really price any further. the argument that i would make is one of effect it has and that is drowns in yemen despite the obama administration's rhetoric to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al qaeda, that it's not drowns or airstrikes that are driving. it is civilian casualties. it's the individuals being killed along with the al qaeda targets. when i was in yemen, i was talking to someone who's very, very close to al qaeda he said look, you know, there's a difference between yemen and afghanistan and yemen and afghanistan are arabs and a knock at the country. in yemen archenemies in yemen. they move around much easier than they did. they can be a member of al qaeda and can be no locally. maybe some people known them as he tribesmen another see the u.s., for instance you would see them as an al qaeda member. the u.s. thinks it's killing an al qaeda member and maybe it is. but he's been a killed on the ground and yemenis seen being killed is in fact the tribesman. this is a challenge that the u.s. obama administration not released all and i would argue that the drones in the airstrikes have not actually solve the problem and they've actually exacerbated the problem the great deal. so not to go on too long, but just let me close with this last scenario. after the christmas day attack 2009, president obama asked his staff to imagine what would happen if al qaeda had been successful and i think that's a very good exercise. and if today al qaeda were able to carry out an attack, even a fairly small one not on the scale of september 11th, but on the scale of christmas day 2009, with the u.s. respond? many people, put myself into a large-scale renovation of yemen would be mistaken that the u.s. has been bombing them and for the past three years and it really doesn't seem to have had the impact of the u.s. is like it to have. one of the arguments instead is that the u.s. is able to bob al qaeda can keep a credit back on its heels, the al qaeda won't be able to plot complete and launch attacks against the united states. the last three years have shown that is not indeed the case. we've seen this year the u.s. is carried out at least by my count anywhere from 37 to 50 airstrikes on suspected al qaeda target. those are according to the anonymous officials that we'll see quoted in the "washington post" or "the new york times." those are an effort to kill 10 to 15 individuals with the u.s. police plot against the u.s. so one of two things is true. neutron strikes aren't as accurate as we all told they are or the u.s. is doing something different than what it says it is doing, targeting more than just a 10 to 15 individuals. so what would any initiation and be able to do if al qaeda were to carry out an attack today? if a large-scale ground invasion is foolish in the disaster is and is really table, do they just have another missile search, which referred the same, which doesn't seem to be effective. this is the critique of the jenin battle that has been designed by individuals within the upon the administrator is not dismantling and defeating al qaeda. in yemen, was happening on the ground if al qaeda is expanding and the problem is exacerbated. so while ibrahim finished an optimistic note, although i fell back to earth with a rather pessimistic one. >> thank you, both. before it up into crushing sunni audience, what is to have. the first question is how much of al qaeda in the arabian peninsula is really a great united states? is it fair to say this is an organization dedicated to attacking the united states? is it safe to say it's only 10 to 15 individuals and if they are dead or arrested for you are retired, a bigger question i have is both of you are critical of a term solution. greg, you spoke to do clearly about baker is on the current solution, but there's problems as well with what i call a development solution. there's no real link in the academic literature that development reduces support for terrorism and attack some believe it might even increase it. more broadly is that there's absolutely no political will. there's almost no financial capability, it received at least in the united states to do a massive development program in yemen. this is not something the u.s. is good that it may be an individual project you're there, but transforming the economy. so in a way, if all the options are lousy, demand up with the lousy drone option rather than the work since the development option? i ask you to comment on both of those. ibrahim, i'll ask you to start. >> thank you. well, let me start with the first. i think i'm a very large-scale large-scale -- [inaudible] and i'll explain now. one of the issues that i'm not very supportive of use to treat one individual without looking at the entire conflict. the problems in the stability that yemen is facing is where as a whole, that is where the defense is coming from. jim and his almost 25 million people there. [inaudible] the gulf region here again talking about a region that is linked directly to the national economy and is going down the hall. so yemen so far has kept yemen contained in one geographical area that resulted out of yemen. let's keep in mind that on the other side of yemen and somalia now we have the message that yemen -- we can only imagine the moment between the goal for between europe and asia in