leone and liberia in the past 21 days. and assessed, and if appropriate, tested for ebola. we provide health alert network switch reach hundreds of thousands of health care workers. we do webinars and reach out to associations, emergency departments, medical associations, and many others so that we can ensure that the available information is up to date and useful. right now the bottom line of what we are talking about today is that we are stepping up protection for people coming into this country and for americans related to travel. we will continuously look at ways that we can increase the safety of americans. we do that at many different levels we do that in dallas where officials there are working intensively to monitor every person who might have had contact with the patient to ensure that if they do develop fever they are immediately isolated and the chain of transmission can be broken. we do that in our health-care system with the kind of outreach i have described. so patients will be rapidly diagnosed and if found to have ebola, rapidly isolated. we do that at the source understanding that until this outbreak is over in west africa whatever we do can't get the risk to zero here in the interconnected world that we live in today. we do that through intra-and travel programs, including the efforts that we undertake in west africa and some that will be described in more detail later in this briefing. i think before turning it over to the deputy secretary i would like to emphasize the basic principles we use when looking at interventions. we continuously evaluate ways to better protect americans. protecting americans is our number one priority. we make sure that whenever we do is something that works, that we evaluate, that we can think of ways to continuously improve. third, we recognize that whatever we do until the outbreak is over cannot get the risk to zero in this country. that is why we continue to surge the cdc response in west africa and the u.s. response in west africa, and the international response, where we seen hundreds of health care workers, hundreds of millions of dollars, and affecting those countries paid as we say in health care, above all, do no harm. we have to ensure that whatever we do doesn't unintentionally increase the risk that we will be at risk. just mind is of what happened a decade ago in the sars outbreak, sars cost of the world more than $40 billion. it wasn't to control the outbreak. those were costs from unnecessary and ineffective travel restrictions and trade changes that could have been avoided. what we want to do is ensure that we don't undermine our ability to stop the outbreak at its source and unintentionally increase our risks here. to outline the new measures being taken and reviewed, i will turn it over now to deputy secretary. >> thank you very much dr. freeman. the department of homeland security is focused on protecting the air travel and is taking steps to ensure that passengers with communicable diseases like ebola are screened, isolated, and safely referred to medical s&l. we have implemented a range of measures to ensure a layered approach. today the existing measures include issuing do not board orders to airlines if the cdc and the department of state determines a passenger is a risk to the traveling public. providing information and guidance about ebola to the airlines. posting notices at airports to raise awareness about ebola, and providing a health notice commonly referred to as a care sheet to travelers entering in the united states that have traveled from or transited through the affected countries. with information and instruction should be concerns of possible infection. we are announcing, enhanced measures, specifically the enhanced screenings that will consist of targeted questions, temperature checks, and collection of contact information of travelers from the affected countries entering the united states at five airports. jfk, newark, douglas, chicago o'hare, and atlanta. customs and border control officers by way of background, they will observe all passengers for overt signs of illnesses, through visual observation and questioning as appropriate. for those entering the united states at all with the entry. in addition, moving forward all travelers arriving to the airports identified in the united states from liberia, sierra leone, will undergo the increase to measures. they will answer targeted questions about whether they have had contact with ebola patients. we will collect additional us-based contact information should cdc need to contact them. finally, we will take their temperature with a noncontact barometer which can be a key indicator of potential infection. we are taking these additional measures in a dynamic environment to ensure a layered approach and that we take the security measures that we assess to be needed right now. with that, i will turn it back. >> before opening for questions i would recap that starting a jfk on saturday and at the other airports that were mentioned in the following week, these airports represent 94 percent of the travelers who arrive from these three countries. the department of homeland security will be implementing a new detailed questionnaire as well as a temperature taking and providing information to each traveler. if any travelers are found to either have a fever or have a history of contact with ebola in the on-site centers for disease control and prevention public health officer will take additional action as needed. i want to emphasize this is stepping up protection. it is going to find people with fever or contacts who don't have ebola. we know that over the past couple of months one out of every 500 travelers boarding a plane has had a fever. most of those had malaria. none of those as far as we know have been diagnosed with ebola. we expect to see some patients with fever. that will cause some obvious and understandable concern. i would like to spend a minute talking about malaria. it is important to understand how it is relevant here. malaria is spread by mosquitoes. it cannot get it from someone else. malaria is a disease which in west africa is extremely common. it is also a disease which traditionally has been known in health care as a fever that comes and goes. it may come for 48 hours and then go away for three days. it comes back every two or three days. it would not be surprising if we sell individuals with malaria have a fever after coming back here. that might be common presentation among those who have fever, if any such people are identified. this is why incidentally we strongly encourage americans traveling to areas of the world that had malaria to take preventive medications which are highly effective at preventing malaria. what we would do in this situation is a clinical assessment and exposure assessment. we would then hand the individual off to either the local health care system that might need to assess and isolate individual and test them, or to the local public-health system which would, if the person is actually a contact, take appropriate action and ensure their temperature is taken every day for 21 days after the last exposure. before taking questions i would reiterate what we're doing is stepping up protection. we will evaluate the new measures and start them on saturday at jfk and over the coming weeks at the other airports i mentioned read we will if i wake this experience. we are always looking at ways to better prepare americans. we will start with questions. wait for the microphone. >> there are some critics who say that even with these efforts that people will fall through the seams, that it will not be enough to read will these efforts be enough to protect the country? >> what we are doing is putting in additional protections. we have been very clear that as long as ebola continues to spread in africa we cannot make the risk zero here. we wish that we could. i understand there have been calls to ban all travel to west africa. the problem with that approach is that it makes it extremely difficult to respond to the outbreak. it makes it hard to get health workers in because they cannot get out. it would make it harder to respond to the outbreak in west africa it will spread not only in those three countries but to other parts of africa and we will ultimately increase the risk here. that is why the concept of above all doing no harm is so important. next question? >> i am wondering about some screening at airports. how effective is this a finding sick people? >> we have looked at different screening methods at different times. the thermometers that are used are highly effective. they are fda up and for use in u.s. hospitals. they do not require touching the patient and they get a reliable result. is there anything more you would like to say about prior offense? >> i do not believe so. >> what is the legal authority the federal government has to hold american citizens if they need to be quarantines? there are some experts that say it is like looking for a needle in a haystack and the effect of what is happening today is to calm the public panic about ebola, that the risk and the usefulness of catching people with it is low but the effect is to calm people down. >> a couple of points. the first point is that the number of travelers is relatively small. we're