Transcripts For CSPAN3 Korean War Interrogation Rooms 20240713

The National History center cohosted this event. Once more, welcome everyone. Welcome to the Wilson Center, welcome to this washington history seminar. A seminar through which we try to provide at the Wilson Center in connection with our partners at the National History center, historical perspectives on international and national affairs. Im christiane offerman, i direct the history and Public Policy program here at the Wilson Center and i have the privilege to cochair with my College Professor eric carlson of George Washington university. This is a joint enterprise by the National History center and initiative of the American Historical Association, directed by professor dane kennedy, i dont know if dane is with us today. Joint initiative between the National History center and the history and Public Policy program here. Were in our ninth year of holding these sessions every week during the semester, mondays at 4 00 p. M. And i hope to see many of you again for future sessions. Let me thank a couple of sponsors of this series. The la page center for history in the public interest, as well as George Washington university h history department. We also want to thank a number of anonymous donors, who make these meetings possible. And we welcome contributions from all of you in our audience. Details about how to do so are on the back of the flyer, or just go to our various websites. A couple of people who behind the scenes do the heavy lifting on getting us organized and making this event possible, thats rachel whitley, the assistant director of the National History center. Rachel, are you here today . Where are you . Back there. Thank you, rachel. Pete piercedecker on the back on my program here. As well as our talented interns, who youll meet during the q a well, theyll help with microphones as well. Finally we want to acknowledge that todays session is cosponsored, cohosted by the Wilson Centers Hyundai Motor Foundation Center for korean history and Public Policy. The director, gene li is here and we are grateful for the centers cosponsorship. Before we begin, before i ask eric to introduce our featured speaker today, let me just ask everyone to turn off your mobile devices, put them on silent so we can have a good, thoughtful, focussed discussion. And with that, eric . Thank you, christiane. Its my privilege to welcome our speaker this afternoon, monica kim, currently assistant professor in u. S. And World History in the New York University department of history. She is the author of the Interrogation Rooms of the korean war, the untold history published by Princeton University in 1960. She has published in critical asian studies, critiques concerning the United States and warfare. Her work has been published at the wolf center at the university of pennsylvania. Today she will be speaking on the subject of the new book, the Interrogation Rooms of the korean war. Professor kim. Thank you. Thank you so much. Its actually incredibly meaningful to hear about all the different communities that has come together to make this kind of gathering possible. And im really looking forward to the q a discussion about the book. So when we look ahead to 2020, which seems significant to all of us in this room for various reasons, 2020, next year, also holds another significance, specifically in terms of the korean war. Next year the korean war will reach its 70s year of conflict without any official end, the korean war is the one hot war from the cold war that continues to this day. For this forgotten war with American Public consciousness we take for granted the ceasefire signed in july 1953 that holds this fragile abans of outright conflict on the Korean Peninsula. The hyper demille a rised zone along the 30th parallel in korea is one site of evidence of this ongoing war. But today im going to turn to the conditions around the signing of the 1953 ceasefire, namely the one issue on the negotiating tables that effectively delayed the signing of the ceasefire for over 18 months. In december 1951, all agenda items at the negotiating table, including the decision about where the ceasefire line would be, had all been settled except for one. The prisoner of war repatriation issue. In january 1952, the u. S. Representatives for the United Nations command put a new proposal on the table. One for what they called voluntary repatriation. Setting off a controversy that would take 18 more months of fighting and negotiating to come to a settlement. Today i will examine what i determined to be a fundamental shift of the korean war in 1952 with the governments introduction of the voluntary repatriation proposal. Where the war shifted from being waged over the border, the 30th parallel to being waged over the prisoner of war. The war moves from a preoccupation with territory to a contest over human inferiority. The pow issue of the war has often been a footnote in the history of the war. But by moving from the battlefield into the Interrogation Room, i argue that the pow issue illustrates a critical legacy and impact of the ongoing korean war, where the korean war is not simply a vestige of the cold war but rather a demonstration of the irrevolution of the mid 20s century of formal decononization and the ambitions of the United States. So rather than kind of the cold war binaries between communism and anticommunism im going to focus on sovereignty and intelligence and also the workings of racial i hait yol j across the wars. Im interested in how the ongoing war informed the everyday today and beyond the Korean Peninsula. Telling the story of the korean war from inside the Interrogation Room results in not only a history of experiences on an intimate scale but also a scale that goes past asia and both north and south america and a global scale that encompasses india and switzerland. The Interrogation Room provides us a different mapping of the war and the usual map that focuses on the 30th parallel as the hinge in the history of the war. So the more traditional visualizing of the korean war conflict. Now by considering the pow issue, we end up with a map of the war via p. O. W. Camps on the Korean Peninsula, which looks like this. Often considered to be a marginal and peripheral figure in the war, the p. O. W. And these camps would soon enter the spotlight on the Global Political stage of the war. Im going to focus on two particular p. O. W. Camps today. The first is the u. N. Camp number one, which help upwards of over 170,000 p. O. W. S. And then, camp number five, the Northern Command under north korean and Chinese Military control. This was located near the river and about 3,400 p. O. W. S were in this camp. Im going to begin my story today with the most high profile event concerning the p. O. W. Issue during the war. Which was a kidnapping, later called a mute any by the u. S. Army which occurred inside the camp. Im going to end my talk by examining the most infamous memory, lets say, from the korean war, something thats ironic given the status as a forgotten war in the United States. The issue is brainwashing. So im going to examine the experience of u. S. P. O. W. S in camp number five. Were going to move to camp number five by way of an examination of why the Interrogation Room became the subject of intense debate and controversy in 1952. So lets begin. So on may 7, 1952, on the small island, off the southeastern coast of the Korean Peninsula, six korean p. O. W. S, kidnapped the u. S. Army commander of the army p. O. W. Camp. News of this mutiny quickly reverberated through newspaper headlines all over the globes up to the highest ranks of the military and the depths of the u. S. Congress. When he emerged from compound number 76 three days later, the u. S. Army sent in paratroopers, tanks, grenades and tear gas. Resulting in the deaths of 34 p. O. W. S and one u. S. Soldier. For an event that captured the attention of people across the glob and elicited the violent response of the u. S. Military, the kidnapping itself occurred in rather undramatic fashion. In the early afternoon, Brigadier General dodd met with six korean p. O. W. S who requested a meeting with him to discuss complaints they had. They talked through the barb wire fence, as you can see, at one point one of the p. O. W. S, this particular fellow right here, a rather large man of