the department. when i look at it as a whole, that's receiving major problem, major potential problem that if the situation becomes aware and yemen goes into violence, thessaly should be expecting to see. so probably you are right but at the moment we are not seeing that very obvious%, but these scenarios, especially as mentioned earlier, there's a political sense in yemen. that is where we would expect to see happening in that region. and that's what my view is. now, other approaches that aren't effective, well, greg and i have agreed security solutions based on drones presently go argument is not a big doing. i look at where al qaeda was 10 years ago and where it is now and this is again "the new york times" or others. so they know it's not working in the figure of the solution has failed and is contributed and away again to the regime of manipulation of al qaeda and that is how it went. now i think the importance of development in my view has engaged the people in a process that was not a piece called the casualties of the civilians of the anbar province, but with a process that they belonged to is that contribute to because in my view, one of the major problems again as they show ownership limited to the regime and not the way i see it happening but the new regime was to have the president embarking on similar policies. so engaging with people in my view is the major key here and that's a contribute to making a difference. >> yeah, it thinks. , those are both very good questions. i think ibrahim case an expansive answers. why look at al qaeda in the arabian peninsula, this is an organization we otherwise think of as a terrorist organization that who it is they are defines them. al qaeda of course sees itself as an organization that carries out attacks. they wouldn't call them terrorist attacks. i think we all agree there are terrorist attacks. they're an organization that carries out operations and that is an important distinction. carrying out attacks is only part of what it is the organization does. this is an organization that unlike other groups of al qaeda that we've seen are able to carry out attacks in yemen and able to carry out attacks or attempt to carry out attacks abroad, whether in saudi arabia and the attempted assassination in 2009 whether it's their attempt against the united states. but there is a different finance to decrease of attacks and attacks in yemen are a means to an end for the organization. they are a means to head back against yemeni government or military attacking non, whereas attacks against the west are an ad in and of themselves. dan, you asked about sort of killing these individuals and are just going after the 10 to 15 and the individuals plotting against the united states, would we be safer? is a great three-part series in the "washington post" by greg miller, karen deyoung agricola address just this. one of the quotes from u.s. official in their lives we have 10 to 15 or 20 enemy killed them and there's 20 guys this sort of papa. this is very seductive if you're in the pentagon you have this list of individuals plotting against the united states. if you come across these names off the list makes it feel as though you keep the united states safer. i think there's a faulty logic going on in there. we've seen over the past decade the u.s. is fighting wars that just killing these particular individuals is in itself make us safer because so often many more people, put in the ranks. there's also a tendency to personalize al qaeda appeared particularly in yemen we saw this with the american-born cleric, the individual that the argument was advanced that if he could be killed the u.s. would be safer. he was as close killed in the drone strike and said number 2011. we know they had a plan in which they gave the latest version thankfully to an undercover agent. so not on where a lackey hasn't crossed list we talk about ibrahim sharqieh were all worried about. there's a couple important things to remember. one, abdu rabu mansour hadi wasn't a member of al qaeda. this is an individual radical license. this radicalize largely because of the iraqi war and while we're focused on this individual, on abdu rabu mansour hadi as the bomb maker, is a mistake to think of the u.s. were to kill him al qaeda's bomb making capabilities would all of a sudden disappear. abdu rabu mansour cross the border into test and fix as i recounted in the book. he was trained by someone presumably in yemen and has been promoted in six years. it's a fairly safe assumption that he's trained other individuals as well. so just talking about individuals sort of misses the point is what i think is particularly important is that as al qaeda has expanded in late 2,952,000 or more today, al qaeda in the arabian peninsula has a much bigger pool of talent from which she drawn out limited previously. briefly on your second question, i agree there are a lot of good options. i am not anti-drone. i think drones are an amazing piece of technology that the u.s. has, but if used judiciously and wisely can i think make a big difference in the work and so qaeda. however, instead of being a part of the solution, they become the totality for the obama administration and i think you're right that people in washington look at yemen and cms and yemen house for a number officials become too hard