Inaugurated the global war on terrorism but we will replace it with a mexico au mf and you just thought, is this progress . What do you make of this . There is a sense that maybe we went bananas there for a while but how about a mexican invasion . There is the fatigue of big wars, tens of thousands of troops deployed to iraq and afghanistan but most americans are, for better or for worse, a nerd to a small footprint, small drone strike. What they are contemplating is use of that which is a few missile strikes, performative and symbolic missile strikes against drug labs in mexico. We are putting the war back on the war of drugs. There is a real downside even if these were pin strikes. There are many downsides to attacking cartel and damaging our relationship with mexico. I think it does reflect where the conversations i dont think many are serious. That said, this does normalize them and make it more likely that they future president may act on them. I want to read a quote here from the chairman that the house now has a task force on countering the cartel. The chair talked a bit about the examples of what an au mf would do. What we want, according to this individual is to get mexico to ask for military support such as Close Air Support while they are prosecuting a target and surrounded by [indiscernible] which is exactly what happened earlier this year. Navy seals were calling Close Air Support and all of the guys would be gone and we would move along. This is getting back to this idea of, mexico is in a civil war or an insurgency but they just dont understand it or they wont try hard enough. You have heard over and over, as i mentioned before, this idea of insurgency, stability operation. I remember during the battle days of iraq and afghanistan, which Cato Institute was opposed to at the outset, thinking, at least 7000 miles away. It is a bearable thing for us to be doing but at least it is really, really far away. The idea is that you would import the insurgency or a Counterinsurgency Campaign and stick it on your border in your largest trading partner . That seemed to me there is this idea of, to me, living in an alternate reality. It is not to make light of the fact that military scale, using military equipment, 50 caliber machine guns. I am not saying that these guys are out there in their backyards with slingshots. These are real bad dudes with real heavy weapons but it is escalating a conflict that is right now at a pretty low level to full on shooting. Let me find another one here from the online audience. Lets go to you people here. I am juggling three Different Things and forgetting about the living, breathing human beings. By the moderator in my . Right down here in the front in the white shirt. Sorry. Hi. My name is veronica with the National Coalition for drug legalization. I think the larger question that no one has really asked is, what are your thoughts on the legalization of all drugs and do you see this as a way to reduce drug violence and drug overdoses and what would it take to get people to start taking about legalization of all drugs . Of course, that is the only way we will see the reduction in violence and deaths. We learned this with alcohol but it seems like we have very short memories. I always tell people, when i go to my drug dealer, which is the neighborhood liquor store, and i look on the shelf at bourbon, which is my drug of choice and it says 45 alcohol, and never even crosses my mind that they may be lying to me or might have fentanyl in it. That is because it is legal and regulated. The solution is, to legalize all drugs in the same way. Unfortunately, it seems like you are asking about the prospects rather than even entertaining Something Like a halfway step like decriminalization, which is happening in europe decreasingly. The czech republic, germany, they are not arresting people for possessing any of these drugs for personal use. They are not even hearing people talk about escalating the war on drugs. I dont really have a lot of optimism about our prospects. Lets go to another person right there, checkered shirt. Another question for dr. Singer. What role does drug scheduling, under the controlled substance act play in all of this . We are talking about synthetic drugs and amateur chemists trying to stay ahead of though wall with bureaucrats scheduling new synthetic models for these drugs. What role, if anything, does that play in the crisis . Well, if anything, the Drug Enforcement administration does the scheduling. By scheduling of drugs, as schedule one, that means it has no accepted medical use and a high tendency for abuse. Among drugs that have been placed in schedule one, first of all, you are depriving research and the opportunity to do Clinical Research on drugs that could potentially be very helpful such as psychedelics, even a lot of the drug war hawks are suddenly realize the benefits of psychedelics may have for the treatment of ptsd, particularly in veterans and other problems. We basically stunted Clinical Research of psychedelics for 50 years because they were placed on schedule one. Cannabis, i dont think that anybody with a straight face could say no accepted medical use of cannabis. That is one of the downsides. The other downside is they are helping to create a market that the cartels and other people want to get into the drug market can get into because if you make a schedule one, it is no longer available through the legal market. Heroin was made schedule one they did not have a schedule for that but it was banned in the United States. The man who invented it gave it the name heroin. That was banned in the United States in 1924. That became the number one opioid that people were using in the black market because obviously it became attractive for people in the black market to sell. It is on the formulary and much of the developed world. In some countries like canada and germany, the netherlands, switzerland as