considerable strength walked slowly through the gate when the gate had to be opened to allow a truck full of tents to go through. And he stretched his arms, pretended to yawn and then he grabbed dodd. The p. O. W. S carried dodd into the compound closing the barb wire fence behind them. Whole affair lasted a few minutes. After they uncarried dodd into the compound, they unfurled a large sign that said we had captured dodd stated the sign in english, he will not be harmed if p. O. W. Problems will be solved. If you shoot his life will be in danger. So the reaction from the u. S. Press was pretty immediate. Rumors of the capture of dodd and finally a press release by the u. S. Army sent the press into a frenzy. Front page of the l. A. Times on may 9, 1952 blared eighth army ordered to free general held by red p. O. W. S. Each statement and each newspaper risissued by the w, each statement and paper issued by the army echoed a similar sentiment, why were the p. O. W. S, why had they captured the Camp Commander . Perhaps the most striking detail reported about the kidnapping was a rather unusual a rather u quote, it was disclosed that the communists had asked for 1,000 sheets of paper, presumably writing paper, and that this already had been sent to the island. The purpose was not clear, but the requisite order had been issued. So the p. O. W. S request for 1,000 sheets of paper points us in the direction towards understanding why the kidnapping of Brigadier General dodd incited such bite spread anxiety. The events signaled that the script of warfare was no longer predictable or stable. As western powers refined and redefined the laws of war in the aftermath of the devastation from world war ii in attempt to define and regulate warfare, the official outbreak of the korean war on june 25th, 1950, revealed an undeniably curious situation. It appeared states were no longer waging war anymore. When the press asked president truman if the u. S. Was at war on the Korean Peninsula, truman replied simply we are not at war. He agreed the u. S. Military was instead involved in what was called a Police Action. War, we must remember, was a privilege accorded to only recognized states. Only sovereign entities could engage in what clauseowits called a duel recognizing two plausible states. Nowhere was recognition laid more bare than at negotiations tables for the armistice at the village of panmundan. This would be a role that the United Nations would not take up again until the first gulf war. And as for china and north korea, the United Nations did not recognize either state as sovereign entities. Thus, in this situation, to define what was legitimate warfare was to define who was a legitimate state. At the u. S. Armys press conference on the dodd kidnapping, the u. S. Army official described the situation as such, quote, the communists are talking with general dodd. It is a oneday panmunjan. The p. O. W. Camp on kote island was indeed not on the periphery of the events of the war, but rather already in the center of the jstruggle over the stakes o sovereign nation of the war. The kidnappers entered the spotlight because the figure of the p. O. W. Was the most contested topic of the armistice negotiations. The u. S. Representative for the United Nations command had put forth a proposal for voluntary repatriation, and according to this proposal, korean and chinese p. O. W. S under United Nations command custody would be free to quoteunquote choose whether or not they wanted to return to their homeland upon the sign if anything the ceasefire. The u. S. Military Interrogation Room, as both the u. S. Delegate and the Truman Administration insisted, this was going to be a space of what they called, and i quote, free will. The delegates of north korea and china quickly pointed to the fact that, basically wait, 1949 geneva conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war calls for mandatory repatriation, we need to have more of a discussion here. So it was due to this debate that the Interrogation Room quickly became the flashpoint of heated International Controversy about how to regulate warfare. As the Interrogation Room came under scrutiny, the nature of the encounter in these spaces became a measure of the respective states legitimacy in its claims or challenges to ideals of liberal governance. This was what was really stunning for me in my research, that you have this moment in 1952 where different states and different organizations are actually putting forward the argument that their Interrogation Room was actually going to be the most efficacious in terms of democratic processes. And so i found that very stunning, and thats really how my deeper dive into this material began. My book reveals how the global visions of u. S. Secretary of state dean atchison, indian president nehru, north korean premier sung, were thousands of acts of disciplining of possible subjects. The book actually opens up both in u. S. Occupied south korea and also japaneseamerican internment camps. Then it follows 4,000 japaneseamericans to korea where they served as interrogators in the korean war, traces the postwar journeys of korean p. O. W. S shipped by the United Nations and Indian Military to india, brazil, and argentina, and it finally maps out the movements of american p. O. W. S through the interrogation networks within chinese and north korean p. O. W. Camps. So obviously im not going to be touching upon all of those in my talk today, but certainly during q a if you have any questions about some of the other Interrogation Rooms, i would be very happy to engage with that. So lets begin with how the p. O. W. Became the central issue on the armistice negotiation tables. And for that we need to move actually back to the white house, to d. C. So by august of 1951, the newest addition by the Truman Administration to basically the National Security Council Joint chiefs of staff, et cetera, et cetera, truman had created something called the psychological strategy board or the psb. And the mandate of the psb was basically to create the vision, the kind of holistic strategy for psychological warfare for the United States in front of the cold war. So by august of 1951, the psb had actually already honed in on the p. O. W. As a possible site on which to configure the cold war aims of the u. S. Administration. The figure the p. O. W. , according to the psb, would essentially provide a purpose for u. S. Military involvement in the fighting on the Korean Peninsula. It was already a difficult task to mobilize mass support behind what truman conceded was a Police Action under the United Nations. So since one could not fashion a compelling figure of the enemy for this war, the psb turned to fashion a figure of rescue, the p. O. W. The presence of two states on the Korean Peninsula, one created under soviet occupation in the north and the other under u. S. Openings aftccupation afte colonial rule after 1945 in the south, this essentially created a competition between which type of putative decolonization was valid, effective, and democratic. After the 1948 elections in the south, the u. S. And the United Nations declared the southern republic of korea the only sovereign state on the peninsula. Essentially to have p. O. W. S choose not to repatriate to the northern dprk, the democratic peoples republic of korea, would be to validate the u. S. Project of liberation through military occupation in the south. So the psb proposed to consider the p. O. W. S as essentially what they called political refugees. Enabling the United States to adhere at least to the principle, if not to the letter, of the laws of war like the 1949 geneva conventions. So whats very important to note here is that from the outset, the u. S. Emphasizes that individual choice is the key element at stake in this debate over p. O. W. Repatriation, and the u. S. Interrogation room of all places becomes exemplary, supposedly, of liberal democratic governance. The u. S. Delegate to the panmunjum negotiations recasts voluntary repatriation as freedom and choice and says mandatory repatriation would be like forced repatriation, goes so far as to say command proposal is essentially a bill of rights for individuals. So the sheer act of saying either yes or no in the Interrogation Room is essentially framed as a moment of liberal individual choice. But theres something puzzling