New book will be coming out the world war ii memoirs of major russell. To ourive our attention speaker, dr. Lawrence kaplan. [applause] thank you. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Discussing civil war artillery today, if it were possible, john tidball, who is one of theidered foremost experts on the topic, would be speaking to you today. Tidball died in 1906, thats not possible. The will be discussing topic based on his writings, which i edited, and were the title the Artillery Service in the war of the rebellion by Westholme Publishing in 2011. The main point that tidball makes is that Field Artillery was most effective in the civil war when it provided mass. Tration and he argues convincingly that the inability of the army to organize its Field Artillery prior to the battle of contributedille significantly to its defeat in a number of major battles. Byill illustrate his points book. G excerpts from his writings. Tidballs first, a word about john tidball. He was a career army officer his long service as an artilleryman. He began his career after graduating from the u. S. Military academy at west point in 1848. The civil warugh in most major campaigns in the and from theer, first battle of bull run through of petersburg, receiving the rank of Major General by the wars end. The regiment as a battery commander when he as aved an appointment colonel volunteer artillery regiment. He was commonnant to the cadets 9thest point and led the corps artillery in the appomattox campaign. He resumed his position as a captain in the second artillery. The west, wrote the manual of heavy artillery arvice, which later became Standard Army textbook. He was superintendent of instruction in virginia, from 1874 to 1881. Later, he had more than 40 years of service in 1889. The photo shows tidball as a commander in 1862, standing by a threeinch gun. Ance the photo on the right is tidball at the Artillery School career. Nd of his army two years after the death of hunt, Major General henry 9, the former8 chief of the army of potomac, the militaryf service institution, a professional military journal, published a speech general hunt had given, recapping a history in the army. The article most likely motivated tidball to write a comprehensive series of articles the journal orr perhaps the editors of the journal approached him. Either evident, he wrote a in either event, he wrote a comprehensive series of articles. The articles included the army battles of fair oaks, gainess mill, malvern,ville, antietam, fredericksburg, and gettysburg, for the army of the tennessee, andbattles of stones river chickamauga. And for the army of ohio, the shiloh. F later, in 1905, a year before his death, as the army was modernizing its Field Artillery after the spanish american war, studyte an unpublished for the Field Artillery board at fort riley kansas entitled the organization, command and deployment of Field Artillery in the war, based on the civil war. This report included additional insights into the artillery well as a general overview of the petersburg campaign. First became familiar with staffwritings as a historian in oklahoma in the early 1990s. Subsequently i determined these needed to be brought back into the forefront for students and scholars of the civil war. To emphasize is that writings were never intended to be read by a civilian audience. These writings were originally a military journal for people in the military, and the 1905 for internalrictly army use only. Report, most of it was a rehash of what he had written in the 1890s. So i took about 10 of that report and incorporated it into this book. Coverageuded also the petersburg campaign. Its worth noting that, as i pointed out, that ordinarily if thewere a member of military in the 18 90s, you who john tidball was. He was kind of the unofficial for the army. T the army didnt have official historians this those days. He really was the de facto army expert writing for an army a topic that he believed had been overlooked by army, notably the the use of artillery in the battles. These are the only writings of a participant that offer a comprehensive overview and eyeysis as assessed through office a skilled artillery commander. I want to emphasize, you can go and there are over 17,000 books on amazon about the civil war. And mayben artillery you get it down to about 1500 or 1700. The only book by somebody who was there, an expert, assessing the major battles. There are no comparable works by that was there with that expertise. Ter so tidball makes several important points. First, he makes a strong case the up to and including battle of chancellorsville, the Poor Organization of Field Artillery where batteries were the highest organization and were assigned to brigades and divisions rather than separate the confederacy had done contributed significantly to the union army of its majorer battles. Now, in the civil war t army direct fireowered, Field Artillery. Huge clouds of smoke, as in this postcivil war photo obscured the battlefield. Had to be manhandled back into position. You typically would fire between maybe two or three shots a minute, depending on how your gun crew is. And firing ranges extended up to 1700 yards, despite the fact that rifle Field Artillery could is. Targets out to a range of and firing ranges 4,000 yards or so. There was no system in place for indirect fire hitting targets sight in thene of civil war. So this is a key