well. People are often times given heroin when methadone is not working for them as a form of medication and treatment. A question came in that im going to manipulate a little bit and then throw to you. It was about the cartel itself. You wrote a book about that. In reading about in preparing for this, some of these folks are really, really bad people. Lets just say that up front. One of the things i was reading to stress this up, they have sophisticated testing equipment. Sometimes they will get an addict and just shoot them up with the drug to see what it looks like and then one particular instance, the guy died and then they just sent that stuff to the border anyway. You think to yourself, who would do that kind of thing . I guess to stipulate, not nice guys. What with the cartel do . What is your best guess at the responses. On paper, the United States military in the u. S. Marine corps the United States marine corps will mop the floor. That is not the way it works. What is your best read of how the cartels would respond to a greater u. S. Military role, shoulder to shoulder with mexican military or not . The political aspect is hanging right there, obviously, but what is your best guess to how the cartels would respond . This is a great question. The discussion is not based on reality and fact. It is not bad and good actors. When the Mexican Government in 2006 declared the war on drugs, it was like a discourse, a narrative about the bad people and the good people. The bad ones are the Cartel Members and the good ones were the military, the federal police but we understood that in context of war, we are talking about insurgents attacking too where we really dont know. We are talking about military groups also getting into here. This is what happened in colombia. Not all the time, u. S. Soviets in the case of 2006 to today, we are talking about military dress in civilian suits in order to not affect the perception of the military. This is going to be very complex. We are not talking about bad people and good people. Who are the perpetrators of this and who are the victims . Where the disappear people . Some of them were collateral victims and some of the ones who disappeared were the bad cartels. Also, the mexican military collaborated with u. S. Agencies. What is going to happen in the conflict of war . This is going to be much more complex. We have a monolithic bad actor that is dedicated to traffic drugs. It is not a serious we have a model, all of these things have bad men leading with capacity to fight against the military of mexico or the United States. Now, we have a third component here. The Mexican Government is not going to allow u. S. Military force into mexico. What is going to happen . Are we going to have the militarization mexico has reached levels we have never imagined. There is a monopoly of the Public Safety at the federal level. They control the ports, the customs, migration. They are participating in the construction of the projects, they are participating they are going to be dealing with an airline that has been created. They are participating everywhere. I dont know if that gives you an idea of what the Mexican Government is thinking about. We can really create a war against two countries. I dont want to be pessimistic but is the Mexican Government going to support the u. S. Military . I dont think so. Lets see there is somebody all the way in the back there. Sorry if you had your hand up. Thank you so much. I have so many questions but i will boil it down to one. Thank you very much for your book. It was awesome reading. Is the government essentially a Transnational Criminal Organization . And you repeat the question . Is mexico a Transnational Criminal Organization or could it arguably be perceived that way . The Mexican Government . A Transnational Criminal Organization . Okay. If you are characterizing the Mexican Government, all of that that, i am glad you didnt mention the concept statement the mexican state as that National Criminal organization. Probably when you characterize the Mexican Government, you are thinking of them, because we are talking about the secretary of defense, or the head of secretary of Public Safety that was the Main Organization that was formed during the six year period, the administration of felipe. But if you are talking about the Mexican Government are connected with the cartels that some political figures are considering, it is a tactic which is driving today the narrative among certain political groups in the United States print i am talking about a very important section of the republican party. Everything mexico can all the government is connected. El chapo is in prison. You are kind of like assuming that the whole government, including the president of mexico and the military is directly connected, collaborated , and also participating in the drug trade. And that they are all combining themselves to bring the drugs to the United States. I think this is a massive exaggeration. It is very risky and it is going to put the whole country of mexico against the military of the United States, the government of the United States. There is going to be a war against two countries because there is a war on drugs but if you characterize the Mexican Government as a Transnational Criminal Organization they will declare a war on mexico, and this is very dangerous. That was a Charles Tilly question, are getting back to organized crime. I think, unless there is an other hand, which i dont i think we have exhausted most of what i saw that wasnt stepping on other questions here. Yeah, i think we have covered most of what we needed to cover today, and i dont want to stand between all of you and perfectly legal it will be available, so i think this is a very important, very grim topic that i think is going to be persistent in the years to come. This unique perspective is going to have a role to play and i am very thankful that