Nassar standard of but-for causation in contexts other than FWA retaliation claims. For example, in
Palm Beach County School Board v. Wright, 217 So. 3d 163, 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed an adverse judgment entered against an employer in a Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) retaliation claim, holding that
Nassar compelled the court to adopt a but-for causation standard. And while before
Chaudhry no Florida court had considered the effect of
Nassar on FWA retaliation claims, the federal courts that had had generally recognized that
Nassar mandated a change in the causation standard.
See, e.g.,
Ramirez v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 546 F. App’x 829, 833 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that on remand, the district court “may need to consider whether [the plaintiff] ha[d] sufficiently satisfied ‘but for’ causation in [the] case”).