point. Though the technology of rifled artillery, which ill talk about in a minute, was rangesle, the fighting were all going to be direct smoothhether you used board artillery or rifled artillery. Ranges are in the line of sight. It wasnt until the 1880s, that the militaries of the world developed smokeless powders, and they developed recoil system, which would make artilleries very effective, beyond the line of sight. That happened in the early 20th century. So what this translated to was a tactical organize organize organization an with theo keep pace times. Im going to read a number of excerpts from tidballs book. Are going to be from the words of henry hunt, the former chief of artillery potomac, but most from john tidball. So i quote, the old system of batteries to small infantry,ns of belonging to the smooth bores, had outlived its usefullens, the war of the rebellion, following mexican warhe naturally adopted the message of the latter. But meanwhile, short as the a mighty change had taken place. The most effecting the use of artillery was that it should have a corresponding freedom of action and ability to take positions where full advantage had from its improved arm. And this, it is obvious, could not obtain, so long as batteries continued to be tied down to the occupied bys ofparatively small bodies infantry, so long as they were apportioned out in equal quantities at regular intervals battle,e line of considerationsll top of the field. At the start of the civil war, infantry divisions had Field Artillery batteries attached to them. Commander would force the artillery to go along with infantry, regardless of where the best position was for support. Freedom of maneuver to provide fire support where the artillerymen thought it was going to be best. And so this is where the major battles of which im going to highlight a few later on this tidballs of his argument, if you will. It really has to do with the and howtion organization determined the effectiveness of fire support the u. S. Army. So in 18 1, the u. S. In army had 48s. Companies of heavy artillery and of fieldteries artillery. This is before the war. The field artilleries served with the army in the field. They often served as infantry on frontier. N heavy artillery was generally preferred Service Since it was which had a cities with higher standard of living. Began, the states o of large number independent batteries without regimennal af affiliation at all. In the confederate army, it will be a battalion, but not in the yet. Army aw, the u. S. Army comprised mix of smooth bore and rifle field guns. These are just a few to the types that the army had at the time. 1857 napoleon gun seen here represented the end of the the smoothbore artillery technology. They never made a better smoothbore artillery piece than this. This is the end of the line of that technology. A fine field gun. A combination, which would give you a curved trajectory. A gun gives you a flat trajectory. This was a combination of both. Rare you can have an effective one in both, but in this case, it worked. In france andoped emperor,er the napoleon iii. Early in the war, batteries were amprised of four guns, for sixgun battery. By doing away with one of the guns, merging it with the gun, you really eased your Logistics Supply line for ammunition and it makes it easier all the way around for supplying an army. Had no rifledarmy field guns until 1861. Brandnew technology, just coming on board, coinciding war. The civil robert parrot, the superintendent of the west point in new york invented the parrot rifle and patented it in early 1861. Used 10pounder and parrot guns. This was followed by the threeinch ordnance gun manufactured in pennsylvania depicted here. While these guns represented state of the art technology, created confusion and logistics problems in field mixedies that now had materiel and different ammunition. So now this is the beginning of whole new state of the art branch of technology. Rifled Field Artillery. With the start of the civil war. Youve got people of experience have never used these weapons before. The manuals that the army is smoothboreall for artillery, when the war starts. Its going to take a while for catch up ando include rifled artillery. A the bottom left, thats siege gun. The difference between heavy andllery or coast artillery Field Artillery is the Field Artillery goes with the army in the field. Heavier guns are going to be pretty much static and since is horsedrawn in the army for field operations, youre limited by the weight of a field battery can be, because of the amount of horses that you need to keep up with army on the move. The gun on the left excuse corner,e righthand thats a gun that was used by the confederacy. Brought it from the british. Thats a breachloading field gun. A breachloading field gun is wonderful if you have a recoil system on the field gun. Thats not going to be developed 80s or 90s. Recoil backoing to and youll still have to wield it back into what battery from. On you want to fire and so youre not going to really save a lot of time by loading it from the breach or muzzle. Youre still going to rose that time with the recoil. System, get a recoil you want a breachloading field gun. Cooneers andct the thats what protect the cannoneers. To focus myng remark on the army of the potomac, pretty much in this discussion, for limitation of time, rather than the army of the ohio or the army of