we covered what i think is a tremendous amount of different aspects of this issue. It is 4 20 on a friday afternoon. Thank you very much and please join me in thanking the panelists here today, thank you so much. [ applause ] [indiscernible ] [indiscernible chatter]ernible ] [indiscernible chatter] Defense Department officials discussed findings and recommendations of the review including mitigating biological threats and training and protecting military forces in combat. The event was hosted by the center for strategic and international studies. It runs just over an hour. Welcome and good morning to everyone assembled here in washington at csi as and those watching online and tuned in to cspan 1. We are delighted to be able to host this one hour session today and the release of the inaugural department of defense bio defense review. We are doing this today under the offices of bipartisan alliance for Global Health security cochair, former cdc director julie, and former senator richard special thanks to my colleagues at csis, michaela , mclean, sophia, special thanks to that csis Production Team that is putting this altogether, eric, alex. Theo and duane. And special thanks especially to Jennifer Nicholson who has helped us over many weeks and planning this out and many others that i cant really begin to humor, there has been a lot of support for putting this together. Bipartisan, as we were here in this postcovid moment, and it has the potential, as we were here, to bring about fundamental changes. A few minutes ago, we published here at csis , my colleague emily harding, Deputy Director of International Security programs, and i published article questions hes on the release of the ppr. Michaela, we recently published an essay entitled the worst is over, now what, that examined this postcovid moment that we have entered, and it began by unpacking many of the factors of pessimism that there will be little sustained progress in building preparedness and response capabilities against future pathogenic threats, but it makes the case beyond that that there really is reason for optimism and hope, based on several factors. Survey work that shows strong american support for an active u. S. Government engagement in this area at home and abroad. The appointment of new Senior Leadership team at the white house, the cdc, nih, and elsewhere. New capacities in the white house and cdc and elsewhere, and the de facto bipartisan consensus, despite the rancor and the noise in our country to better protect americans for investing in new technology and better biosafety and bio security and other issues. And most importantly, in our deliberations today and in the paper that michaela and i published, we make the case if the wheels of government continue to turn in generating new Security Strategies and analyses for improving the performance of the u. S. Government, the vitally important for how u. S. Departments and agencies are to perform. The budgetary needs and the oversight to ensure accountability. Special congratulations to secretary Deborah Rosenblum and her many colleagues who have worked long and hard to generate this important work. A certain urgency surrounds strengthening bio defense in our government, but it did take 21 months to complete this, and the delay is are a reflection of the complexity of the threats and the science, the array of dod institutions involved. The inevitable conflicts and bureaucratic politics, but we are at this point now where it is out and the moment has arrived to accelerate its implementation. The world of bio defense has changed profoundly and dod needs to change accordingly to move ahead. This lays down a new paradox around bio threats coming from multiple directions, including national from china, russia, iran, and north korea. Creates new opportunities, and the massive proliferation laboratories. We will hear more in this discussion around china and the question of what exactly is the threat that is posed. If the bpr is careful, i think we will expect greater clarification as we move into the future. Is it engaged in bio weapons programs . There are other questions that emerge out of this that we will also have to think about. Chinas larger environment what becomes of them . Also, what about our Bilateral Dialogue . Is that dialogue is there space for that . The bpr, as we will hear today, that Institution Needs to bring about greater accountability in the next coming days. Action plan of the next 12 months. This will really be a critical task. A bit of the down payment. I believe that is all possible. Dod is bio Defense Activities a longstanding friend and colleague, a generous support system. Many fields related to this broad enterprise, an exceptional commitment to strengthen americas defenses. From november of 2021 to april 2023. Before joining the biden administration, deborah was the executive vice president. We will hear from the audience here. Lets get moving. Please join me in welcoming secretary Deborah Rosenblum. [ applause ] good morning and thank you very much for that wonderful introduction. I want to thank csis for hosting us here today and i am really pleased and quite frankly relieved. That i am here today, because that means that we have successfully completed the review and made it available for the public. We are here to discuss the results of the review and how our work at the Department Also goes well into the work of the National Security at the white house under previously dr. Beth cameron, and dr. Paul today. In updating the National Bio Defense strategy, as well as updating the Implementation Plan where dod plays a significant role. As we begin our discussion of the review, i do want to share with you the deputy secretary of defense asking me and my colleagues. I had wonderful partners throughout the department of defense in the military department, along with the joint staff where dr. Frederick was. And we also owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the individuals who are here today who led the bio review on a daily basis, my wonderful deputy, as well as richard johnson. Along with dr. , who is not with us here this morning. I also want to give a shout out to many of you here in the room, as well as joining us virtually. Your intellectual work that you are doing, as well as the intellectual capital that you brought to the discussions that were hosted by Johns Hopkins center for Health Security, as well as m. I. T. Lincoln lab, where instrumental. What were the key issues we needed to get after, as well as providing instant to look at these things from a different way. When you read the following words from the report, and you will hear us repeating them often the department of defense and the nation are at a Pivotal Moment in bio defense. We face an unprecedented number of complex threats, as outlined in the National Defense strategy and the National Defense strategy. The secretary of defense charged the department with being prepared to operate in a biological threat environment and to support the enterprise both at home, as well as abroad. Dod must implement the significant reforms outlined in the bio posture review to enable a resilient total force that deters the use of bio weapons, response rapidly to natural outbreaks, and maximizes biosafety and bio security for laboratories globally. We have no choice if we are to effectively implement the National Security strategy and the National Defense strategy. The National Defense strategy speaks of the growing risks of chemical and biological threats in the context of the strategic competition with a near peer competitors. But we are not only concerned about china and russia, we must remain focused on the potential impacts of existing and emerging biotechnology is that could be incorporated into any biological warfare program, for purposes inconsistent with obligations under the biological weapons convention, as well as actions of nonstate actors. The National Defense strategy also highlights significant transboundary challenges associated with pandemics and naturally occurring diseases. These threats certainly impact the readiness and resilience of our military forces. Bio defense is no longer something that is the purview of just specialized units that have traditionally been worried about these threats. Deterrence requires a combat credible force, and to be combat credible, the whole joint force must be capable of being resilient. As i noticed, the bpr was built on the Foundation Laid out in the National Defense strategy, along with the bio defense strategy. But it was also greatly informed by a number of Lessons Learned from covid19 pandemic response. The bpr outlines reform initiatives along four key lines of effort, which i expect our panel to discuss today in greater detail. The first, enhancing Early Warning and our understanding of emerging bio threats, what we call understand. Second, improving the preparedness of the total force. Otherwise known as prepare and protect. Third, beating the response, to mitigate the impact on dod missions and the total force. Otherwise labeled as mitigate. And finally, improving strategic coordination and collaboration to enhance bio defense. Today, i very much want to emphasize the coordination and collaboration line of effort. Even with the release of the bpr, much of our work is now just beginning. While i am relinquishing my title as colead of the bpr, i am assuming a new one as the executive secretary of the bio defense counsel. Chaired by my boss, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, dr. Bill laplante. The bio defense counsel is charged with implementing key bpr reforms and empowering the department to take this more collaborative approach to bio defense. We must continue to emphasize and maintain the energy of the bpr as the Council Takes on an authoritative strategic role. Integrating numerous roles and responsibilities throughout the department, without supplanting existing authorities. To serve as much more than an implementation committee. Even after the exhausting 18 months, we know there are significant topics that we still need to continue to delve into, such as the medical readiness of the force. Although focused internally, i take as a key due out that the bio defense counsel must facilitate better communication and work with all of you as advocates for bio defense. Whether that is in the interagency, with our allies and partners, and academia, industry, or amongst think tanks. As i have noted, we are at a Pivotal Point in bio defense. We must maintain our momentum to prepare for any number of complex potential biological threats. At dod, this means continuing our bio defense efforts to support the National Defense strategy with its three primary focuses, on integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building advantages. We must maintain this focus, we owe it to our total force, and to continue to advocate and defend the Critical Resources that the department is requesting. We also need to collaborate on improvement across the National Bio Defense enterprise. This work is fundamental and critical to the National Defense and National Security. So, with that, again, i want to thank csis for giving us this wonderful opportunity, not only today, but in continued collaboration. And with that, i look forward to our panel discussions. [ applause ] good morning once again and thank you very much for your opening comments, rosenblum. I am a senior associate here. My pleasure to invite our panelists this morning starting on the far end, dr. George founded the commission in 2014. The current cochair, the former senator tom ridge. Among the many distinguished commissioners are former congresswoman susan brooks and peggy hamburger, also a commissioner on our Csis Commission here. Used to be a senior professional staff are in the house of