down the covid secure route. yes. last point in this section is one of you looking ahead steps and we know that we shifted in the rolls over this period of time. you say this. don't go for simple, rigid rules if it is likely you are going to have to bury them or have limited ability or intention to enforce them. that is correct — or intention to enforce them. that is correct 50 _ or intention to enforce them. that is correct. so it _ or intention to enforce them. that is correct. so it builds _ or intention to enforce them. that is correct. so it builds on the earlier— is correct. so it builds on the earlier point about rules. so the worse _ earlier point about rules. so the worse thing to do is to say that this is— worse thing to do is to say that this is the _ worse thing to do is to say that this is the rule and then you can see att— this is the rule and then you can see all around that it is being broken — see all around that it is being broken i_ see all around that it is being broken. i hesitate to say this in a room _ broken. i hesitate to say this in a room of— broken. i hesitate to say this in a room of lawyers. but the classic example — room of lawyers. but the classic example is _ room of lawyers. but the classic example is if you see a wall and its is no _ example is if you see a wall and its is no batt— example is if you see a wall and its is no ball games, the first thing you might — is no ball games, the first thing you might think is, well, that is a pretty— you might think is, well, that is a pretty good wall. and as soon as you start to _ pretty good wall. and as soon as you start to break the rule, you essentially become a rule breaker. so you _ essentially become a rule breaker. so you really want to design rules that are _ so you really want to design rules that are generally followed. you want _ that are generally followed. you want to — that are generally followed. you want to enforce egregious breaches, but you _ want to enforce egregious breaches, but you don't want to inadvertently signat— but you don't want to inadvertently signal that— but you don't want to inadvertently signal that lots of people are breaking the rule because it will actually— breaking the rule because it will actually make it even more likely that others will follow suit. thank ou. a lot that others will follow suit. thank you a lot of _ that others will follow suit. thank you. a lot of information - that others will follow suit. thank you. a lot of information and - that others will follow suit. thank you. a lot of information and we | that others will follow suit. thank i you. a lot of information and we are dealing with a high level, it is more detailed in a statement and i am conscious of not wanting to do justice to these important principles. let's move on to the final area, which is lessons learned, covid missteps. injuly 2020, you set out a number of opinions and criticisms on the initial response to the pandemic. from a behavioural perspective, in a document entitled institutional lessons from covid. you explained that was a hard copy letter initially sent in july to helen initially sent injuly to helen macnamara and alex chilton in the cabinet office. and later, is it the case you asked for that copy of the document again and you updated it and in september 2020? let's look at that. and what a summarise can be seenin that. and what a summarise can be seen in the top right—hand corner. and it runs to 13 pages approximately, it is a significant piece of work itself. it informs your evidence and warrants to be read and considered in its entirety, which it will be and has been on this side so i will not go through it sequentially. ijust this side so i will not go through it sequentially. i just want to draw out two significant points, which is this. you describe the early misstep and we can see it in paragraph one, overconfidence and anchoring on our experts's medical community led to a presumption that covid would be like a flu—like wave, blanking it to the pursuit of near suppression as a viable option. our decision—making was vulnerable to systemic error. and if we could go to page two, please. this is your executive summary and you expand upon this. just going to find the right reference, it is the second last paragraph and you say how this was built into, just pausing for a second. next, thank you very much. it is the third paragraph, forgive me. you say this presumption was built into the contained delay and mitigate research strategy and it underpins the early chris whitty position on test and trace and the patrick vallance view on herd immunity, brackets, later airbrushed, close it is. it would be remiss to pick up on that now, what you mean by the last remark, herd immunity, laterairbrushed? you mean by the last remark, herd immunity, later airbrushed? that communication injuly 2020.?011 immunity, later airbrushed? that communication in july 2020. you will be caettin communication in july 2020. you will be getting evidence _ communication in july 2020. you will be getting evidence from _ communication in july 2020. you will be getting evidence from many - be getting evidence from many people — be getting evidence from many people. patrick has been pretty clear— people. patrick has been pretty clear on— people. patrick has been pretty clear on it _ people. patrick has been pretty clear on it. i think within government communications, there was defihitety_ government communications, there was defihitety a _ government communications, there was definitely a deemphasis on the head immunity— definitely a deemphasis on the head immunity language and the way in which _ immunity language and the way in which the — immunity language and the way in which the early strategy i think was expressed. others had argued there was continuity, but it did feel that was continuity, but it did feel that was a _ was continuity, but it did feel that was a significant recalibration or description of it —— the herd immunity _ description of it -- the herd immunity-— description of it -- the herd immuni . �* . . description of it -- the herd immuni . . . . , , . immunity. after the media and public backlash around _ immunity. after the media and public backlash around the _ immunity. after the media and public backlash around the 13th _ immunity. after the media and public backlash around the 13th and - immunity. after the media and public backlash around the 13th and 14th - immunity. after the media and public backlash around the 13th and 14th of. backlash around the 13th and 