highlightingd tidballs main points. Following the first battle of run in july 1861, at a call major000 volunteers, general mcclellan became the commander of the army of the potomac. Appointed major William Barry to be his chief of artillery, mostly administrative position, who determined the organization of Field Artillery to be two and pieces per thousand troops. Ofre would be three types rifled field guns. The threeinch ordnance gun and parrot guns and 12pounder napoleons. Each battery was to have six minimum at a 400 rounds ofwith ammunition per gun. West did not the see these reforms until the end of the war. Assigned tore to be divisions, not brigades, in the thearmy of the potomac, consistg of one regular army battery and three volunteer battery. The regular army battery commander, a captain, would act a Division Artillery commander. After the battle of chancellorsville, batteries were organized into separate battalions with their own staff. And if several divisions formed a corps, then one half of the decision artillery would make up an artillery reserve of 100 guns. Army corps were formed in 186. Spring of 1864, the batteries of each corps were united into a brigade with its own separate command of staff. Run, there are nine batteries of 39 guns, 650 men 400 horses in the army of the potomac. Okay. 1861. July of 92march of 1862, there were batteries, 520 guns, 12,500 men horses. 00 a considerable increase in men, materiel and horses. This Field Artillery included 30 regular batteries and 62 volunteer batteries. Nearly all the regular batteries in the u. S. Army were potomac. My of the the army of the potomac was 11 infantryto divisions of between 9,000 and 10,000 men each. Had four Field Artillery batteries. There were no fieldgrade officers. Fieldgradeds, a officer is a major, a colonel and above. Captain was the highest level of at the time. In chargegot captains of their batteries, senior regulary captain, a army officer would be the de facto chief of Division Artillery. Not taking artillery around theplacing it battlefield. Thats still going to be left to the infantry commander. Hes simply going to take care of the administrative pieces about moving the men, materiel and horses, making sure it gets from point a to point b and different battles on time and the like. Fieldgradee no officers, which created problems aspiring promotion. Okay. Youre in the army. Theres volunteers coming into the army. Do you want to stay a captain the entire war . Probably not. You probably want to get a promotion. Maybe you want to be a major or a colonel. And the only way youre going to is get out ofn the artillery. But there are no fieldgrade jobs in the artillery. War department initially refused to permit regular Army Artillery officers to become of volunteer infantry regiments, which is what tidball when they lyfted that re when they lifted that restriction. Comprised 18 batteries of 100 guns. There were 14 regular batteries batteries. Lunteer they all had six guns and about 12pounder napoleons. A reserve was established in the army of tennessee after the intle of chickamauga september 1863. And there was no artillery reserve in the army of the ohio. Now, tidball notes, the name artillery reserve was a misnomer. It wasnt reality in the artillery division. Reserve,f being in a it was generally the first in the fight. A Corps Commander wanted batteries for any invariably sent them to the reserve. The fact that batteries being assigned to divisions made commanders they gave them up, though but temporarily, after many objections and often with delays, fatal to the in view. All who had comprehensive experience with artillery during will remember many instances of this within their observation. Colonel henry hunt served as the chief of the artillery reserve. He subsequently succeeded William Barry as the chief of thellery at the start of Antietam Campaign in september 1862. He was briefly relieved of his responsibilities by Major General hooker prior to the of chancellorsville in late may 1863 and reinstated during the battle to help gather the army of the potomacs retreating batteries. As for general barry, tidball barry wasliam assigned to duty in washington newnspector of artillery, a office, the functions of which comprised supervision over toillery matters pertaining all armies. Up to this time, there had been a systemizedlect data upon this branch and make warvailable for use in the office. The consequence was that things haphazardly,deal resulting often in grave plunders, as for instance, upon one occasion batteries were required without delay for a certain expedition. The war office, looking over the returns, found some batteries here and there at north apparently available for service at the front. Accordinglyre ordered to join the expedition with. But they had neither guns for for the field. Only the officers and men. Batteries only in name. There was no chief in washington to regulate such matters. It was partly because of this the temporaryt office of inspector was created. An artillery of instruction was established in washington, where the newly raised batteries were received, equipped, instructed field. Pared for the other camps were established for the western armies. Returned to the field as chief of artillery and major tennesseesmans campaign in 1864. But thats all were going to be hearing about them for the rest today. Alk during the war, conservativism and tradition of the War