talking about 150 print day. it is not an effort that would be particularly disruptive to large numbers of people. we think it is manageable. in terms of the legal authorities both within the public health and within the border efforts there are legal authorities and public health. there is a right to protect the public. we can do that by isolating individuals who may be infectious or a risk to the public. >> thank you. i would just amplify that response. in our screening we have the authority to take measures with respect to u.s. citizens as well as non-citizens to ensure that the public safety or security is not threatened. in the public health arena just as it is in the national security arena. >> we will go to the phone for the next question. >> today, from cbs news. >> the cdc has said that all we need are face masks, gowns, and gloves. then you see these hazmat suits. i'm wondering if ironically any consideration is being given to the possibility that this suit is increasing the risk of contamination because in taking them off someone can be contaminated. >> thank you. there is definitely a balance here. the more cumbersome and equipment it is, the greater possibility of a problem. in west africa we have seen needle sticks with clean needles but through infected by contaminated gloves. it is difficult to work in more cumbersome equipment. that is why we're looking at as many practical approaches that will still being safe. we recognize there is concern with the infection in spain, with the infections in west africa to make sure that our health care workers or say. that is why the cdc has infection control experts who worked intensively with any facility concerned about or has a patient with ebola. next question? >> thank you for taking my call and you may have explained this and the previous conference call. explain to us whether, stunk and was eligible to receive blood plasma from the hospital? what specific questions about the care of the patient who died would have been referred to the hospital there. i would remind us that ebola, even with the best of treatment is a terrible disease. it is fatal in a high proportion of cases. we encourage rapid and early diagnosis because the earlier someone is diagnosed the more likely they will be to survive. >> what information can you tell us about a possible second patient in texas? do you know whether this person was in contact with mr. duncan? was he recently west africa? >> my understanding, this is recent information, we will get definitive information the next few hours, there is someone who does not have either definite contact with ebola or definite symptoms even ebola who was being assessed. what we expect is that as people are more concerned, as there is a higher index of suspicion, people will be upset. that is is how it should be buried we should keep in perspective. right now there is only one patient ever in the u.s.. the individual tragically died today i read we are tracing the other 48 people with contact and of them as of today have had theodore symptoms, suggestive of ebola. we recognize we are not out of that waiting period. it is a time when we are anxious and assessing. >> was he one of the people monitoring? >> and to get back to you on that. my understanding is that he had neither a definite contact nor definite symptoms. >> the los angeles times. given the demand for manpower and supplies in west africa, are the critical resources that are being diverted for screening processes that could be better utilized on the ground in west africa or elsewhere? >> to screening program here is not diverting from or undermining our efforts in west africa. the temperatures will be taken under the supervision of customs and border protection. the cdc already does a staff patients. we wanted to add a small number of additional staff to provide 24/7 coverage at these airports. it is in no way going to make it more difficult for us to stop the outbreak in africa. >> earlier you talked about the added level of screening includes checking temperatures. if the symptoms don't show up for anyone days how does that help? >> we are looking at every layer that can be put in. the assessing and the possibilities of what can be done. one of the issues is the information provided to travelers who arrive in this country. that is provided in west africa and here through the cbp entry station through information. that is one of the areas we will be looking at closely. >> could you describe where the decision to do this additional screening at her words came from? did it originate in homeland security or in the white house? i ask because i know you were critical of taking this step a week ago. can you tell us more about the quarantine facility is? will they be at each of these airports? will be staffers be wearing protective gear? >> i will ask the deputy secretary to continue. have said consistently we will do whatever is effective to protect americans. this is a whole of government response. we look carefully to seeing what we can do and do most effectively to protect americans. >> i would echo the remark. this has been a collective effort across the administration to respond to this outbreak of ebola in west africa. the individual customs and border protection officers will not be wearing masks. it has been a medical assessment of the need now. thank you. >> are there quarantine stations? >> yes. >> you said that we can't eliminate the threat to the united states until we take care of the outbreak overseas. can you see to the state of the international response? what is the situation there? >> we are seeing surging enough resources to the country and to each of the three countries. we're surging out to each of the counties and districts within the countries. these are three countries that have different epidemics. liberia has had the most extensive so far. there have been in some areas some decreases in recent weeks. we do not know if those will hold. in sierra leone we see increases of cases that are concerning. there are increases and decreases, and we are monitoring that closely. we have seen a strengthened response from the world health organization and the united nations. we have seen many countries stepping up, including the united kingdom. if you look at sierra leone at our efforts as an example to do laboratory work, the cdc operates several of the essential laboratories in these countries. in addition, the united kingdom, south africa, russia, china, canada, the european union, and i'm leaving out a few, they do laboratory works. there has been a strong international response to challenge. we are seeing in west africa some signs of progress. we are seeing more safe burials in liberia. we have contacted organization that is expanding from the country to provide safe burial service. we are working with communities to do that an increase isolation and treatment capacity. i think we are beginning to see that search response have an impact on the front lines. it is going to be a long fight. we are far from being out of the woods. >> there has been a major effort from the u.s. and other partners. we hope and expect to see more resources coming in from countries around the world matching the leadership the u.s. is showing. right now the biggest challenge is getting resources needed to the front lines where they are most needed. we will go to the phones. >> my next question is from maryland. >> i wanted to ask about a situation in suburban dallas. he said the person does not have definite contact with ebola or definite symptoms. do they have possible context? >> since it is a merging situation i would have to refer you to dallas. often in situations like this information may change from minute to minute. i would reiterate what i said earlier we do not have a concern for symptoms consistent with ebola or for definite contact as far as everything that i have learned up to a few minutes ago. >> my question is regarding air travel. the new procedures for the different airports. is there a special procedure or guidance given to the airlines when thinking about cleaning an aircraft that has just arrived from west africa? is that a precaution to take? can you explain what the airline should be doing in that regard? >> we have detailed the guidelines and work closely with the airline industry. there are guidelines if the have a patient potentially with ebola for enhanced cleaning of the airplane. is anything more you would like to add? >> i do not. >> let's go to people who haven't asked questions. >> you noted earlier diagnoses increased the chance of survival. given the delay amid i know that diagnoses, did that contribute to his death? it is ambiguous with the communication failure was at that hospital. how can americans be confident that other hospitals are not going to make the same mistake? >> i can't comment on what might have happened with an individual patient. one of the things we're working hard to promote is ensuring that doctors and nurses, pharmacists, health care workers throughout the system think ebola. anyone who has fever and asks whether they have been in africa in the past 21 days. that is important. that will help us ensure that if there is another patient who arrives they are rapidly identified for their own sake and their care to isolate