the descent rate was too high they started too high. the engines were spooled back. when they could gain speed again, it was too late. heather: why did that happen initially? was it pilot error? guest: no one likes to use that term. i don t like to use it, either. it probably does involve error of judgment there. the cockpit resource management, c.r.m. is very important. how they pass off to each pilot, their responsibilities and the non flying pilot should have warned him possibly earlier than he did in order to get airspeed back up. heather: doctor, thank you for joining us with your insight. gregg: the most noted pilot in the country, captain sully who landed the flier the flight safely on the hudson river is reacting to the crash and describes the difficulty
normal except the we we glidepath system including two hours of data from the cockpit voice recorder and 24 hours from the data recorder capturing the entire flight. the spokesman from not conserve spoke from the ntsb spoke with the reporters. a scale by a crew member to increase speed was made approximately seven seconds prior to impact. the sound of the stick shaker occurs approximately four seconds prior to impact. a call to initiate a go around occurred 1.5 seconds of with impact. heather: the pilot requested a go around 1.5 seconds prior to impact and said
the target air speed, next thing she said was a stick shaker sound was on. stick shaker literally shakes the stick of the airplane to get the pilot s attention that you are about to enter a stall speed. what happened is, it sounds like they are coming downhill. they are bleeding off air speed the throttles are back at idle, they bleed off too much air speed. now, they realize they are low and flat. stick shaker is going off. somebody in cockpit, go around, go around, let s get out of here. they throw the throttles up but it takes so long for those engines to spool back you they impacted the ground and shattered the tail off the aaron. at that point . gregg: i ve got 90 seconds before a break. why would this happen? is this pilot error?
are dealing with spinal injury, some rail sis. guest: that has to do with the tremendous stopping of 9 huge plain in motion and you and your body inside that plane are caught up in the forts can cause many injuries. gregg: head protection? guest: assume the brace position. if you know the plane is going to go down, there are two variations of brace position, where you put your head down on your lap or between your legs and grip your knees and put your hands in front of you on the seat back and put your fog head on it to rest your head on your hands and use a pillow. if you hold a small child cradle the baby. heather: what if you are not given a warning this is going to happen which these folks, this was no warning, it was seven seconds the pilot was expressing concern. what do do you?
seasoned pilot i m not trying to suggest any pilot in particular, but with the information yesterday would any pilot have needed the extra instruments to land any plane? we re operated under visual flight rules. pilots visually sight and report the runway. that is the primary under yesterday s conditions. we also augmented go that a precision report a monitoring system which a supplemental system but beyond what is required. at this time i m going to turn it over to the n.t.s.b. chairperson. debra. on behalf of all the board members and staff of n.t.s.b. we offer condolences to families that lost loved ones in the crash. our thoughts go to those