Department hampered efforts at artillery reforms to improve combat operations. Im going to read an excerpt from henry hunt. In the civil war let me back and get back to henry hunt. During the war, in the civil war, the artillery commands were composed of masses. Sometimes had more Field Artillery than served in the mexican war. The disproportion of the artillery of an army corps to a single battery was as great as of a division of infantry to a regiment. It therefore required higher tbraidz of officers with grades of officers with more ofate staff and them than did the other arms. But the War Department wholly lefted the artillery and the commanding generals to their own devices as to its organization. All the surviving officers of the mexican war and field officers of the army, major and above, were to other duties. The Legal Organization of the volunteer rejments provided for field officers and the supply of generals for the large commands providingo the laws general officers for the whole army. Let us now see what came of this. Told me that when at the War Department he stated to general mcclellan, asked in the beginning for but two artillery generals. Is chief. The other to command the reserve. Ofving the selection brigadiers to command the corps servicey until field indicated proper selections. The general, brigade general thomas now i need to answer here objected that the law always allowed one brigadier for regiments. 40 companies. And that 60 artillery companies, would not warrant the appointment of two generals. General barry replied that a equivalent not the of a company but a battalion. But the generals opinion, as prevailed. The next year, the general in wasf held that a battery equal to a regiment of infantry, that it was commanded by a captain. Therefore, could not use field officers. And it was directed in gem that artillery in general orders that artilleries should be taken into service by batteries, thus rendering the field and staff unnecessary. So both principles were adopted. Of the war, the artillery was deprived of general offers because the batteries were companies and the batteriescers because were regiments. Of course, all promotions ceased in the artillery and many accepted it elsewhere. Henry hunt continued. Yet, there was one easy way by which most of the evils could have been avoided. Immediately after the battle of generalksburg, i asked burnside to see president lincoln and asked him to confer recommended for the Peninsula Campaign and to me forthe officers to duty according to their brevet rank, that this was asked for gratification of these officers but because the good of the Public Service that it would enable me to provide the artillery with its chiefs of competent rank for their duties. Gave abrevet rank, you gaye commissioned officer a higher result of meritorious conduct but without receiving of real rank. So you wear the insignia but getting the pay, and its temporary. So hunt continued, general burnside informed me on his return to the army that he had done so, that the president acquiesced at once, saying that when at antietam he had promised that he wouldlan do this and requested that when saw theburnside secretary of war, he would asked him to have the commissions made mr. Edwin and stanton promised to do. But unfortunately, general burnside mentioned the halluckance to general that happened, who said it must not be done and had it stopped. Have the bureaucracy in washington making sure youre not going to have any officers the rank of captain in the u. S. Army. Fewe will be a few, a fieldgrade officers. Andy hunt and john tidball the like, who get their brevet promotions. Temporary brevet ranks for the war. But regular army officers, no. Was notWar Department allowing, with the exception of circumstances, really any fieldgrade officers, because the captain being the battery the highesthats organizational unit the artillery has. Im now going to look at three theles of the army of potomac, antietam, fredericksburg and chancellorsville, that tidballs points about the organizational ineffectiveness of the u. S. Armys Field Artillery and combat operations. Okay. Antietam. The battle of antietam, also fought onharpsburg, september 17, 1862, near sharpsburg, maryland, and antietam creek, as part of the maryland campaign. Bloodiest single day of the war with more than 22,000 casualties of dead, wounded and missing. It was also the bloodiest single day in American Military history, not just the war, for the u. S. Army. After pursuing confederate maryland, union army Major General mcclellan lees army. At dawn on september 17, major hookers first corps assaulted lees left flank. Millerswept across cornfield and fierce fighting took place. Then assaults against sunken road eventually pierced the confederate center. The federals did not follow up their advantage. Mcclellan did not commit all of his troops into the fight when needed. In the afternoon, major ge generals burnsides ninth corps the action. At a crucial moment, confederate arrived andl hills launched a successful counterattack, driving back burnside and ending the battle. One,ugh outnumbered two to lee committed his entire force, while mcclellan sent in less army,hree quarters of his enabling lee to fight the standstill. A lee withdrew his army the following day. Now, the conventional wisdom of just about everybody studying this battle is that mcclellan didnt put all his forces into the fight