them promptly. >> following up on the question, we have heard about who this person is in frisco, texas. the 48 people, all all 48, are they being monitored with a personal temperature check? if this person was not one of them they would not be getting those checks? >> in texas, intensive work is gone on to identify everyone who had appeared definite contact with the index patient and everyone who might have had contact with the index patient. that identify 10 people with definite contact and 38 whom content could not be ruled out. everyone of them has been identified, monitored every day when someone from the public health system measuring the temperature with an accurate device. none of them have had symptoms. none of them have had fever. there have been rumors and concerns other contact or cases. none of them have panned out. i understand there is a situation being assessed. the latest information we have is no definite contact him and no definite symptoms. >> one is that duncan didn't have a fever when he was question, and he lied about his contact. what our screening process be effective in catching him today? can you talk more about what cost the $40 billion in the sars epidemic? >> it is true that the index patient when he left africa did not have a fever and we think he did have a fever when he arrived here. he became sick 40's after arrival. these questions may have identified him as a contact interviewed by customs and border protection. we are looking at every step that can be taken to increase the likelihood that if somebody arrives and developed ebola they will be rapidly diagnose an isolated. in terms of the costs of sars, many of those were related to people canceling travel, to trade restrictions, or tray that did not occur. i have spoken with business leaders who emphasize that there are so many misconceptions about ebola that they are already seeing things like a reduction in investment in parts of africa that are not in any way involved in the ebola outbreak. we are concerned if we don't ensure that we focus on what works and do that well we may have that same kind of unnecessary and counterproductive costs year. >> i wanted to ask a question about the difference in care between, stared duncan and kent bradley. you are referring those questions to the hospitals. >> i would, that each patient situation is different. unfortunately z-mapp, a promising treatment for ebola is not available. there is no more of it in the world. it takes a long time to develop. other medications, it is up to the treating physicians and the family of whether or not to use it. that is all i would have to say at this point. next question? >> are these announced measures the extent of the new protocols or is there more to come? >> first off screening of outbound travelers is already underway. it has been for some time. every person leaving has their temperature taken with an fda approved devices. every person leaving is monitored for fever. over the last two months we have identified 74 with fever and three others with symptoms that resulted in the not working the plane. outbound travel is being monitored now. we are always looking at all the programs to see how they can be better or more effective. one of the things that we will be looking at is how this program goes starting at jfk and rolling up to the other airports in england what can be done as we continuously work to increase safety. >> you had mentioned strengthening those outbound screenings. one of the quick follow-ups, how will people be identified a flight out of west africa is a separate booking? >> would you like to respond? >> if i can just add something in response to the immediately preceding question, we are working very closely together across the administration and we will continue to assess the risk of the spread of ebola into the united states and take additional measures as necessary to protect the american people. it is very important to emphasize the point that dr. friedman made which is we are continuously assessing the situation and taking the measures we deem necessary. we have in our screening capabilities the ability to identify individuals traveling not only with respect to the last point of departure but the point of origin. we can embed it in a fine the full journey of the individual arriving in the united states. thank you. >> my question to you is the goal has always been to stop the outbreak at the source. we're seeing that is not the case anymore. ebola is identified decades ago. what can you tell us? is ebola here? that we need to keep an eye on? >> we have stopped every ebola outbreak until this one. this is an unprecedented outbreak in west africa. we are surging the response with a whole of government response point it is going to be a long fight. we remain convinced we can contain the outbreak in west africa. if we fail to do that then it would be a very different situation because it could spread to other parts of africa and could be a longer-term risk to us here. as of today the only patients with ebola in the u.s. are in hospitals. the only risk is among people who returned the last 21 days. it is important to put into perspective what the risks are. ebola is scary it is a deadly disease. we know how to stop it and we are stopping it in west africa community by community prayed dallas is doing an excellent job of tracing contact to stop it there. health-care workers throughout the u.s. need to think ebola in people who have fever and have returned from each or any of these countries in the past 21 days. two more questions and then we're going to stop. >> earlier the cdc sent out guidelines for handling human remains. can you expand on those guidelines? if the cdc will be playing a role with the dallas victim. >> as in africa, we are concerned that handling individuals who have passed away from ebola is a very high risk procedure. the way ebola works is if you are exposed but not sick you have no ability to pass it on to others. as you begin to get sick you may be able to pass it on. the sicker you get the higher amount of virus in your body. when somebody dies from it there are large quantities of virus in their body. we have worked to ensure that respectfully and the ability of the family to view the body, the patient who died earlier today, his human remains will be safely removed and safely handled so that they won't present a risk to anyone in the family or the health care system, and anyone who is participating in the process of burial. we have one last question. that will be back to the beginning. >> we already know about the others, but there were others out here. what happened to that patient? >> we don't reveal individual patients. we certainly revive detailed consultation from cd seeing on every single patient who we find. every single patient who might have ebola. so we can provide the expert consultation and ensure they get the care available here. and wrapping up, i would like to thank all of you for your interest. i would like to remind us of the tragedy of ebola for the patient's family in dallas and for the thousands of families throughout west africa who have been dealing with this terrible disease. i would like to thank the department of homeland security for their partnership in this and for customs and border protection. the commissioner there, whom we have a productive relationship with. we will always look at what works. we will continuously evaluate it and consider what more we can do to keep americans safe. understanding that as long as ebola is spreading in africa it will remain a risk here. we will do everything we can to stop it at the source and to protect americans. thank you. a memorial for president reagan's press secretary. former secretary of state colin powell talks about world affairs. an author talks about how as a marine in vietnam landmine exploded and nearly killed him and changed his life. author and:00, activist ralph nader calls for an alliance between parties to take on the issues that plague america. a surgeon and, author on why he feels medical science should be doing more for the aging and dying. naomi klein 7:00, on market capitalism and its impacts on climate change. curator and director of the cia museum explains the museum's mission of preserving and presenting the agency's history. saturday, the king george's war of the 1740's. how it helped the colonists established regional identities. president ford upon's congressional testimony on the nixon pardon. know it you think about the programs you are watching. us or e-mail us or send us a tweet. join the c-span conversation. ike us on facebook, follow us on twitter. >> the atlantic council and computer security firm o the next, computer security experts discuss how to make voting on the internet possible and its technological and political challenges. >> i particularly want to welcome those of you following this event online. we encourage you to join the discussion using the hastage #acevote. in a world of near infinite commuting powers -- computing p owers, almost every task can be executed online. majoritythat the vast of countries hold elections using paper ballots seems to be an anomaly. online voting has the obvious but still largely unproven potential to improve accessibility for the disabled and elderly. it can cut