into mountains of grievances by sunni communities. let me give your viewers a glance a glimpse of what we re talking about. you still have tens of thousands of sunnis in iraq who are treated like criminals because isis functioned within their own communities, they are placed in detention camps, they are excluded, they are treated like basically criminals. they are collectively punished. so isis, even though it lost the khalifa, the territorial khalifa in 2017 in iraq, it has been able to find a refuge within these sunni communities in iraq. in fact, your question is so important because there is a growing evidence now that isis or the islamic state has been able to renew its ranks with younger recruits from members of families who have had ties to the islamic state, and also members internally excluded and angry sunnis.
killing one individual regardless of how important this individual will not really put a permanent end to the islamic state. what has happened what has happened in the past three years, after the dismantling of the khalifa, the physical khalifa in iraq and syria the group has mutated into a resilient insurgency, a low cost resident insurgency. it has a few thousand sand fighters. low-cost operations. it has sprawling operations in syria and iraq and afghanistan. it has carried out thousands, not hundreds, fareed, thousands of attacks in iraq and syria and afghanistan. it has targeted mainly tribal figures, village elders, security forces, local leaders, and it has basically, you know, shown its ability to persist. we re not witnessing the resurgence of isis, we re really witnessing the persistent of this particular resilient and potent insurgency. and what should one do about it, fawaz?
let me ask you, fawaz, about on that issue, you wrote a very prescient piece on foreign policy in august of 2021 as the taliban was taking control of afghanistan. you wrote, the taliban can t control that should be in the west. this major problem just in terms of the taliban taking over which has proved to be entirely true, they face terrorist attacks all the time. how unstable is afghanistan and do you worry that it could become the cockpit once again of terror groups getting larger and larger as the instability grows? you know, there is we re not really talking about mysterious challenges. we know where the islamic state or al qaeda or isis came to afghanistan. how they are nourished. how they survive. how they persist. how they basically find ways and means to exist. conflict zones, economic
afghanistan. you wrote, the taliban can t control that should. this major problem in just in terms of the taliban taking over which has proved to be entirely true, they face terrorist attacks all the time. how unstable is afghanistan and do you worry that it could become the cockpit once again of terror groups getting larger and larger as the instability grows? you know, there is we re not really talking about mysterious challenges. we know where the islamic state or al qaeda or isis came to afghanistan. how they are nourished. how they survive. how they persist. how they basically find ways and means to exist. conflict zones, economic collapse, civil strive. so if afghanistan basically if the economy collapses as it
islamic terror and isis specifically? is it still a major threat? joining me now is fawaz gerges, professor of international relations at the london school of economics and the author of isis: a history. fawaz, welcome. first, give us a sense of what al qurayshi s death means. is this a body blow? how would you describe it? well, i mean, i think the killing of al qurayshi will have more of a tactical impact on the islamic state than a strategic impact. my take on it, fareed, and i m very harsh on american foreign policy, is that american politicians tend to simplify very complex problems. killing one individual regardless of how important this individual will not really put a permanent end to the islamic state. what has happened what has happened in the past three years, after the dismantling of