nation. what? an introduction for an introduction. and first off, i'll say that i serve as the executive director for civil trials. and it is an honor because i have the chance work for all of you. it's it's absolutely. the program grows at the grassroots. so it's individuals like all of you who may have an idea know of a spot in your backyard. you want to have it marked and marketed the world. and you come to us. so it's your stories that we get to tell. and it's truly honor. i would also be remiss if i didn't say that i came to history at a young age and there are few scholars who i can point to who helped get there. and the gentleman i have the honor to introduce is one of those. oftentimes, you often you listen to a biography, you think to yourself, i know who that is. you don't necessarily have to have a biography list behind him, but this one is definitely worth noting. scott, as a 34 year veteran of the national park service, served as gettysburg supervisor historian for 20 years. he won the national service regional freeman tilden award and excellence of interpretation in 1993 and was fundamental in the growth of gettysburg on site interpretation and living history program. even if it was the 11th site on bart's list, ten that growth also included the distance and satellite educational efforts. the key player for the design of all aspects of the new gettysburg museum and visitor center, and he retired from the park service in january 2014. but as we often that when you retire, you stay busy. scott has authored numerous articles, essays and books on civil war subjects, has appeared on the history channel, discovery channel, cable network, c-span think they're in the house tonight. his most recent publication is to antietam, the maryland campaign from. september three to december 16th, an 800 page in-depth study of the campaign up to the eve of the battle, antietam, published in september 2012 by john hopkins. he's currently working on the sequel, which will cover the battle of antietam and, its aftermath and the end of the campaign. please join me in welcoming scott hardwick. i can tell you, drew, if you have to drive, around northern virginia in your job, my hat goes off to you because. yeah, you know what i'm talking about. and bert and bert. bert worked me. i clearly failed. know, i, i got to tell you, when i came in here and i heard bert, you know, he had lost the top ten with this crowd, i was like, oh, my god, this is going to be, you know, you can't win in the top ten, you just you cannot because everybody has their own argument and thing. and i think bert did a great job. so i have no problem with gettysburg being 11 or nine or eight, i don't care where you put it we all our own opinions on these sorts of things. now tonight, in my part of this, we're going to talk about the antietam campaign and the prussian military theorist carl von claus vets once said that war politics by other means, we might say extreme means. and the maryland of 1862 or the antietam campaign, you could really almost pick any campaign of the war. but this campaign in particular is infused with not just on one side, on both sides. so tonight, what i intend to do is look at this campaign and talk about five topics associated with the campaign because for me to try to go through the whole campaign, that's a seminar. that's not a talk. we're going to talk about. and the maryland campaign, why did lee invade maryland? the armies of, the campaign, understanding strengths and weaknesses of the army can help you better understand how this campaign evolves the way it does and turns out the way it does? mcclellan and special orders. 191 this is the famous lost orders. robert lee's orders to his armies that are discovered and mcclellan is given those orders. we'll talk that and why lee offer battle at sharpsburg. it was a very controversial by robert e lee. all right the war and slavery. now, onef the myths from the civil war, and w know the civil war is famous for all of its myths. but one of the myths of the civil war is that emancipation played no role until september 1862, when lincoln issued the preliminary emancipation proclamation that is not true from the beginning of the war the republican party and lincoln were out for slavery. they were they didn't want the border states, missouri, kentucky, maryland were slaves as well. they could not afford to let those states go into the confederacy. they had be very careful how they proceeded. however, the attack on slavery very, very early in the war, remember the confiscation acts? i know these things seem to can be kind of boring, but they're connected to the war. august of 1861 the first confiscation act says slaves that come within union lines or free emancipated. one of the biggest emancipator of the union army in the spring of 1862 was george v mcclellan. he didn't like this he didn't like this policy, but he abated as the soldier because civil government made the and he obeyed the policy. so slaves who came within the lines when they were on the virginia peninsula were free. now they congress is going to up the ante a little more because as the war's to go on and the border states are being very difficult to work with for lincoln, he's trying to give them a plan of compensated emancipation. they're not interested and compensated emancipation. they want to hold on to slavery and south. the confederacy is fighting very hard. i mean, big battles there. they're determined to win their independence. so they're there. they're going to up the ante on the attack. and there's also some complications for in the field who are running into slaves. is this a loyal master or is this a disloyal master? i don't know what i'm supposed to with these slaves that have just come within my lines. all right. we're going to make it a little bit more simple for if it is state that is seceded and the slaves come within lines, they're free, they're emancipated, you do not them to the owners. not only do you not return them, you will be court martialed. if you do. it is illegal to return slaves to their owners. that's the second confiscation act. there's thing in the second confiscation act. it it calls for the president, the united states, to issue a proclamation declaring all slaves the states in rebellion to be free. now we all think lincoln kind of came up with this idea, i'm going up the ante. i'm going to issue this emancipation proclamation and i'm going to change the war. actually, the republican congress calls for him to do this. this is very common for congress to do this. there's a great by james oakes called freedom national that lays out this discussion the destruction of slavery in more detail that i encourage you to read because it gives it gives you a much better idea about the attack upon slavery and lincoln's role in this. so. is on board with this he wants this second confiscation act wants to issue