here, because truman is essentially arguing that the u. S. Is going to have some kind of authority on this issue because its going to be able to know the desires of the p. O. W. But how could the u. S. Military claim to know the desires of 173,000 p. O. W. S . Indeed, who were these p. O. W. S . Among the 170,000 p. O. W. S in the camp were 50,000 p. O. W. S who claims to be from the south originally. People had been drafted or joined the northern Korean Peoples Army when it had come through the south earlier in the war. And also if you think about this, if you are a south korean soldier and then you are taken essentially as a p. O. W. By the north korean army, but then later on when the u. S. Military is given the green light to cross over the 30th parallel and if you have those north korean troops surrender to the u. S. Military, what ended up happening was that the u. S. Military would look at the south korean p. O. W. S who are p. O. W. S for the North Koreans and said, oh, okay, we dont know what to do exactly here. So then everybody became p. O. W. S. So you actually had south Korean Military officials as p. O. W. S. And thats very important to note. Another thing that was important to note is that after the entrance of the Chinese Volunteer forces into the conflict and the u. S. Military is being pushed back down towards the 30th parallel, there becomes a new sort of informal policy where the u. S. Military is allowed to round up entire villages. So then you could actually have three generations of a family behind the barbed wire fence. This is all really important to note because its a population for whom the u. S. Military was supposedly going to very easily just ask yes or no, do you want to go back to your homeland . Obviously for this kind of population, the question of where is home is a little complicated. And also it really highlights how, in 1952, the 30th parallel is also not considered to be a natural, permanent border. Its really showing how artificial this border is on the ground in terms of thinking about where p. O. W. S are considering either home or what theyre fighting for in terms of a legitimate state on the ground. Now when we go into the Interrogation Room of the u. S. Military, though, u. S. Militar , turns out to be less concerned about the p. O. W. S themselves and much more concerned actually with the interrogator himself. So id like to share with you one particular lecture that was given by Lieutenant Commander samuel c. Bartlett jr. And he was a u. S. Naval reserve interpreter who had been present at the japanese surrender at iwo jima. This lecture gained considerable traction within the military Intelligence Section for training new interrogators. At the heart of bartletts lecture titled some aspects of interrogation of oriental p. O. W. S. At the heart of that was a template for the process what was he called procuring information from an oriental prisoner of war. Quote while the process is not always dwight so simpquite so se likened to a drink out of a coconut. You cut the top out with a machete and pour it out. There are six steps in this simple process. First you must get the coconut. Make sure that there is milk in it. If you cannot see the drawing, its somebody shaking a coconut. Then you cut it open. You remove the milk. Taste the milk for potability. The sixth one, you give it the thirsty party. So here the central primary concern is about how good was the interrogator at controlling the interrogation, at demonstrating a superior intelligence that effectively rendered the oriental as an object, as transparent, as naive . The claim to know the desires. The simple yes or no, that the korean p. O. W. Would supposedly give, fit all too well within the logic of the naive oriental. One with no history. And also whats very important as i move to talking about interrogators themselves is that this really gives us a frame for thinking about the korean war, not as starting in 1950, but really needing to think about military, about technologies, about intelligence techniques that is really forging the crucible of the Asian Pacific wars and thinking about a transpacific and a transwar frame for the korean war. So this is only an ideal template, though, because in practice u. S. Military interrogation during the korean war had a really difficult challenge. And that was language. During the korean war in the face of a severe dearth of translators, the u. S. Military drafted and recruited japanese americans to serve as interrogators and translators for the war. Approximately 4,000 japanese americans were in the korean war serving in some linguistic capacity in the u. S. Military. And the majority of them had spent their adolescence in the internment camps of world war ii behind barbed wire. John fuji, an associate press journalist, wrote an article describing the interrogation scene on the postbattle battlefield. Here you can see there are multiple people who are involved in interrogation. So you have lieutenant henry j. Picard who is from louisiana who is the head of the interrogation team. The team consisted of six men in total which includes picard. You have a chinese civilian and a former korean policeman who is the initial interrogation. Also a south Korean Army Lieutenant who grew up in china, educated in japan, so conversant in mandarin, japanesekorean. Two secondgeneration japaneseamericans. First lieutenant thomas shirasuke from salinas, california, and private wakagawa of honolulu. I found this particular ap article in the very shame archival footnote as bartletts lectures. This never actually made it to press. I believe that the u. S. Military officials decided to censor this article in part because fuji essentially reveals the labor involved and the numerous contingent variables involved in the production of a single interrogation report. And i would argue that the most important variable was the supposed consent and desire on the part of the japaneseamerican interrogator to fulfill his own role within this kind of racialized hierarchy of labor. And its very key also to note that whoever was the head of an interrogation team, that person was always marked as either white or caucasian. So let me introduce you to sam yamamoto. When sam yamamoto arrived at the unc camp number 1 on the island of kote, he was instructed to persuade p. O. W. S to not choose repatriation to the northern dprk. And in these repatriation screening Interrogation Rooms, he actually didnt have, thats kind of the one time he doesnt have a white u. S. Military Intelligence Officer presiding. And it appeared miamoto was to persuade not to repatriate. So here his own consent and desire to participate in the u. S. Project was supposed to be instructive for the postcolonial korean prisoner. So in 2007, i conducted a series of oral history interviews with miamoto. And in describing his experiences as a 20yearold interrogator on kote island, he recollected that almost without fail, korean communist p. O. W. S would usually spit on the ground, they would spit on the ground before they entered a u. S. Military Interrogation Room. According to miamoto, when they noticed him, they didnt spit on the ground. And in fact, they wanted to ask him a question. And this is how miamoto describes the encounter. So the p. O. W. Actually wanted to know, you were in a concentration camp, your own government put you into a concentration camp, why are you not fighting with us . Miamoto very notably actually replied that, im here because i was ordered to come here, i didnt come here by choice, i was ordered to join the army and i was ordered to study the korean language and i was ordered to come here and talk to you about this. So inside the u. S. Military tear deviati Interrogation Room we have a reluctant interrogator, and we have a defiant korean p. O. W. And both really challenge our ideas of what might be happening in an Interrogation Room during the korean war. And certainly they both challenge the neat idea that the u. S. Was presenting that oriental decolonization had now been accomplished and achieved by the u. S. In south korea. And also that, in terms of japaneseamerican internment, the japaneseamericans themselves also had accepted that history. Now during the dodd kidnapping, the one single most important demand that they were making, so bring us back to kote island. So they wanted the cessation