Transcripts For CSPAN3 Battles Of Robert E. Lee 20170818

All right. It is my pleasure to introduce for our final afternoon talk. Barton myers. Hes an Society Professor of history at washington and Lee University. Where he teaches courses on civil war, war and society. His main refers is warfare, soldiers and atrocities. He has earned his ph. D. At the university of georgia where he studied under john insko. There he published his masters thesis entitled executing daniel bright, race loyalty and gorilla violence in a coastal care loo nacommunity this received the 2009 jules and Francis Landry award for the best book in southern studies, just recently Cambridge University published the dissertation, rebels against the confederacy. As you can tell, barton is an expert on gorilla warfare he has a recent volume thats come out, edited with Brian Mcknight and daniel suter land. Entitled gorilla hunters, irregular conflicts during the civil war. 2017 youre not going to speak on gorilla warfare after all this he does more than that and i have asked him to speak about robert e. Lee on the front lines of battle. So let us welcome barton myers. I want to thank dr. Carmichael for having me here today today to speak about one of our greatest commanders and most controversial figures. Robert e. Lee of virginia. For the last five years ive been a professor at be washington and Lee University where robert e. Lee is buried in the lee chapel museum. So hes become a Cottage Industry over the last few years for folks and ive dealt with a lot of issues with lee and the historical memory over the last few years. Before i started my career in the academy, i was a National Parks ranger and lived on the battlefield. So i spent a lot of time thinking about robert e. Lee. I want to talk about lee, one slice of his military career. The moments when robert e. Lee was in greatest personal danger on the battlefield. General robert e. Lee had been the commander of the Northern Army of virginia6, 1865, he gra staph of a worn confederate battle flag to rally the fleeing remnants of his army. At the battle of Sailors Creek lee was for the final time personally placing himself in line of battle to lead his soldiers. Reaching the crossing of the river road overlooking Sailors Creek, the disasters which had overtaken our army was in full view and the scene beggars description remember a Battle Tested veteran whose troops provide the rear guard for the entire Confederate Army at precisely the moment of greatest desperation struggled to set the harrowing scene. Hurrying teamsters with their teams and dangling traces, no wagons. Retreating retreating infantry without guns, many without hats. A harmless mob of the massive columns of the enemy moving orderly on. Maholm explained lees deportment. The general straightened himself in the saddle and looking more the soldier than ever exclaimed as if talking to himself, my god, has the army dissolved. Then mahone replied, no, general, here are troops ready to do their duty. In a mellowed voice, lee said, yes, general, there are some true men left. Will you please keep those people back . As i was placing my division in position to keep those people back, the retiring herd just referred to and crowded around general lee while he sat on his horse with a confederate battle flag in his hand. I rode up and requested him to give me the flag, which he did. This final scene became one of the most enduring memories for many soldiers from the entire appomattox campaign. It was one of the final moments where lee, the battlefield commander, connected with his soldiers. On three battlefields during the final year of the american civil war, general robert e. Lee intentionally placed himself in harms way, attempting to rally his men from near catastrophe, positioning himself in line of battle with the intent of personally leading his grave clad soldiers. At each battle wilderness, spotsylvania, three times, and Sailors Creek in the final days of the war, the men in his army stuck to lee. Each of these lee on the rear or front line of battle moments where the commanding general personally rallied and fight on the field leaves behind evidence something of his character, his generalship and his overall thinking about the art of command on a 19th century battlefield. The historical moments of lees personal Battlefield Leadership during the final year of the war specifically in may 1864 and april 1865 provide an opportunity to evaluate him through his physical actions at the tactical level as opposed to an interpretation of his Strategic Thinking at the level of Campaign Planning where historians have spilled much ink investigating his thoughts on generalship during the american civil war. Those moments where lee put himself at greatest personal risk also are the moments where he discerned that his army was an exceptional danger. Robert edward lee was no stranger to the perils of the combat post. His service during the u. S. War with mexico, particularly his h heroining in april 1847 which provided u. S. General Winfield Scott with critical intelligence on the enemys flank position was vital to the planning of a crushing flank attack, executed by scotts army. To be sure, lee was in danger on the battlefield while in command of the Army Northern virginia consistently throughout his time as commanding general. At fredericksburg in december of 1862 he and Lieutenant General James Longstreet were standing on telegraph hill, known as lees hill on lee drive today, near a 30pounder parrot rifle. A heavy siege Field Artillery piece rarely used by Confederate Army in the field, when it exploded and fragments flew all about them. But none was hurt. At chancellorsville, where lee commanded only a fraction of the overall army on may 2nd, 1863, as Thomas Jonathan Stonewall Jackson took roughly 30,000 soldiers of the second corps on steamed flank attack march, he again was in mortal danger. Lee was conspicuous along the front lines of General Lafayette mcclaws division as it performed diversionary maneuvers. At