representatives where she worked with the House Committee on homeland security, included in her broad background is her expanse as a Service Member in the u. S. Army as an intelligence officer, paratrooper, and she has a phd in Public Health and the university of hawaii. Deputy assistant director for nuclear defense, she has held numerous senior federal government leadership positions including chief of advanced and emerging threats at the Threat Reduction agency where she was awarded for her innovations to detecting contaminated battlefields. Next is richard johnson, Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and countering weapons of policy. He was at the state department where he was a deputy lead coordinator for iran nuclear implementation. During the obama administration, richard served as director of nonproliferation at the security council, welcome to all of you. Deborah, thank you very much for your opening comments. There is an awful lot to talk about. Lets take the history back a little bit. You mentioned and there that the u. S. Has been involved in conflict operations in every declared pandemic in that 20th and 21st century. We have experience in operating in a bio contaminated battlefields in one way or another. Lets go back to 9 11, the anthrax attacks really brought this to the United States and i opened a lot of eyes, that was sort of lost in the other things that happened there. Between the anthrax attacks and the covid outbreak, georges commission was started on strengthening americas Health Security which started before covid. We were all looking at what would happen in the United States should there be an outbreak of some bad disease, usually ewing the model. Then covid happened. The uss roosevelt, an Aircraft Carrier was taken out of service, was placed out of service in guam for quite some time. The various exercises were canceled. Operation warp speed, the very Successful Program that brought our vaccines to the floor were heavily supported by dod assets, not only in our science world, but also in our logistics world. The military supported civilian activities with logistics and medical support in hospitals and various Vaccination Centers across the country, large support for the civilian efforts, and our military labs were supporting other laboratories around the country in diagnosing and finding out just what was going on. A lot of work both in the military and supporting our civilian colleagues. The question then is, as steve mentioned, the worst is over, now what . How do we keep the momentum going . So, the big question for you is what is next . In your paper, you say youre going to assess the bio threats to our country through 2035. Take a good look at that. We have looked at the threats from other countries, we will talk about that in a minute. We want to get into the areas of what is new. You mentioned that tipping point, and ive got to believe that some of those tipping points have to do with the advances in bioengineering, the advances in artificial intelligence, how does that play into things . Let me just throw it to you, what would you like to add from your opening comments about why now . What cost secretary austin months ago to write this, saying we need to look at what we are doing within dod . Let me make a few kickoff remarks for us, then turned to my colleagues. I would particularly like to hear from dr. George and all the work that the Bipartisan Commission has been doing. I think when secretary austin put out his memo, certainly what we had just lived through from a pandemic perspective it was vivid and front and center in everyones mind. But that, while a very critical, important piece, we were actually at a point where we could have learned the wrong lessons. We could have learned the lesson that, from a dod perspective, our force notwithstanding some of the difficulty is, was okay. It was resilient, the readiness didnt really go down. But what was happening at the same time was the development and ultimately the publishing of the National Defense strategy, where as i talked a little bit about, with the focus on the peer competitors, but for those of us in the bio defense enterprise, we are very cognizant as well of the ongoing and accelerating pace of really revolutionary technologies and science, as well as convergence , and bringing other disciplines into this area. And it led us to fundamentally look for the next 10 to 15 years, what kinds of threats might our forces be encountering and how prepared are we against those . And that was fundamentally the dr. George, you were quoted in the Washington Post recently, commenting on your peer competitors, what are the threats out there, as you see it, from outside of dod, from other countries and organizations . We know from the state Department Verification and compliance report, unclassified, that russia and north korea have active biological weapons programs and that china and iran have programs of concern, i think is now how we are talking about it. But i would say also, it would be foolish for us to think that just these four countries have decided they are getting involved and that is it, there is nobody else, just these four. That doesnt make sense from a proliferation standpoint, both from the proliferation of weapons and the proliferation of science, and quite frankly, the proliferation of fear. Once people start setting up these programs and the word gets out, surrounding countries began to pay attention, and we would hope that they would say, we need to establish defensive programs, but we cant be sure that they are going to do that. Military strategy differs according to various countries. So, i would tell you that i think we have to be concerned about other countries jumping in and trying to develop or obtain biological weapons as well. So, i think that is one thing. The other is we have talked about force protection. And enabling our war fighters to be able to