no, it doesn t mean that yet. it s a significant development along that path. but there are other technological hurdles our sources say to doing that. you have to be able to build a missile and warhead that survives reentry and you have to have a reliable missile system. and of course u.s. intelligence inside north korea is very limited. we don t know what we don t know, so there is significant question as to what their capabilities actually are. this assessment speeds up the time table and subjects that they have achieved miniaturization much sooner than previously had been understood. and how did we miss this? how did it happen so much faster that be we thought it would? well, in a sense this is something that many analysts have been saying, they are two years away, five years away. and now it s finally now arrived. all right. stand by for me. general, what does this mean for
cooler heads prevailed. north korea has gotten its nuclear bomb and working on miniaturization. is it worth keeping the military card on the table or better to pull it back a little bit and go what you were talking about earlier of tougher sanctions route? look, there is absolutely nothing that we ought to do that would take the military option off the table. but the president is right about one thing. china can influence the outcome of this. it was different in the aftermath of world war ii where the soviets and china getting the weapons. they wanted to survive the experience. if they want to survive the experience. the president s options are notify the world that any company doing any business whatsoever with the dprk and iran cannot do business in the united states. number two, tell japanese prime
getting an icbm, it seems there is a public red line. the reason you haven t seen clear testing is they have nuclear weapons. the next step is miniaturization. on top of an icbm is a little harder and takes more time, the next test will mean they both have the missile on top of it. leland: you don t do that, maybe they would irritate china if they launched a missile with a nuclear warhead on top. how do they prove that? what is the next thing to look for before they launch something like that? a next nuclear test. and testing what it is miniaturized it. some knowledge of what how
your home to mobile. you are witnessing the ultimate miniaturization of the cassette player. never has so much genius been coaxed into so little space. in all the great bursts of innovation, there is always some kind of scientific breakthrough that has to happen first. and none of this stuff could have happened in the 1980s without the transistor being invented in the late 1940s. japan and sony in particular really understood that this technology could make things smaller, more affordable, more personal. sony was the brand name that really mattered in the 1980s in technology. i ll take the sony. the original sony walkman was so solid, it was a pleasure to hold. it had density. it had heft. the cassette, pop it in, close it. a very satisfying sound. not just a click-click. it was click-thunk. gorgeous, gorgeous machine. it provided you with a soundtrack to your life.
action against china. this can no longer be an incremental build-up. if the technology is resonate in north korea, if the miniaturization of warheads is continuing to occur, it is no longer about freezing. we have to make sure they stop production of nuclear weapons. the chinese need to be held accountable for the financial support, the technical support. neil: it never happens, commander. this latest test, we were aware that it was coming. w we decided not to knock it down, because it didn t seem to be an mediate threat or wasn t necessary. what did you think of that and the reasons behind it? i think at this point, it is a mistake. why should the united states always wait for something to become a threat or for something to become realistic and attack us before we react? it comes a point where we need to say we re watching the build-up. we have the technology to know what s going on. we re looking with the chinese