two different points lee was under long range Union Artillery fire. During one moment a tenpound shell cut the tree square off just about a yard above the heads of lee and the clause. A short time later a confederate soldier described how a shell burst immediately in front of old traveler and stood up as straight as id ever seen a man. Lee urged them to go back under the hill for safety. Only to see him a little while later calmly watching from the front lines a few hundred yards away. Even his celebrated ride into the chancellor family farmyard on the morning of may 3rd, 1863, when the house was on fire and as the Confederate Army desperately pressed it two corps back together pressed lee on the front lines at a dangerous moment for the entire army. Colonel Edward Porter alexander, who commanded the artillery barrage which preceded pickets charge at gettysburg encountered another incident where lee prepared to place himself directly in harms way while preparing for a possible defense. General lee rode up entirely unattended. He must have intentionally separated himself, staff and couriers, or some of them would have surely been with him or followed him in a few minutes, and i have no doubt whatever the object of his visit alexander remembered, general lee expected meade to follow the fugitives of picket dlr picketts division. He had the combative instinct as strongly developed as any man living. No soldier could have looked on and listened to the fight he had just been making without a mighty stirring of every fiber in his frame, a yearning to have some share in it, alexander believed. And the general had come out determined. If there was any more that he would be in the thick of it. Ive sometimes felt sorry there wasnt. Id like so to have seen him in it. Certainly the physical presence of robert e. Lee on the field or in camp could be striking. Countless soldiers and civilians comment on his soldierly bearing and his magisterial appearance. Even for the carefully comported an encounter with lee could be awe inspiring. Lieutenant colonel, former military observer and member of the elite guards, spent three months in the confederacy and watched the army of Northern Virginias campaign in the summer, pennsylvania summer of 1863, commented on lees singular build. General lee is almost without exception the handsomest man of his age i ever saw. Hes 56 years old, tall, broad shouldered, very well made, very well set up. A thorough soldier appearance. And his manners are most courteous and full of dignity. Hes a perfect gentleman in every respect. I imagine no man has so few enemies or is universally esteemed. According to the british officer lee never wore a side arm during the period free mantle camped with the army in Northern Virginia, though he was photographed in richmond during the latter half of the war carrying an impressive custom made parisian import officer sword gifted to him from a maryland admirer in 1863, he seems to have rarely worn a weapon during the course of campaigning. His weapon was his mind and his physical charisma. He was the campaign strategist. It was his duty to di vievise t battle plan and seek to its execution by watching, directing units to their most appropriate destination. And most especially dealing with subordinates who are executing pieces of that plan. His Situational Awareness and observation skills were finely attuned and noted by colonel fremantle. General lee was also selfaware realizing his personal presence at the proper moment could inspire his men to impressive battlefield performance. With the attrition rate in the officer corps of his army reaching Dangerous Levels by summer of 1864, his personal attendance would be critical. By then several had been severely or critically injured. Lee himself when general joseph e. Johnston was grievously injured in the shoulder and chest at seven pines may 31, 1862. Earlier that april 1862, the confederacys highest ranking commander in the western theater and lees own former Commanding Officer fell medicortly wounded shiloh. On the evening of may 2, 1863, the difficult terrain of the wilderness of spotsylvania county, virginia, the commander of the second corps, Stonewall Jackson fell mortally wounded when he was accidentally opened fire on him and his staff while he was engaging in a dangerous nighttime reconnaissance at the battle of chancellorsville. And on may 6, 1864, after initiating a successful flank attack at the battle of wi wilderns, James Longstreet would be wounded in a confusing incident nearly choking to death on his own blood. Not dissimilar from the same friendly fire incident that mortally wounded Stonewall Jackson in those same wounds that same wilderness nearly a year before. The armys of the confederacy has sustained grievous losses due to the personal leadership of their commanders on the battlefield. And lees own moments of personal bravery and leadership between the Overland Campaign and Sailors Creek replace him in some of the greatest physical danger of his life. To lead in a desperate battle meant to risk ones life on a 19th century battlefield, everyone for the commander of the entire army. Of the several moments where lee placed himself in a Tactical Combat situation, either to lead men or to come a rallying point for their line of battle, perhaps the most well known is the lead to the rear incident at the battle of the wilderns, 1864 in widow kathrine tapps rented field deep in the second growth forrest that dominated the countryside. Just one day before in the same field lee and generals a. P. Hill and jeb stewart had all nearly been captured as the two confederate infantry corps of his army, then on the field, left a wide gap that Union Soldiers found. Only the reticence of the Union Soldiers on the edge of that field had prevented them from all walking up the 200 yards from that tree line and making all three confederate generals prisoners or dead. On the next day, on the morning of may 6th, 1864, the unit involved was the lead element of longstreets first corps