expect areas. you see it would be wrong to expect that areas. you see it would be wrong to expect that any future scientific adviser expect that any future scientific adviser would have specialist knowledge on political or epidemiological matters. given your no doubt epidemiological matters. given your no doubt fortuitous experience in medicine no doubt fortuitous experience in medicine and pharmacological matters did you medicine and pharmacological matters did you on medicine and pharmacological matters did you on reflection think that you played did you on reflection think that you played a did you on reflection think that you played a greater role in responding to this played a greater role in responding to this pandemic and perhaps you might to this pandemic and perhaps you might have done if you speciality had been might have done if you speciality had been different? i might have done if you speciality had been different? might have done if you
entries suggest that sir patrick vallance had said that a number of ministers were trying to in essence use science to make decisions so they didn t have to make decisions themselves, and there isn t a great structure in that. the point of the inquiry is to learn how to make those decisions, should they need to be made again. there are questions for scientists as well. we have heard in this inquiry, back in february 20 20, six weeks before the uk finally went into lockdown, that there were those in downing street, particularly borisjohnson, who maybe were not taking covid as seriously as they might or should duff done considering what ended up happening, so there are questions to the scientists, had you understood the scientists, had you understood the virus sufficiently and should you have worn people earlier? that could have had a different outcome in terms of restrictions being made earlier and different outcomes to what happened. h0??? earlier and different outcomes to wh