur at war" memorial -- macarthur memorial. thanks to all for coming. world war ii veterans? congressman whitehurst. theto, fluent from philippines. he grew up in occupied philippines. [applause] ginger hanson holmes right here in the middle. grew up in the jungles during the occupation. wither brothers fought gorilla leader. larson? where are you at? chris grew up in manila as well, battle boy during the from manila. got a lot of great -- [applause] they're what makes this place so special because they keep coming time.ll the we had somebody new. gwen, are you here? she was from los spanos. yeah. she was in an internment camp. i didn't call you out, it's just because i don't know you yet but i hope i sure will soon. we have three great authors here today and then we have the philippine delegation which will presenting their own book, and then, as well, we'll be showing bonnie's film later on with the help of philippine bank, the mainstay behind all of the support that our philippine delegation gets. long day. day, a i'm glad we're inside. it's going to be 100 degrees outside. it kickedhead and get off. our three authors came all the as from colorado as well wisconsin and new jersey all to be here. the one thing they have in is they all did research here at the macarthur memorial books.se three we're very pleased to have them. they all have different styles all three of the books are great. all.them had to. because i had to be up here on stage. first off, we're going to have walter borneman. walter made quite a nuisance of the past couple of years being here non-stop, this.t get me no. very nice guy. very glad to have him. professional writer. is his book, "macarthur at war." there's been a lot of books macarthur. clayton james did three volumes on it and it usually took him about 10 pages just to get to one point. [laughter] very famous book. used to take him about 10 pages and he never really got to the point. [laughter] walter has a way of synthesize ing ideas and really the essence of fewain issues in just a paragraphs, a few sentences. and that's really the strong point, i think, about walter's book. very insightful about douglas macarthur. so we will bring him up right now. so walter borneman from colorado, welcome to macarthur memorial. [applause] walter: good morning. morning. walter: it is, indeed, a privilege to be here. nice going to say some things about jim zobel, and i that i still will after introduction. i'm delighted to be back here. i am. i would not have been able to do without the research facilities of this particular institution. and i thank it as an institution and i certainly thank jim zobel personally,dual, for all the help. and i was going to alludeless, allude, jim, to fact that maybe there were a few too many e-mails over the course of three but you offered gracious assistance always and i it.tly appreciate well, "macarthur at war: world is,ii in the pacific" indeed, just that. oneally wanted to focus macarthur's evolution as a military commander during that four-year period of time. now, i think it goes without the obvious is that with is no middle ground douglas macarthur. him. are people who revere there are people who despise him. and i think that that was probably true even during his lifetime. to me -- thising book has been out 10 weeks. and it's been amazing to me to country andd the therew much polarizations still is 75 years after macarthur in world war ii, 50 years after the man's death. there's still a tremendous polarizations. either those people who are sure general ofgreatest all time or those people who for picky reasons all the way down think that he was a terrible person and made no contributions. that there is no middle ground with douglas seem as a it might mission impossible, for me, to which wastried to do really talk about a very approachand analytical to both the many, many good did,s that i think he particularly this whole idea of his evolution during this four-year period of time as a and to talkmander about that as well as some of exasperating qualities. and those of you who know that there's no shortage of those kinds of qualities. the adjectives used to describe him were never bland. whether they were superlatives of add yo layings or disdain -- there's aor disdain, lot out there. so what i tried to do is, in largeand thanks part to the research facility here, the ability to sort of things through, talk to scholars in the field, and kind whoet to the bottom of macarthur was. mention-- let me just briefly two things that are themes. and then i really want to spend ame time on this evolution as military commander theme. one of the themes that's in the book that i really found fascinating is how does a man go is relativelyho well-known but certainly not country ons the december 7, 1941, and then months he's this absolute great american hero, a rallying cry for everything that's happening in the united alliedand the entire world at that period of time? well, i think there are a number answers to that. one is certainly his ability to, respects, manage his own press. i think that there's also the situation you have that he's the only one during the first six of 1942 who is really actively engaged with the army. out there doing some things but earnest j. king, operations, he's not one to publicize things. macarthur's headquarters, on the outr hand, are cranking these communiques and press releases. and the american public really on their eyes philippines. i think a final component of he makes this transformation to great american during that america, these tenuous six months of really desperately need