costs and improve voter turnout, especially for younger generations. although the adoption of most technologies takes time and benefits inting's terms of reach, access and participation have the power to revolutionize the democratic process. haveal countries implemented successful e-voting systems. brazil, estonia, switzerland. we hear are delighted that this report today is the outcome of the effective partnership between our cyber statecraft initiative, the partners formed at mcafee. took this effort because of the practical, results oriented approach of our cyber team, lead so ably by our top cyber expert. commitmentlects our to nonpartisan work. this is a bipartisan issue, with both sides aiming to create a cost effective and secure voting platform. we head into the home stretch toward congressional midterm election and we face the beginnings of what is already unfolding at the presidential election two years at. -- years out. we are intent on helping to shape a broader public debate on the role of the united states and the world and a critical ingredient to this debate is the extent to which our own public engages of the discussion, especially for voting. it could become a larger part of the political process of the united states and other participatory democracies if the security is in place. campaign patient a bipartisan as nonpartisan issue. in a democracy as possible if you have any questions create trustworthy platform. online istechnologies which must have security rights of landlord.. conversation -- he is a ranking member. he has become a national leader on cyber threats and cofounded a congressional cyber security caucus. as partis staff members of our next generation programmers. we are delighted to have you here. program i would like to introduce our key mcafee, tom mcgann of who has been a key partner. he is vice president of government relations with a long track record, but he began his on capitol hill as a legislative director into chief of staff to a congressman. thoughts onr a few the changing nature of the cyber security debate and how it can play a powerful role in enhancing the well-being of peoples lives. i look forward to getting into this report, both here and online. [applause] >> it is a great pleasure to be here. it's always a pleasure to work with such a distinguished group of people as the atlantic council. i would like to anchor the atlantic council for hosting this event and bringing together such a distinguished panel. the atlantic council is one of the leading think tanks in the world. his leadership has been truly impressive. he has developed a very fine cyber security practice that has made significant contribution to the debate here in washington. mcafeeantic council and have started the journey to change the nature of the cyber security debate. our goal is to move the public discussion from one that all too often focuses on doom and gloom to one that focuses on the age of the possible. we believe that cyber security can play a powerful role in the betterment of people's lives. the right security can enable more opportunities for people to vote. the right security can enable secure access to online information and services. the right security can enable innovations in the area of d, in theation, indee area of true innovations such as driverless cars. about then today promise of online voting starts the discussion on the art of the possible. we welcome the active engagement from stakeholders and government, the private sector, and academia. consensus on the positive role of cyber security in improving the lives of people is a vital addition to the debate. this debate for too long has been dominated by doom and gloom, a flat landscape, and an overemphasis on regulation. more positive perspective that understands the importance of innovation and promise is a necessary addition to the debate. wille positive approach enable the policymaking process to be more balanced, to focus less on regulation and more on the true promise of security and the power of innovation to move markets and bring better and more secure products to the marketplace. moving forward, we are planning to launch a full on study that will focus on the importance of security in the area of health care. we now turn to the discussion at hand, the matter of e-voting. >> good morning and thank you for kicking us off. i appreciate all of you being here. my thanks to mcafee and intel security for making this possible. online, followu us on hashtag #acevote. we want get into a deep discussion on the biography of the people in front of you. you each have that -- we will do a quick introduction. from aight we have jodi company that has been involved in e-voting and we will start with him. to my right, pamela smith. she has been involved in electronic voting. you can see in their biographies the many different areas to try and get through the most things in the near term. mcafee, my far left, longtime technologist that has a history of working and trying to solve hard problems and get security to work us so we can unlock the promise of the most technology. i want to start with jordy. your company has been in this field. withave been presented these hard problems and have to get solution around this. thatare the technologies we are really looking at here and how have we been able to deploy them in the field and actual elections? thank -- in terms from thempany, we have known the main problem of electronic voting is not standards of using it. and graphicography protocols to solve comp looks problems. -- complex problems. this is something that can be used in electronic transactions, like banking. we are using cryptography protocols, providing privacy. --ther thing we are doing it's not only a matter of providing privacy, but of third point that is important. we are not only doing internet voting, it will allow people -- third parties to monitor what is happening and provide transparency. to providedifficult when we are moving in electronic environment. technologyproviding for the norwegian country. in switzerland they are also continuing to use it, an important step for providing security on electronic voting. case, they had changes on the standards required on electronic voting. this specific case in switzerland, they start thinking that up to 10% can vote online. they want to manage the risk of introducing internet voting. currently they change the law or casechange the standard in increase the number of the population that can use internet voting. increasehey want to the number of the electorate up to 50%. they need to introduce everything. one of the things we have seen that is important for providing is the ability to check that everything is happening in a proper way. >> does the privacy and mentionedity -- you to separate technologies. we are talking about electronic voting but you also mentioned internet voting. can you walk us through -- what do we mean by both of these? when we add an "e" in front o fit -- can you clarify? >> electronic voting is using electronic means for casting vote. --ine voting that i use a touch screen would be e-voting but it would not be online voting. >> exactly. e-voting is more focused on the specific machines for casting votes, standalone machines. internet voting opens the door to cast their vote at home. you can vote at home. in this case what happens is the the vote turnout -- election officer has no control over what is standard so the security risks are higher. there are requirements for more robust protection against attacks. i think this is where you have been spending a lot of your time. any thoughts on the things he said? >> thank you for having us here. agree strongly with the point the report made about the difficulty into challenges of solving the security and privacy issues. with voting in a polling station with a direct recording there are amachine, i number of issues that may come up. if the equipment should happen to break down, you need something else to vote on to replace it, otherwise people are disenfranchised. typically the backup is the paper ballot. if you use a standard voting system and polling places the paper ballot is counted by an electronic machine. issues one of the key that you are looking for in a voting system is availability. with an online voting system, there may be challenges with availability if, for example, there is some kind of distributed denial of service attack. particularly during the last phase of the voting. this would particularly hit the united states tough. >> you might be able to say we can spread out the voting over a longer. all the voting is happening on a single day somebody could run ddos and take it. and we do partly true have some states that do early and absentee voting. what's key here is that there is a deadline. in the event that a denial of service the track caused a major disruption and it happened in the timeframe where there is no more time to solve the problem, there is no voting after election day -- the deadline factors key. >> that's not even a voting problem, that is an internet problem. if the internet can't be 100% available -- >> there is a lot of work being done to handle and manage ddos attacks and those problems that can arise from simple failures. we have seen failures of online voting registration