Bomb, five to six bombs, by january, february of this year. Has iran accomplished that mission . Do they have enough material to do that . I dont think we see that. The sense is no, they do not. The concern was when they had 20 purity and enough kilograms up there to have maybe one but yet we dont have all the information. So we cant say with certainty they dont have that, correct . Were just looking at the declared facilities, the facilities were aware of. There may be undeclared facilities, as the iaeas indicated. And mr. Lauder and ambassador detrani, you were saying that its very difficult to monitor and verify irans compliance with the iranianu. S. Jpa agreement. Do you believe these details should have been worked out prior to any agreement starting and releasing sanctions . If you go into a negotiation, you should have everything on the table. I want to know everything you had before you move forward. I mean, would you agree with that . Sir, i dont have all the modalities of the negotiators and what they were using. I believe they gave them relief on a certain number of sanctions so they could move forward. But if we cant verify now or monitor it, we should have had a way to monitor that stuff, all those parameters before we move forward. I would hope so. How about you, mr. Lauder . I think its very important that before theres further loosening of the sanctions, which have brought iran to the table, that we do get this complete and full accounting of irans intentions and have the data monitoring thats the basis of our monitoring regime. In your opinion does the Current Situation in Irans Nuclear program or whatever theyre doing in our agreement, does it allow iran to get closer to having a bomb if we stay on the current track . Mr. Rademaker. I think the Obama Administration would argue that the current arrangement diminishes the risk of Nuclear Breakout because it limits the number of new centrifuges that iran can deploy. It limits the prevents them from continuing to enrich to the 20 level which they were doing in the past. But on the other hand, theres been some recent analysis done by the bipartisan policy center. Its on their website. Theyre no longer producing 20 enriched material, but their production of lower enriched 3. 5 has gone up by about 25 . And then what ive heard today on this panel the advantages are the progress is substantially less than the Obama Administration advertised. Right. But what ive heard on this panel today is theyve got way more centrifuges than they need to have for Nuclear Power production. And so i think were all in agreement that theyre moving in that direction, theyve been moving in that direction in the last 25 to 30 years. Playing the cat and mouse game. Do you believe that the u. S. Iranian interim agreement was detrimental to the u. S. Security, or israels security or the Regional Security the way it was negotiated, release the sanctions at the time they did . Do you think it was detrimental to do that . Just kind of real quickly because im rung out of time. I think twas detrimental on the sanctions side. I also think it was highly detrimental by basically legitimizing centrifuge enrichment in iran which at the time we said was not permitted. Ambassador detrani, what do you think . [ inaudible ]. Your microphone, please. The reporting from the iaea indicates that iran has down blended and converted to uranium oxide their inventory, part of their inventory of 20 purity enriched uranium. The iaea report speaks about the framework for cooperation. So i think what weve just recently seen from the iaea is that there has been some movement on the part of iran in response to the relief on some of those sanctions. But thats just a very interim type approach to it. Certainly if youre sitting in israel youre looking at something different. Thats different. That brings me up to my last question. Since iran do you feel like theyve abided by the terms of the agreement . Sir, i dont have all the particulars on, that but according to the iaea, the iaea most recent report is a much more positive report that ive seen in the past with the exception of the weaponization and the militarization. Okay. And if they dont abide by, that what should we as a nation do . More sanctions . Preemptive strike . Prepare for the day that they do get a nuclear bomb . Sanctions are biting. Sanctions are big. Sanctions have had impact. Theyre having impact. Im out of time. I appreciate your time. Thank you. We go to mr. Juan vargas of california. I too want to thank you, mr. Chairman, again for having this meeting and also for the ranking member. And to give us so much time. I appreciate it too. Thank you. As many of you know, ive been very critical of the interim deal. I thought it was a mistake. I believe that we first should have gotten the final deal, then we should have negotiated the interim deals. In other words, we first should have made sure that there was no path to getting a Nuclear Weapon. Then we could have negotiated these interim deals because i did think that the sanctions were working. I voted here to ratchet up the sanctions because i think you had to get to that fundamental choice, do you want your Nuclear Program and do you want to militarize it as youre attempting to do or do you want a functioning economy . We will continue to press the sanctions until you didnt have a functioning economy. I think that would have been the right way to go. But now we are here and we are here. And i think it is a very dangerous situation that were in. Because i do think were going to get to july 20th and for sure theyre going to want more time. Thats what we feared at the beginning. I think thats going to be the case. Then what do we do . Then do we say were not going to negotiate and make ourselves look like the bad guys . Then its harder to put the sanctions back on again. So where do we go from here . And i do want to comment, mr. Rademaker. I couldnt agree with you more wholeheartedly. If its a fiveyear deal, if its