a hero. you know, this is absolutely the setup. americans wake up on december 8, 1941. they have heard the news of pearl harbor. from that.eling what is the first thing that happens in their mail on monday december 8? douglas macarthur, by some just of fate, ends up on their doorstep on the cover of magazine, a very auditory article by claire booth lewis and she really sets macarthur up this hero in the far east. again, the timing just by coincidence couldn't have been more amazing. but that's actually what on december 8. the other theme that i tried to book iset into in the oflore this whole issue army/navy controversy, rivalry. ok? exists becausey there are people on macarthur's staff, like subjecterland and to sutherland and to some extent george kenny who are really anti-navy. talking last evening that sometimes, i think, that thinkcome out -- i could of a number in the recent past ont are really focused just the controversy and trying to really build it up. and if you read some of these things, you really wonder at the the day: well, now, wait a minute. how did we ever win? these guys get together and really make things happen? thei would suggest you that truth of the matter is that worked prettyally well. now, early on, you know, he's got his issues with tommy hart the asiatic fleet in the fall of 1941. he comes to work very well in what we're going to talk about at some length in combined operations. i think he really does a great navy. working with the and let me just throw out one thing as kind of an aside and ine some of you historians the room occasion to think about. king, the chief of naval operations. would have happened if somebody else had been in that naval position and hadn't said, as king did, we are going two-ocean war. because king said that, there is of supplies amount and materiel that flow into the pacific. now, macarthur would not have said that king was one of his strongest supporters or macarthur is a beneficiary of that kind of strategy. let us talk at some length about the evolution as a military commander. in case there are some people new to macarthur, here is the are 62nd bio to get us to december 7, 1941. centuryfinitely a 19th man. you need to remember that when you start with general macarthur. he was born in 1880. his father won the metal honored for the charge of missionary ridge in the civil war. he went to west point, graduated first, of course, in the class of 1903. did two tours in the philippines. chief of staff and brigade commander in the famed rainbow division. after the war, superintendent at west point. did you know since we are about to focus on the olympics in brazil, he is the head of the american delegation to the 1928 olympics in amsterdam and very, very typical macarthur fashion, he tells the american team in the amsterdam, "americans did not come here to lose." america got first place in terms of gold medals of the 1928 games, so some people do not know that about macarthur's involvement. athletics were always very important to the general. by 1930, he was chief of staff with herbert hoover and stayed on in the position for franklin roosevelt. 1935, goes to the philippines as military advisor. 1937, recalled in the united states. what will he do? he is still relatively young. he does not want to go back to being a corps commander. he has done that. resigns from the army, stays on in the philippines as philip marshall of the philippines army. he is basically recalled to duty 75 years ago this month in the philippines to be commander of u.s. forces in mubarak east. -- u.s. forces in the far east. december 7, december 8 in manila time, 1941. macarthur is awoken in the morning by who is a perl harbor. -- awoken in the morning by the news of pearl harbor. we look at him as a military commander. he is simply overwhelmed. as most commanders on the american side by the speed and complexity with which the japanese bring the attack against the philippines and quite frankly, across all of the pacific. it is not surprising that to when we look at and i will give you just three examples of what i think are perhaps his biggest defeat and then three examples of his biggest victories. i have gone around the last 10 weeks and talked to people and the critics of macarthur are always ready immediately to say, macarthur got caught with his planes on the ground at clark field. well, yes, but those of you who know the story -- it is far more complex than that in terms of what happens. operationally, the american forces at clarksville really account for themselves pretty well. they get the bombers and fighters in the air. the mistake they make is when the second wave, the continuing wave and the japanese attack is happening, they have landed and gone to lunch. that is the problem. but again, the shorthand of macarthur getting caught with his planes on the ground is not quite true. it is much more complicated. the retreat to the peninsula, american and filipino forces, macarthur's strategy had been despite long years of what is called plan orange. involves --rategy he is going to be able to defend the entire archipelago. he spreads out men and supplies all over the island. the speed with which the japanese attacked overwhelmed that and by controlling the air, they really prohibit any kind of movement of supplies or things to baton. i think what happens in terms of that is that macarthur again is just almost blindsided by the speed with which the japanese attacked. let me suggest to you that one thing about macarthur is that he always worked on his own time and he expected a japanese attack at some point but he thought