14th of march. . �* backlash around the 13th and 14th of march. , ~ . ., , , backlash around the 13th and 14th of march. , r ., ., , , , ., march. yes. and arguably, it is for ou to march. yes. and arguably, it is for you to determine _ march. yes. and arguably, it is for you to determine rather _ march. yes. and arguably, it is for you to determine rather than - march. yes. and arguably, it is for you to determine rather than me, | march. yes. and arguably, it is for i you to determine rather than me, but a recalibration of the policy. i might— a recalibration of the policy. i mightjust say the a recalibration of the policy. i might just say the key point actually— might just say the key point actually was slightly different, a subtle _ actually was slightly different, a subtle one. even now had the benefit of reading _ subtle one. even now had the benefit of reading sir patrick's reflections, he does talk about in his evidence of course, the best thing _ his evidence of course, the best thing to— his evidence of course, the best thing to do— his evidence of course, the best thing to do would have been to have a much _ thing to do would have been to have a much better test and trace system and so _ a much better test and trace system and so on _ a much better test and trace system and so on. but that is actually a part— and so on. but that is actually a part of— and so on. but that is actually a part of sophisticated suppression. that is— part of sophisticated suppression. that is what the south koreans did, that is— that is what the south koreans did, that is what— that is what the south koreans did, that is what singapore did, that is what _ that is what singapore did, that is what many— that is what singapore did, that is what many other countries did. and we didnt— what many other countries did. and we didn't do— what many other countries did. and we didn't do it. we were not doing it in february, it wasn't on the table — it in february, it wasn't on the table and _ it in february, it wasn't on the table. and partly, it links to another— table. and partly, it links to another issue in this document, which _ another issue in this document, which is — another issue in this document, which is the how, how would you do it? it— which is the how, how would you do it? it is— which is the how, how would you do it? it is the — which is the how, how would you do it? it is the boring mechanics of, how would — it? it is the boring mechanics of, how would you find out and have a tletter— how would you find out and have a better contact tracing system, built at scale _ better contact tracing system, built at scale and so on. on better contact tracing system, built at scale and so on.— at scale and so on. on the relation to the help — at scale and so on. on the relation to the help point, _ at scale and so on. on the relation to the help point, which _ at scale and so on. on the relation to the help point, which is - to the help point, which is operationally, one of the points you make is there needs to be thought as to how to deliver strategy and follow—up and explore the questions and really examine under the bonnet what needs to be done. yes. and really examine under the bonnet what needs to be done. yes, exactly. it is the very — what needs to be done. yes, exactly. it is the very practical— what needs to be done. yes, exactly. it is the very practical detail. - what needs to be done. yes, exactly. it is the very practical detail. if - it is the very practical detail. if you say— it is the very practical detail. if you say in— it is the very practical detail. if you say in a _ it is the very practical detail. if you say in a model that we want to reduce _ you say in a model that we want to reduce social contact, a host of questions — reduce social contact, a host of questions immediately follow. howe, who, what? _ questions immediately follow. howe, who, what? how would we do the detait— who, what? how would we do the detail of— who, what? how would we do the detail of it — who, what? how would we do the detail of it— who, what? how would we do the detail of it. yes, two points i want to draw out- _ detail of it. yes, two points i want to draw out. you _ detail of it. yes, two points i want to draw out. you are _ detail of it. yes, two points i want to draw out. you are invited - detail of it. yes, two points i want to draw out. you are invited into l to draw out. you are invited into sage, you are at a number of meetings, you are watching and expressing concerns from the margins and then from the centre regarding what was happening and asking questions. you say in your statements that your view is that yourself and others were quietly dismissed as not understanding the science, is that correct? br; dismissed as not understanding the science, is that correct?— science, is that correct? by some, erha s? science, is that correct? by some, perhaps? some. _ science, is that correct? by some, perhaps? some, not _ science, is that correct? by some, perhaps? some, not all, - science, is that correct? by some, perhaps? some, not all, but - science, is that correct? by some, perhaps? some, not all, but yes. | science, is that correct? by some, - perhaps? some, not all, but yes. and our perhaps? some, not all, but yes. and your phrase — perhaps? some, not all, but yes. situc your phrase anchoring was perhaps? some, not all, but yes. fific your phrase anchoring was mentioned at the outset. anchoring, groupthink is the similar phrase used, but you mentioned this was at the heart of one of the missteps in that early response, is that right?