an emancipation he's to go down to harrison's landing. yes i know everybody's out there. hartwig that picture is not from harrison's landing. that is from antietam. i know, but it's lincoln and mcclellan. and there wasn't any pictures taken in landing. so he goes to harrison's landing early. mcclellan has been defeated in the seven days battles, and he is going to sit down, meet with mcclellan. and when he's there, mcclellan is going to hand him letter called the harrison's bar. and mcclellan gets bashed for this letter like. he's way out of line. i don't think mcclellan's out of line at all. he's the commander of one of the largest field armies, the union. he has a right to express to the president the united states what i think about policy and what he tells the president is that a declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our armies. but that is a pretty shot across the bow. i hear what's going on in congress debating the second confiscation act. don't do something radical here. that's not a good idea. now, part of mcclellan is a conservative, but the other thing that mcclellan is probably at is anything that he sees as radical might make the other side even harder. so he's opposed to anything like that, he still has the concept that there's a lot of southerners who are unionists at heart. we can win them over if we don't go to radical. well the president has decided that he's going to fight the war with one hand behind his back any longer. so he listens to mcclellan, he reads his letter. and then on july 22nd, five days after the second confiscation act is passed, lincoln sits down with his cabinet, reads them in emancipation proclamation, and they tell boss, not a good time. we lost independence, soldier, the war's not going well. this could look like, you know, an act of desperation, and it might backfire. we need a victory. we need a military victory for political event to occur. so they hope that that victory is going to occur in northern virginia, under the command, general john poe, he's commanding the army of virginia. and lincoln essentially gives him, the army of the potomac. they never relieve mcclellan of command. they detach the entire and send it to poe. and pope, we know gets defeated soundly defeated at the second battle of manassas. and a union army retreats into the fortifications of washington in tremendous disorder. the troops are disorganized. they're they're really discouraged, and they are furious at pope pope's time. you can't have a pope anymore. so lincoln comes to a very decision. he calls cabinet meeting on september the second and he tells hisan in command of all the forces within, the fortifications. he's very specific about. he is not the commander of the troops that will put in the field commander of in the fortification, because haven't decided what we're going to with mcclellan yet. now gideon wells, who you see in the lower, says there was a more disturbed and despond ing feeling than i have ever witnessed in counsel. one of them who was despondent, edwin stanton to the left the secretary of war. he was with rage. he despised mcclellan much someone allegedly said that he would favored the capture of washington to the return of mcclellan to command whether he really said that or not. i don't know. but he hated him. so there's there's a they're not happy with lincoln's decision. we thought we were going to get rid of mcclellan, but things are going to get even worse because it appears that the confederate army may possibly move into and order sent to mcclellan on september the third, saying there is every possibility that the enemy, baffled in his intended capture of, washington, will cross the potomac and make a raid into maryland or pennsylvania. a movable army must be immediately to meet him again in the field. who's going to command that movable? they don't say they haven't picked them. on september the fifth, lincoln will visit ambrose burnside and burnside command of the army and burnside will tell the he believes george mcclellan is the best to command this army. now mcclellan will stab him in the back on in this campaign, but i don't think mcclellan even knew that burnside done that. so lincoln's kind of over a barrel. he doesn't really have any choice. and on september the seventh, he's going to visit mcclellan at his house, which was also his headquarters in washington. and he tells him general, you take command of the army in the field, verbal command. now, if you read mcclellan after the war, he tells you that he command without any authority, that no had the courage to put him back in command. so he just kind of took command. now, i'm telling you, i'm not a mcclellan but there's not a chance on this earth that he did that he had never been relieved of command, ever. the army just took his army away from him. all he needed was a verbal you are back in command of the field army. that's all he needed. so there's no question in my mind that lincoln did that lincoln places him in command of the army despite fact that these two men may have a little bit of a history. and most of it's one sided lincoln work with almost anybody mcclellan can't work with hardly anybody. he has problems throughout his entire life with superiors always we can see some of the things he had to say about the president. an idiot. august 16th, 1861. he's nothing more than a well-meaning baboon. october. 1861 i went to tea to the house shortly after tea where i found original gorilla. november 1861. and then there's the spear. the other guy's gideon wells is, weaker than the most garrulous old woman, were ever annoyed by. he has funny. secretary of state. seward was a meddling officious little puppy. now he's writing these things to his wife in private. but believe me, you know, when someone feels certain way about you, you can pick that up. and people have that up about mcclelland. but lincoln looks past this and he places mcclellan as the best man and he's got the commanding army that's going to take the field against robert lee who has invaded. now, what's his mission? protect washington, d.c. do let them get the capitol. he also has to protect baltimore, determine there is a confederate army, south of the potomac. yes, we know that some confederates have invaded maryland, but there are all types of rumors that there is a big confederate force still in northern virginia. you have to determine that as well. third, drive the confederates out of maryland and lincoln has fourth thing that he needs mcclellan to do give him a victory so he can issue is emancipation. now, this is one of the great ironies of the maryland campaign. we need a general who doesn't believe in an emancipation proclamation to win the victory, to deliver it. that's what lincoln needs from mcclellan. so let's move to lee. why does lee invade maryland? now we see the two armies, the big red dot and, the blue dot red dots. it's