it was going to come in the spring of 1942. and when it comes in december in such a fury of planned air and sea attacks, i suggest he is overwhelmed. the third topic or defeat in terms of his portfolio that i , i think there needs to be more scrutiny about whether he could have moved more quickly and prevented the entire new guinea attack back and forth across the trail. to macarthur's credit, he does that in terms of defending the bay and being ready to respond to the japanese invasion there but it is an interesting time in july 1942 that again, there is a lot going on and he does not have much resources. it is still a situation where if he had been able to do that and able to really focus on the big picture of new guinea, he might have been able to start elsewhere than port moresby and fast-forward the war by six months. there is three macarthur defeats that by no small coincidence come very early and the war. -- in the war. the three great victories that i suggest to you are his invasion in early march of 1944. it is ahead of schedule, a surprise. i think more importantly, it shows combined operations. today, we take in air, land, and sea acting together for granted. in 1941 and early 1942, he is just not ready yet. he has got to be educated. he has got to evolve as a commander. again, much to his credit, he does. he embraces combined operations in all of those areas and i just go on quickly to say the other of two victories from 1944 that i would suggest are on the great list are certainly his leap across the north coast of new guinea and of courses invasion and returned to the philippines. in all of those operations and those great victories, combined operations is front and center. we're going to talk a little bit about macarthur myths. i think there is this myth that he was this great lone wolf. a solitary figure. -- a solitary strategist sitting there brooding. it made great press copy. sure what he was thinking. reminiscing about his father's charge of missionary ridge. and suggest to you when you peel back that myth of the lone wolf, it is to macarthur's credit he has been able to put together a highly effective team that knows combined operations, knows to work together as a team. and we know the names. bob eichelberger, walter krueger on land. amphibious with operations. dan barbee, his name was uncle dan the amphibious man. he goes to work for macarthur and the first couple assaults that he leads, my goodness. there's a dozen landing craft and a couple supporters in 1943 -- a couple of destroyers in 1943 up the coast of new guinea. contrast that to years later with 600 ships sitting out there in the gulf. it is an amazing transition of america's industrial might and strength in only a short two-year period of time. it is a testament to macarthur's commanders and macarthur himself, who selected these commanders, that we have a situation where they are really able to bring to bear and manage that kind of increase in forces and bring to bear combined operations and, of course, perhaps most important of all is george kenney. and his use of air power. we certainly have a situation with the battle of 1943. prior to that, i think there is general macarthur saying, oh yeah. as chief of staff, i did not think too much in the 30's about airpower. he is on record saying, i do not know of the army needs bombs. the navy had bombers so he needed bombers, too. that it is a situation that by watching the battle of bismarck sea that macarthur really comes to embrace air power. and it becomes an important part of all of his operations. in fact, kenney is so focused on these early advances and to these early raids that would go sees forward airbases for his fighters. the one time he had problems with lack of air power because they made a new leap too far. this is an example to macarthur. important andry we really always need that going forward. the other couple things i point out which i think has to come under the umbrella of combined operations and under the macarthur evolving. sometimes we forget from the american side that there were a tremendous amount of a strong -- of australian troops involved. keep waiting for an historian to write a review of my book and say, for a yankee did not do too bad of a job of reminding folks, the australians were involved. the final operation of combined operations is the operations, the kind of intelligence that permit george kenney to find that japanese convoy that is bound for leyte. make that kind of attack and be knows attack, macarthur where a lot of the concentration of japanese forces is. because it was relatively -- i don't what is easy -- but it was relatively telegraphed in terms of what he has to do to make the leap over the concentration of forces. in retrospect, sometimes it is written about and looks like strategic genius but it is really the fact that ultra has provided a lot of that information. so, i think, suffice to say, that macarthur really evolves during these four years as a commander. let's use the term military commander and leader. i do not necessarily use those synonymously. macarthur evolves on the technical side as military commander embracing combined operations, but he also comes to evolve as a leader. i think macarthur is really a hands-on lead from the front man who, in world war i certainly shows that. again, why he did not go to baton only one time during that terrible ninety-day siege, i do not think it is answerable. but the bottom line is he goes from the "i shall return" to the "we shall return" -- no, that was not general macarthur, it was definitely "i shall return " and by doing