arriving as reinforcements, the presence of the texas brigade commanded by john gregg is partially an explanation for accounts of this incident. Lees direct interaction with these grenadier guards of the Confederate Army was well preserved by texas authors, h historians and soldiers. The state of texas even placed one of its ubiquitous pink granite military markers at the field to commemorate this moment and their subsequent assault, a charge that stemmed the forward progress of Union General Winfield Scotts Union Second Corps and led to vicious fighting in the woods around the brock road plank road intersection. The road network crucial for union army southward movement. Chronologically this is also the first moment where lee attempted to lead men personally into battle as commander of the army of Northern Virginia. And as such there remain many months to both reflect and record this moment before the death of the army in april of 1865. As the texans started, general lee rode up, they saw him and gave a cheer. The old man with a light of battle in his eyes and the joy of seeing them arrive rode up behind their line, following them in the charge, one confederate recounted. At once the men began to shout, lee, go back, lee to the rear, when he stood still, a major took his horse by the bridle and someone pointed out general longstreet to him, whom he had not yet seen. And he was in that way pulled off. The texans caught the worst of it. They lost nearly half their men in a little while. Longstreets corps had arrived on the battlefield led by charles Fields Division and gregs texans 800 strong on the left hand side of the road. Edward Porter Alexander recalled it was but a little after 6 00 when the terrific crashes of musketry which began to burst in the general roar of the morning told hancock and meade and grant that longstreet had arrived. Hancocks advance was everywhere checked. He sent for reinforcements. Another officer wrote in the actions of may 6th, general lee was among the thick flying balls on the front lines waving his hat and encouraging the men. There are several potential explanations for why the Wilderness Battlefield was one of the better documented and memorable moments. One reason was the Army Organization was still relevantly still intact at the beginning of the campaign. It was a larger army at that point than it would be at Sailors Creek. And soldiers had some time to lees battlefield account. Famous exploits early until the war on many battlefield and one had strong identity after the war. And finally, the topography at the site made it possible for many men to have seen him. The openness of that field and an area densely covered with trees drew men to the clearing in large numbers. What separates these 1864 and 1865 battlefield moments from his actions on july 3rd, 1863, gettysburg, is the proximity to the enemy. While he was clearly under union army counterbattery fire from across the field in pennsylvania and at chancellorsville and at fredericksburg, he is in far greater danger and closer proximity to forward moving infantry in these later engagements. The desperation that pervaded the moment at wilderness where ambrose hills third corps was nearly driven completely from the field was different. And that the positioning of the army had loosely arrayed along two key roads guarding approaches. The flight of this corps around dawn on may 6th drew the attention of lee to a near disaster. Less than a week after lees attempt to lead the texans he would once again insert himself among the troops set for the attack. At the battle of spotsylvania courthouse, the infantry assaults that led to lees actions came to the result of his placement along a protruding imminence of high ground, left a significant component of the entire army in a bulging line precariously positioned in relation with the remainder of the army of Northern Virginias defensive line. In essence the corps stuck out like a big thumb that could be smashed by a hammer blow. That is precisely what the union army attempted and nearly succeeded at doing. The removal of confederate artillery from lee, by lee was also critical to the poorly executed defense. On may 10, 1864, the second of the lead incidents occurred. As colonel emery uptons brilliant plan, 12 hand picked union army regimen stormed the west face by brigadier georges. As lee prepared to ride wito th sound, his Staff Officers including colonel Walter Taylor and colonel charles s. Vennable stopped him. Lee told the men you must see to it that the ground is recovered. Taylor mounted his horse, grabbed a battle flag, a highly unusual move for a staff officer, and along with other officers led reinforcements to the battlefield of the section at works. Gradually confederates were able to push uptons forces from the union as reinforcements never came for support in the initial attack. Confederates suffered 150 casualties in that one action. Over 20,000 men would follow uptons plan with an even larger assault on the morning of may 12th. Li lieutenant colonel, general during ulysses s. Grant, commenting most desperate engagement in modern warfare. General John Brown Gordon elevated to command may 8, 1864, described the desperate seen near the mccool house on the morning of may 12th. The third lee to the rear incident. Lee looked a very god of war. Calmly and grandly he rode to a point near the center of my line and turned his horses head to the front. Evidently resolve to lead in person the desperate charge and drive hancock back or perish in the effort. I resolve to arrest him in this effort and thats to save the confederacy the life of its great leader. According to georges gordon, he was at the center of the line when general lee rode to it with uncovered head he turned his face toward hancocks advancing column, instantly i spurred my old horse across and grasping bridle and hand, i checked him. Then, in a voice which i hope might reach the ears of my men and grab their attention, gordon dramatically called out, general lee, you shall not lead