of precisely this, of the repatriation Interrogation Room. The reason why they were asking for the cessation of that was that they were claiming that the u. S. Was forcing subjects of the dprk to essentially renounce the states sovereign claim over them. So lets return to compound 76 in may 1952. For the three days that dodd was in the p. O. W. Compound, he actually had to attend multiple meetings with the p. O. W. S. The p. O. W. S collectively formed the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Volunteer prisoners of war representation association. Dodd signed papers recognizing this representative organization. This active writing by dodd was central to the project of the p. O. W. S. And this is really where, actually, the p. O. W. S demand for 1,000 sheets of paper is really significant for us to take notice. Their demand for paper was to create a bureaucracy that would approach the p. O. W. As a subject of a state, not simply a wartime category. Using their position as prisoners of war, these representatives in turn forced the International Community to ask what type of political collective body the dprk was. And to argue that it was a legitimate state. So here, just having us really think through compound 76 as being a space of a diplomatic negotiation. So the p. O. W. S were acutely aware of their position on the international stage, and now they were claiming the ability to govern the p. O. W. Themselves. And it was this very claim that became the transgression that the u. S. Military would later label as a mutiny. Now once the p. O. W. S brought dodd into their compound 10, it was clear that the kidnapping had been carefully planned in advance. P. O. W. S had prepared a really tidy room for him, and they even had a guard that was placed there where p. O. W. S later in their interrogation would say that the guard was there to maintain dodds prestige. Dodd went to theatrical performances in the evening. Really more like a diplomatic guest. He didnt even eat the p. O. W. Rations, they got separate food for him through the barbed wire fence. And they even arranged to have a doctor examine him. And this is a p. O. W. Who had served as a compound doctor, not a member of the representative association. I always feel that he seems a little bit startled in his photo. In his interrogation, he gives us this story. He says that hes called over to the tent in the compound to examine dodd. Once he arrives, this is the scene that he sees. Upon arrival at the tent, why dodd was taking a bath in a metal tub made from an oil drum. About three p. O. W. Monitors were washing the generals body. When the general had finished withing i examined his finger and knees and observed they were healing. Then he listens to his heart. He appeared to be in good condition. And leaving, the general gave me a pack of cigarettes. So the scene where dodd is being bathed by three p. O. W. S, and then the careful medical attention that he receives, really toes the line between the assertion of a complete surveillance over his body and also the offer of special services to an elite guest. Dodd was unmistakably a prisoner himself under the care of his captors, yet theres no reversal of a binary hierarchy of power between a p. O. W. Camp commander and the p. O. W. Instead the p. O. W. S carefully marked both dodds body and the space of the compound itself to establish and assert dodds authority, which they then make explicitly contingent on their own authority as a collective of representatives for the p. O. W. Camp. Now during the war, the u. S. Military was frustrated that american p. O. W. S on the other hand had not committed a mutiny of their own in the chinese and north korean camps during the war. The u. S. Proposal for voluntary repatriation, along with the insistence that the p. O. W. Was able to exercise individual free will and execute choice without duress in American Military Interrogation Rooms, this later becomes an unexpected doubleedged sword for the u. S. Because after the signing of the ceasefi ceasefire, 21 american p. O. W. S choose to stay in china. With the proposal for voluntary p. O. W. Repatriation, the u. S. Had essentially turned a historically vulnerable figure of the laws of war into a political subject of the International Community, one who could make a choice and was under the aegis of the United Nations. However, when confronted with these 21 p. O. W. S who chose to stay in china, the u. S. Military, government, and public had to neutralize these american p. O. W. S and the potential visibility of their politics by rendering them again as vulnerable subjects. And this is where brainwashing becomes the term that grabs the media spotlight. So what did everyday interrogation look like . Especially under north korean interrogators . In his mandatory interrogation conducting by the u. S. Intelligence corps, richard artisani jr. , who was a Master Sergeant in the u. S. Army, he recalled a korean major who was responsible for individually questioning every p. O. W. He was a quote englishspeaking korean, 25 years of age. It would take about one hour for each intake interrogation, and p. O. W. S would have to give their name, rank, serial number, and actually the respective incomes of their parents also. After that, this korean major posed a last question that artisani would actually hear at the end of many interrogations to come. And this was, state your hopes and desires. Again, a quote from artisani. He was very sincere and appeared to have no hatred for americans, and after posing the final question to artisani, the major wanted to explain his own hopes and desires. And again, according to artisani, the major stated that quote his individual hopes and desires were for the americans and chinese to leave korea and for the koreans to live in peace. So here ive decided to focus on north korean rather than chinese interrogators because theres actually a critical difference that comes out in the archive, which is that chinese interrogators were much more interested in technical and tactical information, which makes a lot of sense, because many chinese troops were on the ground. However, with the north korean interrogators, i find that they were more interested in establishing what you might call a more horizontal relationship with the u. S. P. O. W. In what i consider to be a form of internationalism. So, for example, in december 1951, which is one year later than artisanis intake interrogation, another p. O. W. Named sheldon fause talks about he experiences a different kind of interrogation, more extensive, by north korean interrogators. So two korean lieutenant colonels, one supposedly named kim, the other zun, took fause to a korean home outside the camp, telling fause that they quote just wanted to have a talk with him on general matters pertaining to life in u. S. And korea. They give him cigarettes, tea, brandy. They sing together, home sweet home, home on the range, my old kentucky home, you are my sunshine. Later on sheldon fause would say to the u. S. Military interrogator he thinks that kim especially knew these songs because he may have been educated by a u. S. Missionary at some point. At a certain point the conversation takes a turn toward controversial political subjects, such as the workers plight in the u. S. , the success of communism in korea and why not in the u. S. , et cetera. Fause, he actually quotes excerpts from marks and engels as a way to goad more information from kim and zun. And then towards the end of this very extensive interrogation, kim and zun bring fause back to the camp. As theyre walking back to the camp, according to fause, kim turns to him and says, dont tell the chinese about what just happened. Quote the chinese did not understand the problem and the ccf was not as clever as they thought they were, and kim also emphasized that north korean communists were closer to the desired level of development. And before they parted ways kim insisted and advised fause to make sure he went to a university upon return to the u. S. And to study political science. And the university that was recommended to him was the university of new mexico. So in the portrait of these oriental interrogators as im going through the archives, something very stunning starts emerging, which is that the chinese and the north korean interrogators themselves had attended universities