that, it galvanized american public opinion. but in terms of all of his communiques, many famous stories of his communiques, he evolves with that, too, as the war goes on. and if you read some of his communiques, it is almost like movie credits by the time he credits the american commanders and the australian field commanders as well. i think he does a good job of evolving, the whole idea was it necessary for him to wait ashore at some of these places? no, probably not. he understood it was great showmanship, he understood it was great press i think he desperately wanted to wipe out some of the characterizations and i think there was also a n element of his that he really wanted to be with his troops. he wanted to be in the field to see what happens. parenthetical, the evolution of combined operations. how could he go ahead and basically do some of these operations and go off on the field, sometimes going into radio silence, if he did not have the kind of strong staff that he had not only picked but also delegated. he would have found himself in deep trouble in terms of command and control of feet did not have -- command and control if he did not have that strong staff. let's look a little bit at some of the myths, if you will, about general macarthur. we have already talked about this lone wolf status and said he is really not. he has this great staff the -- he has this great staff. the other component that is important to remember is that he is always in a situation of receiving strategic directive from the joint chiefs. he is not out in the pacific as the lone wolf deciding all by himself how we will defeat japan. the joint chiefs of staff, again a reference to george marshall and admiral king, they are the ones devising a global strategy. in the pacific, they can never decide whether the main line of attack across the pacific will be douglas macarthur and the army in the southwest pacific or the others. but be that as it may, the directives are coming from the joint chiefs. but, i think macarthur, to his credit, is definitely a good soldier at heart. he is following orders and very effectively implementing those kinds of directives. as far as strategy, let's talk a little bit about island-hopping. that is another macarthur myth that he invented island hopping. a myth that he is the one who said we are going to circle and isolate the wall. the truth of the matter is that island hopping is something that we could even argue the japanese did their own form of island hopping when they leap over macarthur and 80,000 filipino troops and isolate them rather than engaging at the head so -- engaging head to head. somethingping is kincaid does in the allusions in 1943. this is a situation that by 1944, the joint chiefs made a decision they are not going to attack directly. they will basically isolated and send macarthur on his way through the rest of new guinea. again, even if he is not the father of island-hopping, and by the way, i think maybe you understand by my priority comments i am tempted to call him the father of combined operations. not quite. pretty important in that regard. so he is not the father of island hopping, but when it comes to new guinea and the attack on how india and going certainly attack, he embraces it. the second part is, does he always do that the answer is no. -- does he always do that? and the answer is no. we are going to hear about the campaigns in the southern philippines and everything that goes on. by 1945, he has been so successful, the joint chiefs throw up their hands and say, we have the strategy of going back and attacking the home islands of japan. macarthur's down there in the southern philippines and now he is going into borneo and wants to continue operations in the south, so it is the kind of thing they almost grow up their hands and say ok, macarthur has got all of these resources and we are going to let him go and run with it. the point of island-hopping is that he doesn't very well when -- does it very well when he chooses to do it and i think that he really is a master and understands the concept of isolating an opponent's strength. let's talk about low casualty rates. another myth of macarthur is that he accomplished more of everything with less of everything and along the way, incurred the lowest number of casualties. he said that repeatedly in his press releases. counts in the pacific do not bear that out. in round figures, there is about 100,000 american casualties killed in action in the pacific in the second world war. about 40% of those, 39,000, occur on the ground in general macarthur's theater. so again, the idea that he has the lowest casualty counts of any commander in some operations that is true, but another operations, when we compare it, to other operations on iwo jima , the casualty rates are pretty similar. there are two famous incidents of macarthur that critics point out to say he was callous about operations and things. the way he valued human life. the two famous examples are him are saying, go to burma, don't come back alive unless you take it. the casualty accounts do not seem high enough. he has a similar conversation in 1945 on luzon where he tells krueger that a again, you do not seem to have big enough casualty counts. what is going on with the advance? you need to press more heavily. these are two examples thrown out as criticisms that macarthur did not care about troops. let me suggest to you, and jim duffy will show you a photo and -- a photo in a little bit. there is a great photo of macarthur and kenney on the tarmac in new guinea getting ready to launch the paratrooper is