centreville and near manassas, where the battle of second manassas was fought. washington is where all these union are all gathered within the fortified nations. so lee has some options available to them. he has the initiative. well, he's got three essential options that i see first option. he can invest washington, d.c., but besiege the city. he's not going to be able to besiege. so he can't cut the entire city off. but he can try to invest part of it. what's the good thing on? it it maintains the pressure upon lincoln, the federal army. well, when you've got an army outside, your gates. that's pressure. what's the what's the downside? negative. his men can't eat no supplies in northern virginia. no, no means of getting supplies. that isn't going to work. second option, withdraw to warrenton and reassess your supply line. your army is very poorly. re-equip your army. resupply your army. bring up some of the convalescing wounded, sick men that are in richmond and your army will be bigger safe move. it's a safe move. negative surrender the initiative, the enemy. if you know anything about robert e lee. he never, ever likes to do. that. invade maryland. a third option leaves. northern virginia. open. all right the battlefield. second. manassas. just trying to collect all this equipment off the field. you also give a break to the area of northern virginia. you also give the conscription officers an opportunity to get into areas to conscript soldiers in area that have been overrun by the yankees, maintain the pressure on the federals. they've got to react. you go in, you go into maryland. they have to react to that. you force the enemy to take the field before are ready. that's why you don't want to go to warrenton. they come at when they want to. you force the issue. they come at you when you want them. before they're ready. before they're reorganized. before these 300,000 volunteers have been absorbed. the army and trained. get them out into the open, into the field. and fight them. you. the initiative you're calling shots. there's a potential to invade pennsylvania and, influence the fall. congressional. that's a biggie. really big for lee. lee has once expressed it to davis, the confederate president. what he seeks are heavy victories. what he means by that is victory, is to do a lot of damage to the to the federals. but the confederates don't suffer as much. and that will undermine mine the morale of the northern people and the way they'll express their morale being undermined is they will vote out the republicans and vote in the democrats, who are far more likely to negotiate a peace settlement with confederacy. there's also potential for european intervention if you're successful. lee does not think there's going to be any european intervention, but some people do. but it is always the possibility, the negative. how are you going to supply the army, the physical condition of the army? that's a negative in any of them. you can look at the list. it's a no brainer for lee. we're going to go into maryland. that's that's where we want to go. now, lee is going to write to jefferson davis on september the fourth as his army is beginning to cross the potomac river into. i am more fully of the benefits that will result from expedition in the maryland and i shall proceed make the movement at once. unless should signify you're just appropriationhould the results of the expedition justify it. i propose to enter pennsylvania unless you should deem it an advisable upon political or other grounds. this is just pro forma stuff. davis absolutely. this movement. he's already moving. he's just showing. dufresne to davis. this was smart on lee's part because davis didn't like people who didn't show him deference. he's showing davis deference. you are the president. i am following the strategic ideas that we had. we've already discussed this as if this opportunity arose. that's why he knows davis is not going to say no, i don't want you to go into maryland. that's not a good idea. he knows davis will approve it. he just wants davis to feel like it's his idea. and he, the approving official. so lee has two choices on how he's going go into maryland. he can go east of the ridge or he can go the way he did at gettysburg. west of the blue ridge, down the shenandoah valley, he chooses go east of the blue ridge. even though stonewall ja wanted him to go west of the blue ridge and lee's reasoning to go east of the blue ridge and one and march up to frederick, maryland, i think was sound by moving frederick is much closer to washing.c. and baltimore. he poses an immediate threat to both of thoses. and he will bring the union a out of the defenses of washington faster than if he goes. gettysburg campaign route. that's his goal. i want get that army out. i wa tget it out in the open. i want to fight that army. and i want to beat it because where i'm going to get the political consequences of that victory. so lee makes this decision, why does he invade maryland? it's the best move politically for the confederates. it is a risk militarily. but as lee will tell james redden, the confederate secretary of war during the period before the gettysburg campaign, when saddam was very concerned what was going on at vicksburg, and he wanted to move part of lee's army out there. and lee reminded him all movements, all decisions in war entail risk. you just have to calculate the risk. so lee's calculated risk. he feels that the best option for the confedera is to march into maryland. now, two armies that will nfront each other in maryland are very different in certain ways. the army of northern virginia begins the campaign much stronger than almost confederate writer will ever acknowledge to you. the army is probably about to 75,000 men. it is extremely poorly supplied, particularly the troops that have been in the second manassas campaign. these guys have no regular food. their uniforms and clothing is beginning to fall apart because they've had no resupply of clothing because they're beyond their supply line. the only troops that are well-supplied are troops that come up from richmond and reinforce lee after second manassas. so the army is in rough shape. lee knows that of dawsey. pender writes the following he's a brigade commander. he writes the following men in his brigade during harpers ferry operation. my dear, such a filthy and unprincipled set of villains i have never seen. they have lost all or decency, all sense of right or respect for property. i've had to strike many a one with my saber. the officers are nearly as bad as the men in one of my regiments. the other day they thought they were going to go into a fight. six out of ten officers scoped and did not come up until they thought all danger over more than half my brigade went off that. now this is a he's describing an army that is rough shape but right below that dr. lewis steiner was a unit