my men in a charge. No man can do that, sir. Another is here for that purpose. These men behind you are georges, virginians and carolinans, they will not fail your here, will you, boys . I shouted to general lee, you must go to the rear. The echo, general lee to the rear, general lee to the rear rolled back with tremendous emphasis from the throats of my men, gordon later recalled. And theyd gathered around him, turned his horse in the opposite direction, some clutching his bridle, some his stirrups, while others pressed close to old traveler ready to shove him by main force to the rear, i barely believe had it been necessary or possible they would have carried on their shoulders both horse and rider to a place of safety. Douglas southall freeman, Pulitzer Prize winning biographer of lee, then under the command of colonel evans and the 52nd virginia john peagrams brigade under colonel hoffman is a powerful factor in the rescue of lees army. It had lifted these soldiers to the very highest plain of marshal enthusiasm. Gordon remembered the presence of their idolized commander in chief, his magnetic and majestic presence and the spontaneous pledges which they had just made to him all conspired to fill them with an arder and intensity of motion rarely possessed in any troops of war, georgias bulldog commander believed. I ordered forward. And with the fury, the cyclone and almost with listless power they rushed upon hancocks advancing column. The whole incident lasted only a few minutes. Gordon, one of lees most capable remaining battlefield commanders assessed the successful counterattack, long afterward the bitter trial in appomattox, lees spirit occurred to that spotsylvania and been permitted to not fall in that furious charge or in some subsequent battle. Perhaps the most direct diagnosis of lees actions at spotsylvania came from isaac g. Bradwell, a soldier in the 31st georgia infantry of georgias brigade who remembered the general showed he had despair and ready to die rather than see the defeat of his army. Another strikingly similar incident occurred that same morning, may 12, 1864, as lee continued to rally the defense. Lees staff officer charles s. Vennable confirms this fourth lee to the rear battlefield moment in his spirited co correspondence. We soon came under the fire of the enemys artillery. This excited general lees horse. And as he was in the act of rearing a round shot passed under his belly, very near the generals stirrup. The men of the brigade cried out, go back, general, go back. For gods sake, go back. And perhaps some made a motion to seize his bridle. Vennable, who was an eyewitness to the scene with harris mississippi brigade later wrote general lee then said, if you will promise me to drive those people from our works, i will go back. The men shouted their promise with a will. General lee then gave me, vennable, orders to guide the brigade to general rose. We found general rose near the famous spring on the battlefield with a few rods of the line of battle held by our exhausted troops. As the column of mississippians came up, lees staff officer remembered an aide to camp from general rhodes came with a message from Stephen Dodson ramser that he could hold out only a few minutes longer unless assistance was at hand. Harris brilg gagade was deploy immediately under tremendous fire and on a very difficult piece of ground. Never did a brigade go into a fiercer battle under greater trials. Never did a brigade do its duty more nobly. The entire sail lant was not recaptured, but the progress of the enemy was checked and they were driven into a narrow space in the angle they had occupied. Reflecting on the moment after the war, colonel vennable powerfully asserted, i believe that few battle incidents recorded in history rise in gran jugra grandur grandeur. And yet many have questioned lees promotion to the command of this same army in the spring of 1862. Granny lee, the king of spades, where names commonly attached to lee by newspaper editors, after his lackluster 1861, failure at the battle cheat mountain, admirable if underappreciated work defense building in South Carolina and georgia, defensive works around richmond in the early part of 1862, other soldiers who knew him personally however predicted forceful action from the former superintendent of west point. Descriptions of lees aggressiveness as a commander and predictions of his assertiveness and command style predate his Civil War Battlefield successes at the head of the army of Northern Virginia. One prophesy came from the explorer, Joseph Christmas ives. In 1861 ives, who was born in new york city, graduated from west point in 1852 and who had worked briefly as the principle engineer and architect on the Washington Monument in d. C. Served closely as robert e. Lees chief engineer when they worked to fortify the coast in georgia and South Carolina. Ives intimate relationship with lee was relatively brief, but when lee assumed command of the army of Northern Virginia in the spring of 1862, the young artillery commander inquired of him about his thoughts on lee as a battlefield commander. When queried about whether lee had the boldness of fighting general necessary for overall command at a desperate moment when Joe Johnstons army faced general mcclellans on the peninsula, ives was very direct. After rather dramatically stopping his horse in the road, he turned to alexander and responded, alexander, if there is one man in either army, federal or confederate, who is head and shoulders far above idol n either army, in audacity that man is general lee. And you will very soon have lived to see it. Lee is audacity personified. His name is audacity and you need not being afraid to see all of it you will want to see. In his memoir alexander furthered his thinking, i think military critics will rank general lee as decidedly the most audacious commander whos lived since napoleon. And im not sure napoleon in all his career would be held to have overmatched some of the deeds of audacity to which general lee committed