the and with him commander of the 503rd parachute regiment. look at macarthur's face when that comes up on the screen. look at the way he has his hand on tolson's sleeve. let me suggest to you that macarthur realized he needed to expend lives. most regrettably, but it needs to be done in war in order to accomplish objectives. i think at his heart, he really did have a lot of empathy for his troops and the men he was sending into harm's way. and i would point out, jim i -- jim, i don't know if you did this on purpose, but jim's book in terms of photographs and everything, when i got that and looked through it, i was struck that a lot of those photographs show macarthur in a very engaged, caring discussion with an engaged comic caring look on -- engaged, caring look on his face talking to a man he is sending into harms way. that is not to say there is a little bit of dichotomy sometimes when macarthur would show up with his khaki gloves and pressed uniform and everything and talk to people who had not had a shower in two weeks and everything else. there was not always a great camaraderie between macarthur and the troops, there were different personalities. but i would suggest to you, my research would show the idea that the whole idea that macarthur did not care or was callous about an expenditure of lives just is not true. let me tell you the final story about a myth that really makes me pull my hair out. this is one thing that i think is very difficult to defend douglas macarthur on and that is his continuing discussion, his rants, if you will that he is always short of supply, ok? and number two he is always short of men and finally that somehow the powers that be in washington are out to get him. i just do not think it is true. even in the philippines, in the fall of 1941, macarthur saying he could defend all the islands, send me all you've got, on the morning of december 8 him a -- on the morning of december 8, bomberscarthur has more that are in the entire philippines. we have all seen the movie "tora tora tora," so again, george marshall with limited resources, with president roosevelt, are pushing all kinds -- and i -- the whole idea that he did not have political support in washington. suspects that macarthur and people on his staff are always sure are out to get him and those of the obvious three subjects. three suspects. franklin roosevelt, george marshall, and dwight eisenhower. you will remember dwight d. eisenhower at this point, early in 1942, is still working for george marshall as chief of the war plans division. it is up to eisenhower to try to figure out, how will they did the philippines. both marshall and franklin roosevelt really have a commitment to do that and as the war goes on in there are more and more people, more supplies and everything that go into the south pacific theater, at one point marshall, in january 1944 has got to write macarthur and say, would you please hurry up and unload these supply ships? you are clogging the pipeline. they have dozens and dozens of ships waiting to be unloaded. macarthur, through all of this, with this great buildup of america's industrial-strength, is basically saying i am operating on a shoestring i need more stuff i need more material and supplies. so i understand that it is the job of a field commander to lobby for more resources but let me suggest to you that i think macarthur took that to the absolute extreme and there is an element of paranoia in his personality that is not more -- not very flattering. there is an element that he just could not embrace the fact that he was getting not only political support but also military support. and certainly, again, in the questions, if you wish we could talk about this relationship with franklin roosevelt in the -- and the whole 1944 presidential campaign and things like that. marshall, roosevelt, and eisenhower, would never be singled out as people who are huge macarthur fans. the truth of the matter is is they did support him and there was a lot of material that went into the southwest pacific. let me tell you the story that i think really emphasizes that. we have a situation where it is december 1943. george marshall and roosevelt and the joint chiefs are in cairo. marshall could well have simply flown from cairo westward back to the united states. he does not. he decides to go the other way in newit both macarthur guinea. -54 and the man who isomes macarthur's pilot, he at the controls. the copilot was sick on the cockpit floor. they are flying eastward into pakistan and it is pretty dicey. lightning all around, a big storm. they are checking the storm and all of a sudden lightning flashes and exposes these huge towering mountain rages on both side of the plane and they take a look at the map. a french map. elevations are in meters. not feet. [laughter] maybe we better pull back a little bit. that is how dangerous the trip was. that is the point of the story. that is how dangerous marshall's trip was. if that plane had gone down, that could've been huge in terms of the american war effort. i tell you that story again to emphasize how dangerous it was. so the plan goes on and it lands in india and eventually gets to australia. macarthur has been criticized for not being there in person to welcome george marshall, his boss. macarthur is out on an island. jim most show you a picture of jim will show you a picture of this, too. it shows those people who were on the side of being absolute, no holds barred macarthur critics, will go to the worst possible extreme to put a bad light on something. in this case, macarthur shunned marshall and went