a tenyear deal, if its even a tenyear deal its not a deal. I mean, that is a bad deal. This is a situation where you have to make sure you can force them to comply all the way out. Because otherwise, they will just simply play cat and mouse and outlast us ten years, and then theyll get on with their Nuclear Program. So where do we go from here . Meaning were approaching this point. I dont think were going to be the monitoring and verifications, congressman. Theres no question about it. And weve talked about unfettered access, anytime, anyplace, access to all the facilities. Concern about covert facilities, concerned about weaponization. These are things that need to be drilled down and pursued with great vigor indefinitely. Right. But i believe were going to get to the sixmonth assume for a second we get to the sixmonth and they want more time. I think thats what do we do . At that point what do we do . Mr. Rademaker, you look like i think its pretty clear that if we reach the sixmonth point without having reached agreement on the comprehensive solution that there will be a sixmonth extension. In fact, the jpa at one point says it will take up to a year to negotiate this. So even in drafting the jpa they were anticipating potentially a sixmonth extension. I did want to pick up on one thing you said. You said you think the right thing to have done here would be to negotiate the final agreement and then come back and fill in the details. You know, it pains me to say this but i think in fact that is what they did. I mean, the jpa does specify the final agreement. The final agreement is that i read it earlier. The final agreement is that upon the expiration of the comprehensive solution the iranian Nuclear Program will be treated in the same manner as that of any nonNuclear Weapons state to the npt. So the end state, the final state is no sanctions, no restrictions on their ability to do whatever they want in the nuclear area. Ordinary safeguards if i could interrupt for a second. I thought the issue of having any type of enrichment program. Any type of way for them to be able to reach their ability to create the Nuclear Weapon, the heavy water facility. Thats there. I know what youre saying, and im actually not disagreeing with you. But i think that in the final agreement what i would say is if youre going to allow any kind of Nuclear Power program that had to be one that was so tight there was no way you that had to have the fuel coming from somewhere else, montrealed closely, that youd have to have unfettered access to their country and where they could potentially be hiding things. Thats the deal i mean. Because i agree with you. Thats why i think personally. And again, ive been critical of the people i think associated with this deal were very goodhearted and attempted to negotiate with a western type of nation and found out that thats not who theyre negotiating with. I think it was very naive. Mr. Lauder, could i have you comment on that . I think the extent to which negotiations continue, the opportunity that needs to be seized, and i agree with ambassador detrani in this respect, is to use that time to push even harder to expand the monitoring provisions that iran will need to undertake. Iran is different. They have violated International Norms over an extended period of time. They have not been in compliance with international agreement. It is reasonable then to expect that iran should need to undertake additional need additional monitoring provisions to build confidence in the international community, that they are changing their path. Thank you. My time is expired. I want to say i think that iran is like north korea. I believe if they get a Nuclear Weapon theyll also threaten to bomb los angeles or else and i unfortunately think that they might have the nerve to do it. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Vargas. We go now to mr. George holding of north carolina. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I think we can all agree that if the Obama Administration is able to craft a final agreement with iran that it would be a huge Foreign Policy win, at least in the eyes of the administration, a Foreign Policy win, a political win, truly in an environment of an administration that is some what bereft of Foreign Policy wins or accolades. You know, my concern is that if they achieve what they consider a win that theyll lack the political will to risk tarnishing that win by calling out a violation that we find subsequently. So my question, im going to just run down the line and have each of you all respond to this, is what internal controls are there there . Red team, so to speak, that would ensure that the politics of trying to salvage this Foreign Policy win dont trump good sense in the white house as far as calling out a violation. Mr. Rademaker, take 30 seconds, and lets go down, and by the time everyones done that ill be out of time. I honestly dont know what sort of checks there might be within the administration. Every president can structure decisionmaking on Foreign Policy in his administration in the way he sees fit. Id like to think that there are people at the Defense Department that are vigilant, that there are people in the Intelligence Community drawing attention to problems. But i dont know. I think the ultimate red team is the United States congress. And this committee perhaps that might have been helpful as the president was considering exchanging bergdahl for five taliban terrorists. Well, the good news here i think for the congress is i think one of the things the iranians are demanding is an end to all u. S. Sanctions. In fact, theyre promised that in the jpa. And i dont think the president has the authority unilaterally to get rid of all of the sanctions. He has some waivers. He has some ability not to enforce certain laws. But i think at the end of the day there are certain things that only the congress is going to be able to do. So for them to be able to fulfill their commitments to