u.s. sanitary commission doctor in frederick, maryland. and talked to a lot of confederates when. they occupied frederick and he said they all believe in themselves well as in their generals and are terribly earnest. he thought were pretty tough. one of the things that the confederate army has that is a big strength is. most of the soldiers in the are combat veterans. they're experienced combat veterans, trained combat veterans. and lee has a very small and very good command team. he has two essential wings because the confederate congress doesn't yet allow army corps to be formed. so the right wing and left wing, and they're commanded james longstreet and stonewall jackson, superb corps commanders. so he's got this really good command team. but as the campaign progresses, the the problem for quartermaster is like william elder manifests themself selves and grow to immense proportions. if we can only enough for our men to eat up here. i don't. general lee's army can be whipped. he's very competent. but he can't get enough for the men to eat. and that is going to play havoc with this army. when the army gets to leesburg, virginia, they have a shakedown. kind of like what sherman did before he started the the march to the sea. not as elaborate, but they're going to shed about 5000 soldiers. they're either physically unfit or they don't have shoes. those soldiers are excused. they're going to march them to winchester. that leaves a balance of, let's say, 65 to 69000 men in the army. they march into maryland. they will lose thousand 107 men in the battles take place before antietam, sharpsburg that's south mountain, harpers ferry, crampons, gap skirmishes plus sic. they left in frederick. so we have a balance of about 63,000 men. they're going to fight battle of antietam with 37 and 40,000 men. you can do the math. they. lose 25 to 27000 stragglers in. the maryland campaign. these are sick guys, are guys who just they got to get something to eat. they're just end of their tether. and everywhere the army goes. you can read their accounts. they leave a stream of stragglers everywhere they go. so that's percent of the army strength is lost due to straggling. that is a problem. if you if think it's all made up, read lee's correspondence after the maryland campaign is over. he didn't think it was made up. it was a crisis. the army. the potomac is hodgepodge. thro together of essentially three differenarmies. and we all know that every army even though they belong to the same army, do things a little bit diffent. it's like you can work for i work for the national park service and interpretation thgs differently than resource and law enforcement. and so on was the same way with where we did things differently ybthan antietam did that fredericksburg did. so the armies of the same way yohave the first corps and the thorps. they are bh from pope's army of virginia. you have t secondorps, one division of the fourth corps, one division ofhe fifth corps and the sixth corps. they are from peninsula army, the army, the potomac that ve been on the peninsula, the nt corps is burnside's corps. they basically been an expeditionary on the north carolina coast, etc.. they're like a mini army. they are all thrown together now. they're the army, the potomac. but 84,000 men on september the seventh, they'll increase to about 87,000 men. by september the 17th, the day they fight the of antietam. and one very significant thing about this army is about 18,000 of its infantry. that's about. 15 to 18% of the infantry of the army are raw recruits. and when i say raw recruits, i'll give you an example. carmon, who commanded one of these raw regiments 13th in new jersey. he was a an experienced soldier. he had been in another new jersey regiment on the peninsula. he's having a conversation with colonel samuel rosedale of the 128th pennsylvania. ten days before the battle of antietam. and rosedale asks him how to form line of battle, not knowing and giving as an excuse. he had no time since being commissioned by a copy of tactics. he's going to be killed. rosedale in the battle of antietam. and when he's killed in battle of, antietam, his unit is trying to form into a line of battle. and it is chaotic. and nobody knows how to do it. none of the officers know how to do it. none of the men know how to do it cause they never drilled it, never trained. they've never even fired their weapon. most these men. and that's what a lot of these regiments are like. so that in it's the ability of this army to do certain things and mcclellan that particularly in the early movements of the army he had to give these some seasoning. people often wonder, why didn't he marched 20 miles a day? can't march 20 miles a day with guys who've never done any marching? he's got a season them gradually and they're going to throw a lot of these units into the battle of. antietam and the experience is really for these troops, but for the veteran corps of, the army, these men who've been demoralized by the defeat on the peninsula. now that second manassas, the mood of these men, i think, is reflected by alpheus williams, a general in the 12th army corps. he writes to his daughter, says, i can't tell you the future if we fail now, the north has no hope no safety that i can see. we have to win this. and the confederates feel the same. so it sets up this this epic campaign. mcclellan's command team is a little bigger than lee's and a little bit more complicated. he has. he's divided. the army into two wings, the right wing, which is ambrose burnside. and i call center wing. he never really named it just sumner's wing. edwin sumner will command the center wing, which includes own second corps. they don't appoint commander that he can continues to command it. and the 12th army corps. that old gentleman you see there will take command of the 12th corps two days before the battle of ante. and that is joseph mansfield. and then burnside has the two best corps commanders, probably with the army. that's jesse reno in the ninth corps. and joseph of the first corps. the last two guys you see down there are actually both under arrest when campaign begins. it's fitzjohn porter and william b franklin. charges have been levied against them by john pope and they have been relieved. command. but mcclellan asked the war department. this is a crisis. these men are experienced. there's some of my best guys. i need them with me. and they released both of them. so these everybody is under a bit of a cloud. mcclellan doesn't trust the government or the war department. he doesn't like anybody. they don't trust him. got two of his experience corps commanders, the fifth corps and sixth corps commander who these guys were possibly facing court. so there's a lot of pressure upon. so this is his command team. it's not a great command. he's got some good commanders in it. it's as streamlined and as simple as liza is. and he