himself in the two years and ten months which he commanded the army in Northern Virginia. By spring of 1865 the army of Northern Virginia was a shadow of its former size and officer corps withered from tens of thousands of losses in the summer and fall of 1864. Yet during the final days of the war, lee remained willing to place himself in danger during a fifth desperate moment. Knowing the gravity of his armys situation better than anyone else, lee was aware at Sailors Creek on april 6, 1865, of how close the possibility of annihilation for his army was. For nearly three years of war lee had sought the american aus ter lites, climatic set piece battle against a numerically superior foe. Quest was napoleonic crescendo moment. A masterpiece of command that could end the war. Humane goal. His entire 34 months as general of the army of Northern Virginia, his bold assertiveness and campaign strategy, also tactical audacity on the front lines can all be seen through this lens. He had tasted the sweetness of the lobsided victory at fredericksburg, the euphoria of snatching success from the jaws of defeat at chancellorsville, the agonizing defeat of his second raid into the northern at gettysburg, the brutal stalemate of wilderness, the near destruction of a corps at the bloody angle at spotsylvania, but at Sailors Creek he saw what looked like the possibility of the army coming completely apart. Disease, fatigue, severed his living, breathing army, the union armys massive effort to apply pressure on several fronts beginning with ulysses s. Grand whose overall command in 1864 brought devastating results for lee and union battlefield success. Now, it potentially created a c coupe de gras moment. Lee understood the time was and where his own personal leadership fell into the armys demise. From what can be gleaned from his early war actions on the front lines of battle, lee had long made the determination that if his army was threatened with a final climactic tactical moment on the battlefield, he was willing to make the ultimate sacrifice with his army. Now, john b. Gordon called him the very god of war, but lee was quite mortal. A number of artists beginning as early as 1866 have attempted to capture the gravity of these poignant moments between lee and his soldiers of his army. W. L. Shepherd, henry a. Mchartel, sidney king depicted him at spotsylvania with mccool house at the center in the foreground and moore counselor, lee with battle flag in hand. The urgency of the lead to the rear moments is what separated the events of those battlefields in summer 64 and spring of 1865. Lee sensed the collapse of the army. And by extension, virginia and the confederacy. And he was willing to place himself personally in the gap. Like warrior king spartan king leonitis in 480 bc, hes willing to sacrifice himself to save his people, his army, their cause. Though lee would not be called upon to make the ultimate sacrifice in battle, his men, officers and enlisted who shared an incredibly strong attachment to their commander, perhaps as close as an army could attach itself to a man, would offer themselves as a shield for him on all five occasions, texans, georgians and virginian, mississippians and virginians again. Spartan mother call to her son, come back with your shield or on it. Many would not return from the desperate battlefield actions. But on each occasion the army was saved from immediate destruction. Lees own reflection on these instance written in december 1865 at the request of a maryland judge was brief. And even conflated the events in his own memory identifying only the moment with general john b. Gordon at spotsylvania specifically. Reflecting on lees modest or confused response, colonel vennable of his staff preferred the contrast of lees battlefield actions to napoleon bonapart. Napoleon, soldiers, i will keep myself at a distance with a fire. If at a custom you carry disorder and confusion into the enemys ranks, but a victory appear uncertain, you will see your emperor expose himself in the front of battle. Vennable saw lees actions devoid of this kind of theater and reflecting, quote, the simple devotion to duty of the christian patriot, thoughtless of self, fighting for all the men held dear in contrast with the selfish spirit of the soldier or fortune, unquote. The aggressive military strategy lee, Jefferson Davis and other commanders like John Bell Hood shows led consistently to largescale battles, bled the Confederate Army and as a result the cause, but also reflected the desire of the confederate population for battlefield victories over a more conservative defensive strategy that would not have drained the manpower and resources of the south as fast. The south lacked the adequate war planning in 1861 to see this outcome in advance. Did have a fine artist, a Fine Campaign artist in robert e. Lee and a fighter in that commander. But in the end that aggressive strategy, which saw set piece victory was a key reason for the confederate defeat in the field as it killed and wounded men at a furious pace. These tactical moments on the field with lee reflected the overall strategy taken to its greatest and most dangerous degree. In some there was clear purpose in lees meaning to ride out in front of his men and place himself in danger. Lee was not a suicidal die hard successionist, but lee was a personally brave warrior general in an area when this remained an indispensable characteristic of a great military battlefield commander. The men in his army recognized this in lee. And for them lees survival was the armys opportunity at success. The essence of his leadership was a deep connection to the men in the army, but also a realization by the men that lee represented the physical embodiment of their cause. If lee lived, there was still a chance for confederate victory for these soldiers. This highlights the contingency of these moments. The soldier who is sacrificed themselves for the larger army, and even for lee personally, did so because they believe lees personal survival represented