in the United States, or they may have had, for example, some of the chinese interrogators had longer ties with the oss, right, during world war ii. But i think that its really these interrogators that make the u. S. Military very nervous. And this is a list of the books that were available in the library of camp number 5 with really illustrates pretty extensive understanding and knowledge, lets say, about literature in the west that deals with class and with race. Now for the u. S. Military, they had to create a summary of findings based on all of the interrogations that the u. S. Counterintelligence corps was doing of returning p. O. W. S. And they had to publish a report. Now in this report its very clear that the thing that is really puzzling them the most is the oriental interrogator. And here they say, well, its true that some physical measures were employed, these consisted chiefly of isolation at small space, a few sharp blows, relatively mild beatings. This is all falling very far short of the fingernail pulling, elaborate castration, and other chinese tortures popularly associated with oriental captivity. So here whats troubling the military officials and psychiatrists is that if the chinese and north korean Interrogation Rooms are also devoid of torture, as the americans claim that theirs, were a precarious proximity occurs between the liberal bureaucratic space of the american Interrogation Room and that of the north korean and chinese. The report writers then characterize the oriental Interrogation Room as quote a lesson in the anatomy of seduction and subversion. And they argue that the oriental interrogation techniques, although not outright torture, were not rational and appealed only to base instincts and desires. So this targeting of desires as irrational is key in understanding how race and class played a very Important Role in the boards explanation and reliance on the idea of brainwashing. The p. O. W. S marked for further interrogation by the u. S. Military were usually soldiers of color or from the working class. Indeed, the three p. O. W. S singled out by the u. S. Military as quote potential menaces to the u. S. Included an africanamerican, a filipino, and a japaneseamerican. The u. S. Military attempted to portray the internationalism espoused by the North Koreans and its potential appeal to certain american p. O. W. S as irrational desire, thus the utility of the frame of brainwashing. Now the Investigation Report juxtaposes this with what they considered rational behavior exhibited by p. O. W. S in the camps. So for example, the ku klux klan. The u. S. Military evaluation of all these interrogations concludes that this organization, which was formed at most of the camps, and the membership included a few wellmeaning individuals who sent anonymous notes bearing the signature kkk, beatings were also administered to progressive and reformers. When an american p. O. W. , like africanamerican clarence adams, whos one of the 21 p. O. W. S who decide to stay in china, when he announces after the signing of the ceasefire that hes not repatriating to the u. S. As an active protest against Jim Crow Society in america, we can understand how the experience of threatened violence by White Supremacy was neither abstract nor distant for american p. O. W. S in p. O. W. Camps along the yalu river. So at first glance it appears that these the u. S. Military really incorrectly theorizes the oriental interrogator. But i think that the deeper anxiety at the heart of this inquiry was that the oriental interrogator might have correctly theorized the american u. S. The american p. O. W. Or soldier or citizen. In fact the underlying fear, i guess we could sum up in one question, would be, what if the oriental knew the american better than he did himself . So in the annals of u. S. Foreign history, it was the catalyst in effect for the implementation of nsc 68, which is often called the blueprint of the National Security state for u. S. Cold war ambitions. Theres an off ttquoted statem made by atchison in 1953 when theyre reflecting back on u. S. Involvement on the Korean Peninsula in june 1950. And the quote goes, and i think quite a few of you already know this quote, the quote is, korea came along and saved us. Right . Korea came along and gave us the impetus and the reason to implement the broadvision of nsc 68. Atchison then goes to state on a little bit more in detail. He says quote korea moved a great many things from the realm of theory and brought them right into the realm of actuality and the realm of urgency. Now what is remarkable about these lives of interrogators and p. O. W. S is that they attest to a critical shift that happened on the level of Global Politics during the korean war. Through the Interrogation Room, both ordinary and exceptional, we see how the individual person became the terrain for warfare and also its jus ad bellum in the 20th century during the korean war that was officially not a war. By moving the story into the Interrogation Room, we can extend the diggance of the korean war, this currently ongoing war, much further than it being a onetime flashpoint. Interrogation also was not a onetime event, it was a veritable landscape ordinary people had to navigate and negotiate over and over again. We can extend the histories to before the korean war outbreak in june 1950 to both the intelligence and interrogation networks established by the u. S. Cic in south korea and going back to the japaneseamerican internment camps in arizona and beyond. We can also follow someone like clarence adams, who was from memphis, tennessee, and decided to stay in china. In anticipation of the cultural revolution, he then decides to come back to memphis, tennessee. Hes hounded by the fbi, hes called up by the house of unamerican activities committee, and also hounded by the kkk. Hes unable to find work in memphis, tennessee, because of this red baiting. And so he sets up the very first chop suey restaurant in memphis, tennessee. In the level of ontheground experience in this war, we must ask exactly where is this ongoing korean war and its legacy . Where is the korean war in our everyday . Thank you very much. Thank you so much. Now we open up for comments and questions. The ground rules are simple. Please wait till youre called on, wait for the microphone to reach you. Please use the microphone. And identify yourself before you ask your question. I will take cochairs prerogative to start off with what is perhaps a basic question to ask you to elaborate on one of the themes of the talk and something you go into at great length in the book. And this is the meaning behind and the uses to which voluntary repatriation is put. So could you say just a little bit more about how the u. S. Arrives at this policy that proves to be so sticky in negotiations . What informed that thinking . Is this really about kind of the creating of space of liberal individualism where an individual can then define visavis states where, in this case he or she wants to go . And the extent to which this is a doubleedged sword . The end of the paper talks about those who do it from the american side, who dont go back either, and this proves to be a propaganda bonanza for the North Koreans. So what started off as something the americans were really pushing wound up hurting them to some extent, at least in the prop grand derealm. Or am i misreading that or mishearing that . Thank you, eric. So the voluntary repatriation proposal so again, historians have thought about this as a real propaganda ploy. And it is, right . However, it really touches upon this moment i think where you have a war thats called a Police Action and not officially a war. And this idea that to conduct a military intervention on behalf of an imagined individual on the ground, this i think is the key element here where u. S. Wars of intervention, theyre not going to be considered official wars anymore, but theyre always waged on behalf of an individual on the ground. So 1952, i feel that this is a moment where that kind of hallmark and shift happens. Also, for the voluntary repatriation proposal, the psb is really thinking about the p. O. W. Because theyre looking ahead to the San Francisco peace treaty conference with japan. And theyre concerned that globally the u. S. Is not having the same kind of support as it did immediately post 