systems happening right before the deadline and caused some people not to be able to register to vote in time for the upcoming election. timing is important. but it is also important to note that most elections are run in the united states by local jurisdictions. local jurisdictions are counties are townships or parishes. have counties tend not to great big i.t. budgets with lots of funding for i.t. staff. or really robust capabilities for avoiding the downside of a ddos attack that even a major corporation has problems with. we have to think about how elections are conducted. the promise that any robusta democracy makes to its electorate is that it will provide them with a justified confidence and accuracy. any voting system you use has to be able to demonstrate to the loser that they lost. to do that you need actual evidence. voters need to be able to see that their votes were captured and election officials need to be able to use that evidence to demonstrate the votes were counted correctly. that is what we look >> it seems like it should be so easy. we have our vote, were voting for who is the best singer, who has the best variety act on television. are there a lot of folks saying we ought to be able to have this? this is for either of the two of you. is there a lot of demand from the younger generation to say why can't i just will -- why can i just vote on my phone? >> i think there is that question, will we do everything else online, why can we not do this online too? there are a lot of things that support voters being able to vote without getting to that transmitting a ballot. you can get information online. you can get ballots to someone , like remotely located overseas voters who have ,raditionally been able to vote you have cut off a big chunk of time they need to get that problem solved. there are many things we do online. what most people don't think about until you talk it through is that elections have special properties that other online transactions simply don't have. thatnonymity property votes are supposed to be anonymous, you have to verify that they are in eligible voter but then you separate that identity from their actual vote. that is a really challenging problem in auditing generally. >> regarding the young generation pushing for online ,oting, the experience we have or least we checked the statistics about who is using online voting, young people usually tend to use more online voting. in the experience that we , wherece online voting not talking about substituting completely any kind of voting with online or electronic voting. in this case talking about in france where they're using -- afterting for over using two or three times, more than 50% of overseas voters are , theyng internet voting .an vote in person --rently the statistics especially when you're talking about remote voting, remote voting can be online by electronic means. are can be postal voting. they prefer to move to internet voting. the internat voting -- internet voting would be more feedback. >> your mail ballots can often be trackable. one of my favorite stories demonstrates that we don't really know yet about who wants to use it and how the public uses it, and is there a measurable impact on turnout. i think there is still more research to be done in a place in ontario where they decided to experiment and a pilot allowing online voting. they had a 300% increase in turnout in early voting, but zero turnout increase overall. what that meant was that people who were going to vote anyway tried out this method, but it did make more people vote. >> one of the things you helped with when we are reviewing the voting isn'tternet just the casting of the vote. that was an important change to the paper we added in, there is the registration, there is the collection and processing of the votes. internet doesn't just have to be the licking next to a name -- clicking next to a name. you can look at all these different places in ways that we can improve the process. i was really glad for your input for that part of the paper. i had first started to get interested in digital voting, electronic voting, or in the early 1990's, because we were writing about the third wave, newt gingrich joined in and they were doing books and writing together to say we can have a truer, freer democracy, more like the founding fathers wanted, where we can come together and issue our votes on home computers. they weren't thinking about phones back then. and help us find this better democracy. but that was 20 years ago. and it's coming together in some .laces what is the timeframe looking like here? >> have got a few positive things to say, but a lot of what i'm going to say unfortunately is doom and gloom and very debbie downer, for lack of a better word. expertsast majority of that work on voting security and voting technology would agree that somewhere in the 30-40 year timeline is the point where we have the infrastructure that can support secure online voting. >> 30 to 40 years, starting in the mid-90's. >> there's very good reasons for that. make no mistake, we have to solve this kind of problem. the reason we have to do that is to the extent that we want to have remotely physically distributed representative democracy, there's going to be situations in which physical exchange of matter is impossible . say two colonies on mars. this may be a thing in the future. there are places where exchanging physical matter to be the auditable record of the vote is going to be extremely challenging, if not impossible. you either have autonomous, separate democratic body are you have to have some way of doing this kind of thing securely. that, the positive externality of doing work on this is that to the extent you solve some of the challenging cyberms here are the core security issues that we work on that has a lot of benefit for other kinds of applications you can do on the internet. the one trick here is there are number of risks that are solvable, some are not. we can go through them real quick. we are talking about uncontrolled platforms. if you're going to do some critical democratic process like voting online, you don't want to leave that up to the security of peoples desktops, laptops, and phones. even know the extent that you have that stuff on there. moreover the intelligence communities around the world have made a business lately of undermining the infrastructure of the internet in such a way that you don't know exactly what is happening with this stuff. the unsupervised nature of internet voting, and this is similar to the vote by mail, so the security and privacy experts vote byk on this, the mail is an unfortunate legacy thing we can't get rid of. it has the property that, unfortunately it's very easy to coerce people that are voting in an unsupervised environment where you don't have someone making sure the proper policies are in place so that someone cannot sort of force you to reveal your vote to them and things like that. realize this but there's a great paper i can point you to that shows you adoption ofwith the the secret ballot in the u.s., election day was a payday for some people. once the australian secret ballot, which is a government printed standard ballot cast in spread, voterhat persist the patient drop precipitously because you no longer could make a connection between how people cast votes -- the election went the other way. i know the estonian system allows you to vote multiple times and only your last vote cast actually counts toward the election. i would think that the provide a might help more elegant solution for this. >> those are things that help. none of those are perfect. no one can take your government id card after they watched u-boat and not let you have it back until the deadline. there's a lot of layered techniques that adversaries can do. it makes it harder, but at the there are records of how people voted which is contrary to having anonymity, and they have an injured structure where everyone has a cryptographic key associated to your identity and used for a whole bunch of other things. it's almost embedded in how you interact with government. it is very unlikely we will have that. >> a quick point i want to make, there are two other risks that are important to mention. one is the opportunity of wholesalers and retail kind of attacks. balloting is no panacea in the sense that you can do a lot of things like ballot stuffing. you have to touch a lot of ballots in order to accomplish those kinds of attacks, whereas being a purely software-based thing, if you find -- if you're recording all the encrypted traffic, these are serious things that any system that said it was secure was not secure the next day. you expose it to anyone in the world compared to more control type system. the second you have some really candidate that hackers really like, a second that happens in an internet balloting election, that person will win. i can bet you $100 right now that will happen. especially in countries where it is winner take all, you can certainly imagine someone spending a million dollars is not a bad investment for a piece of malicious software that would try to subvert the election. we know were going to need to do this. we cannot just be saying in 50 or 100 years were still filling out paper and still doing these