and lee did, and lee fought the union to a standstill. Was that. The argument that tidball makes is regardless of the fact that all his forcesg to bear, had he used his Field Artillery better, had it been organized more effectively to fire support, that even with the forces that were the unionhe believes could have turned the tide. Makes that point that the Battalion Organization of the confederacy was more and effective in providing fire support, while was converselyy hamstrung by its inability to its artillery efficiently or effectively. Hires what tidball has to say. His artillery organized into ba battalions of four to six batteries each. Command of each battalion was assigned a colonel or a each,nant colonel, and to two batteries and a major. His artillery was always in hand servicelable for whenever and wherever most needed, consequently, a smaller amount of it was able to perform an amount of work equal to that the much larger force of his adversary. With thes artillery, exception of the artillery reserve, had no higher whatever than the individual battery, and these corpsttached in hookers to brigades, one battery to each brigade, and the other corps to divisions, without any commanders, other than the individual battery commanders. Army, outside of the artillery reserve, there was officer ofld artillery, a major on duty with the artillery. Was thatquence although all the batteries were engaged at some time or other battle, they were as a rule employed in such a haphazard matter as greatly to weaken their effect as a whole. Or two instances where batteries massed so as to give blows. E the fact of their being tied ofn to the narrow limits small infantry commands rendered their employment, other than a scattered and feeble manner, impracticable. Then tidball adds, hookers ten batteries were attached one to of his ten brigades. Each brigade numbering about line. Man actually in the ground over which hooker was to advance and did advance was a mile wide and was mostly covered with woods. Men inad about 10,000 line, it is readily seen that he thebut little room left for batteries. Some of the batteries, however, managed to get in and did heroic service. Of them were unable to follow their brigades and were but little real service and action. The same thing obtained with the seven batteries of the 12th when the latter advanced under Joseph Mansfield over the little while afterwards. Most of the batteries of those unemployed at the most critical period of the battle, and while the infantry to which they were attached was lifeanddeath struggle in their front. On the left of the ground then fought over, between it knolls antietam, were and secondary ridges. And in such positions that batteries occupying them could in flank andckson disorganized his masses. The advantages of these not probably come under hookers own observation and he had no chief of artillery him. Int them out to it was certainly not the province of his battery commander. In fact, it would have been highly improper for them to have left their own commands to search the battlefield for positions for their batteries. Organizedtteries been into brigades or battalions, the of these could have thrown out to this position a dozen or so batteries to fire which, on jacksons flank, would have probably enabled hooker not only to hold that from which he first gained but to gain still more. Tying downtem of batteries to the narrow limits of a small infantry command did of this freedom. Consequently, jackson was unmolested on his flank by hookers batteries, many of idleness, in enforced while his infantry was being beaten and driven back. Whoops. Sorry. Next major battle was fredericksburg. Ambrose replaced mcclellan after antietam. Attackes plan was to richmond via fredericksburg. The battle of fredericksburg was fought from december 11 to 186 , in and railroad 1862, in and and aroundfredericksburg, virgi. Burnside had replaced mcclellan, who was not seemed as seen as pursuinge enough in lee after antietam. Burnsides plan was to attack the confederate capital of richmond via fredericksburg. He planned to cross the river at midnovemberg in and move rapidly on richmond before lee could come to stop him. However, bureaucratic delays prevented burnside from receiving the necessary pontoon bridges in time, and lee moved block the river crossings. When the union army was finally able to deploy its bridges and cross under fire, urban combat 12. Lted on december 11 and union troops prepared to attacked the confederate defensive position south of the strongly fortified asge west of the city known marys heights. Union major franklins grand division pierced the first confederate defensive line of jackson to thell south but was finally repulsed. Tuitions ofered the sumpter and hooker to launch assaultsfrontal against longstreets position on heights, all of which were repulsed with heavy losses. Burnside withdrew his army on 15th, ending another failed Union Campaign on the eastern theater. Everybody knows burnside assaultsfutile frontal against entrenched opponents. It was fruitless. Youhere again, if understood how artillery should have been employed by those who there, you can see an possible. E view was im going to read some excerpts to say,henry hunt had if he hads view, played a greater role in orchestrating the battle, might orchestrate a to victory. At a conference of general grand divisionis commanders to determine as to a battle