the iranians in this negotiation theyre going to need this committee and this congress to pass legislation. And that will afford you an opportunity to pass judgment on the entire arrangement. And for that reason, i would think it would behoove the administration to consult closely with you now to make sure that you are prepared to accept indeed. I dont know if thats happening. But ultimately, they need to persuade you that theyve struck a good deal and if there are details youre unhappy about its better to know that now rather than promise things to the iranians that theyre not going to be able to deliver. Mr. Lauder . I agree that perhaps the most effective red team for this will be the u. S. Congress. You will have the opportunity, im presuming to say this, as an outsider, but this is not a treaty. But you will have the functional equivalent of a resolution of ratification when you deal with the sanctions question. And that is an opportunity to express the congresss views about the types of capabilities that need to be for monitoring that need to be nurtured in the u. S. Government, that need to be funded in u. S. Government. And you can ask for a periodic compliance report. It could be the extent to which iran is complying with the agreement and what types of anomalies are being detected, what is being done to resolve that. They ask for both a periodic unclassified and a classified report. Thats certainly been a feature of other agreements in the past. I didnt used to like them when i was in the executive branch because they were a lot of work and it led to it led to a lot of internal debate, but i think its something to make sure that the iranians understand that their compliance is going to be very important to the United States across all the branches. Thank you, mr. Heinonen . Thank you. I agree with mr. Lauder and the best is actually the public opinion, that you make the deal open and open compliance reports. And this deal is important. This is important not only to the security of the United States of america but the Regional Security, and this sets a benchmark, for example, for how were going to deal in the future with north korea. This has a lot of ramifications and they dont end here. I believe ground truth will be the monitors in the field, the iaea and other countries. I believe its those foreign governments that also have access and unique insights into whats going on there. I think a strong case can be made that they can speak to compliance issues and if iran is gone on to their own way and cheating and so forth i dont think anyone will be able to conceal that aspect to it. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Holding. We thank all our witnesses for their testimony today, and i think youve given us a lot to consider as the administration continues to negotiate. I am particularly troubled that, as mr. Rademaker put it, this agreement puts iran on the path from nuclear pariah to nuclear partner. And i dont think any member of the committee is comfortable with that given the supreme leaders comments in may in particular about expectations that we might try to limit their Ballistic Missile program. As i quoted earlier, he said, this is a stupid idiotic expectation. But i didnt give you the rest of his quote, which to me is very revealing. He said, the revolutionary guards should definitely carry out their program and not be satisfied with the present level. They should massproduce Ballistic Missiles. He said, this is the main duty of all military officials. Now, hes not referring to a Space Program here. And when you combine that with a call for the head of Irans Atomic Energy Organization to add 30,000 centrifuges last month to irans existing 19,000, ignoring what the iranian officials and what their leader is saying on this subject as they move forward with their program is very concerning to me. And i especially wanted to thank mr. Angle and the other members of this committee and our witnesses for the chance today to take a good hard look at the ongoing negotiations. Thank you all very much. And we stand adjourned. Cspans new book sundays at eight includes huffingtobe post senior military correspondent david wood. Theres something that drives them to this ideal of service and the its like so many people i know who served in war, is that the intensity of the experience, the intensity of the relationships they had with their combat buddies are so strong and so pure and true that they look back on those times with longing. And so id always asked them, you know, do you wish this had never happened, and theyre like, id do it again in a heartbeat. I think theres Something Else that goes on there too, and it is that going through a near death experience somehow seems to give them so much strength and courage and optimism that i think thats one reason why they would do it again. Read more of our conversation with david wood and other featured interviews from our book notes and q a programs in cspans sundays at eight, from Public Affairs book, now available as a fathers day gift at your Favorite Book seller. The center for strategic and International Studies held a discussion monday on chinarussia relations. With former australian Prime Minister kevin rudd and former u. S. Ambassador to china stapleton roy. They discussed both of those nations increasing tensions with the u. S. Even as relations between china and russia continue to warm. This is 90 minutes. Good afternoon, everyone. My name is chris johnson. Im the freeman chair in china studies here. Its great to see so many friends to join us for what i think is going to be an absolutely fantastic panel. I couldnt be more proud of the panel we managed to put together. Obviously, an issue of tremendous concern, lots of thinking about whats going on in the sinorussia relationship and how it matters for sinochina or si sinorussianu. S. Triangular relations. You all have the bio. This is another installment in our china reality check series where we try to look at issues that are either controversial by their nature, are poorly understood here in washington or we just feel deserve more attention across the board. And this topic certainly struck me as i was in shanghai watching the summit between president putin and xi as something i needed to do as soon as i got back. So im very pleased all these great gentlemen were coordinating their schedules. It wasnt easy but we managed to get them all in one room. Were going to have dr. Brzezinski start off. Ambassador roy will follow and Prime Minister rudd will follow up from that. Just getting some framing remarks. Well have a few questions and answers amongst ourselves here and then well turn it over to the audience for broader discussion. Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much. I take it were supposed to talk about the agreement between russia and china and its implications. Let me make three basic points about it. Because in my judgment at least it is still in the realm of speculation. Perhaps my two colleagues know much more about it because they know more about china than i do. But on the whole so far most of the issues that arise out of that agreement are subject to some degree of uncertainty. My sense of that agreement, however, on the whole is that it does not really create a situation in which the russians are gaining a great deal. Theyre gaining something thats essential to them, is important for them, and it can contribute to some degree of influence and success. But they dont retain in my view at least as much freedom of action subsequent time as the chinese. After all, its a longterm agreement. Its a longterm agreement which involves commitments by both sides of substantial character but of much larger character on the russian part than on the chinese. Moreover, the russians are making a commitment to china of a sort that theyll have a longterm interest in maintaining its maximum or perhaps even enlarging. Their relationship on that same issue with the european unusual is already estimated and will probably decline. So they have a vast interest in this being successful and sustained. The chinese of course do also. Its good to have this russian support. It does provide them with a degree of guarantee for the future. Thats very important. But consider this. In some years to come there could be issues pertaining to, for example, new opportunities from iran. There could be new opportunities to purchase a great deal of energy from saudi arabia. Especially as the structure of World Distribution comes out from saudi arabia will be altered. The chinese already have a farreaching longterm agreement with turkmenistan which can grow in size, and they certainly want to preserve it. So in a sense my feeling is that while this is a mutually beneficial agreement the strategic consequences of it are more promising for china than for russia. It doesnt imply in any sense some cleavage between them. Ats normal outcome of the prolonged negotiating relationship. But the chinese retain options subsequent in time regarding that agreement that are not open in the same degree to the russians. And the minor second aspect, i dont know what the price structure for the agreement was, but talking recently to some central asians who obviously have a keen interest of their own in this agreement, i got the impression that their view was that the russians are were compelled to make some serious concessions in the price. So that email from the sort of price structure point of view, this probably was more to the benefit of the chinese than to the russians. But it does emphasize enforcement of an enduring relationship, the one that can be altered asymmetrically. My second point pertains to the geostrategic realities of that relationship more generally. Clearly, russia, china, and the United States are the worlds most preeminent powers, although president obama on the whole correctly demoted russia publicly in recent times to the status of a very major regional power. Not global power. I dont want to take issue with my president , especially since im sympathetic to that point of view, but i do have to acknowledge that when it comes to atomic weapons russia is a global power. It is a global power thats close to being a peer of ours. Whereas china is not. And that of course introduces a significant asymmetry in the russianchinese relationship. Although i rather doubt that either the russians or the chinese are contemplating a nuclear engagement against each other. Russia is a global atomic power. China is not. China lags behind the United States. And lags behind russia. The chinese believe in minimal nuclear deterrence, inflicting a minimal amount of damage sufficient tone force political consequences that they view desirable but not wreak total damage either on us or on the russians in their targeting. That makes some significant difference. Secondly here, however, on the other hand both china and the United States are Global Economic powers. Russia is not. Worse than that, china is a growing Global Economic power. Russia is not. Russia is a receding regional at best economic power. And that problem is getting more serious for the russians. So here it is also a matter of some asymmetry in the relationship. And one could even argue that one of the highly possible consequences of the ukrainian adventure is going to be a result which might well be one of the most damaging territorial geopolitical outcomes for russia in its entire imperial history. If you think of russias imperial history, it has been one of steady growth, with some setbacks here or there. But the setbacks were never really decisive. The war in crimea in the 1850s was a setback. The war with the japanese was a setback of some far eastern significance but not fundamental. The defeat in 1940s would have been that. But russia prevailed. But the possibility of losing ukraine is going to be the most serious territorial defeat for russia. It will mean the loss of more than 40 million people. And a large