Verification will end when the comprehensive solution ends. Then we revert back to the Additional Protocol and comprehensive safeguards. The same verification that every other country in the world is subject to. Its a critical question for the committee to ask, whether youre prepared today to agree that if iran behaves for a set period of time then were prepared to end their sanctions and prepared to end special scrutiny of iran and treat them as if they were japan. I point out in my testimony, there are other examples of countries that have abandoned Nuclear Weapons programs and weve accepted that. Once they have abandoned their Nuclear Weapon program, we treat them like a normal country. South africa is an example. Brazil and argentina are examples. What was different in those cases, not only did they say they were abandoning Nuclear Weapons programs and take steps in that direction, in those cases there was also a fundamental change in government. In south africa, the Apartheid Regi
With zero tolerance for cheating. An immediate test of irans willingness to cooperate rests with the iaeas attempts to clarify evidence the International Observer group has on the potential military dimensions of irans programs. For several years, iran has refused to provide information or explanation to the iaea on past bomb efforts. This includes the Parchin Military base where iran has gone to Great Lengths to eliminate all traces of any clandestine activity, including demolishing buildings and including removing large areas of soil from the site. Irans willingness to come clean on its past Weapons Programs should be an acid test for western negotiators. We must ask, what good is striking an agreement and removing sanctions, our only leverage, if iran keeps a capacity to secretly build nuclear bombs. Unfortunately, u. S. Negotiators have already made a key concession that will complicate the task of verifying Irans Nuclear commitments. The interim agreement of last year would allow
Verification over several decades and the views i will be presenting are my own and not intended to represent views of those ive been associated with such as the department of defense and the Nuclear Treaty monitoring and verification. My statement draws in part on those experiences and on the Defense Science Board Task force report as well as the work of a nongovernmental task force on verification requirements for Nuclear Agreement with iran. Neither of the two task forces makes a judgment as to whether compliance with any particular Nuclear Agreement is ver fibl. Indeed, we do not yet know the details of the monitoring provisions that will emerge in the iranian agreement now under association or in such an agreement will be concluded. The Defense Science Board Task force report underscores that monitoring Nuclear Programs is very challenging. And that the technical capabilities to do so are limited. But the report suggests a number of steps that can be taken to make monitoring more
As a former personal trainer, I had a love-hate relationship with January. The gyms were always brim-full of people working on their New Year resolutions, and I wondered how many would make it into February or March. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, I failed to meet my own fitness and lifestyle goals. I put on a few pounds, isolated, and disconnected from the hobbies and activities that brought me joy.