at fredericksburg and how it should be fought, i undertook to put the army across the river one ofain conditions, which was that all the napoleon guns of the divisions should be my disposal for the purpose to rejoin their divisions as they crossed the bridges. This created so much on the part of division commanders, who did not probably understand that all artillery of an army is to be employed when required for army ofposes, under the general artillery, that burnside at once abandoned an intention he had already formed on their suggestion to break up the artillery reserve as soon as the was over and distribute the batteries to the divisions. Proofs before him that a strong artillery reserve, under the immediate command of the chief of artillery, was indispensable, for he could not prompt or cheerful acquiesceness and calls on the placens to supply its when on the divisions toly its place when needed. Necessity was absolute, the corps reserves were required on a long line of nearly five miles in order to inmand the whole yownd i ground front of us, including to control the movement of the troops. Thrown,bridges were the army passed over. Although not more than a half there,ould be employed the plan of battle was changed anhout my knowledge, and attack was ordered on the extreme right of the enemy, with divisions, brigade general mead, supported by gibbons. Ohn the attack was resolute and for a time was successful. Were notupports sufficient. The enemy rallied and drove back loss,ivisions with heavy given being wounded. In advance,nformed 100uld easily have drawn idle and useless guns from the were blocked,y where they blocked the streets, the plainto those on and supported by two of major thenal hookers divisions, on the spot, left both of franklins corps free for the assault. I have little doubt that franklin would have succeeded. Been aso, it would have army. Erous day for lees following the palt battle, hookr commanderurnside as of the army of the potomac. The next major battle was fromellorsville, fought april 20 to may 6, 1863. Virginia, near the village of chancellorsville. Hookers army of the potomac fought general lees army of virginia, an army less half its side. Lee divided his army in the enemyce of a much larger force and won a significant confederate victory. To go intot going detail about the battle. Ill give you some of tidballs remarks. With hisd dispensed services of the chief of artillery, and there was no one on the field to make proper batteries. The the senior battery commander was its chief of artillery and exercised nominal control over its batteries but there was no one to take a comprehensive view entire field and distribute the batteries where most needed. As a rule, the batteries stuck to theiry as possible divisions. But in a country so wooded, this many of themhrew into positions where they could but little service, often of no service whatsoever. Now, hookers ideas connected with the management of artillery underwent a radical change lessons of chancellorsville. Theaking a broad view of case, he could not avoid seeing that the sequence of success of lay in the able of the latter to maneuver his troops on field with promptness, to attacking him first at one point and then another, as the phases of the demanded. Reasoning still further, hooker became convinced that this sow certainty of movement arose from the infantry and artillery of lees army, a commonoperating for end, were kept so distinct in method and management as not to other in their movements. As lee subsequently marched and fought over the same ground, artillery most harmoniousy in a noteration, hooker could see the more businesslike path adversary. Hooker, still commanding the army to potomac, now willing to listen t to the suggestions and advice of his artillery chief, consented that the artillery formed into brigades of batteries, one for each army ands, two for the calvary four for the artillery reserve. Each to be under its own commander who received his orders direct from his Corps Commander. Ins was a long stride advantage. But there were at first few officers on duty with the army were of suitable rank to command these brigades. U. S. Armys next great battle was gettysburg. Into greatng to go detail on gettysburg, but i will tidball has to say. Gettysburg was the first battle the potomac in which the artillery as a whole factrought to the front, a due more to the Efficient Organization which it had just received. The same thing had occurred at some of the other battles, it is more than probable history would have had a different story to record. One of the main features of this wa of this battle was the grouping of batteries. The two great principles ofrincf artillery. Well, while i have focused on the army of the potomac, as i tidballsearlier, t. I. D. Theings also included battle of stones river and the battle of chickamauga, september 1863, and the army of the ohios 1862. Of shiloh, april stones river highlighted how the federal batteries were handicapped at the start by brigades. Ersion of the brigades concentrated haphazardly by accident, concentrated their firepower to help bring about a victory. At chickamauga, a battle of a wooded terrain, this highlighted how major rose kransliam recognized the defect of his after theon and battle made a few moderate reforms by reorganizing his efficient. O be more he took batteries out of togades and assigned them organized ad reserve under