45. And so to, again, create a p. O. W. , an individual whom the u. S. Was going to rescue. This really was considerate ed e a possible buoying of u. S. Hegemonic power. And also an example of the promises of the liberalism. Great, thank you. Lots of material here and lots of questions come to mind. But let me also perhaps start off by asking a little bit about your sources here at the home of the cultural National History project where we be obsessed with Empirical Data and archival sources. Id love to hear a little bit more about the archival Source Foundation for your work. And secondly perhaps also in conjunction with that, maybe you can just tell us a little bit how you came to the subject. So thats quite a bit. In terms of how well, i came to the book through the archives. And i knew that going in i wanted to write a history of the korean war that was more bottomup than topdown. Also as secondgeneration koreanamerican, i grew up with this war. But the war was both everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Nowhere in terms of the history textbooks. It wasnt spoken about either within my family, but it certainly was everywhere. And i understood that it was a huge part of one of the reasons why we were here in the United States. So i was very invested in thinking through how global geopolitics, which we often think about as happening at very elite levels, that actually ordinary people are navigating and understanding global geopolitics themselves. And interrogation became a place that seemed to really crystallize these kinds of knowledges and navigations. So because i was starting out bottomup, i went to the Inspector General guys of the army because they investigate soldiers complaints. Im going through these files. Im very much focused on content of reports and summaries. I notice that the name of the interrogator was someone like george yamamoto. Or jimmy tanaka. And thats when i realize that i had entirely taken for granted what was actually happening in the Interrogation Room. What language it was in. Jimmy tanaka or george yamamoto, they sounded like japaneseamerican names to me. So that also opened up an entire line of inquiry for me. So as im going down further in terms of that research, at the same time im also really looking for different kinds of interrogation reports. Having a sense of, for example, there are investigation case file files for the kojito camp. Theres over 300 of them in terms of any investigation into murder, suicide, harm, injury. So that became one place to sort of understand what was happening in the p. O. W. Camps. What became very clear by doing that was was that the u. S. Military Interrogation Room was certainly not the only time a p. O. W. Would be interrogated. This became very important for me in the book. Which was to show literally an ecosystem of interrogation where you would have south korean paramilitary youth groups organizing within the p. O. W. Camps and creating their own Interrogation Rooms where they would interrogate p. O. W. S coming out of u. S. Military Interrogation Rooms. So its something about that kind of density of experience and how people are negotiating that that was very important. Another thing was a lot of freedom of information acts. You would know what your work at National Security archive. So what happened with that, with the good work of archivists at the national archives, after nine years over 1,000 interrogation case files, and these are the interrogation case files of u. S. Counterintelligence corps interrogating u. S. P. O. W. S returning from north korean and chinese p. O. W. Camps about their experiences of interrogation. So its a bit of a room full of mirrors. But i decided that, okay, if i really go through this and if i can see certain kinds of patterns or things that are somewhat surprising. Because theres a lot at stake for these u. S. P. O. W. S coming back. They know that if they say anything that sounds like at all they had quoteunquote sympathetic or had really learned something, lets say, from north korean and chinese instructors at the camps, that they could be marked for the rest of their lives. However, many startling things came to the fore. So thats what i was really looking at. Thank you. All right. Lets open it up. Who would like to start . If you could wait for the microphone. Its coming. You know the rule. Hold on, the microphones coming. Is there any fallout from the u. S. Experience with involuntary repatriation at the end of world war ii . So i asked myself that very same question. And certainly you would assume that its trumans concern over that very question that then spurs on this voluntary repatriation proposal. However, when you look at psb decisionmaking, this is less about visavis whats happening in terms of western europe and the soviets and much more about creating an individual thats going to or a subject thats going to rally a kind of american consensus for u. S. Involvement, continued involvement, in the korean war. Yes, iactually, thank you fo your presentation. I just i have an insight that the war is not just about some political decision, but its about matters of human beings, including some p. O. W. And a lot of interrogators. So my question is about the decision was made at the time, actually in 1953, the south korean president decided to release many anticommunist p. O. W. S from korea. Actually, his decision was not about repatriation but is about some individual choice. And also is very related with his political decision. So it would become the fundamental bedrock for making full defense treaty between two countries. So what do you think about his decision . So i have an entire chapter dedicated to that very question. Its a very important question. So i guess for those who might not be so familiar with all of the details involved with this, because the south Korean Military was under the aegis of the u. S. And United Nations command, south korea, there was no south korean delegate at the table at panmunjom. So the south korean president used the issue as a way to articulate certain kinds of limits that he wanted to put in terms of u. S. Ambitions visavis what was happening in the korean conflict. Its also an important thing that youre bringing up. When he decides to so it basically happens at midnight, right . So its midnight. And south Korean Military all over the peninsula at different camps, they cut open barbed wire fences at certain camps. And its the anticommunist p. O. W. S who come out. And so often the story about this moment is that this is ri being nationalistic, et cetera, et cetera. However, if you look very closely at who is helping coordinate that very mission, lets say, have a are anticommunist south korean youth groups who have organized within these p. O. W. Camps, and they are within the same history as the anticommunist youth groups like northwest young mens association, who were very close in working with the u. S. Cic during the u. S. Military occupation. So its on one hand simply a continuation, right, of that kind of close collaboration and the kind of power that it really shows how much power paramilitary youth groups had gained over the occupation period. And theyre now considered basically by ri as an extension of his own military, right . So absolutely, him doing that was a statement of assertion of his own kind of sovereignty, a right of sovereignty over his own military. Thank you for your talk. Im a junior scholar here at Wilson Center. And i wanted to ask about recasting of repatriation as voluntary. As im working for a Research Unit back at my home which is researching voluntariness. And i wanted to ask how if you could talk about the direct connection about the legitimizing of the u. S. Intervention by recasting it into voluntary repatriation to the geneva convention, refugee convention, of 1951. And how or if there are direct connections to later repatriation regimes on a global level thats based on voluntary repatriation. Thank you so much. So the somewhat surprising thing when you go a little bit further into, for example, Something Like the red cross archives, with the discussion around the 1949 geneva conventions, there was a whole discussion, absolutely, about repatriation of p. O. W. S and soldiers post 45. And the u. S. Delegate and also the soviet delegate both voted to not allow voluntary repatriation. So that