doesn't have commanders of the experience of jackson and longstreet. special orders number one, 91, probably the most famous lost orders of civil war. what are they? well, when lee invad maryland and marched up to frederick, where the circle is on the right, he got up there. expectee was a union garrison where it says miles, there'ree red dots and it says miles harpers and then up white and martin's. you see big one at harpers ferry, litt, er 10,000 men, and one at martin are sitting astride the communications lee is going to need to when. goes into pennsylvania. when you go down valley, you can't get past these union garrisons communication so he's got to clear them out. he thought they would just retreat when he got up to frederick. he expected you know, they're going to do the smart thing. they're going pull them out. well, henry halleck, the union general in chief, orders those garrisons to stay in place. now, lee, characteristically does not see this as a problem. he sees it as an opportunity. let's get them. let's get them. we can get them before the yankee army comes of washington, d.c.. so he draws up a very elaborate plan, an extremely complex plan when when consider that these men are all dealing written communications. there's no radios, telephone or telegraph that these guys would use. so we're going to take one wing or one force undertonewall jackson will march to boonesborough to williamsport, cross the potomac river, into northern virginia, and either destroy the garrison at insburgit on to harpers ferry, another column, general lafayette mclaws, consisting of two divisions will march down and maryland heights. the key terrain domg harpers ferry on the maryland shore. a third column, one infantry division under general john will march downear point of rocks on the potomac go through northern virginia and come and capture loudon heights on the on the south side, harpers ferry on the virginia side commanding harpers ferry, capturing those key positions with jackson sealing off the west. they be able to destroy or capture the union at harpers ferry once the garrison is captured. all the troops will march to hagerstown where we see the other red big red dot. that is where lee will re concentrate his army. but in the original plan, nobody going to go to hagerstown initially. when they began to execute the order on september the 10th, lee, however, had learned through some of his or someone that there was a union militia, hagerstown, from pennsylvania and that the people in hagerstown were taking their food supplies out. he needs that food bad. so he modifies the plan, the march, and he takes command u to hagerstown and he leaves hill's division at boonesborough. can look at the map and you c. lee is really taking a gamble he his army is ntains by by rivers. and they're really widely there at hagerstown boonesborough, down near harpers ferry on the maryland on the north, the potomac south of the potomac, across from the shenandoah. and then we've got jackson over west of harpers ferry. big risk that he's taking. that's the plan. that's the plan. he draws up. when the confederates begin to execute this movement, the union army is marching maryland. anon september the 12th, the elements of the army arrive and on september the 13th, the army, the begins to close up o frederick and occupy the town and. some of the troops who are arriving arrive south of the town include the 27th indiana. they march a field across them in argosy river. they marched into the field. the regiment stacks, arms as they stack arms. some of the ncos in the regiment look down their say an envelope laying on the ground, pick up the envelope. there's three cigars in it and there is a piece paper wrapped around it. going to tell you it's pretty weird. i mean, i don't think the army in northern virginia issued orders from army headquarters in envelopes wrapped around cigars or orders wrapped around the cigars. very strange. but be that it may, they find the piece of paper is special orders. number 191. it was the orders from army headquarters to dhl. everybody points fingers as to who lost this thing. i don't think this entire affair reflects very well on the way they did business at army of northern virginia headquarters. they should have known that that order there should have been a receipt that came back, that dhl had received that order and signed for that order. no record that ever happened just kind of write on, you know. so now that they got found the orders, they're going to hurry them on up the chain of command and eventually they're going to be in the hands of george mcclellan when does mcclellan get them? there's lot of debate about this right now. mcclellan going to write a a very excited telegram that he sends to the president that is dated or timed 12 a.m.. now at mcclellan's headquarters, almost always, when they put 12 m, that means 12 meridian, 12 noon. and that's what we've always accepted. and and then didn't do anything for the rest of the day. it was very strange. you know he's he's he's been roundly criticized for this. right. well, a few years back, a fellow named, maurice daoust, was going to the lincoln papers. and as he was going through the lincoln papers, he found the telegram that lincoln had received, not what was sent from the army, the potomac but what was received. and behind the 12 a.m. someone had written it night, midnight, 12, midnight. now, i think i saw james rosenbach over there. all right. thanks to james, because he a while back sent me the the books of the u.s. signal corps and the messages that they sent back and during the campaign. there is message sent to mcclellan on september the 13th. unfortunately, they don't put the time, but it says the president is at the war department office and he is anxious for news from. you and, by the way, the line open to point of rocks all telegraph lines have been cut by the confederates. so you're not telegraphing from frederick to washington. you had to go a roundabout way. so mcclellan's message excuse me is going to go from iraq's to sugarloaf to washington, d.c. and the message is senate midnight and here's why? i think it is. unless we find smoking gun, we can never say. certainly mcclellan is going to send it. 3 p.m. in the afternoon. a message to his cavalry commander, alfred pleasanton. he's going to tell pleasanton, we've just come in to possession of the of howard. he doesn't tell him he's coming to possession of these orders of the confederates. he out the order of march of the confederates that is called for in special orders. 