piece of territory. And putin has already accomplished something that hasnt been achieved by anyone so far in the russianukrainian relationship. Unlike, for example, the poles, who for a variety of my judgment on the whole legitimate reasons strongly suspect and destruct distrust the russians. The ukraineians have not harbored animus toward russia by and large. The results of crimea plus whats going on is creating a nation of intense hostility towards russia. And if the outcome is one that sustains a westoriented ukraine laush will have suffered. And i think the probabilities are will suffer the greatest setback insofar as its territorial history is concerned. The chinese are not threatened with that. The chinese have from their point of view unfortunately rather bad relationships with the majority of the countries on which they border. There are claims and counterclaims. And the russians and others are worried about that. The largest piece of territory lost by china historically is to russia. So far the chinese have not raised it openly. Although in private conversations with some people, myself included, they have mentioned it rather explicitly. That is a problem for the future which the russians cannot entirely ignore. And the chinese, while having regional conflicts, local conflicts with some of the neighbors, with some exceptions on the whole have acted with restraint. On the whole. There have been some problems lately with maritime limits and so forth. But they have not resulted in drastic outcomes. My last and third point is what about the geostrategic trajectories of these three countries . Here again on russia i can be very straightforward and simple. It is a downward trend. The by and large general trends are negative. Take it in terms of population. Russian population is declining. Take it in terms of russian social talent. Large parts of it, not overwhelming but significant, are emigrating. Take it in terms of durability of human life. Russia is still relatively on the low level compared to advanced societies. Take it in terms of private capital. Every successful member of the new middle class is trying to export money somewhere else. Now, some of that up to a point is happening in china too. Theres no doubt that the new class of multibillionaires is trying to export a great deal of its capital. But by and large, there is still nothing comparable in any way to what is transpiring in russia. There is not a mass emigration movement. There is a sense of vitality. And there is a sense of prospective success. China rising peacefully is still the predominant slogan in the country, at least on the official level. And in that sense the geostrategic trajectory of china is rather positive. And again, in sharp contrast to russia. Now, that of course from the chinese point of view and from the global perspective is complicated by the fact that the chineserussian relationship is not the preeminent global relationship. It is the chineseamerican relationship that is the globally preeminent relationship. But the decline of russia in that triangular relationship obviously boosts the influence of china, gives china the option of utilizing russia whenever convenient, but presumably out of caution and strategic intelligence not associating themselves with russia too much. Look at the u. N. Votes, for example, on ukraine. China explicitly abstained. Abstained from a resolution which was explicitly condemning russia. They didnt back russia. They didnt try to veto the resolution. They simply abstained. Which shows that the russians do not enjoy the preeminent place in chinese strategic calculations. It is still the United States. And hence, a great deal of what transpires in the triangular relationship also depends on us. Can we maintain a posture that enhances the significance mutually of the americanchinese relationship . Because that impacts on the chineserussian regsship. A and here i have some reservations on both sides. And im not trying to be solomonic. I think both sides lately have not acted as skillfully and as intelligently as one might wish. I had from the very beginning some reservations about the wording of the pivot speech the moment i read it, i said to myself i really wonder how the chinese will interpret it. Why put such heavy emphasis on the significance of a military shift to the far east with the algerian with the afghan war coming to an end . Why put so much stress on it . Why talk implicitly about some form of containment in that context . By hints about maritime or territorial problems. Why not simply say, which would have been truthful and accurate and served the same purpose by saying the United States has been part of the far east since 1905, the roosevelt negotiating treaties between japan and russia. And it remains one and will remain one. And you dont have to say it involves aircraft carriers or military personnel or new deploymen deployments. Or mr. Rodman in your country, actually, where it wasnt specified very clearly where the American Marines to be stationed there are to defend australia from china or from getting a new what is the country called . New guinea. Papuanew guinea. But the fact its going to be american troops there i thought was somewhat wrong message. Not necessary. Lately even in some speechd, in particularly the west point speech, there are some references to china in relationship to other issues which implied a somewhat ambivalent assessment of the chinese role in the world. I think we have to be more careful in that respect. And of course our newspapers can be naturally and instinctively critical of the chinese political system being free. The chinese, however, have been responding to this or maybe even contributing to it through an increasingly negative press about the United States. The fact of the matter is much of the chinese officially controlled press is very hostile towards the United States. And very explicitly so. Some of the articles which i read every week are emphasizing american