touchscreen machines and whirring about hanging chads and the rest. >> one of the things we need to understand is that voting started very early in our republic where you would have to go to the courthouse and be sworn in by a judge. there was no real registration process at the time. from that you would then voice folkshoice to a panel of who were keeping the tally. that was very useful because it did allow us to have outside observers see really what the a verys, and to have consistent vote. fast-forward to the 1990's were you start to see electronics come in to the voting process, voting machines that are used for casting as well as tabulating votes. the technology has sort of driven some of the processes of what we do today. those machines are very costly. you try to have elections together, federal, state, and local. we try to do that and established polling places where the equipment can be brought in and the like. today we are dealing with a very different world than we dealt with just 10 years ago. the mobility that we have today that is driving the need and want to be able to vote from something other than those established polling places. the problem is that we are in a situation where technology is changing very quickly, but we're looking at a problem itself that does not lend itself to operating well in the generic internet environment that we have today. identity is a real problem today. identifying somebody definitively is something that has to be there to support the one man, one vote aspects. nationaluch as the strategy of trusted identity in cyberspace are advancing this in a very positive way from an identity perspective. there is a working group around trying to figure out how to really provide real identity on the internet. the internet engineering task force. they have established most of the standards that we operate under today with the internet. wereey here is that starting to see some of the building blocks of technology that will make the infrastructure possible. today we don't have an canastructure that successfully work well in guaranteeing electronic voting online. there's too many ways it can be circumvented and attacked. bot nets that capture keystrokes and look for certain types of can really be modified very easily to use that targeting internet voting. the reality of what we're seeing is technology is moving forward. rather quicklyg in the next 10 years and i don't expect that advancement to be reduced over the next 20. the focus that we need to have is to look at really what the requirements are for internet voting. they are different than e-commerce. as such, we need to address them specifically. we need to make sure there are real standards in place so that the folks -- the security experts reviewing the different parts of the infrastructure actually have the means to have a consistent view of what's occurring. today we have a lot of -- in they means for voting arena and we need to have this to be much more open and standardized so that we can see and evaluate the voting mechanisms for the security threats that could compromise the national elections. >> i feel like to some degree we -- to some saying degree we have to fix the internet. thecks that are inherent in infrastructure that we have are the difficulty of identity so it sounds like because the internet itself is pretty shaky, that anything that has to be -- have transparency,dit is going to be shaky. >> although i do wonder if some of what we tend to be thinking americans,cially as we tend to think about the big national elections held in held for hundreds of millions of people. it seems like there interesting in otheries happening jurisdictions that are much smaller. maybe for a citywide election or other areas. is that a good way to start tilting -- building? how does this work when it's not a big national election for huge country, but building from the ground up? important --at is is i agree there are risks as we introduce internet voting. the way to manage this is to provide the proper measures for managing these risks. it's something that is done with internet voting. there are countries that when they started to introduce internet voting, they are introducing internet voting involving security experts that have the security requirements they need to implement things in a proper way. and then they have standards -- securityl requirements that need to be fulfilled by any voting platform that needs to be put in place. not for therting to ae electoral vote but specific group of voters so they can start to pilot these and see the reaction of the people. if they see that things are stable and they can trust what is happening, and this involves security experts about how things are happening there. , it seemsimportant sometimes we are continuing the risk of other voting channels. sometimes you can solve these risks him and you mentioned that in the case of estonia, norway -- toher countries using realre that they are voters. they canortant that continue to solve problems in other voting channels. norway's using multiple voting. >> local, regional -- >> it is at eight municipal level. they are thinking about introducing it to other municipalities. times can vote multiple and can also vote at polling stations. the vote will be counted. >> any other thoughts, in this question about scale? >> i think the pilots are really important. naïvely assee them being a surefire way of getting to where you want to go. to the extent we want to run things in elections that we really care about, you have to run them in elections we don't care as much about. there are a couple of things come alive for example you can imagine mr. tony soprano looking at a 150 million dollars bond for a landfill or something and saying i just spent a million dollars to throw this local election. youe are some cases where will see things like that being pretty serious. at the same time, you got to do it somewhere. i live in tacoma park which ran fully auditable election in an actual government which is a really big learning opportunity in terms of making sure that people can use these things. this is something i work on every day, making sure that putting a piece of paper in the ballot box is something people can understand. we have houses of years of experience of doing stuff like that, whereas photography, i can talk to you about a box with two locks on it, but it's not going to give you the smart high school level, i can actually do the math on my own and get to the end. we need to get to where things are that simple where you can ,alk or the protocol yourself being a smart high school her, which is my lowest common denominator. >> they're very few public test opportunities before you are running an election in real time , you need to have the opportunity for hackers to have at that system. in cases where that has been allowed like the d.c. case in 2010 where they ran a test before using the system in a live election, and it was breached inside of 36 hours. it's a really interesting scenario, but they had to be authorized to do this. white hatot been up hacker, had it been somebody who had malicious intent tom a they might have breached the system without letting anybody know and then had their way with the results. so it's really important there be these public testing opportunities and that the results of those public tests are made available so that we can learn from them. >> that was such a beautiful attack. >> within 36 hours they found a way, when you type in a file name and sometimes the idea was you upload a pdf of your ballot. of gettinga way crazy characters into the filenames that a sickly got you complete control of the system and that automated a little programming language that allowed them to change every single ballot to a write in vote for evil computer movies. then they modified the web form where you did this stuff to play the michigan fight song after you cast a ballot. this hatred got it sounding weird music, it's the michigan fight song. the electionsl is a buckeye.s a guy -- >> were talking about the internet is so difficult to secure, but if that almost every level we have these vulnerabilities. this came up earlier. you're working on a trusted machines on this on trusted network. that doesn't make it impossible, but it means you need to be going through each and every step on this on trusted stuff and say how can we get it trustworthy enough so that it's --least as trust hersey trustworthy as the paper of the stuff it's going to replace. that can become a very difficult spot, especially when the manufacturers of this gear the sealways as nice as was. i put it up online so it could get tested. they did tryacked, to go to prosecutors. they said maybe in fact it is not ready for prime time. trying to solve a problem in a very small scale and it has to operate in a very large scale. we have different types of elections. we have federal, state, and local, and each has its own specific needs and requirements. when you're looking at a microcosm of a local election, it's easy to see how it electronic, online voting could potentially work. to a staten't scale or large u.s. kind of national election. the problem really is that this needs to be a designed aspect instead of an emerging aspect. we don't want to wait 30 years to