an officer. The battle of shiloh highlighted how artillery batteries helped save the day, after several batteries broke away from their aigades and were able to form line and amass and concentrate their fire. Overall, in looking at the role of the u. S. Army, it should be apparent that the army labored under a number of disadvantages that inhibited its efficiency toand amass and concentrate its fire effectively. The army of the potomac was the most progressive in eventually its artillery organization to be more effective. The consistent threat that in examining the u. S. Armys major battles in the and of the potomac, up to including chancellorsville, is that Field Artillery needed reform to bel ekive, a higher to be effective. For example, the confederates, battalionopted a organization for their Field Artillery, consistently outgunned theand army of the potomac until hooker reform sobraced the long sought after by henry hunt other artillery progressives. So despite this progress in the potomac, there still persisted a problem of finding fieldgrade officers for higher artillery. Remember, they didnt get permission for brevet ranks to artillerymen. General halak stopped that in washington. Won the the u. S. Army war, one can argue that it likely would have been more it hadful earlier if better organized its Field Artillery. And thats what i want to leave you with today. Point that to make a this book, which i highly recommend to serious and scholars of the civil war, should probably be on bookshelf if you arent familiar with the use of artillery in the civil war. Is ii dont want to do dont want to recommend this book to people with just a the civilterest in war. This book is on a higher level than that. And it was really intended for military professionals. Its really intended for the serious student, the scholar of the civil war. So i wouldnt recommend it, again, to somebody who just has passing interest. It has way too much detail and information for just the novice. Keep that in mind. Its not like a college 101level course. This is on a level of like an level course, a senior or graduate level course for the civil war. I would certainly strongly this book for people oradd to their book shelves advise to friends or relatives if you know somebody thats really seriously interested in war. Ivil its relatively unknown and obscure. And unfortunately, most of the writings, which were widely 1890s, had been pretty much forgotten until i incorporated them back into this book. Thats what i want to leave you with. Any questionstain or comments that you may have. Microphone . O to the mic yes. Can you tell us the highlevel problems they were encountering . You told us. I have just a lowlevel question. How was a battery manned . How many men . Ers, how the quick answer is luckily and all thatnuals information from the civil war is available online. But having reviewed some of that here, a came gardenvariety battery would have about 150 men and i dont horses. How many varietyto garden battery. There were horse batteries that were developed during the war moreheyre going to have horses and maybe some more people to take care of more things. Answered your question. I would encourage you you can check a civil war instruction manual. Online. E it will give you all the nuts and bolts about everything you about fieldow artillery and the war. Thank you. Goodforchun yesterday to the good fortune on a tour with ed and we actually walked the malvern mill. What he pointed out was that was decided by the artillery. Henry hunt, who you alluded to a massed about 35 napoleons up on the hill and that decimated the confederates. Talking about earlier in the war, this was two beforealf months antietam. The effectiveness of henry hunt. Describes henry hunt was ectasy when he saw the field there. Into greatgoes detail on malvern hill. Some, i had to pick illustrative battles to illustrate these points. Have the time here today to go into all the great ones. Shiloh, malvern hill artillery played a critical role. Ofwe got to walk the path the confederates there at malvern hill. The other question i had for you is about the confederates at gettysburg. I had read that one of the reasons their artillery barrage didnt work very well is they fuses,t changed their and thats why they didnt thatt for the is correct . Im not an artillery expert on every aspect of the war. Thatld very well b. I could very well be. I dont have the expertise to answer that. But what i will say is this. Powder back to black artillery. In a battle in the 19th century, weapons, youowder typically start off with an artillery dome and you try to silence your opponents artillery. If you silence your opponents artillery, then your infantry can go down for the attack. But those are basically black powder Field Artillery tactics. They were known at west they taughtse napoleon tactics. The confederates were whereing their ammunition henry hunt decided to husband his ammunition. It may have given a false sense of security to the confederates that they were winning the artillery duel. But thats all covered in tidballs book. Were also i cant you. Rt any other questions or comments . Yes. What lessons from tidball were and used from the spanish american war and world day . And the present frankly, the army had to relearn the lessons of artillery. For the spanish american war was still the battery was still level. Hest and in world war i, the battery was