Its not a complete process. The reality is is when she published those guidelines those of the guidelines and theres no avenue for the public to have input on that and i think thats troubling. I would disagree in the sense therethere is already been sevl places where they have input and they can continue to have input. They continue to respond to the 2010 guidelines, which are part of the foundation and the information we take into consideration. So its an ongoing education process. I dont think it ever stops. That may not be a formalized period of time but it never stops. The gentlemans time has expired. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thanks to the witnesses were testifying today. A few questions to the comp might after all this discussion weve had. The first one that i have is that when i look at data on the students that are overweight or obese, have we had any evidence that, which direction the weight has gone . First to ms. Burwell. Do we have any education on whether this program is re
I feel very, very good that the systemic shortfalls and challenges we faced at the time of 9 11 have been addressed successfully. I will say going forward, though, as we look to the kind of information were dealing with in todays terrorism environment, the challenges are still there. They are still in ways growing. My analysts at nctc who come from across the Intelligence Community from every intense Community Partner contributes personnel to nctc. The design of reform but increasingly we are finding that relevant information exists in the nonclassified world. In the open source world. In the world of social media. So the next great leap for nctc, indeed i would a argue for the National Security community will be finding new and powerful ways to leverage access to open source information, information that is out there for anybody to look at, but out in such volume that looking at it in tpre of analysis and rigor you will want is a challenge. One of the things that happened just this we
Existed actually like a small subcommission of washington, d. C. It was a separate city. The 911 calls and all of that intelligence that was related to those 911 calls werent passed on the the city wide 911 call center. So that was a gap we had to expose. The First Responders that were responding were not getting the information that your call takers were receiving through the base communications so thats something we worked on and i think thats something that we should take from here and if you command a base thats something you should look at in your procedures. Emergency call takers should train together. Your Police Forces on your bases should train together. We currently train with ndw, with fort mcnair on an annual basis so that were familiar with each others tactics, procedures and how we respond. Additionally, when we responded to the navy yard, since that was a separate environment, the navy yard went on lockdown, thats one procedure we sat down with the base commander, sat do
Those teams have some great capabilities. It gives you a great starting point. And i think that our first thought in 2010 was lets set up with the initial structure, set it up in terms of offense and defense and teams that could do offensive actions to defend the country. Anyone have anything to add to that . Yes, sir . Dr. Singer . Just two things. The first is the idea of assuming that our response would have to be limited just to cyber means. If someone carries out an act of war against us using cyber means we are not and should not be limited in our response to use other means, and thats why were seeing that kind of deterrence hold. The second though is as general alexander said weve built up great capabilities. There are many things mr. Snowden did but one of the other things he did was reveal we have very potent cyber offense capability capability. I would add to those who believe building up more will deliver deterrence. The question, why has not not delivered deterrence yet . T
Haystack, youre looking for a needle in a stack of needles, and i dont really know how many people frequently dig their hands around a pile of needles, but it seems pretty painful and pretty difficult. And that highlights exactly what the problem is with the Insider Threat. These are people who look exactly like the person next to them. Its not necessarily about trying to figure out whats wrong or whats different. Its about identifying what some of these indicators or red flags along the spectrum are, trying to mitigate the exploitation of them so that a person doesnt reach that Tipping Point and then incorporating, monitoring or detection mechanisms so that you can see some of these behaviors. Its clearly, as i said, a multidimensional problem, so it requires a multidimensional solution. Its a goal of an Insider Threat program to detect, deter and disrupt. You can take a twofold approach in how you combat those objectives. The first is in how you identify the problem. Not only are Ins