to hide on goodenough island and did not want to invite him. marshall did not feel that way, ok? and i suggest to you i think marshall gets a lot better idea of what is going on in the southwest pacific by flying to the island. by meeting with macarthur and his combined operations staff then he would have by being in some hotel room. from marshall's standpoint, and many times, and i think he is sort of the salt of the earth in terms of managing his commanders. marshall really goes and makes this effort pretty complicated to say to macarthur, we support, we the political establishment and military high command, we support what you are doing here. macarthur, on the other hand, says -- and let me just read you what he writes after that. macarthur says, probably no commander in american history has been so poorly supported at times of instability, as though was intended that i should be defeated. how do you write that? the only thing more disingenuous was macarthur's assertion that he had "absolutely no contacts in the united states, despite almost daily messages with marshall. from one of his letters, and i quote, his opinions were rarely sought and "my advice on important matters given little consideration." here's his final line, "my isolation is complete." again, all i point out about his good points, his military acumen and combined operation, it is just on was -- it is almost crazy to me to use that term that he cannot accept that people are supporting him. george marshall has just flown halfway around the world to prove it. and by the way, george marshall dispatches high ranking george lincoln, the brigadier general at the altar conference, after each of the major global planning conferences, marshall sees that a high-level officer on marshall's staff goes to wherever macarthur is and delivers the talk and gives the report in terms of what has happened. ok. final story, jim. people ask me do you have a favorite macarthur story? and the first time i got that question, i wrote about the four or five star admirals. i usually have a story that encapsulates each personality and draws a story as well. but i do not have a story like that about macarthur. i think that is because of how complex a man on all sides of the compass he was. let me give you my macarthur story and let you ponder it. there's no punchline. it is the second day of the boat escape. they are waiting it out on an island. japanese troops may appear at any time. old.thur is 62 years that is sold by the standards at the time. he is worried about his young wife. he is worried about little arthur. he does not know what is going to happen. let me suggest to you, to macarthur's critics, that i think they would do well to look at that particular moment because i think on that hot desert island, late that day as the sun scorched and they had to decide if they are going to make another run at night or wait for submarine, later that afternoon , macarthur really reaches into the depths of his personality and finds a steely resolve that really leads him forward through the course of the war and i think it accentuates both his more positive, better polities -- better qualities and accentuates some of his weaknesses, but on both sides, evolving as a leader and being exasperating on some of things we talked about, i think that moment is a pretty defining time. so where does douglas macarthur stand three quarters of a century from his tribes and defeats? on september 2, 1945 -- after four years of war, one thing was certain about douglas macarthur and his place in history. his rhetoric, however titled hyperbolic at times, and his characterization in films, generatents, served to an enormous rallying cry for the american and australian people in the dark days of 1942. responsible as he was for the debacle in the philippines, he miraculously escaped on presidential orders and a great majority of the world was left with no doubt that he would return. he was their inspiration, rallying point, and a synonym or victory. macarthur acknowledged one commentator provided his countrymen with a badly needed a idol at a time when the military altar was almost bare of icons. the american people continue to embrace him even as other heroes joined him on the after. -- on the altar. after march 1945, 43% chose macarthur for greatest general. eisenhower came in second with 31%, general patton was third with 17%. macarthur always carried with him and indomitable will to win. anand indomitable -- win.itable will to it was ingrained is his genes. he said there was no substitute for victory. a concept more clear in world war ii than in korea five years later. he fit the times perfectly. douglas macarthur's most important contribution was to be the hero who rallied america and its allies. and to become the symbol of inolve so desperately needed drearyry days of 1942 -- jury days of 1942. it was a role of a lifetime he played brilliantly. he was "macarthur at war." thank you. host: we will take a few questions. >> can you hear that? if you have any questions, please come to the microphone and ask your question. >> i just published a book on the japanese occupation. i lived through the war in manila. i've two points to make. you said the announcement of a two-ocean war, i do not get that from the history of naval operations busy -- operations because he said they got 3% or less of total resources well into 1943. macarthur's "i shall return" or "we shall return." when he said that, it was a rallying point. >> i can respond. the first thing is that you need to remember that in terms of supplies and support that were going into