national security adviser, the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the director of national intelligence either of the relevant committees in the house, including the big 8, which you know include intel. you didn t tell the intelligence committee, you didn t tell the armed services committee. you report that after you took it upon yourself to have this phone conversation, that you told them of the conversation heard. not that china believed that we were going to imminently attack them. which by the way, has never been true in my lifetime. and it may be true, since they believed it, that s why they re digging icbm holes faster than they can fill them with icbms. but you chose instead to handle it yourself with a phone call. so, general milley, you offered all of the concerning intelligence and i m going to request that you provide it to us. i would like you to provide us the relevant intelligence information that you based your belief that china was going to to believe that
0 during this process, the views of all of the joint chiefs of staff, all of us, the centcom commander, general mckenzie, general miller, and myself were all given serious consideration by the administration. we provided a broad range of options and our assessment of their potential outcomes. we couched that in cost, benefit, risk-to-force, risk-to-mission. all of that was evaluated against the national security objectives of the united states. on 14 april, the president of the united states, president biden, announced his decision, and the u.s. military received a change of mission, to retrograde all u.s. military forces, maintain a small contingency force of 6 to 700 to protect the embassy in kabul, until the department of state could coordinate contractor security support, and also to assist turkey to maintain the hamid karzai international airport and to transition the u.s. mission to over the horizon counterterrorism sport and security force systems. it is clear, it is obvious to