to do. easiest thing is drones are perfect, so let's do that. i think a very real but unspoken assumption underlying all of this was really brought out over the past month as they went to yemen and back to the united states is that the u.s. seems to believe that this is a war the u.s. can win on its own and i think that's wrong and i think that's a mistake. if this is the u.s. against al qaeda and yemen, if it's framed that way come to seem that way, that's where the u.s. can never win. the only people who ever defeat al qaeda are the yemeni shiites coming in the clerics and so forth. the u.s. can do a lot to help them. unfortunately see right now is the u.s. that is so heavy handedly encouraging that so many strikes and killing so many individuals and yemen, the u.s. is essentially shrinking the space in which individuals can stand up against al qaeda. let me end with one and it goes. there is an anti-al qaeda cleric who railed against al qaeda from the pulpit, talked about what it was they were doing this against islam kamal jim and should not be in a good of jihads. this is something of a real impact, hurting al qaeda's recruiting, scheduled a meeting, wanted to get him to back off on some other metric. this meeting was to pay u.s. drug, u.s. air strike in the anti-al qaeda cleric was killed. b. macinnis,, in the back. please wait for the microphone and please introduce yourself. >> name is helena and i spent the last year in yemen and has some of the same observations i heard you talk about. i was there september to may -- i think the last point you leave us with is a huge way for america to really hate straight when they talk about the window where it was an opportunity to work together and for america to partner against al qaeda. that opportunity is largely influenced the drone policy. do you think there is any room are opportunity to somehow patch that i've been to work from their? and the second part of the question is people -- there's been no moral accountability, no accountability at all and a lot of yemeni people are saying hey, where's the responsibility? verse reparations? of the civilians have died. there's been no reparations. do you think that could even never be a possibility but what would that look like? >> thank you are great, where to start and then we'll go to ibrahim. >> on the first by compuware write about a missed opportunity. we saw this on the counterterrorism side as he addressed quite eloquently as well as on the political side. i think the u.s. really missed an opportunity to get rid of president sulla and his family. one of the lessons of the past year and a half in yemen politics and how the u.s. is on track to yemen as an opportunity for them if they don't come around again. there's a price to pay for diplomatic mistakes and when the u.s. makes a mistake by running its yemen policy regard or that he said he read the kingdom take the leap in yemen, which is mind-boggling on why that would be done, there is a very real diplomatic and political price to pay. when i was in yemen, think i took away its yemen is a broken country. it's difficult not to maintain faith in the fiction that gunmen this is a unified country. the places outside the capital have drifted so far beyond control of the central government in sanaa will take much more time, much more effort and money to bring them back into the orbit of the central government than the yemeni government really has capacity for right now. even in the capital, sanaa has become a city of factions. there's essentially four factions fighting over sanaa. at the top you see political elites. you know, the former president, one of the really amazing things in tunisia denali goes into exile. mubarak was to present. and libya, gadhafi is killed. he has immunity in a silly political player. so you see factions that are really fighting while everybody else is doing with electrical blackout that happened every day with the rising price of water and flour and bread and petrol. it's really quite broken and into this steps organizations like al qaeda when the south river to provide services. you are right the opportunity has been missed. i don't see any easy or quick solution and that's what the u.s. is looking for right now. i'm the second point of accountability, you're absolutely correct there as well. this has been a frustration. i've had many conversations you've had and sat down to type the u.s. diplomat including some who are intimately involved and some of these strikes. when i asked him about the situation like the 16-year-old son of or a lucky who was born in denver, colorado. he was killed in a drone strike in september 2011. let's been told to me, what's been said to me as he was sitting with the wrong people and he said at the wrong people does it happens. that might be a few that make sense in washington and maybe something to look at people as if they're al qaeda or not al qaeda that that works. in yemen where people are known as more than just members of al qaeda, with the most role and at times competing identities in the hierarchy of allegiances. that does not sit well at all. one of the things the same is it's not as though al qaeda's theology, worldview, morality has suddenly become popular in yemen are palatable to a lot of people in yemen. but when people are being killed, when you