the survival of their ideals. While lee, his army, the destiny of the confederacy were inextricably intertwined in 1864 and 1865, his actions demonstrate the power of his own presence on a critical piece of land and in a desperate battlefield situation in an era when this personal presence of a Senior Commander was part of the successful execution of the art of command. Lee became the admired symbol of his soldiers. And these three battlefields provided pillars, pillars for the erection of the pristine image of robert e. Lee in the lost cause mythology written after the war. For many former confederates after the war, it was in these battlefield moments where lee became the infallible marble man. His personal understanding of honor and command responsibility dictated to him that he was literally the last line of defense for virginia and for the confederacy. Here lee presented the final measure of a general officer, personal sacrifice to save the army, to save virginia, to save the confederate cause. But even if he couldnt do that, to do everything in his power to try. Thank you very much. [ applause ] ill take a few questions if you have any. Please come to the mike if you have any questions. Thanks. Dont be shy. The very first image i put up, the jewel vannerson image, was done several images created from, they were sent through the blockade to one of the german states to Edward Valentine who was then in the process of creating a bust of robert e. Lee. Going to create one of the most famous sculptures of lee which is in lee chapel today. Yes, sir . Ask for an opinion. Was robert e. Lee, his personality, his character, who he was, as a person and as a general thank you very much. Hello . In your opinion was lee by personality, by character would he have been capable of executing the defensive strategy that in the early part of the war had been a matter of discussion among different confederate officials and other generals is all we have to do is not lose this war, in other words adopt a strategy that washington embraced the fabian strategy of George Washington revolution. Yeah. I think theres no question if given the option and given the opportunity to execute a plan like that, lee could have executed the plan. You see this at fredericksburg, without a doubt. I think James Longstreet, for example, his ideas about strategy mirror that battle consistently. Thats the kind of battle longstreet wants to fight over and over again because he knows gives him the greatest chance in a conventional way on a conventional battlefield of winning. It drains the union cause more than the confederate. But lees not really working in a perfect world. Hes got a lot of political pressure. So does the Davis Administration to fight this strategy and go for the victory. But also, lees a humane person at the end of the day. He wants the war to end quickly. He doesnt like the high casualty account. And theres a logic behind going for the battlefield victory that hes going for. Hes read about napoleon. If that was the strategy that was ultimately the one that was chosen, it could have been executed. But the confederacy lacks the war planning or the foresight in 1861 off the battlefield within the War Department itself to contemplate what the rapid casualty account is going to look like for that. One doesnt need to go far to read the census and know exactly how many military age white men were available. It was there in a supplemental census in 1860 was done, all they would have had to do was do the calculations of how many large scale battles with how many casualties were going to drain a finite pool. But those considerations were never made. The early secretaries of war, the confederacy, walker, people like that, were not thinking that far ahead. And Jefferson Davis obviously factors into this calculation enormously in terms of the strategy that was chosen. Was that is that potentially a contributing factor to picketts charge out here at gettysburg . That willingness to make that grand assault, napoleonic assault, because that just didnt fit lees style of war or his own personal character. I think its absolutely fits into this equation of going for the quick end to the war. I think of lee as a very humane person in terms of trying to alleviate the number of casualties during this conflict. He sees the accounting. And i think that factors into the equation. Thank you. No problem. Thank you. Great question. Yes . Lewis, media p. A. I have a question about Sailors Creek. Apparently the generals who were supposed to do what they were supposed to do didnt do what they were supposed to do, consequently had this big defeat. So is there anything written about, i mean, lee must have been an enormous shock. And he had already proceeded several miles ahead of the army and he went back to find out what had happened and discovered what had happened. So how did that affect him from there until his surrender . I think one of the things you have to really consider about this final year of the war is how fast the competent commanders underneath lee, the subordinate commanders, especially at the level of colonel and brigadier general, are being killed, wounded, mortally wounded, taken out of the service, and how much of a strain that personally placed on robert e. Lee to be the one who monitored everything at every moment. The attrition rate is just enormous by this point. And some of the best fighting brigadier generals, the guys you really expect to be out there filling the gaps are falling left and right. And i think that really factors in to lees shock at times on the battlefield that he has to be the one to get out there and do this personally. But yet, you know, whenever those moments arise he is willing to do it. Im sorry. One of the interesting statistics at appomattox is that the army of virginia had surrendered like 15,000, i think the number was, but from the time they started to retreat from richmond and petersburg, they had lost Something Like 25,000 or 26,000 soldiers, either through desertion or they were marching through places close to where the soldiers lived so they would ask their officers is it okay if i can leave. And after the surrender, i think the number was 26,000 came back for parole. They signed up for parole. Yeah. Different estimates. 