mandatory repatriation had to be the case. For me, with the korean war case, the reason why it gets a little difficult to kind of peel back the layers, is that the whole issue about voluntariness, right, this individual choice, ends up being a cover, right, for whats actually happening on the ground, which is that the 38th parallel is not operating as some kind of discrete boundary between two separate states and two separate peoples. And that actually whats actually happening is on the ground, people, how to say so that p. O. W. S themselves are arguing that, actually, we are p. O. W. S, our state has a kind of claim to us, et cetera, et cetera. And then the u. S. By fashioning this as kind of a choice then also continues, basically, what the 38th parallel has thrown into relief, which is that for nobody on the Korean Peninsula at that point does anyone think that decolonization has actually finished, right . Theres no agreement about what a liberated sovereign postcolonial korean state is, right . So by moving the kind of pieces so quickly to voluntary and individual choice, it really bypasses this more critical structural material element of everyones experiences and whats really at stake on the ground. Im a little confused im bruce guthrie, whos also still confused. In your talk you talked about the japanese interrogators who were american, say, or whatever. Was that were the same teams interrogating both camps in the north and in the south . And you talked about the 21 who decided not to repatriate to the u. S. , although you only had pictures of 20. How many on the other side chose not to be repatriated . Okay. So maybe ill start out with the numbers question. I mean, the numbers question doesnt quite get at the full story. But for korean p. O. W. S, those who could repatriate to north kor korea, they repatriated over 90 . And you could say the same thing in terms of south korea. So the propaganda win, lets say, for the United States, really happened more in terms of chinese p. O. W. S. However, a historian named david chen chang is coming out with a book specifically on looking at chinese p. O. W. S experiences. He discusses how the choice about whether or not to go to china or to firmosa at the end of the ceasefire was not related to what divisions the u. S. Laid out, it was prewar political lines that had already been built in among their communities. So for the interrogators, though, the japaneseamerican interrogators, they were working for the u. S. Military. And so the u. S. Military, because of chinese and then asian exclusion acts which were passed in the late 1800s, not a very large koreanamerican community to draw upon once the korean war breaks out. So thats why they turned to the japaneseamericans. Because they reasoned that, well, korea was colonized under the japanese. Many of them probably remember japanese. And perhaps they would talk in japanese. And so thats why they turned to the japaneseamericans. And either asked them to volunteer or also drafted quite a few of them for the war. As you can imagine, for korean p. O. W. S, this is about five years after liberation, theyre not necessarily going to be so keen on speaking japanese in the Interrogation Room. But thats kind of the larger sort of structural reason why the u. S. Turns to japaneseamericans. Were just a quick followup. Were you able to find any documents relating to the rationale behind employing japaneseamericans for this . I mean, was this purposeful yes, yes. So it so precisely what i had just mentioned, so that does appear in documents. And there is a whole discussion also about again, what i mentioned about kind of this racial, almost hierarchy that starts happening. So the japaneseamerican interrogator was not considered to be as loyal or as reliable as a white caucasian interrogator. But the japaneseamerican interrogator was more loyal and more reliable than a korean civilian translator, right . So you would always see a kind of matrix, lets say, of different configurations of people being employed for these interrogation teams. Thank you. Hazel smith . Hi, hazel smith. Thanks for that really interesting introduction. Im sorry i missed the first five minutes, i had to come from somewhere else. First of all, i think the real for me it was so fascinating to hear all them pe this empirical research. The japanese, the interrogators, the multiple level of meaning that brought to the interrogations, absolutely fantastic. I really found it was clear that this was a massive contribution toknowledge. I cant wait to see the rest of the book. I want to ask you, though, of all of these interests themes, what is your big takeaway . I get this is a contribution really a contribution to knowledge. I get that we are looking at this complicated relationship between the individual and the interrogators and that this brings a whole different level of analysis when we are thinking about both war time and post war peace. I get that, you know, almost this truism level, the policy of voluntary, quote unquote, choice, there will be some level of hope and aspicture traration North Koreans would look to go elsewhere. North koreans were all soviet pup itpe puppets. What is your big takeaway from this in terms of how would any of these insights youve got apply to other wars to other peace building processes to how we think, for instance about these days knowledge that is gained from defectors . So what is the big takeaway from it . Thank you so much, hazel. So certainly for me, once im deep inside the writing with all of the research, one of the things that really came to the fore for me was writing a history of the korean war and taking very seriously the stakes of formal decolonization, right . And not necessarily being just within kind of the cold war biary of the u. S. And soviets. That seems rather obvious once youre on the ground, right . And what i was really interested in so, first of all, often when we think about Interrogation Rooms, right . A lot of the outrage coalesced around torture. I was much more independenteres figuring out what kind 6 landscape, lets say, right, does interrogation actually create on the ground in terms of war fare and peoples experiences. And so as i was going further and further into that, i then realized that, okay, Interrogation Rooms and the kind of reliance here on the individual person and this the Interrogation Room is not supposed to produce information, right . The Interrogation Room is actually supposed to produce a certain kind of subject. The u. S. , which is often saying that this is, you know, other states kinds of projects, the u. S. Is absolutely right there in terms of that project. Then you have that kind of resonance in thinking about selfcriticism, right . And this kind of north korean and chinese, this selftransformation in terms of positioning yourself as an individual visavis the collective, right . For the u. S. , what i see is thats kind of logic, lets say. You can see that operating also on the level of, for example, the kind of different strategies that start developing in terms of bombing. They are saying we are also going to create a Leaflet Campaign where individuals on the ground will bomb leaflet bomb different civilian sites and people can choose whether or not they leave the site before the bombing happens. Because of the u. S. Bombing of north korea, that it was to devastating, right . As i was doing more work to realize that the language, lets say, of kind of voluntariness to see how that helps to facilitate, right . The development of Something Like mass bombing, right . This is when i was like, okay. There is something going on here in terms of Interrogation Rooms that actually have to do with the kind of fashioning of war fare. That is really a hallmark, i think, of the United States, especially in the latter half of the 20th century. All the way in the back. Hi. How are you guys . My name is caroline and im a student at the George Washington university studying international affairs. Thank you a lot for being here. I really enjoy your book and im excited to finish it. So my main question is surrounding the general frustration i have with the whole war in korea being discussed as a proxy for u. S. And u. S. Interests and i understand that manifests itself to a certain degree in Interrogation Rooms because both sides were trying to get the prisoners to