visit tribesmen, a father, lucid mother or your brother or son, what happens is the senior took been in and people pushed into the arms of al qaeda because al qaeda is fighting back against the u.s. and the u.s. is the organization, the country that kills your tribesmen and family member, says the marriage of convenience for people and that's very dangerous because this could then expand al qaeda much more broadly and it doesn't matter what their motivations are. it matters the actions they carry out an attempt to attack the u.s. >> thank you. ibrahim. >> the element here -- the problem in yemen is very conflict. one dimension of this conflict is in the past that the former regime actually reminds many of the tribal leadership and it got many of them involved in corruption, said the regime rather solves security in many parts of the country. so they have their own structure, their own interests as the pursuing their own tribal interests. the tribal leaders are pursuing interests of tribal members. they are loyal to saudi arabia. so the issue is not only limited or contained within yemen, but also extends beyond that. the tribes are a big order. now whether you can build an alliance with the tribe come and that's a big question and for that i want to make sure an example of the most recent experiences with the new government -- [inaudible] and al qaeda -- [inaudible] there was the alliance and the yemeni have their own tribes. so by catherine it's again the drawings and the alliance with the yemeni army after al qaeda was pulled out, what happened is the yemeni army withdrew from them in the local tribe is to deal with the retaliation of al qaeda. so what happened a few weeks later, a suicide bomb or had a funeral that ended up killing 46 people. so this has been a huge obstacle for alliances to build with the yemeni army. so we have not only not killing with the issue of outsourcing security, but rather issues of trust. to what extent the tribe can trust the new government or contrast the u.s. government. i'm not sure this issue of trust exists. which make said of course more complicated. now i think the lady for bringing up the second issue, which is about the reparation, which is now writing a paper on the issue of reconciliation and attacked about reparation and that hopefully will come out soon. and of course there's the issue of accountability. some also the reconciliation moving forward because i strongly believe in the means of the political system is that there should be not only reparation in terms of money, but most importantly an apology. i mean, in particular from the yemeni state that contributed to the suffering of the people in yemen over a decade. now, with these problems that result, not only in terms of financial, but policy is in india's government is willing to do. so reconciliation and reparation is not only about financial. it's part of the solution in my view. >> thank you. right here in front. >> thank you. my newest entry network at network at the washington institute. people think of al qaeda as a terrorist organization, increasingly as the insurgency in yemen and many of the lessons learned might be some things and i'm struck by how much the policies discussed is eerily similar to attacks in iraq and afghanistan -- [inaudible] >> thank you. greg, do it to start up one? >> sure, i'll try to i'll try to be brief, which is against my nature, but i'll try so we can give our questions then. like i said earlier, it is important for us to think of al qaeda more like they think of themselves as an organization. we saw in 20112012 as ibrahim mentioned that al qaeda was able to provide services to the essentially became the defect or governing body. they set up their own police system, the court system and were providing water, electricity. and they were providing importantly security. it was a very jacksonian, narrow, their interpretation of sharia law and you do something people do the rules of the game and they knew the security and in that way there are parallels to the rise of the taliban in the night to 90s in afghan and then you had places where in schools that have been petitioning the yemeni government for years to send teachers, they never came and al qaeda showed up and saw a need within a couple weeks with a bunch of al qaeda guys teaching young individuals within the school and you can imagine what it is they were teaching. one of the important things to keep in mind here is that the current generation of leaders, bin laden's personal secretary, someone who went after afghanistan worldview is from the 1990s. the worldview of thomas al qaeda leaders have formed today and the environment much more radical than was the case nearly a decade earlier. there are some important lessons the u.s. can learn from iraq and afghanistan and what is taking place there. again the thing i take away under the stress to people is that this is not a word the u.s. can win on its own. it's very tempting for the years to see a problem and want to go and consult it all the way. there has to be a realization that sometimes being so proactive and carrying out so many missile strikes and drum strikes can actually have a negative impact. >> ibrahim come at a joint to >> well, i didn't hear the question. but what greg said made sense to me, so thank you. >> i'm sorry. all