aggressiveness, american insensitivity, american domineering aspirations, and so forth. And that i think feeds a sense of mutual mutually increasing antagonism potential ly, mutual suspicions and uncertainties. Just coming here i was reading an article entitled american hegemonists biggest threat to china is the americanization of china. From a Major Chinese publication. It is of course connected with systemic challenges within china itself. The chinese dont like the comparison between themselves and ourselves in terms of who has the largest number of corrupt public officials. I think its a close call as to which one does. Except the problem is that our corrupt officials act in keeping with our financial culture. That is to say, enrich yourself as much as you can and rip anybody off as much as you can. The chinese officials happen to be members of the Standing Committee of the communist party of china. I thought a communist party had rather different principles regarding distribution of wealth. So its even more of a challenge to their internal lodgic and stability than ours. But the interaction of the two perhaps has a somewhat crossfeeding effect. So these the are kinds of problems that i think can surface and link to specific problems on the ground could become quite serious. One of the things to watch, and ill end on this, insofar as strategic prospects is concerned, is the potential evolution of a very specific japaneseindian relationship. The indian press is full of articles about the new connection between modi and abe and how logical it is for a potentially strong maritime power, technologically highly advanced, such as china to a close relationship with india which is threatened territorially by a nearby strong neighbor. So the chinese too i think have to be very careful in how they handle their external affairs. And for us the challenge is to prove to everyone that Americas Energy for continued growth and vitality and social success has not been dissipated and especially by social trends, which warn of certain potential social risks and tensions. And ill end by simply mentioning it. The growing disparity between the very rich and few of them and the very many increasingly poor, and theyre the vast majority. Thanks. Thank you. Ambassador roy. Thank you. Dr. Brzezinski has made my task very easy because i basically agree with the various points that he has made. But when were talking about russian relations with china, it cant be all summarized in just the few minutes. So there are some additional points that i would like to make. First, its vitally important not to oversimplify the relationship. Its an extremely complex relationship. And its an asymmetrical relationship. What do i mean by asymmetrical . In 1993 russias economy and chinas were about the same size. Chinas economy is now four times larger than that of russia, and the disparity is growing. As a result, until recently russia including putin would be very reluctant to commit russian resources over a longterm period to the growth of china. Now, some other factors have come into play now, but that underlying suspicion on the part of russia about the potential threat to russian interests of an increasingly strong and prosperous china is always an underpinning of russian views of their relationship with china. Having said that, though, its very important to understand how strong the impulse is between the two countries to improve their relationship. Neither of them like a world dominated by a sole superpower. So that strategic factor, despite the fact that until recently both of them had more important relationships with the United States than with each other. And i think you could still say that in the case of china. But recent developments in u. S. Russian relations have altered that particular balance. But the underlying fact is they dont like a superpowerdominated world and it was reflected in the fact that ten years ago they finally settled their remaining border dispute through a border agreement that involved the transfer of some islands in the amor river from russia to china and the division of an island. So here were two big strong counsel resolving a territorial dispute through the transfer of territo territory. Thats something that both governments ought to bear in mind and particularly china in terms of looking at how territorial disputes are affecting their bilateral relations. So the trend in russianchinese relations has been toward improving them, and i think its fair to say that they are the both they have been in postworld war ii history, including the period of communist cooperation, because its a different type of relationship now. Now, having said that, ive mentioned that russia was reluctant to commit its resources to the development of china. That has changed. It was changing over time. And i think the ukrainian developments have greatly strengthened that desire on the part of russia. In the case of china and looking at the energy picture, which is what we were supposed to be talking about today, until the mid 90s chinas Energy Strategy was based on selfsufficiency. But beginning around 1993, china had to move to a different Energy Strategy because it was becoming increasingly reliant on imported energy. So now the fundamental driver of chinas Energy Policy is diversity of supply. And in large measure because of the ukrainian crisis the importance to russia of the diversity of demand has become much more important. A large portion of their gas exports has been to europe. And now theres a question in russian minds of how reliable that demand is going to be. And the second factor is the chinese demand is growing rapidly and european demand is growing very slowly and may decrease because europe is now looking at diversifying their sources of energy because they dont like the implications of being too dependent on russia as the source for their natural gas supply. So these are the considerations that came together in this meeting that produced this