Welcome to the hudson institute. Ein senior fellow at the institute of we are here to talk with Christian Brose whose new book, the kill chain, is in the future of hightech warfare that Christian Brose just released. Chris is a former staff director for the Senate Armed Services committee an and prior to that e Senior Policy Adviser for senator john mccain and previously held other positions in the government. Right now he is the chief surgeon to build capabilities for the military as well as for the department of homeland security. We can talk about that as we go through the interview. But thank you for being with us today. So, just to start off, what led you to do this but i know youve been thinking about these issues for a while and obviously something that you have encountered during your time onn the surface kennedy and senator mccain is the policy adviser. But what was the genesis of sitting down and writing the entire book . Guest its a great question i ask myself constant const
Are still there and we never change them theyre still dangerous and in some ways theyre more dangerous than ever because people are focused on other issues and they simply dont see the dangers that we face and sent in to parry why isnt it discussed. Thats that course is too deep for me to answer psychological question to fundamentally. When the cold war ended the danger and the worried that people had the fear that people had about a Nuclear Catastrophe just ended with it and they just dont want to pick it up again and soon again but unfortunately the reality is that the danger is still very much there. You searched at a time that the defining era of United States Nuclear Policy is that its focused on the wrong threat. What he talked about was the wrong threat so the threat that were focused on a leftover threat from the cold war is the threat of an intentional attack from russia that is simply not a likely threat because it would be suicidal for russia to watch that attack any attack
We face today is blundering into nuclear war by mistake thats the threat we should focus on thats the right threat and by focusing on the wrong threat yesterdays threat of a russian intentional attack rationally making the threat of a blunder even worse. Hypothetically mr secretary give me an example of what would be a blundering threat i think the most obvious example is a false alarm that we have had now during the cold war 3 different false alarms. More of them i personally experienced by getting a phone call remember might it 3 oclock in the morning or i caught a call from a watch office a north American Intervention telling me this computer is showing 200 i. C. B. M. s on the way from the soviet union to the United States. It quickly added that he concluded as i thought he was calling me to see if i could help him figure out what had gone wrong with his computers i tell you i will never forget that moment and no one can ever tell me that the probability of a false alarm is theoret
Many of you know doctor parry was the nineteenth secretary of defense in the clinton administration, a world renowned expert on us foreign policy, National Security, defense policy, arms control and long and distinguished history at stanford. A senior fellow at fsi and the Hoover Institution and codirector of National Security cooperation from 19881993 and bachelors and masters degrees in mathematics at stanford which is impressive to me because i didnt get through as a graduate student. Michael and barbara, Professor Emeritus at stanford, great to reconnect with you, and we also are thrilled to have doctor parrys coauthor here, tom z. Collina. He has 30 years of washington dc experience in nonproliferation issues and senior position at the arms Patrol Association and institute for science and interNational Security. And nuclear testing, with the new start treaty and a degree in International Relations from cornell but we wont hold that against you. I am pleased to introduce my colleag
True why well i think what happened is that a lot of policies that we had for the cold war for the arms race we had with the soviet union those policies never changed when the cold war ended and so as bill said people have moved on cerns have moved on to other issues but the old policies are still there and we never change them theyre still dangerous and in some ways theyre more dangerous than ever because people are focused on other issues and they simply dont see the dangers that we face and sent in to parry why isnt it discussed. Thats that course is too deep for me dance a psychological question to fundamentally when the cold war ended the danger and the worried the people had to fear the people had about a Nuclear Catastrophe just ended with it and they just dont want to pick it up again and soon again but unfortunately the reality is that the danger is still very much there. You certain tom that the defining air of United States Nuclear Policy is that its focused on the wrong thr