lectures are repeating the question to make sure. >> thank you good good morning. i am giancarlo gonzalez the talk radio news service. yemeni president abdu rabu mansour heidi was here that september and he expressed his unreserved admiration for the general program. i would like you to comment on not as well as subsequent statements were obviously you mentioned economic packages as part of the corruption of his part of the road. he also mentioned huge economics knows that help this country as well as allies which enabled him to ultimately -- [inaudible] >> ibrahim comment the question is about the new statements that it a strong program that i i thk the saudis for their support and i will add my own little to this question in general the impression i get from both you and greg for their grave problems with the current approach. when the service greg and then ask ibrahim to comment as well. >> i was actually in yemen when president heidi was here. there were bigger concerns and i think it's important to remember when we talk about president specifically that this is an individual who came to power with almost no domestic base of support within yemen. so what we've seen happening since he took power in figure 2012 is president hadi is incredibly reliant in order to continue to rule because he needs the u.s. and the strong full throated support of the international community in order to offset the last domestic support within yemen and the usa's president hadi because president hadi allows the u.s. to carry out and do it's really important for the u.s. in yemen, which is carry out strikes against al qaeda. some are little concerned -- i'm very concerned with the mutually dependent relationship where both sides need the other in order to do what it is they want to do in yemen to continue to rule them at the u.s. to carry it out drumsticks, but neither advanced yemen down the road create the environment we all want to see, which is a place for al qaeda doesn't have safe havens. >> thank you. that's a very good question. i have an office actually that came out in particular and sending congratulations to the new term for president obama and the issue and congratulations and continuing to do with counterterrorism policy. let's keep in mind that no president, president hadi is a possible regime. he was the vice president and he's a military man with a military history and the vice president and he was part of the policies, so that's one. two, i think from a number of statements is more mentioning support of the military support to its structures of military units, which is one of the major challenges that president hadi is facing now and actually that will determine he was living now. the former machine have been the former president is they are in this part of making the opposition group. so one of the major challenges is reforming the security units in yemen and that is the un's help is needed. so we see that continuing policy of focusing on military support to president hadi as well. >> thank you. >> thank you. donna cranfield for the middle east. i agree with both of your comments and statements that the narrow view of our security approach is counterproductive and development approach should be taken. a bit too pushy both a little bit further in defining what that would look like. imagine you said at the pentagon and try to conceive of a programmer approach to be more project to an understanding that you don't have to be responsible for the next bomber who does slip through the cracks and understanding that the development approach i think we all see as fundamentally essential will take years if not decades to actually achieve it subject to so for the and medium term strategy, what is the alternative? pulling back and drum strikes may be something that i like to see. i guess that also with the mind of the last question that presidents hadi's rough embracing is seeking ownership in the way he mentioned that needs to happen -- [inaudible] so here is someone taking ownership by saying i'm the one who personally approves these strikes and then the public reaction was extremely negative in yemen. so how to do with all these factors. >> grade, ibrahim, just repeat very, very briefly, what would a development approach look like in some detail, beyond which encouraged government in yemen, but what programs and initiatives might be success? and to piggyback on not come if development is succeeding would be the long-term so they're still short-term and medium-term risk and pratt and how would this be built with? greg, will ask you to begin. >> sure, i don't know if i agree that a development approach is the best way to go in yemen. a great many of the things stanza in his remarks before his question. i think development has to be part of it, we have to take reality for what it is. the u.s. is having an economic crisis. we're not just going to pour money into yemen although we give yemen more money this year than ever before and one could make arguments about how much we're spending on drones and it's all classified them where's and the military spending on the parallel clandestine programs are known or at least are not known to me. i think there's a lot of things the u.s. can provide. the u.s. can provide that leadership. the u.s. can do a good job on things such as judicious use