agreement. Now, the agreement on its surface looks like a very important one. The supply of 38 million cubic meters of gas annually by russia to china beginning in 2018. Thats a big deal by any measure. But we have to be careful. Dr. Brzezinski correctly pointed out, we dont know the details. Key factor is price. What we do know is that china compromised a longstanding position by agreeing to a base formula for price that is related to oil price. This is the way that russian supply of gas to europe is priced. High Oil Prices Mean you pay higher price for the natural gas. But china has always resisted that type of a formula and its one of the reasons why for ten years the two countries were not able to Reach Agreement on this particular deal. Now theyve reached agreement and it seems that they have agreed to a oil pricerelated formula but we dont know the details. And its very likely that russia was in a weaker position than china was in working out the final details of the agreement. But well have to wait until we learn more about the actual pricing arrangements. Now, the second thing to remember is lets not blow this deal out of proportion. The deal provides for 38 million cubic meters of gas per year. It doesnt begin until 2018. And it will take a while to ramp up to that level of supply. Chinas current consumption of natural gas is running at somewhere between 70 billion cubic meters a year and 100 billion cubic meters of gas a year. So this deal represents maybe 25 or less of chinas current consumption. But by the time the gas comes on stream it will be a much smaller percentage. Why . Because china has set the goal by 2020 of having an annual consumption of natural gas that is in the 200 billion cubic meters of gas per year or 220. So 38 billion viewed in that context is a much smaller percentage of chinas overall natural gas consumption. Now, theres a reason why china is trying to increase its consumption of natural gas so rapidly, and anyone who has traveled to chinese cities knows why. Coalfired pollution is decimating the air quality in china. And therefore, they have a major urgent need to diversify away from coal burning and to utilize more Clean Natural gas. And so that is the trend which is under way. And russia is part of that picture. But dr. Brzezinski referred to the turkmenistan deal. The turkmenistan deal is for a shorter period of time but provides for 40 billion 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year at its maximum level. And theres a possibility that will rise to 70 billion cubic meters per year. So once again and australia is becoming an important potential supplier of lng to china. And somewhere around 2020 its possible the u. S. Fracced gas will become available for export to asia, and that will also affect the considerations. So if you look at this particular deal in the context of this broader picture, you realize that its an important arrangement but its by no means one that ties the two countries together in a highly dependent relationship over a long period of time in the sense that one country could exert influence over the other by diddling with the supply of gas as russia has done with the ukraine. China is not prepared to put itself subject to that type of leveraging, and i dont think that russia has gained that potential in this particular agreement. So within that context i think we should not assume that the rivalry factors in the sinorussian relationship have been eliminated. Theyre very important in central asia, for example. Where the chinese supply of consumer goods has essentially driven russian goods out of the market but that russia still has knows historic relationships with the central asians. Now, heres an interesting point, and ill close on this point. Weve just had this conference that putin attended called the conference on interaction and confidencebuilding measures in asia, or cica, if you will. At that conference president xi jinping gave a very important speech in which he essentially addressed a major security proposal. Hes talking about a collective security arrangement for asia. And there was some language in that speech that seems to be targeted against the United States. But if you look at other language, you realize this particular organization has 26 members plus some observers. And of those 26 members 19 are not in east asia. Theyre basically relevant to central asia. Not to east asia. And president xi emphasized that no country should dominate the security of a region and all countries have a right to their security independence from other countries. Was that really targeted at the United States . Or was that targeted at Russian Security ambitions in asia . I lean toward the latter interpretation because of the locus of where he made the speech. That doesnt mean that there were not elements that were aimed at the United States, but it suggests the complexity of the sinorussian relationship. We should be very careful to do our homework before we jump to premature conclusions. Thank you. Prime minister redden, you certainly travel to beijing a lot and have embarked upon this very ambitious project up at harvard to help think about these issues. So i wonder if maybe you would frame a little bit about how this is all seen through beijings eyes and how you think that sets the strategic framework going forward. Good. Thanks very much. Its i take very much stape roys comments about complexity. And there is develop complex developments into a snappy phrase which causes us to reach false strategic conclusions. Thats the first caveat which we should all apply to a serious study of International Relations and strategic affairs. Second point therefore which arises in my mind is when we look at both the content and the symbolism of the recent summit between Vladimir Putin and president xi jinping in shanghai, what does it actually mean as opposed to what everyone theorizes it as meaning . And in the grand sweep of chinarussia or sinosoviet relations as it used to be, does