get the internet as stable as it could be to support electronic voting online. we need to start looking at how we can design the voting system to ride on top of that kind of infrastructure knowing the infrastructure itself is not as secure as we would want. computing and the other types of new advances we 2008 the iphone, 2009 it came out. a very fast-moving world. were going to have to have a means to secure the voting needs a potentially un-trusting environment. it's a different type of looking at the problem. if we can address the problem in that kind of fashion, then it doesn't matter whether you doing -watch or from your computer at home, or if it is a voice recognition thing when you walk into a polling place or an absentee ballot from mars. >> if you look at cryptography, you throw a bunch of ideas out there in a very open fashion. you get the best people in the world to bang away with it. it's a pretty good way to identify flaws that you may not have seen. the way we are now focusing on how to monitor this risk in , things areing evolving and it's impossible to say that 20 years from now the internet will be completely secure. say i have holograms and nobody can open this. is something you cannot control. the idea that it is possible to what is happening in the voting process. at the end [indiscernible] and protected in the server. representults really the content of the vote. if you can't verify this in a 100%hat you can have assured that nobody manipulated voters see that it has been received by the be it is a traditional web casting a vote. it's a way to say i have no security problems now, but maybe in the future i hacker may find a way to bypass some security measure and manipulate my vote. detect thennot manipulation, then i cannot react. >> the notion of future proofing. you want your vote to be private , not only now but for a long time in the future, to the extent that the lincoln figure out how we voted in the past or near our record of whatever they wanted to do with that information. some cryptographers have developed ways of creating protocol that basically say no matter what could happen in the future, your vote is safe at least up until we have quantum computers that can crack this stuff. that's the kind of thing i like to hear people worrying about because i worry about my vote in 15 years. >> everlasting privacy. this idea about cryptographic our rhythms that cannot be broken now, but maybe in the future. we have quantum computers, the worry is that somebody can decrypt the vote. this is something very and board it. important requirement is that the encrypting processes preserving privacy. vote,eone is encrypting a if they cannot correlate, using processes that can prevent correlation, it doesn't matter if someone can decrypt it. in any case were working with -- algorithms. >> if someone does get your most likely the worst-case scenario is someone gets hold of your credit card and makeuse it fraudulent purchases, and that is bad. solvable, and especially, we don't have to worry about it. at most in the united states we would have to pay $50, and most of us don't even have to do that. there might be some trouble about getting a new card, but essentially it's not that bad a problem for you personally. i think we are used to that, saying it is risky but not such a risk that is going to scare us away from e-commerce right now. an just someone getting your credit card and you might have to pay 50 bucks and do some things. you could get disenfranchised and it could change your vote. some countries you could be killed if people could figure out afterwards how you voted. so the downsides of getting it wrong seem to be -- once fraud occurred in a vote, you can't prosecutors the perpetrator. you can fix the problem, but you becauseange the ballot you don't know how those votes actually occurred. that by itself would be a corrupting factor in an election. >> not just the privacy but the very black -- verifiability of the audit transparency. we talk in legal terms in court cases about evidence we talk about chain of custody of the evidence and how important that that is unbroken. it's important because you have to be able to rely on it for the various applications all the way through the process. evidenceat property of of the voters vote having been captured correctly, the way they intended it, and then that correct version, not some corrupted version eating what gets counted and then audited to demonstrate that the accounting part of it was correct, the process is really key in things like the case you mentioned of someone getting hold of your account tone used my rent a limo in arizona at some point, and i called the bank and said i haven't been in arizona for 20 years, maybe. so that wasn't me. they said no problem, we will make that right for you. with voting, you cast your vote maybe from remotely, you don't get to call up the election official at the county and say i voted for so and so, can you see i voted for candidate a? they should not be able to say yes i can see that you voted for candidate a. democrat the last 10 times, this time you voted republican, something must have gone wrong. we will cut to the representative and then we will come back to audience question and answer. on?m i >> yes sir. >> first of all, it's great to be with you today and thank you for the invitation to join you remotely. i especially want to thank david councilnd the atlantic for making this possible. i would rather be with you there in person. somehow fitting i guess in this discussion about the promise of happening over the process of skype. before i begin, let me just say i have great interest in increasing voter participation in our democracy and i always look for innovative ways to do that. i have a long history of being involved with the electoral process with the legislature. i served for three terms and have a great interest in election reform in making voting easier. number of horror stories in rhode island where we had people waiting in line for , and and hours to vote sometimes we actually had the oldest voting machines in the country. sometimes we had to get on our hands and needs -- cantonese to read the bottom of the ballots. not to mention the fact that , i wasisabled myself never really able to vote on my own independently going into the machine. i had to have someone with me and assist me. it wasn't until i became secretary of state and i actually overhauled the states there wastem that accessible voting for people with the build -- bit with disabilities. i actually chaired the special legislative commission looking at alternative voting technologies in the legislature and implemented the findings of that report when i was elected secretary of state. future excited about the and about technology. we have to proceed of course with caution as we work to ensure the integrity of the elections process. enjoying i really am -- this is an issue that means a lot to me personally. it really is a marriage of two tosions of mine, going back 1994 when i became secretary of state in rhode island, i really had the impurity to confront electing anges of transparent government. i've seen firsthand those areas trust andcan have faith in government. also many very passionate about the accessibility of the voting process which is really so fundamental to our democracy. incredible has promise, specially to the population of disabled voters of require diversity interfaces to the voting process. interestedriginally me in the field but my time in congress has given me a complementary perspective on the topic. 2008, i founded the congressional cyber security caucus with my friend mike mccall because i was concerned that congress was paying far too little attention to the potential of the cyber and could cause great harm to our country. chief among my concerns is that critical infrastructure could be vulnerable in this new domain. of course our voting infrastructure is central to our country's existence as a democracy, and just like any other sector, there are vulnerabilities in expanding the use of this technology. electoral system comprises two fundamental principles. each person should be entitled to cast one and only one phot and then his or her ballot should be kept secret. unfortunately, because these principles can clash with our be fair,at elections that a voter should have confidence that his or her vote is counted. the traditional system does the next one job of ensuring anonymity and there are very few instances of actual voter fraud or intimidation. hundreds of thousands of ballots are spoiled each election cycle preventing voters from being heard. additionally, the ballots and cells are vulnerable to tampering. to reduce the risk we rely on -- eibuting oversight -voting systems have the same goals but must achieve them in very different ways. for instance, in traditional systems, double voting is prevented by retiring that a citizen vote only in his or her precinct, preventing double voting remotely while retaining as winter prom because the scale can be orders of magnitude larger. challenges of scale manifest themselves in other ways, the ability of a single bad actor to compromise multiple services. it turns out that cryptographic systems allow one to do all sorts of counterintuitive things. but