of drum strikes and other things, but this is where the u.s. has to bring another regional allies and particularly saudi arabia could have a positive role to play here. mohammed then i is someone who's running several networks of informants we know from lake so we think we know from lake. the u.s. is concerned because of al qaeda. everyone in the room realizes that his primary the u.s. concern them in the al qaeda problem goes away like in 2004, 2005 from the u.s. tends to yemen, there's an argument here to be made about incentivizing the type of behavior that you want to avoid. but for saudi arabia, yemen is right on the border insanity has more concerns. certainly better qaeda, also chaos filling over. this is one of the ways the u.s. can partner with intercollegiate. it would be a mistake to advocate a leadership role within the international community gave that to saudi arabia because of all the mistrust. one of the things that's really stands out to me and do something a brookings institute individual has talked about a lot is for obvious mistakes, they're still a belief that what it is the u.s. stands for and what yemenis would like to see and they're still a role for u.s. leadership. so u.s. political leadership combined with saudi economic support could go a long way towards solving this as well as not taking drum strikes off the table, but rather limiting them. it's not as if yemenis are up in arms whenever there is a drone strike an al qaeda operative was killed. it's a civilian casualties, not the al qaeda men urged an that's an important thing to keep in mind. so hopefully, ibrahim i've given you enough time to really tell us what the solutions are. >> well, i don't know if i have the solution, but i think there's a lot of areas of agreement. binaries not the only approach that can be viewed here for the solution. that is presentation i that is why in my presentation i am not relying on the development would seek obama, that's why emphasize the political sentiment, which is believe it or not in my view is the most important of the shortcomings and, not as indicated that a successful political settlement to see that they are trusting the transition process in place in this process is making a difference and is the answer to many yemen. second, on the development issue, yes, if you expect in a short-term solution, then probably you shouldn't -- [inaudible] keep in mind it's unavailable. here is the sustainability that was a major problem with policies that it's the developments are back and forth as we know in 2004, 2006 in 2008 in so for it. so development provide one turn, not short-term but sustainable solutions. no on this issue going back to the short term, had the question , what is your solution? what are you going to do? the answer i got from gemini politicians is that this entire issue in the way we put a tear is in terms of ownership. ownership is a key issue and empowerment of the local leadership is definitely a solution and i can't agree more with greg on confirming saudi arabia as an enabling country -- in yemen, which would solve many of the problems. thank you. >> yes. >> hi, my classmates. i have a question. why do you think the drum attacks are some kind of necessary evil -- is someone in the u.s. were to issue a similar threat, the person would be killed. [inaudible] >> i'm going to actually start taking questions to a time because we have limited time. also the very front commissary. one second, wait for the microphone. >> well, i just wanted to get your thoughts quickly and if you think it might be a regional competition. >> grade. two questions, one on whether turn attacks are concerned a necessary evil and the second question on the situation of iran's influence within yemen. ibrahim come if i could ask you to start off this time? >> what is the question? >> just her brief thought on the situation but that would be. >> first of all, the mr. with drones. and i think greg outlined a very important thing distinguishing the drug policy and effectiveness. i'm not sure we got into a reclaim to be able to be a guy with legal factor. i think we focus on terms of effectiveness, what is effective and what is not. i just don't see how the drug policy contributed to our solution. i just don't see it. wanted above civilians anywhere, the problems are a very unethical. of course also it becomes a major driving force. so the way i understand was that picture. that was the first question. the second question is when i went to yemen, i went with many questions. [inaudible] no one seems to have answers. i went no one seems to have answers. i went there. i had to meet with the information office mas to this question. what do you want? the answer was i'm not sure how much sense you can make of it is they want to be treated like any other gemini. well, i'm not sure how to tell you about what is the issue. but it is an uprising against solid. they are protesting against the older shame. they are demanding that social, political and economic grievances. i think too many yemenis, guests, they have grievances that should be acknowledged. the major issue that a large number of yemenis believe it's financially and trying to have an influence there. when asked this question come in many yemenis believe they do. the most important development is to accept to be part