operate in a contaminated battlefield. It is not just war fighters standing there with plagues surrounding them somehow, it is a really complicated situation. You are talking about ppe and people covered from head to toe with staff, and filters that wear out after a couple weeks, but we think we need to keep them in those pv setups for longer than that. There is a logistical piece behind that. And the enemy is quite aware of all of this, this is just standard, regular, ordinary military battlefield thought. Taking advantage of those perceived or real vulnerabilities is also in and of itself a threat, that is specific to the biological threat. The third thing i would say is we have multiple things going on in the world at once. We have 10 pandemics affecting the United States all by itself, not to mention everybody else. We have humanitarian crises occurring. We have accidents occurring with releases from facilities, and we have these biological weapons programs. All of them are occurring at the same time, they all overlap. And on top of all that and throughout that, we have dod, we have the United States, its interests overseas, all trying to operate at once. It is really incredibly complicated and not at all the same as other threats. It is not the same as nuclear, not the same as chemical, certainly not the same as the explosive threats. So, on top of all that, we had a session here at the csis yesterday which focused on via safety, bio security. And if biosafety and bio security goals are to be achieved across the world, china needs to be a part of the answer. How do we say china is the threat, we are worried about all the things they might do to us, but yet we need to be working with china in certain other areas, how do we manage that narrow path . Yeah, absolutely. So, first of all, thank you again for having us, this is really an important moment. I think one of the key outcomes of the bpr was the discussion that, as dr. George just said, this is not an issue for just the United States to deal with, this is an issue for all of us to deal with globally, certainly with our allies and partners, and frankly, for those who are not our allies and our partners, including the prc. This administration has been pretty clear from the outset, we want to cooperate with the prc in areas where it is in our joint interests, and that is on things like pandemic preparedness. And so, we have sort of put that door open and i think the National Security advisor has spoken about this in the context of strategic stability, and sort of put in guardrails and the relationship between the United States and the prc. And i would put these biological issues sort of in that bucket. Certainly, we continue to be interested in having a dialogue with beijing on these issues and making sure that we understand where we are coming from. Unfortunately, the response we have gotten from the prc to the relief of the bio posture review was basically an influx of disinformation and misinformation about what the United States is doing on bio issues, and i wont repeat them, because they are not true, but just to say that we have heard this before, and we are focused on exactly what the document, if you read it, says, which is to prevent and to protect and to mitigate against impacts around the world and to understand what that part is, so we want to have a discussion based upon facts and based upon reality. In the meantime, we are also having really robust discussions and need to do more of that with our allies and partners. I will call out just for example, the ukraine scenario has reminded us unfortunately, we talked about covid, we talked about anthrax, but unfortunately, countries like russia have also reminded us globally that these threats have not gone away and in fact, are still there and are growing. So, our support to ukraine, making sure they have the ppe that they need, our ability to downgrade intelligence if there are concerns about false flag operation, all of these things emerged at the beginning of the conflict, and that is why we are really pleased to see, for example, that nato has upgraded its policy, which was outdated, to reflect these threats. Thats why we are really pleased to see that the uk has released a new bio defense related document, just as we are doing this. And dialogue that i lead with our allies in south korea on countering wmd. This is something we need to do more of your in the United States. As you said, in a bipartisan way, but we also need to do it with countries around the world, including the Global Health security agenda. Of course, we want to talk to the prc about this. We will also continue to talk to many other nations as well. Something else that i think we need to remember is that as technology is advancing and some very unique bio development, it also means that we are seeing an increased risk of laboratory accidents, right . With the rise of different laboratories doing high risk life science research, we really also need to look at biosafety, bio security worldwide, and how the department of defense, the u. S. Can help shape some of those conversations to protect not only from those accidents occurring, but also just broadly, our Global Health security. Right . So those are things that we also need to make sure we are having broad conversations about, what does bio Risk Management look like and how do we effectively address biosafety on bio security . Lets skip ahead to how do we do that. The defense Reduction Agency has the Reduction Program at one of their goals is to do exactly that with partners around the world. How does that work . How do they help countries increase their Laboratory Safety and at the same time, perhaps add to the bio surveillance efforts that we have to figure out what is out there . I think there is bt rp and i think there is more. From my perspective, i oversee the policy related to our cooperative Threat Reduction program, which many of you know here. I think it is appropriate that we are talking about that here today. And that program really has grown over its three decades of experience. Many of you think of that program may be as thinking about the former soviet state and concerns about Nuclear Weapons, warhead missiles, chemical weapons. But really in kind of a second phase after 9 11, that program expanded as a bio threat. Now we have just conducted a Strategic Review which we are informally calling ctr 3. 