26 to 28 usually are the common numbers. Youre absolutely right. The army is melting away by that point. A lot of people can see the writing on the wall after petersburg falls. Absolutely right. Thank you very much. Yes, sir . Justin classman from vermont. This is a speculative question, but in 1861 robert excuse me, colonel robert e. Lee was command of all union forces. What would happen if he said yes . Yeah, thats a very speculative question. This is the kind of question that my students always ask me when im on the battlefield travel course for a month with them. We get out in the middle of the woods and theyre like what do you really think, dr. Myers, about what would have happened. I dont usually engage in whatifs. I will say this, and Winfield Scott definitely made an assessment, much the same way Jefferson Davis did whenever he set up the second United States calvary in the 1850s and really assessed the officer corps and what he had. And robert e. Lee was seen as being the most proficient by Winfield Scott. But on the other hand, Jefferson Davis didnt feel that way. He felt like the best soldier in the army was the guy who was lees Commanding Officer, the colonel albert sydney johnston. If youre left with looking at decisions on the officer list of the second u. S. Calvary list, its a pretty good officer list. The captains in that command are some of the best guys youre going to see during the war. But youve got a colonel, and lieutenant colonel, theres different perspectives on this. Jefferson davis was willing to set that unit up. Thats a differing opinion. That doesnt exactly answer the question, but i hope it gives you my thoughts on it. Can you comment on lees relation with some of his subordinates after the war . People like pickett and longstreet, how they went . Yeah, its not uniform. Its not uniform. You see the sort of bitterness of a guy like pickett after the war, his conversations with people. I spent a lot of time reading John Singleton mosbys correspondence and his saying that old man destroyed my division. Those kinds of comments. But very quickly after lees death in 1870 you see less and less opportunity, less and less moment for criticism and more and more perspective on lees value. And eventually you see the creation of the infallible lee, the image of lee. The man and the myth begin to really separate. It becomes very, very difficult for people after that point. But you see people coming to the defense of lee and doing so in very selfserving manners as well, architects of the lost cause mythology. People were using lees image and his history for different reasons, but ultimately you see this myth creation after that. In many ways its very telling that robert e. Lee never wrote his own memoir of the war. Never cleared up a lot of the controversies. In some ways it probably helped robert e. Lee in terms of his esteem among the overall officer corps, because he didnt clear up any of that stuff. That was left to the Southern Historical Society Papers and confederate veteran, the infighting among Confederate States and units and officers about what happened and what actually transpired. Excellent question. Youve done a great job talking about the power of lee and the army of Northern Virginia, Gary Gallagher says that lee in the army of Northern Virginia are a lot Like Washington and the Continental Army in terms of its importance. How powerful was that impact on the west . What do you mean by the impact of that in the west . Well, you talked a lot about his leadership, his inspiration, his bravery as motivation for the troops. Okay. And they were almost idolizing of him. Yeah. And im wondering what the western troops felt, or did they feel an impact of that . That charisma, i guess. I think the instability atop the western armies makes it very, very difficult for those armies to have the same even if they had had an equivalent commander, an equivalent battlefield commander to robert e. Lee, it made it very, very difficult to have that amount of instan instability at the top of the command structure that lee develops a little over 1,040 days that lee commands the army of Northern Virginia, theres a real close bond there. You see this happen throughout history comparatively. Not just Washingtons Army but napoleon with his own army as well, there is that relationship with theres almost like another gear that whenever a desperate moment arises, they can kind of feel that they can take it to that next level with the army and trust that thats going to be there. And lee consistently did that. But you notice the moments with through his personal action exactly when he judged that gear was going to be the one he was going to have to go to. And i think thats sort of a strange car metaphor for robert e. Lees Decision Making process, but i think he really could almost feel when the army was in greatest danger. And i think these moments are, you know, pretty wise decisions on his part where he really assessed it well. Chancellorsville was easy, he realizes only 14,000 men on one side of the battlefield. And his Division Commander a little iffy, so he knows there hes got to be a personal presence on the front line. These other moments i think are an assessment that hes making very, very quickly. Thank you. Thank you. Hi. Hi. Im from moundsville, west virginia. Thats close by where i grew up across the river in ohio. Oh, good. Good company. Good location for you. Any way, my question is this, youre a lee man. Im not saying that in a derogatory sense, but you are. You teach lee. I do. You work at washington Lee University. So as you see that National News story and you see that statue of lee lifted off the pedestal, how does that make you feel personally . And how do you explain that to your students or how does that enter