choose their own identity in their way of life. I was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about how the Interrogation Rooms and the korean war itself shaped north and south korean identities . Because before as soon as possible colonization and everything, there was no two koreas. How did the flinterrogation roo create two koreas . So i think im going to thank you for that question. I think the best way to approach that question is to think about the leg citizen, right, of so if people within the Interrogation Room of the korean war are negotiating and having to anticipate different kinds of powers, right . After the war, how are they then continuing to do that . And how does that impact actually how social and political relations play out . Now, for south korea, one thing i realized through my research was that for the p. O. W. S in the camp, when they were, for example, released, they all knew that at some point that they wanted to stay in south korea, but there was a lot at stake, though, because being p. O. W. S, they were always going to be marked as, quote unquote suspicious, right . And for those of them who were not from south korea, they didnt have the village and kinship networks, right . To show other people to say they were reliably other communist or reliably anticommunist. One of the things that was very important for me to take a look at is it okay if i just sure. Is actually these are any more interrogation moments. So i had mentioned earlier about the anticommunist youth groups. In the p. O. W. Camps, as i had mentioned, they had created almost their own kind of system of interrogation that was in play with u. S. Military interrogation. What began happening was they incorporated tattooing practices. And so with the high stakes of thinking about what is happening with in the leadup to 1950 under u. S. Military occupation there were unbelievable civilian massacres that were happening. The whole line between how you were considered to be communist or anticommunist was incredibly precarious. And so p. O. W. S began to use tattooing as a way to either mark themselves as being relily anticommunist so even beyond the barbed wire fence they would considered to be anticommunist. Or you could also look at this practices a way to possibly punish people and to prevent them from going to the dprk to north korea because they would be tattooed as such. Im bringing this up because the way the u. S. Military portrayed these tattooing practices was this is barbaric, they dont understand rational political governance and why they are resorting to tattooing. Actually, this is coming out of actually their experiences under u. S. Military occupation and the support of these rightist paramilitary youth groups that extend into the military camps of the korean war. I know that doesnt quite address the fullness of what you were asking for, but i think that is one way for me to think through. How are people if this is one way we can see people on the ground negotiating and understanding geo politics, then according to them, what is the global geo politics post ceasefire . Then also, according to the global geo politics, what do they consider to be the possible opportunity for thinking about peace on the Korean Peninsula . So this raises a question that has been on my mind. That has to do with the extent to which, at least the american sector, how much control did the u. S. Military actually have over the camps themselves . I mean, there is a whole operation taking place here with these right wing youth groups that clearly. They control their sectors. Then the flip would be what is going on on the other side of the 38th parallel, we dont get a clear as clear a picture in what you write about that but there is a sense you do have different groups of american prisoners. You refer to the kkk in one of those slides who are disciplining those american p. Pows who might become more sympathetic. The North Koreans and chinese dont have control fully over their p. O. W. Populations either. So this was just something that struck me and i was wondering if you could reflect on. Thats a great question. Im going to use this also to fill in a little bit more of the question you also asked me. So the paramilitary youth groups in the u. S. P. O. W. Camps, youre right, it doesnt really seem like the u. S. Military has all that much control. But that is actually precisely the point. So the u. S. Cic, which had developed incredibly Close Relationships with these paramilitary youth groups during the u. S. Occupation period, is replicating pres sie ining prec relationship there. So the corps is not only in touch with the paramilitary youth groups in the p. O. W. Camps, but they have actually placed people there. Youre right there is no control at all. Like the u. S. Military occupation where there also wasnt necessarily control over the paramilitary youth groups they would provide the kind of information that i think that there was something along the lines of only 89 american intelligence people available during the u. S. Military occupation period, which is just not enough to covering all of south korea, right . They really relied on these groups. Another thing is that this also opens up another war of the occupation period which is that the u. S. Cic helps create the korean counterintelligence corps at the end of the occupation period which will develop into the korean cia. You can see the u. S. Doesnt control the korean cia or nis but there is a deep and embedded relationship there. In terms of the u. S. P. O. W. S north of the 38th parallel, yes, north korean and chinese guards and instructors, what is what was so frustrating for the u. S. Military psychiatrist about the u. S. P. O. W. S was that there was no fence around any of these camps near the river. So they kept on asking why . Why have these u. S. P. O. W. S, why didnt they attempt to escape . I think maybe because they might have stuck out a little bit in terms of if they went into a korean village. I think they are hedging their bets on that one. But what is very interesting again also about the north korean and chinese interrogators and instructors was, youre right, they didnt want to have perfect control because it ended up being a project about persuasion, right, and opening up that kind of space, right, for either you can call it political propaganda but i think if they had exerted a lot of control that would have been very difficult for them to argue for that. Thank you. Youve only been able to touch upon some of the many issues in the book, but the book is available for purchase outside of this room where you can read about the subjects covered and many, many more. Next monday, october 7th, at 4 00 p. M. , we welcome James Mcadams who will be speaking about his recent book about vanguard the revolution and global idea of a communist party in a presentation entitled 2019 melancholy morris and reservation in a year of common anniversaries. You can join us for a reception next door. Thank you to our participants at the seminar and, of course, thank you to monica kim. Thank you very much. Week nights this month, we are featuring American History tv programs as a preview of what is available every weekend on cspan 3. This is coming up on tuesda customer. Mi American History tv this weekend, every weekend on cspan 3. Why do you all know who Lizzie Borden is in raise your hand if you ever heard of this gene harris murder trial before this class. 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Americas Cable Television companies as a Public Service and brought to you today by your television provider. Next on American History tv, two historians exam the history of Health Care Policy since twuned wuneled world war i. The National History Center Hosted this event. Orld war i. The National History Center Hosted this evenar i. The National History Center Hosted this event. I think we will try to start this event on time. I want to welcome you all to this briefing on the history of u. S. Health care, Health Care Policy. Im dane kennedy. This is a briefing sponsored by the National History center which is affiliated with the American Historical Association and its part of a series of briefings that we offer that provide historical perspectives to issues that are currently confronting congress. We will have another one next month on the history