the philippines, you -- into the pacific, you are absolutely right about the 30% number. but you have got to remember that the united states had adopted along with great britain, a germany-first plan. at that time, they were about to be engaged in the war in europe. there are some people who think that nothing should go to the pacific. no commitment in terms of returning to the philippines, no commitment to fighting japan because they are going to defeat germany first and be done with it. that's why i think king is so important. he says three things and sells the joint chiefs on it. one, we will defend australia to effect a return to the philippines. number two, we will make absolutely sure there is defense of the west coast hawaii lifeline to australia. and three, in order to do that, we will not only bulk up counterattack against the japanese in the solomons. so king really is the one who is pushing. -- as toyour point returnint about we shall versus i shall return, i agree with you 100%. i think it really put a personal face on it. not just for your people in the philippines, but for americans, australians, everybody. it became very, very personal and personifies the war effort in the pacific by macarthur. it is one of the stronger points. >> my name is chris larson and i ran to the battle -- through the battle of manila to get to the safety on the fifth of january, 1945. how we survived, i have no idea. my question is, what is your opinion of what happened in the hours after pearl harbor was bombed? there are all kinds of stories out there about sutherland let macarthur sleep there are stories out there about how a number or several of the top officers in the air force wanted to go ahead and attack formosa before the first japanese flight came over. there are half a dozen stories i've read about. i lecture about world war ii and the pacific, especially in the philippines through universities and schools. i have not been able to find what actually happened there and i'm interested in your opinion. walter: i'm not sure if anyone knows definitively what happened. let me tell you to start with -- let me tell you and start with a story, a lot of people of written at the story and that the phone rang, macarthur answered it, and on you went. thanks to the oral history here at macarthur memorial, jean macarthur says that she answered the phone and asked the phone to -- cast the phone to the general -- past the phone to the general. that is the way i have chosen to write it. why would jean make that up? why would she not have that detail firm in her mind? so it is sutherland who places the call, but it is jean macarthur who answers the phone. and of course, then we go on to that moment from their. why did macarthur, as he waited through the hours of that morning, not let the commander of his air forces into his office to discuss things? why did he not summon -- and i have not been able to find the record that he did or they met -- macarthur is going to criticize tommy hart up and down and let's face it, he had limited resources, but if the -- but is it macarthur's decision or is sutherland being the gatekeeper not letting him in? forth a coupled of times. and that is why, out of clark field, it is really a lieutenant colonel who decides based on the reports of the early strikes on northern bataan that they are going to scramble the farmers and fighters. the short story of that you know is a fog settles in formosa, they cannot get the attack off, the americans think, that is all there is. they relent the bombers and so on. i think there are some conflicting issues in macarthur's brain about how quickly he should launch the attack. his orders, if the philippines are attacked and he knows well they have been, to launch a counterattack, we could argue how effect of 35 ee-17's would have been at that point but i think if there is an incident, i think part of it is what i alluded to before. about macarthur being a 19th century man and working on macarthur's timetable. he had not yet fully grasp how quickly events were going to move. i think he procrastinated and waited. yes ma'am? >> in my readings -- my family was in santa tomas -- my dad was a gold-mining engineer in the philippine islands. in all of my reading, my father, you know, i was so young i do not know anything really about the truth of what i am telling you but my father insisted all of his living days after coming back from that war that the chinese had a great deal of information about the coming attack by the japanese on pearl harbor and the philippines. and it was on the behalf of my family that the japanese told my -- that the chinese told my dad, you must get your family to manila and you must it out. -- you must get out. so my dad did that. my question is, in all my reading i read nothing about the influence of the chinese or lack of influence or anything. yet, they were right there with the japanese on their first up. -- on their doorstep. they had already suffered from japanese incursions. why is there nothing about it -- why is there nothing about what we did or did not know from the chinese and why were they not talking to the americans? walter: absolutely. the japanese and chinese of course, had been fighting since 1937. huge war going on with its ups and downs. i do not know the answer to the specifics because i do not know specifically the reports of what you mentioned from your father. but i would suggest that part of it is that china is really in chaos. i mean, that is a characterization we could apply to china a lot of times. so i do not really know how much communication is going