191. he says, i want you to determine, did the confederates follow this order of march? now, if he had found the orders and given the orders before noon, writes the president at noon, he's not going to sit around for 3 hours before he writes to pleasanton. he's just not going to do that. he didn't get the orders at noon. he probably got them in the early afternoon, noon. and very shortly after he gets the orders, he's going to have someone on his staff write this message to pleasanton. and he's probably going to also have his chief detective, pinkerton, try to find some people in frederick and question people who might be in the know. can you figure out, did they follow this order of march? because that would determine that this is genuine. you have to determine that before you order any movement. by 6 p.m., he's convinced before he hears back from that, they followed this order of march and starts to issue orders to his army. after all, orders are issued to the army for the operation on september the 14th, at 11 p.m., he writes henry halleck, the chief of staff and around that time is when he's going receive this message from point rocks, telling him that the president is at the war department and he is anxious for news. and at 12 midnight he's going to write that message that's going to go to the president. the timing of it is completely logical. the timing of a 12 noon message is simply not logical. that's why i fall the side that i think the message went out at midnight. now, mcclellan plans an offensive. he just sit on his duff. he does plan an. he orders the entire ninth corps to march over to to the mounin into what we call pleasant or middletown valley in front th mountai the general plan that he is on september th, the main part of his army is going to march towards turners, gap and fox gap and take on what he thinks is. the biggest confederate at boonesborough. that's lee longstreet hill. that's go be the big battle. we'ng to fight him at boonesborough. the smallest force, the sixth corps to be reinforced couches division will break through crampons gap and get into the rear of mclaws and relieve ferry. i think that was a long long it s a tall order for william b franklin in the sixth corps to execute that. but be that as may make a long story short, on september the 14th, the army, the potomac move and they do fight a battle a series of battles called the battles south mountain foxes gap, gap and crampons gap at crampons gap. the six corps wins a smash victory. they crush the confederates they break through into pleasant valley. they are now on the clauses rear at foxes and turners gap. the confederates hold their position. lee brings longstreet two men down from hagerstown. they lose half their men in the march. the they reinforce d.h. hill on south mountain. and they hold their position. but they lose the key terrain. so during the night, lee makes a decision that he is going to retreat. and we'll get to that in just a moment. but the last i want to wrap up on special orders, 191. it has been suggested that it didn't really help mcclellan. he already he already had a plan. he didn't have a plan. it helped mcclellan immeasurably. i don't i i don't ascribe to the idea. special orders 191 didn't help mcclellan. it confused him. it didn't confuse him. it answered a lot of questions. he was very confused at all these movements that were confederates crossing the potomac in williamsport were confederates up in hagerstown were confederates around harpers ferry. he didn't know where the main strength of confederates were. he didn't know what they were trying to do. he knew that harpers ferry was threatened, but he wasn't sure where to send the weight of his army. 191 cleared it away. he knew what needed to do, and he did it. so 191 was a big coup, maybe not the biggest coup of the war, but was a big coup. and he did act it. so lee is to order a retreat from south mountain. and it leads us to question of why does he offer at sharpsburg? well, here's the situation. you see all those black things up at the top for you guys in the back. at's the army, the potomac at fox his gap and turner's gap. and the three tt white things are lee longstreet and d.h. hill. they've been whipped at south mountain and lee during the night of september the 14th. orders to fall back across potomac river at at shepherdstown. the march through sharpsburg to shepherdstown. campaigns over. he orders general applause. get your topthe potomac river any way you can. you might have to abandon uient and stuff. we've got to get out here we are in a tough spot, he tells stewl. breaks off the operation. march to shepherdstown and cover our crossing campaign is over as the troops filing off the mountain. lee reconsiders. he decides, no, no, that's not a good move. we've got to do to help. mccloy's so we're going to halt at cadyville temporarily will draw union army away from fox and turner's gap away mclaws towards us that's going to give him a clause a chance get away now maybe there's a possibility mclaws can get around maryland heights and march up the road to sharpsburg and join us there and then we can retreat to shepherdstown. so going to send orders to mclaws to investigate that, see if he can do that as troops are marching along, lee changes his mind again. i think he's probably studying maps. he's also questioning people who are familiar with the area, and he decides that better temporary defensive position is behind antietam creek at sharpsburg. so he longstreet dhl youil form your men behind the yantian creek the campaign is still over folks hes still treeat to virginia. this is a temporary stand to extract om clause he still has those orders that he is sent to jackson to break off the siege. however, i execution of september 15th as lee is closef to crossing over antietam, he dispatch from stonewall and jackson tells lu know, by the blessing of god, harpers ferry to be surrendered, they're tonder that day. they surrender that morning, 12,500 union p.o.w.s. it's one of thest victories for the confederates in the war the confederates lose like 300 men in this operation and they capture almost 13,000 men, all sorts artillery, ammunition, equipment. it was a really well executed operation, just took longer than lee thought it was going to. okay. harpers ferry is going to surrender. lee starts to reconsider. maybe there's a chance i can reunite my army and we can fight. in maryland here at sharpsbur you can look at the map. wow, that is risky. look at what the clae to do. yes, to march dowacss the potomac river, get into harpers ferry, then march all the way up to shepherdstown and up to sharpsburg, jackson and, all they walk are all these guys off the march up there. look how close almost alth union army iso e and lee. only has about 15,000 men at sharpsburg, so he makes a decision i'm going to try a fight aattle here. i'm going to see if i can reunite my army and people have opinio aut that epi. alexander, who was his chief ordnance officer in the campaign and one of the one of the best critic critical critical people of the confederacy analyzed confederate campaigns, the war in the east. he writes of this decision of defeat, certainly involve the utter destruction of his