here is the rub, channel communication between our brilliant photographers and policymakers, into in , it allows archers to confirm that ballots have been counted correctly without relying on the integrity of accounts. policymakers understand than a matter how corrupt elections are , if a camper with results, it will be noticed. but they definitely do not understand how it is implemented in different systems. often viewed as borderline magical. once the system uses a property for security and one relies on the ,ntegrity of election officials it's not necessarily going to be evident how it will work without the concerted effort to educate politicians. there's a real risk that they come to view it as different versions of the same product. the security of the competitors may be wildly different. it's difficult to overemphasize at this point, so let me put it another way. politicians are used to shades , and that is a good thing. policymakers need to compromise. ambiguityility to see can be dangerous when confronted with the facts that can be , and it is theories imperative that the properties that we would like to see in a system such as the into in , or policymakers -- holocene makers -- policymakers are not the only fallible humans involved. even a cryptographically sound system relies on people to code it, deploy it, and people to maintain it. might causeor denial of service attacks that halt an election. it could allow an adversary to steal voting potential's and cast a ballot during routine maintenance. could be deleted resulting in a huge loss of voter privacy. these vulnerabilities are real and the haldeman group analysis of estonia's voting system showed problems across all three of these phases. realize important to that our present voting system has numerous points of failure. -voting complexity of e against sets it apart. clerka checker or ballot in a traditional system require specialized skills. being an administrator requires significant training and experience. experienced cyber security professionals right now are in short supply. it's something i've been talking about for years, we don't enough people going into these fields. we could change that in a number of ways, starting at the high school level, to encourage young people to go into science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. especially in the field of cyber security. ciber is a relatively new domain that is still ramping up, cyber training capacity, but part of it is also tied to the inherent difference between cyberspace and me space, you might say. defending against an adversary has always been difficult. attacker needs to find only a while point of getting in the defendant must defend against all possible breaches. is exponentially more challenging and cyberspace. it's just as easy to attack someone across the planet as it is to attack someone across the room. so the attack space is much larger. attackmost as easy to everyone's vulnerability as it is to attack one entity with a vulnerability. as a result, attack is more lucrative, which draws off important talent even as more defendants are needed. government agencies have been particularly hard hit. part of this is due to the problem that i highlighted and we can also blame the lack of coordination with the government in the corresponding duplication of effort. securityem of homeland -- it was patched almost immediately. to ask, because it had other agencies to scan their networks for the flaw, it took days in which hackers were robbed gating in the wild. these are challenges were propagating in the wild. these are challenges that will have to be addressed if this is to be deployed in the united states. it would allow for top level budgetary review of a cyber budget. i have strongly advocated for increased funding for security research to help grow our academic infrastructure to meet demand. i've offered alternative practices that allow programmers with nontraditional educational background the chance to protect their country. i think we can make use of their talents and we should. all congress continues to i believe it will help raise the standards across critical infrastructure domains that a company like target that could be hacked through its vendors shows exactly why we need to raise the bar. ,et me just say before i close i hope you allow me a brief digression into hindsight security. -- government talks about the focus is always on the service side. we can maintain the integrity, the question should be can we maintain the integrity of the ballots cast, but if the ballots , relying onromised a voters smartphone to honestly represent his or her intention is simply naïve with malware as prevalent as it is. it cannot be limited to the edge of the government network. so to say that e-voting is a challenging prospect is really an understatement, but just as there are many security concerns in the cryptosystems with the humans that run them and the devices, there are many potential benefits as well. so i reject the notion that e-voting is a solution in search of a problem, just as i reject the notion that it is ready today. changing something as essential to our identity as the way we choose our leaders ought to be a deliberative process, and an inclusive one, and i hope i have impressed upon you the importance of engaging with policymakers about eve voting and as a corollary, i hope you will join me in advocating for better training of cyber security professionals to defend our country from harm nation'sr advised our policymakers at the same time. with that, i thank you for the work you are all doing, thanks for the opportunity to weigh in on this issue. i thank you for allowing me to join you remotely. i would rather be there in anson but this is appropriate way to communicate with you today as well. i look forward to working with you to address these challenges. i'm a big fan of technology myself, i use it every day as we all do. but not without risk and challenges. so thank you very much, and enjoy your conference. [applause] >> thank you, congressman. that was a wonderful description of the balances that we are theing about here, and congressman is from my home district in rhode island. he covered a lot of things we have not even talked about here, about waiting lines and the amount of convenience, about this able than others that might have difficulty getting to the polls. he covered a lot of interesting things. that disagree with him on there are not enough cyber professionals. we do have plenty of cyber professionals, they are not just all working on the correct side. before we start taking questions, any additional thoughts? >> i thought it was great that he raised the issue of how policymakers are involved and need to be involved and at the same time, it's really difficult. expecting them to have a deep and broad understanding of something like cryptography, which the very word makes my eyes glaze over, i'm going to go ahead and say that. it's really very difficult. balancethat finding the , lawmakers do make compromises. and potentialks benefits. it's hard to really even understand what the risks are, and that makes it a little more challenging. and then sometimes policy will get made that may not be taking everything into consideration, just because it is so complicated. he did weigh in on the framework for cyber security and urged in elections be considered part of critical infrastructure. the other thing he mentioned about enough cyber security administrators, how do you compensate them enough to work at a small elections office and accounting where it it's only part time of the work that they do? >> most of my job is translation of policy makers, but also explaining how and why technology impacts their life. one of the things he mentioned we did not talk about much at all is the promise for accessible, independent interaction with the system spirit a lot of people disabilities have to use very specialized equipment to allow them to interact in digital online forums. they often get used to the one thing they know how to use and how to navigate using a head stick for people who are advanced water pleadings, or certain kinds of screen readers. oregon has something called an online ballot marking system. you can interact via a normal computer. you can use all your own accessible technology. that has a lot of rom us and we involvedee as many with that. we really do have to look at this as a problem itself, not trying to see smeal it together. is, heimportant thing was talking about the importance of the security of the infrastructure. not only on internet voting, anything -- a lot of information related to the election is managed by computers. and using i.t. on the electoral process should also be considered and other processes, not just internet voting. the hacker is going to use it , he will try this first in stead of trying to -- it is important that as for questions, i have 1, 2, and three. the microphone will be coming to you. >> rank you. -- thank you. heard a lot, which is great. hadg the first country that national elections online. there have been several questions about the militant so on. emphasize, want to the word that hurts here is trust. everyonians are used to interaction with the

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