0, which is really focused on the return of concerns about global competitors and state actors, but also more crosscutting concerns about things like pandemics, things like cyber, and we have bio data that is more and more of a concern that we need to think about. And making sure we have an even more global scope around the world to address these issues. I just came back from a week on the continent of africa and a couple places in south africa and kenya and ethiopia where bt rp is doing this work. We are providing support for bio security, biosafety, that is not just making sure you have the dates and the guards and the guns, but also understanding how you are doing cyber security, how you are making sure that your folks are trained. And this is sometimes surprising to folks, people say i looked at your title, i dont know why you are going to africa. But it is really important because we have a lot of these labs around the world and we dont want to have the kind of accidental releases. How are we looking on expanding our scope even more broadly . Cdr is only one piece of the puzzle, there are other programs at dod and other agencies overseas in this regard. Yeah, so, the Services Also have a lot of laboratory overseas laboratories. And through the cooperation that we can do and partner with our allies and partners in those regions where those laboratories exist, it opens up the conversation to how do we effectively partner with those countries and how do we talk about Laboratory Safety, appropriate types of research and understanding, what is the potential risk of exploring certain types of unique or high risk life science work . So, we recognize from the dod standpoint that we need to enhance our conversation, we need to utilize those opportunities and those Research Cells that we have across the globe to help generate more of that conversation worldwide. It also is part of our s p programs and our r d programs to engage with our allies and partners to talk about what is the appropriate types of research to do and how do we ensure that safety and security both internal to the dod, but also proliferate that discussion. There is a challenge here, though, before dod, and that is even in our own country, we have this perception that dod has trillions of dollars at its disposal and it can do everything and it can do everything for everybody. And this arena, i think in particular, it has to be the dod helping and empowering these countries and facilities to do this on their own. It cant be that the United States is just there constantly and those laboratories, ensuring there biosafety on bio security. I think that is a huge challenge and it is a lot to require of the dod by itself. State department, health and human services, whoever else has to be part of that team to allow for that, because they have to be able to operate on their own eventually. It actually speaks to the broader bio posture review, whether it is related to laboratory security, research and development, advanced development, and whatnot, was the question that the secretary of defense asked, was very particular to the department of defense. And while we were very cognizant of the Important Role that the department has in supporting national efforts, it was really saying what is it that we need to be doing for our forces, recognizing the global responsibilities that those forces have. And i think that is an important piece, because so much of the interagency dialogue broadly, work in this area, and we certainly saw this in regards to covid, was that the department of defense has always relied upon to come in when civil authorities are overwhelmed and all of that on an unspoken scale. And that is fundamentally something that the department of defense will always do. You know, we may gripe and groan and say, somebody elses job, this and that, but at the end of the day, the department of defense is there for the u. S. Public and it will support the u. S. Public. But this was really an opportunity to say, given the responsibility from a war fighting perspective abroad and in partnership with our allies in a war fighting scenario, what is it that we need for them to be prepared for to be able to detect early on what is in the environment, to be able to continue their mission, and that was the particular focus that we had throughout the bpr review. If i could bring it back just a second to the formation of the bpr and the council, if you could expand a little bit on how the council was put together, who is on it, and why. The perception, as dr. George brought up, is the dod has incredible skills in just about any area you want to mention, in biological world and medical education, and epidemiology, and nuclear proliferation, you name it, dod has got it. As we said wants in a meeting here, if you want dod to do something, everybody has a day job, if you want to put it in those terms. Dod also has a lot of silos, and part of that is complicated by the unclassified and classified bridge, the wall is between those. The way i take it is part of secretary austens statement was silos are no longer tolerated, we need to get all these things that we have god working together better, so we can, as you mentioned, have the war fighters being more effective, and we can be better at it and not impact ourselves not quite as much. Is that a fair statement . And while i am going on that, you have the authority as you need to do things, you have asked