army because he's got the potomac river behind. them. historian john proops writes it beyond controversy. one of the boldest and most hazardous decisions in his whole military career. it a truth so bold and hazardous that one is bewildered that he should have even thought seriously of making it. and lastly, we'll hear from alexander again, i think it will be pronounced by military critics to be the greatest military the generally ever. okay. so why did he do it? well, kit douglas, i think, is a really good analysis by douglas. all battles are not fought in selected upon sound military, wellington, napoleon lee were all perfectly familiar with these principles. and when they disregard did them, they had strong reasons for doing so. lee is clearly disregarding them and he doesn't tell us why. we just have to try to surmise it. this is my supposition on why i think he stays in maryland and offers battle. number one, he an opportunist opportunity lies in maryland the best chances for the confederacy lie in maryland taking, the safe course and falling back into virginia. yes, i will preserve my army. i will also sacrifice the initiative and. i never like to do that. so you lose the strategic initiative and the enemy gets it. the fighting at sharpsburg, it's going to carry great risks, remember? but there's always risk in every operation. but it also has great possibilities. what if mcclellan attacks and he defeats the attack? mcclellan falls back? where is he going to fall back to? well, the likely place he's going to fall back to, he can really defend easily is south mountain. if he does, that leaves, got an open quarter to head to hagerstown and on into pennsylvania and the campaign north of the potomac continues. and the political consequences of that continue to be felt. i think that's why he's going to fight battle at sharpsburg. he sees the best opportune city for the confederate by taking this risk and he knows that his army is bad shape. i don't know that he knows how bad it is. everybody always can stuff for the boss. his subordinates may have been doing that. he does take a tremendous risk and on the next september the 17th, mcclellan will attack. they will fight the battle of antietam. it is a horrendously bloody battle. both sides lose heavily. but i am here to tell you from my research been doing on volume to the army of northern virginia is absolutely more failed in this battle. terribly maulethis battle percentage wise, worse than the army, the potomac. lee loses a lot more an i think he possibly anticipated in this. he remains on the battlefield on september the 18th. incredibly explores the possibility of making a flanking attack against. mcclellan it tells us something about the the resiliency of lee. he realizes that that is not possible. once a reconnaissance determines that. and on the night of the 18th, his army is going to retreat and cross the potomac river. the army, the potomac will pursue they will cross over the potomac river on september the 20th with the force, the fifth army corps. lee will counterattack vigorously. and the battle of shepherdstown will occur. it's a clear cut confederate victory. the union troops are driven back across the potomac river and the maryland campaign comes to an end. september 20th. two days later. remember politics. rears its head. two days later, lincoln issues the emancipation proclamation as bert antietam. the battle may be a drawn battle, but strategically this a union victory. clearly a union victory. lee did not achieve his goals in his plans, and mcclellan did got them out of the state of maryland. he drove them out and inflicted heavy losses upon him. lincoln sees it this my opportunity. i must seize it and we're going to shoot emancipation proclamation and the reaction we oftentimes when when i've read about emancipation and people write about the army, the potomac and its reaction to it, it's as if writers seek out every who thought it was a really terrible and it was going be the end of the world and they they present all of those but anybody who thought it was a good i'm not going to we're not going to bother mentioning those people. well, one of the people who thought it was a bad idea was the commander of the army, george mcclellan. he writes in a private letter to, a business friend of his in new york, i'm very anxious to know how you and men like you regard the recent proclamations of the president inaugurating serve a war emancipating slaves. and in one stroke of the pen, changing free institutions into a despot autism. now mcclellan frequently went off on things like privately and then publicly acknowledged that the civil government here was subservient to the civil government. and he does this in this case, he tells the kind of language is not probably what lincoln wanted, but essentially tells the army we have to obey the this is the proclamation. we will do it. we will follow it. so he doesn't lead a revolution. rufus dawes fought in the cornfield six wisconsin. and in january of 1863, he was invited to go to his hometown of marietta, ohio, was there on leave, and while he was there on leave, he was asked to give an address. the people in the in the city about how the war was going, what they thought about the war, what these men fighting it, thought about it. and here's he had to say about the emancipation proclamation. slavery is the chief source wealth in the south and the basis their aristocracy and in my observation is that a blow at slavery hurts more than battalion volleys. it strikes at the vitals. we like the proclamation because it hurts the rebels. we like the prop proclamation because it lets the world know what the real issue is. but you don't hear that side it. but there were a lot of soldiers remember lincoln did win the election he was republican from the majority and then in this army of republicans as well because he did win the election and he won it again in 1864. majority of men are, democrats. but even among the democrats. they did not desert in mass. the army didn't disintegrate. in fact, francis donaldson, a captain 118th pennsylvania, i think reflects the mood of a lot of these men very well. i am a democrat first, last and all the time. but as long as the rebels are in arms, i will sustain. the government's efforts to put down rebellion with my life if necessary, what reminds us is that these soldiers accepted, may or may not have liked the emancipation proclamation. men like him. they accepted because it was a measure that they felt might bring the war closer to an and they would just accept it and continue to fight so the campaign of 1862 emancipation plays major role in the course of the campaign and the army reflects the differing views the north that will continue to play out through the rest of the war as the country grapples with this this issue of emancipation. i want to thank you all very much, folks, for me down