back and forth between the americans in china. of course, there are americans there, including an investor at that point. that point.r at so that is not a very good answer to your question, but i just do not know that story of that kind of chinese involvement. >> my name is james morningstar. could you explain your impression of macarthur's evolution of commander of unconventional warfare, especially his relationship to the guerrilla warfare in the philippines. walter: i think macarthur came to realize he was dealing in a very special geographic area. there is this expense of water. -- there is this expanse of water. of rugged islands and things. unlike the static trenches of world war i, i think the core of combined operations as he realized he mused to be -- he realized he needed to be flexible and mobile. that kind of mobility really had to be visited on macarthur relatively early. hopefully, we will have more -- we will hear more this afternoon. the same thing in terms of guerrilla warfare on things in the philippines. macarthur is not used to wage a more that way. -- waging war that way. because of reports he gets in terms of intelligence, but also the fact that this is the resistance he wished wainwright and others would continue to engage on in the islands, i think he comes to embrace that. >> i have a process question. as an author into historian, can you talk us through from the seed of the idea to this book to the more in-depth narrative to publication. do you have a set process or is it different with each work and topic you address? walter: i have a pretty set process. this is my eighth major american issue with new york publishers and i think i would not say gets easier, but there is a process in terms of i know what i need to do from proposal to outline to actual research and then writing. i did a book called "the admirals." which is about america's four and five star admirals. when i did that, quite frankly i have a chapter in their called --a chapter in their called there called "fighting the japanese-and macarthur" so maybe i can be blamed for a little but of the army-navy rivalry. at the time, that was about seven or eight years ago, i had no idea i would go ahead and write about general macarthur. i was encouraged to do that both by my publisher into editor and -- publisher and editor an agent. i'm the kind of guy, i may have a real short-term attention span or something, i cannot go and research an entire book. i have got to begin research from a chapter outline and then write very, very quickly. i stay pretty close to that process in terms of outline and everything. quite frankly, when i get to the end, maps and photos are important and in this particular book, i was here at least four times and many e-mails for the process. as an academic, sometimes as a private historian, i miss some of the give-and-take that you might find in faculty rooms or from colleagues on an academic basis. i dedicated to my friend at princeton. i am dedicated to that back-and-forth. i find that very valuable because i do not have quite the kind of network that may be some folks do. does that help? >> absolutely. more, jim? one i have a suggestion to increase tourism. sorry for the crazy tourists but it will help make more money. let's give a shout to the world war ii veterans in here. [applause] you and especially the pilots may like this idea. i have a plan to construct a full-scale flying replica. "soleinspired by the book the author talks about where he wants to build a replica of the plane but he died in 1994 before he could. i am just wondering how many people here would approve of that. how many people would go for that? and i do have a few questions. are you going to be writing a book about macarthur in korea? that was interesting as well. walter: i am not going to be writing about korea. there will be a book out in the as icalled "the general." have done these books, the thing that has been most touching to me and rewarding to me are the world war ii vets that i have come to know. chris mentioned it is the beginning of the 75th anniversary of world war ii. by the time we're done five years from now in and we -- from now and we celebrate the victory on the deck of the missouri, there are not going to be many world war ii veterans around anymore. it is amazing the number of stories. but there are always people and most recently, i got an e-mail last week there somebody said, you know i think my father-in-law had this book of letters. it is a part of history. i'm going to go sign books. thank you very much for coming. [applause] >> american history tv airs on c-span 3 every weekend. month, primetime to introduce you to programs you could see every weekend. our features include lectures in history. visit college classrooms across the country. american artifact takes a look at the treasures at museums and archives. america, archival films and newsreel. the civil war. the presidency focuses on u.s. presidents and first ladies. all this month in prime time and every weekend on american history tv on c-span 3. american history tv a panel of scholars examine the history covered by the music hamilton and discovers is significance in modern popular culture. they also talk about their relationship between academic entertainment history. and they talk about film production. this was part of the society for historians of the early american republic it annual conference. >> we should probably get started. a great many people will have a great deal to say. and we ought to do what we can to make that happen. welcome to the panel, the second panel on hamilton.