into the dialogue of how you address lee in the classroom setting . Thats an excellent question. Ill try to be brief with my answer to this one. Ive had to engage this question pretty consistently over the last half a decade or so that ive been at w now. The question of monument removal, first of all, or the question of Confederate Flag removal, and in 2014 washington and lee removed its replica Confederate Flags from around the recumbent lee in lee chapel, which is sort of the part of the story that ive been the closest to. And i was on the working group set up by president rusio to research the history of the chapel and the placement of the flags. And what we discovered was that the original Confederate Flags that were originally around were placed in the late 1920s by the late daughters of the confederacy. Whenever it was asked to take control of the interpretation of the chapel of the school at a time when there was a very good possibility that the lee chapel if the school didnt raise enough money might have ceased to exist, or at least in that current form. And the chapel itself has undergone lots of renovations over time. And in the 1960s the Ford Foundation gave money to put a new hvac system and things like that. So the chapel itself is not a stable site in terms of the way it looked originally in 1870 when it was built or in 1883 when the recumbent lee was added to this site. But those flags that were placed there, for example, were placed there 50 years on. The original site actually looked much like this, 1915, you see the washington custis lee portrait family, thats what the collection looked like, that collection is still housed at washington lee. There are two remaining portraits, one is the most famous images of George Washington, the peel image, the one of him in his virginia militia seven years war uniform. And the image of robert e. Lee in his confederate uniform. But ill make it brief in sort of response to the monument controversy. When i talk about this with my students, i want them to engage robert e. Lee as a teachable moment and as a teachable person. One that we have to be critical of from every angle. His successes, his failures, his moral failures, the injustice of his cause, all of these things have to be considered in light of the decisions of a man who was very much mortal and very much a fallible figure, a figure that had great flaws. But when it comes to monuments themselves, i favor con textualization by professionals and a strong involvement by the Historical Community in the contextualization of those monuments and historical rebalancing of the landscape including more perspectives from lots of different minority groups that also deserve to have their history told. So thats the sort of long and short of what ill give you on that. But im happy to talk more about it at length. Thank you very much for your questions. I appreciate them. [ applause ] our look at the civil war will continue in a moment. While congress is on break, we are showing you American History tv programs normally seen weekends here on cspan3. Coming up, why president James Buchanan is blamed for failing to avoid the civil war. Then, a look at general henry halleck, the commander of all of president lincolns armies. Followed by general arm strong custer, how he advanced to where he did and his impact on the civil war. And later, political cartoonist thomas nast and his illustrations during the civil war. American history tv continues tonight in primetime with recent civil war conferences. Tonight, programs from day three of the Gettysburg College Civil War Institute conference including discussions on Union General george g. Meade and the experiences of escaped Union Prisoners of war. American history tv primetime begins at 8 00 p. M. Eastern. Coming up this weekend on American History tv on cspan3. Saturday at 10 00 p. M. Eastern on reel america, the 1944 u. S. Office of war film why we fi t fight the battle of china. Three facts must never be forgotten. China is history. China is land. China is people. On sunday at 11 30 a. M. Eastern, political economy professor and author Robert Wright on Alexander Hamiltons views of the national debt. Hamilton advised the creation of an energetic efficient government, one that did one thing well for as little money as possible. And that one thing was to protect americans lives, liberty and property from tyrants, foreign and domestic. Then at 7 00 p. M. Eastern, new jersey residents and activists discuss the 1967 newark rebellion. There were 268 reports of sniper fire. Zero snipers were ever found. Zero . No evidence of any snipers. No gun shells other than the police gun shells. No footprints, no fingerprints, nothing was found. And yet 26 people were killed, one policeman, one fireman, the rest citizens, all by the three Police Forces that were operating. American history tv all weekend every weekend only on cspan3. Cspans coverage of the Solar Eclipse on monday starts at 7 00 a. M. Eastern with the washington journal live at Nasas Goddard Space Flight Center in maryland. Our guests are a nasa Research Space scientist and the chief scientist at goddard. At noon eastern we join nasa tv as they provide live views of the eclipse shadow passing over north america. And at 4 00 p. M. Eastern, viewer reaction to this rare Solar Eclipse over the continental United States. Live all day coverage of the Solar Eclipse on monday starting at 7 00 a. M. Eastern on cspan and cspan. Org. Listen live on the free cspan radio app. And this saturday well take a look at preparations for the first Solar Eclipse over the United States in 100 years. Plus, programs on the nasa budget, Mars Exploration and more beginning at noon eastern on cspan. President James Buchanan has been blamed for failing to avert southern ses session and avoid the civil war. Historians at the Civil War Institute at Gettysburg College in pennsylvania discussed president buchanans legacy. This is an hour. All right. Good morning, you all. Sorry. I spend a lot of time in North Carolina and