here. all right. it's kind of a challenge because we're in the back, sort of think like we hold up the sign, but like we're all like, oh, my god, that is just so good. scott harwood, ladies and gentlemen, again, come on. we do have time for just a couple questions. so, jeff, hold. i'm hesitant, but let's let's see where you go here. scott, with all your work on the maryland campaign, what do you think when all is said and done is lee's assessment of mcclellan as an opponent lee's assessment equality. oh. i think he understood mcclellan actually well, although i do think mcclellan him at mountain and mcclellan was more than lee accustomed to it. mcclellan had always been very cautious in his operations. he was kind of a set piece sort of commander, although i do still think he believed that mcclellan would behave that way when he makes his decision to stand at sharpsburg. i think he realizes that, for one thing, mcclellan gets severely criticized. the why doesn't he? on september the 15th march from south mountain and attack robert e lee's and you can look at a map like i had up there and you can say it looks pretty easy to do but when you actually get down into the weeds weeds as a soldier would have to do. that was impossible mcclellan could not have attacked on september the 15th. if he had, it would have been a hasty attack with a very small part of his army. his army had two roads to move the entire army. so there was a big, gigantic traffic jam of the army as it tried to move there. he also to reconnoiter antietam creek. what crossings? the army draw so on where was the best place to cross was the confederate position so no attack was really going to take place until the 16th. but there's i think that lee does take the measure. mcclellan and he is confident that he will not be attacked on the 16th. and if he is attacked will be so late in the day that he will be able to his position. so he he clearly feels that with mcclellan, even though he's been surprised that south mountain that this is a commander that i know i basically know what he's going to do and how he's going to operate and he's going to be pretty cautious and careful and do everything by the rules. he's not going to do something outside the rules. but that's that's kind of why i think lee about mcclellan and bob stone, lake of the woods, virginia, my understanding of special order 191 lee expected jack's men to have envelop and capture harpers ferry by the 30 of september, which is the same day that mcclellan got the of the order. what made him think that that hadn't happened yet? was there telegraphic communication to harpers. no, there weren't telegraph. and we don't know of any communications that occurred with lee. we know that lee wrote lafayette in clause and told mclaws kind of admonish mclaws that he hadn't heard anything from mclaws and he wanted to how things were going. it's very possible he heard from jackson verbally that jackson was surprising him of where he was in the course of the operation. lee's release timetable. i have to believe that jackson and mclaws and the others, when they looked at his timetable, were like seriously? all right, the boss, because they had actually for all the troops to be in their place september the 12th. so actually had about two days to move over 50 miles for jackson's and take care of the union garrison at martinsburg. i it was a really tall order for lee to expect them to be able to carry that out but what they couldn't know though when they were planning this operation would the garrisons try to run for it? and if they tried to run for it, it would be easier to destroy them in the open so they couldn't know. so i'm sure that lee felt, you know, any plan like this we have to have some wiggle room in this and it's just that, you know, mcclellan's surprise move on september the 14th took away any wiggle that lee had the time for. one last question, scott. glenn robertson, virginia beach, virginia. it's kind of two, but they're really quick. one is i think they're following up on the lee's measure of mcclellan question. how much do you think his view of mcclellan is extremely cautious, almost timid, impacted decision to save the campaign as opposed to call off the retreat and step five? and secondly, didn't hear anything. and the shrinking the army of northern virginia relating to soldiers not being willing to invade the north. and i've read that it's suburbs. do you agree that or. oh, okay, i'll answer the second part first and the first part. second i found almost no evidence the confederate soldiers were opposed to in and there was one north carolina regiment in division that someone a in a history of the unit. the war said there were some men who said we didn't sign up for doing this. we up to defend, you know the confederacy. so we don't want to go in there. i did find some evidence that or some rumors that soldiers threw their shoes away once they heard longstreet's issued a issued an order that any men without shoes were excused going into maryland. and the rumor some guys threw their shoes away. you know, i sometimes people get so attached, these armies that could never happen. like really, you know, you don't food and you're marching all. the time and bullets are blowing people's heads, stuff like that. yeah, i could somebody throwing their shoes away. i mean, i've kind had it so. no, i found in fact most confederate soldiers were enthusiastic about the invasion were delighted to carry the war into the north. and many of them thought that maryland, where they were going, they know about that part of maryland. they thought maryland because it was a slave state was going to be really welcoming. and i paraphrase one soldier when they left frederick, he called frederick a -- yankee whole. so anyway, the the second part of your question, which was with lee and and mcclellan how much did is his men from mcclellan impact his decision? oh, the campaign fight was to i think that was a part of i think there was a part of it. but i think that, you know, with other commanders that that lee had faced. i mean, look, hooker hooker was a very officer and he executed this brilliant campaign plan, the beginning of chancellorsville, and least ill takes this tremendous risk against him. lee, is this he's a risk taker and he's an opportunist. so i think he may have tried this with other commanders as well, although i do definitely believe he any good commander takes their measure of the other side. wellington did of napoleon. napoleon did of wellington and of blucher. they all knew one another. they all knew their their strengths and their weaknesses. and they all tried to seek to exploit them. and i think that leaves no different. he knows mcclellan pretty from this campaign on the peninsula. what an extraordinary privilege it has been for us tonight to listen to you, scott, thank you so much for being and for having me.