of the national dialogue partner and to transfer from a militant policy in militant group to a political party. but think in my view this is the solution and acknowledging the economic and social political grievances and become a political party. that's what many yemenis want. their argument again is that fair many yemenis, white house? there is a balance we should visit. so burt stands now to be part of the yemen politics will determine the future of yemeni politics. the issue of the should be part of this national dialogue, which would involve of course transitioning from a militant group with political party. the transitions are not difficult, -- [inaudible] a successful transition of the political party will solve a big part of the problem of yemen, a major one actually facing the hope that i see. thank you. >> just briefly on the drones, like ibrahim i'm not a legal scholar. i have often turned that going to law school. maybe in a couple years. robert chesney, but goldsmith commend mary ellen o'connell at notre dame, all these individuals have said the drones of the drum synth on different sides of the issue, but i think their writings and speeches are in a much better position to address the issues they could put the idea of the american public and what it is the american public considers to be palatable. one thing i would say just a snippet of a footnote if i think of what was being done in the name of america was known in the united states to the degree that is found in places like yemen, i think would have been much different debate and discussion. one of the positive things i have seen with books like daniel clayton is kill or capture commenced the piece by scott shane and jo becker and "the new york times" is now as a country we are starting to have these debates in a way that we were just a couple years ago. so the more accountability is obviously difficult to have transparency with national security, counterterrorism operations. the more we discuss prison cons, how it is we want to do this, there is a possibility to put in place a legal and ethical framework that administrations of both parties have up to this point not done. one of the things that really surprised me and took me back when i was in yemen was how popular they had become. i think what we've seen over the last few years is that at the beginning, president of diaz sola that there is very little evidence early on. now it's become a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy. one of the things to remember about him and us a lot of people take money from outside sources. you're if i them in the country. was always unclear is how much influence that money buys. traditionally yemenis take a lot of money and just do whatever it is they were going to do anyway. >> i think we can have one last question. >> jim gingrich, energy research. to respond on gems comment on american policy. the review of the effective drug strategy, and does this represent an increasing militarization of american foreign policy? >> that's a very good question. question is to turn approach in yemen and elsewhere a reflection of u.s. foreign policy -- is greater militarization. >> yeah, that is a very, very big question. with regards to yemen, i definitely think you are onto something and i think there's a couple of reasons out what to very briefly and in closing. one is that drones, you know, there's a sense that using drone strikes, using airstrikes as a way that the affect the really combat its enemies without putting american forces at risk and with a sort of suffering the casualties we've seen in iraq and afghanistan. and while i think that maybe true long-term come i have great concerns about the potential blowback from his actions and that the potential casualties will be later on. that's a very difficult argument to make. i don't think anyone has the data to make it yet because we are still at the point where we haven't seen all the repercussions taking place for these attacks. but i do think that there will be unfortunately repercussions. the other thing i would note is that i think obviously given the situation in libya and benghazi, there are very real risks to american diplomats abroad. but i think what we've noticed over the past decade, the past two decades is moving really to assert that they risk aversion within the state department particularly. many more people who instead of having risk management, now we are much more risk-averse and both of those, the militarization of u.s. foreign policy and risk aversion within the state department has had the effect of many drums are much for attempting because we don't put people immediately at risk and we think we can solve the problem. i of course think that's mistaken. >> ibrahim, let's give it the last word, please. >> well, thank you. i want to thank greg, thank all of you for such a very important discussion and contributing to the understanding of the challenges facing yemen and facing the region. i will end again with what i thought but to ensure where to make sure that the nonviolent model in yemen and violence should be encouraged and they think a successful political settlement would reinforce this model and strengthen it in terms of the long-term sustainability and that's it gives us a solu t

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