still the highest level as well. So it wasnt until the 1930s army formally adopted Battalion Organizations artillery. I enjoyed the talk very much. If artillery is not your specialty, i was going to ask what the difference is between a a rifled,e and thinking about the difference musket. A smooth bore is that similar . Im sorry. Exchanged that. A rifled Field Artillery or a mussket, its a flat trajectory weapon and its got kind of a spiral to give a conical projectile accuracy, so it moves straight. A smooth bore is just a smooth tube. Round projectile leaves the tube, its inaccurate. Its going to go all over the place. So when the army adopted rifled between the mexican war and the civil war, it wasnt artillery, it was rifled small arms as well. Variety smooth bore have an accuracy rating of 30 to 60 yards. You usually have a bunch of people all firing their weapons together at some target. And a percentage of those would hit the target. With rifled weapons, that changes. An individual rifle can actually hit a target its between at, somewhere 550 and 800 yards, so again, when the manuals were first from the civil war, these manuals are all for smoothbore weapons. In a black powder environment, if you remember that photo of all the smoke on the which im going to go back to now hang on a second here. From the 1870s. Picture. T find a real but those are napoleons there. Peopleded to keep together because of all the smoke. Was, is you learned that you cant adopt you smoothbore tactics with rifled weapons, so you infantrymen all lined up together in brightly now with rifled weapons. They make great targets. Two into the war, youll find artillery and infantry trying to protect themselves better. Remove the smoke from the battlefield with 1880s,s powder in the it really makes things dangerous, because now you can actually see the battlefield and actually hit targets at long range with your rifled weapons. I hope that answered your question. Much,nk you very dr. Kaplan. Any other questions or comments . Lotn the civil war, and a of wars, most casualties are due to disease. Battle, that are due to how many were to the extent know from artillery, et cetera, and it seems like, although the amount of artillery went up year to that theificantly, artillery was a very small part battles . Thats a good observation. For the civil war and i guess other the crimean war and other wars in that period. Have the exact statistics. What i can tell you is this. Inillery came into its own world war i. Thats where it killed more people than infantry fire. War i, infantry rifles are going to kill more people than artillery. Thats just a generalization. Can look those statistics up, again online. Im a reenactor and i reenact. 94 of what they what dealt with were rifle wounds, not gunshot wounds. Surgeons could only treat what they could treat. And the artillery either killed you or scared the hell out of you. But as far as causing a wound of extremities, that the surgeon would treat, notwithstanding what happened doctors did not deal very much with artillery wounds. Because of a war so far if you were killed what did not kill you more often was the rifle, the gunshot. Artillery in our civil war compared to napoleonic wars or waterloo or other wars of that period. I do not have the statistics in front of me. Intuitively, i would like to think that at a higher level. I cannot tell you right now. Looked up online. The union had 21 Million People in the south only had 5 million. There was a massive, much more than i thought portion of population disadvantage for the south. The key is what the general determined for artillery for 1000 men. Those genders that the europeans use similar standards and we borrowed some of the standards. What were the standards . As i read earlier hold on a second. If you do not mind waiting. [indiscernible] to 1. Was about 2 that was the standard for the army of the potomac which was the most aggressive and advanced. War . S and the as much as i know. Was that pretty much met in the war . Do you know what the standard was for the south . Not offhand. No. Any other questions or comments . [indiscernible] he was a very fine artillery and you deserve a lot of credit and praise for what he did in the war. Much to his chagrin, he had to retire as a full colonel. The army never gave him a. Eneral pot generals ranks he was not very satisfied with. I want to thank you all of you for coming to hear my talk. Youre free to get in touch with me and talk after were done. Feel free to get in touch with me and talk afterward done. The civil war years here every saturday some to watch more, visit our website, www. Cspan. Org. You are watching American History tv. Next, ophthalmologist gary aguilar has researched and written about the medical evidence of the kennedy assassination for over 20 years. Sciencek titled junk he takes a critical look at the warmer commission s. Ing reports and diagram dr. Aguilar argued that based on eyewitnesses, autopsy photos and ask raise, this evidence was flawed. S is a portion of this it is about one hour. I will be running through quite a few slides and i want to thank everybody and congratulate him for his devotion and he is one of the people when stimulated my interest and brought me sort of onboard after the debate and evidence the medical in 1990. We became acquainted. It was at that point i met smith who was walking into sit down and i want to start out with just a