it mean a lot . And in the within that frame are we looking at a dramatic event which fundamentally turns the dial in the arrangements which Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon and mao and cho enlai reached effectively in the 1970s, which was a strategic accommodation between washington and beijing based on a common strategic neuralgia toward the then soviet union. That was of genuine global strategic significance and the subsequent unfolding of what then became modernizing china as well. Have we reached a new point at which that fundamental axis has now changed . I think personally that the shanghai meeting represents the culmination of forces which have been at work for quite some time in the chinarussia relationship and the chinau. S. Relationship. Which begin fundamentally to alter the premises of the 1972 strategic concord. The second point i would seek to go to is how then our analysis to one side is this reality viewed from beijing. And then finally, though i am no russophile and no russia expert and no sovietologist by training, based on recent travels to moscow id hazard my arm on how some of these realities are viewed from moscow as well. On the china view of reality i think its always important to go back to the fundamental principles of what are chinas abiding National Interests and how it currently perceives those through the Standing Committee of the pollit boo plit politbu. The first point if you were standing around the committee of the politburo at present whether its articulated or not its certainly assumed that the number one interest of the Standing Committee of the politburo is to preserve the communist party in power. It is not something that we should simply smile about and pass on from because when you look at the current dynamics of russian politics and the russian leadership there is no critique coming from moscow, nor has there been for a long, long time. In terms of the viability, the credibility of a oneparty state. And so in terms of regime fundamentals, to state the obvious, but we should restate it, you do not have a rolling critique of the fundamental nature of chinese political power under the communist system coming from moscow. And that is of some genuine comfort to china. Given that the volume of critique it obtains from the rest of the world and sustaining its current political and politicoeconomic model. Number two, from the Chinese National interest point of view, is this. The maintenance of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Well, theres nothing remarkable about that. Thats the same discussions we have around any cabinet table in any capital in the world. But applying specifically to the russian question, this is of i believe profound significance. Number one, the fact that in that period post89 starting with that epochmaking meeting between gorbachev and deng in the middle of 1999 which began the settlement process of the soviet chinese, then russianchinese border, that has provided the fundamental longterm security from a chinese perspective about the vast expanse of 4,300 kilometers of the land border across the north. Any student of chinese history will tell you that the highest levels of chinese strategic concern have always existed in terms of what comes rolling across your frontiers from the north. From the former and later hang dynasties right through until the manchu invasions of the 17th century. And if you include japan within the wider north or frankly into the 20th century as well. The strategic significance of effectively settling the russianchinese border, which occurred in a process beginning in that meeting in 89 and concluding with the amoa river negotiations and agreements most recently, is of profound strategic significance because the core point is this. China no longer regards russia as a threat. And this is a deep, deep question which has been resolved from a long period in history. Therefore, when we look at chinas territorial integrity and territorial claims, the focus is no longer on this vast trert roo terrestrial border but on india in one direction and its maritime disputes and borders on the other with japan and southeast asia. The third National Interest of china and where russia again fits into this is of course the paramount importance attached to the transformation of the chinese Economic Growth moltdel. The number one, number two, number three priorities of this leadership is how do you transform the model which has served kominas economic modernization from 1978 to 2012, 13 into a new model which is essentially based on domestic private consumption replacing Public Investment as the primary drivers of Economic Growth. Secondly, priority also attached to the growth in the Services Industries as opposed to traditional laborintensive and energyintensive manufacturing. And number three, with a greater role for private firms in relation to staterun enterprises into the future. This is where the bulk of this governments, this leadership in chinas energies are currently focused. And therefore, where does russia fit into that . The underpinnings of the old growth model and the new growth model, and where the states contribution has been particularly important, lies in longterm Energy Security and Food Security. And across the Energy Security, security of Raw Materials supply and Food Security questions, china sees in russia a potential longterm huge strategic partner. Yet to be fully articulated, yet to be fully expressed, but of direct and fundamental significance to the continuation of this transforming process of chinas path to economic modernity. Number four is this. That within the framework of these other three sets of interests china, however, in the period since dish think we could probably point it to october, november last year or maybe september, october last year. In a Major National conference on diplomatic work articulated a new approach to its diplomacy, at least in east asia and certainly with its neighboring states