for more money and you could perhaps expand on that a little bit, so how is the council form, who is on it, and why . You asked for a lot of money. The two are actually interrelated, so i appreciate the question very much. So, early on in the review, we knew that we wanted to reference in the review anything that the Department Might need to be built into that fy 23 budget. That is why with the existing budget that was passed into law, you see a significant, almost 1 billion increase across the fiveyear physical program for the department, for the 10 bio defense program. We knew very early on, without a review, that there were significant pieces of work that needed to be done, particularly coming out of covid, largely related to the medical architecture and changing the approach on that front. But one of the things that became evident very early on in the review was that the department had a fundamental governance problem. And that, as you have just articulated, tom, there is a lot of very good work being done across them and i call them centers of excellence, where the department was doing very good work, but as you moved up into the Senior Leadership, there was not an awareness nor an ability to make decisions across the enterprise of the department. And that is a fundamental problem and it is a fundamental problem when the first place that comes up to is the deputy secretary of defense. So, very early on when we were doing our checkins with the deputy secretary of defense, as well as the vice chairman, who said how is it going, we said one of the things we want to flag very early on as we will have to come back with some recommendations on new governance. And that was not a shock to the deputy secretary, as you can imagine, by it then really helped us to understand, as we found issues that formed a basis for the recommendation that we cannot go back to a world where, whether it was personnel and readiness, acquisition and sustainment, you know, here is a gap, please go fix it. We would then say, okay, hope it turns out well. No. There needed to be the ability to govern it across the department, to actively be managing and keeping track of are we filling the gaps that we have, what new challenges are we encountering . And so, that was the basis for and the reason for making a decision to bio defense counsel and it was actually an exception that was made by the deputy secretary, because when she came in and said how she and secretary austen are governing the department, it was we are going to go through regular order, we are not going to establish new bodies, but rather, this is how we are going to govern on a daytoday basis. But the need was so compelling for the department in the area of bio defense and the bio defense enterprise, that she said we need to be able to establish a body that is directly responsible for the deputy secretary, to be looking at the range of reforms that are needed, and that decision also became very important on how we came up with financially , what kinds of investments the department needed and requested, both and that fy 23 bill, as well as what is up right now with congress in the fy 24 bill. And by having the bio posture review operating as an early rendition, if you will, of the bio defense counsel, we were able to Work Together collaboratively on what is the full scope of those investments, whether it be for training and exercises, you know, Early Warning and bio surveillance, and came up with what we believe is a very defensible request for about 800 million in fy 24, and was something that, you know, we spent a lot of time with congress discussing, and have a good amount of support, and congress of course has been a very important partner to us overall in moving that forward. So, that was our experience with the bio posture review that will now migrate permanently and institutionally into the bio defense counsel. So, early on in the discussion of this, the Nuclear Posture, as you mentioned, is a model. It is there, part of the National Defense strategy. Do you see this having lights, having legs like the Nuclear Posture . Steve mentioned that the worst is over, now what . The thing that we all worry about is everybody will shrug and the country seems to be doing it, covid is over, we dont have to worry about this anymore. How do we keep the emphasis Going Forward on this . So, i agree with you very much, we cannot just be relying on a system where every four years or every eight years, the department of defense reviews what it is doing, whether it be on Nuclear Issues or biological issues, and your reference of nuclear made us think very early on that the Nuclear Weapons counsel, which is a similar body, found in that case , it is statutorily required, and it has all the key senior decisionmakers from throughout the department that are working on Nuclear Issues, the undersecretary for policy, undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment, as well as the military services department, the vice chairman, and we thought a similar model made a lot of sense for the bio defense counsel, that the work that was done and represented throughout the bio posture review for all of those organizations, the council needs to have those undersecretary is on that counsel to make the seniormost decisions. The composition of it will be the undersecretarys at the osd level, as well as service representatives, as well as representatives from northern command, because it is there a singular responsibility for preparedness and department of defense support, as well as special operations command. They have responsibility as the coordinating authority for wmd related activities. So, it is not just an osd body, it is one that we very much hope will have active participation from the services, from the command, so it has that element of hearing from all parts of department where the challenges and what is needed to get after them. I am assuming,