- one of the missteps in that early response, is that right? yes. and on a number of — response, is that right? yes. and on a number of issues. _ response, is that right? yes. and on a number of issues. anchoring - a number of issues. anchoring essentially means you have a strong prior and _ essentially means you have a strong prior and you find it hard to move from _ prior and you find it hard to move from it _ prior and you find it hard to move from it so — prior and you find it hard to move from it. so humans in general, behavioural effect, tend to seek confirming evidence for their priors — confirming evidence for their priors. we are not as good at seeking — priors. we are not as good at seeking what is the counter evidence and in _ seeking what is the counter evidence and in particular, in this case, saying. — and in particular, in this case, saying, what experiment a piece of evidence _ saying, what experiment a piece of evidence would answer the question? that's_ evidence would answer the question? that's why— evidence would answer the question? that's why earlier on, i mentioned you can _ that's why earlier on, i mentioned you can do — that's why earlier on, i mentioned you can do experiments very fast. so if you _ you can do experiments very fast. so if you have _ you can do experiments very fast. so if you have a — you can do experiments very fast. so if you have a question, does it work or does— if you have a question, does it work or does it _ if you have a question, does it work or does it not? the puzzle becomes, how fast— or does it not? the puzzle becomes, how fast can — or does it not? the puzzle becomes, how fast can i answer that question? second _ how fast can i answer that question? second point in the final point i want to raises this. it's the negative impact of overconfidence is something you mentioned in this report. and you refer to previous detailed work you have done our decision—making in government and the headline is, to wear overconfidence. and you say this and perhaps we could bring this up. this is page three, please. second last paragraph, i think. is page three, please. second last paragraph, ithink. we is page three, please. second last paragraph, i think. we willjust leave it there for a moment and i would just make sure i have it. yes, second last paragraph. third line from the bottom. ironically, the pride in our science and our capabilities, that being the uk, slowed our ability to learn lessons from other countries. under cover of variations of, it is very different there. there was arrogance we knew better and would do better. that is your words which you set out in this report and sent to government. is that right? report and sent to government. is that riuht? . . report and sent to government. is that riuht? , . . , that right? yes, i did feel that was true. so that right? yes, i did feel that was true- so the _ that right? yes, i did feel that was true. so the report _ that right? yes, i did feel that was true. so the report a _ that right? yes, i did feel that was true. so the report a behavioural. true. so the report a behavioural government, looks at this. it shows for example — government, looks at this. it shows for example generally, people become more senior, there overconfidence generally— more senior, there overconfidence generally gets bigger, rather than less _ generally gets bigger, rather than tess~ i_ generally gets bigger, rather than less i did — generally gets bigger, rather than less. i did feel it characterised a lot of— less. i did feel it characterised a lot of what— less. i did feel it characterised a lot of what was happening from early on. lot of what was happening from early on those _ lot of what was happening from early on. those very early comparisons to other— on. those very early comparisons to other countries. japan, germany. and it made _ other countries. japan, germany. and it made us— other countries. japan, germany. and it made us lower to look really carefutty — it made us lower to look really carefully at what they did and learn the lessons from them. it also had many— the lessons from them. it also had many other— the lessons from them. it also had many other manifestations —— slower. masks— many other manifestations —— slower. masks woutd — many other manifestations —— slower. masks would be an example. we felt the evidence became very compelling, certainty— the evidence became very compelling, certainty by _ the evidence became very compelling, certainly by late march and early aprit— certainly by late march and early april for— certainly by late march and early april for masks and there was a strong — april for masks and there was a strong anchoring and scepticism in many— strong anchoring and scepticism in many of— strong anchoring and scepticism in many of the medical community. and links to what — many of the medical community. fific links to what you many of the medical community. e'"ic links to what you say many of the medical community. el"ic links to what you say in your report and the final point for me is you say in your statements that there was a touch of hubris in paragraph 167. you perhaps, a touch of hubris that we knew better and we would do better, alongside criticisms of how badly other countries were doing. that is a view that you formed at the time, is that your position? that is so. from even february and i should _ that is so. from even february and i should be _ that is so. from even february and i should be clear, of course, this was written _ should be clear, of course, this was written privately. the last thing we wanted _ written privately. the last thing we wanted to — written privately. the last thing we wanted to do was undermine key figures — wanted to do was undermine key figures. on the other hand, to learn the lessons — figures. on the other hand, to learn the lessons. so, yes, there was a sense _ the lessons. so, yes, there was a sense elsewhere that we were lucky almost _ sense elsewhere that we were lucky almost to _ sense elsewhere that we were lucky almost to have the best team. in our senior— almost to have the best team. in our senior figures. and there is no doubt — senior figures. and there is no doubt they are extremely talented and brilliant people. but that can also bring — and brilliant people. but that can also bring a lacuna with it of overconfidence and particularly may be less _ overconfidence and particularly may be less openness to other aspects, to the _ be less openness to other aspects, to the engineering, the how, the detail, _ to the engineering, the how, the detail, the — to the engineering, the how, the detail, the behavioural. so, yes. and we — detail, the behavioural. so, yes. and we could be wrong, of course, we could _ and we could be wrong, of course, we could be _ and we could be wrong, of course, we could be totally wrong. that even if we had _ could be totally wrong. that even if we had gone for it and really gone for it— we had gone for it and really gone for it in— we had gone for it and really gone for it in february, could we have built— for it in february, could we have built a _ for it in february, could we have built a south korean or singapore system? — built a south korean or singapore system? with the public or ministers have wanted to do it because of some of the _ have wanted to do it because of some of the intrusiveness it would have implied? — of the intrusiveness it would have implied? but we feel we didn't deliver— implied? but we fee