Thank you very much for coming. This report, strategy in indopacific. Thanks to the contributors, it has happened. I appreciate your support in the participation today. We with like to thank japan foundation, center for Global Partnership for their support of this. The opinions in the report belong to the authors. Today after i introduce the report and contributors will talk. Now introduction. This is picture i took. The rise of china and its attitude force the United States to address challenge. Vicepresident mike pence spoke at Hudson Institute, very important, and said government approach using political, economic and military tools as well as propaganda to advance its influence and benefit its interest in the United States. Given the United States need to win the competition, cooperation with likeminded countries is key because historically number of Political Partners has been a factor in the geopolitical struggle. For example, in world war i, the winning side comprised 32 countries but losing side was composed of just four. In world war ii, 54 versus 8. During the u. S. Soviet cold war, 54 versus 26. These facts indicate that the number of supporters correlate to the likelihood of winning the competition. Therefore, maintaining the improving collaboration with its allies and likeminded countries will be key for the United States. It is of increasingly importance to identify and understand the perceptions of those cooperating in this region. This is table of contents of this report. This report includes a view studying the United States, the vietnam and singapore, australia, india, british, france, eu, canada and japan. The view from the United States indicate that all countries in the indopacific realize a problem created by rising china. However, there are two different type of opinion about how to tackle the situation with china. The United States, india, australia and japan have chosen a relatively strong stance toward china. The british, france, eu and canada are trying to cooperate with the United States effort. On the other hand, vietnam and singapore are worrying about side effect of the competition. How can affected parties fill this gap . That is my policy recommendation. There are three policy recommendations, security, economy and power. The first one is security. Use test Case Scenario to demonstrate various kind of u. S. Intervention in variety of situations. These are countries like vietnam, singapore or sri lanka are worrying about one situation. If they choose a strong stance toward china, this country are concerned that u. S. And other likeminded countries will not support them enough. The u. S. Should demonstrate best Case Scenario to indicate what kind of intervention the u. S. Might do in various situations. Economy, create a new Economic Development system is not dependent upon china. The u. S. Need to assure its allies and likeminded countries the strong opposition towards china will not stop the Economic Development of those siding with the u. S. The economic structure itself need to change. The u. S. And its allies and likeminded countries should relocate their factories from china and find new markets elsewhere. Transpacific partnership, japan, eu, joint Infrastructure Projects. Using the projects, us allies and likeminded countries need to create new Economic Development system. Third one, power. Accept a new approach that combines security and economics. The problem is caused by the image china is rising power and u. S. Is declining power. However, if the u. S. Side can integrate security and economic effort, it is still very, very powerful. For example, when we talk about safeguarding Energy Supply against Chinese Submarine threat, we could try to build a stronger power, but under the current budget, it is not possible to prepare enough to safeguard extensive communication. From 2000 to 2017, china arrived 44 new submarines. The u. S. Acquired 15. Even though u. S. Is better than chinas, but the number really important. Case in point, india you uae corporation demonstrate this new idea. Set up oil storage in india. This agreement benefit both parties. India can use stored oil in emergency. For the uae, even if tankers cannot go through the strait, uae can sell oil from this storage. This economic effort helps the safeguard communication. U. S. Side can apply this india uae method to deal with china threat. Countries siding with u. S. Could set up Strategic Oil facilities in likeminded countries throughout the indopacific and share storage in peace and in emergency. Not easy to cut this network of oil facilities, it will be hard to threaten or disrupt supply of countries hiding with the u. S. This toughness would assure strong image of u. S. Security system. U. S. Side will win the competition with china. In cooperation with u. S. Allies and likeminded countries, including vietnam, singapore, asean, australia, india, uk, france, canada and japan will be key. Of course, other likeminded countries also would be key. Now is the time. Make America Great leader again. Thank you very much. Introduction has finished. Panel discussion will start. Pacific chair, dr. Patrick croning will lead the discussion. Could you please help me . [ applause ] let me congratulation dr. Magow for an excellent presentation. You can read the report. Theres a lot of material and a lot of breadth to the discussion about the likeminded countries and how they are pursuing security in the indopacific broadly. Im the asia pacific security chair here at Hudson Institute. We have a distinguished panel here to discuss a variety of views. Im going to dig in by offering a few initial comments from a u. S. Perspective, not a u. S. Policy perspective but my own. Let me try to amplify on the larger questions rather than give you talking points here. The first point is simply to say that strategy is something that is an overused word. I overuse it. Its overused in this town. Its not often meant literally in terms of providing a real strategy. There have been questions about the coherence of chinas strategic approach. Does china really have a coherent strategy . My colleague ryan newhart and i have hit a report last month called total competition in which we certainly imply they have a coherent strategy. Even we have questions about how coherent it is. Were trying to look at the facets of what is a very broadbased strategy that is trying to allow china to get its way by all means short of war. Theres no doubt that unfortunately over the last decade or so, china, especially under xi, has been more assertive in the region. I think theres been an absence of significant cost imposition on beijing. A lack of concerted pushback. I think this panel, this report in fact, is an indicator that times are changing. Theres a gathering reaction slowly to chinas assertiveness and one that the chinese cant blame simply on the narrative, the propaganda point that america is trying to contain china and prevent its rise and rightful center stage in the global stage. The reality is theres a lot of concern around the region and world about chinas actions and how china will fit in. Now, of course, china and xi are both on their back foot. Were not wishing the Chinese People ill, especially at a time when they are fighting a shared epidemic in the coronavirus. Theres no doubt the slowing of the economy in china, the mismanagement of information in particular about that spread of the virus is really calling questions about, is china the big power that it even aims to be in the 2020s . Its not starting off the decade on a high point. I do want to say that from a u. S. Policy peck speakrspective Trump Administration deserves credit for a couple of things. The first is simply trying to codify indopacific strategy and bring india and the two oceans as the Prime Minister and india and japan talked about years ago into a more strategic focus. I think this has been a very helpful enlargement of the playing field, including when you bring indopacific i came back from paris and having discussions. As soon as you make indian ocean part of the broader strategic playing field, it allows europe to enter in the discussion in so many ways because europeans see the direct interest. Yes, france has huge equity inside the asia pacific. All of europe can see the glide panel when you think about indopacific about the equities. Thats very important. I think the other thing the Trump Administration did, although they didnt always give the Obama Administration credit, the rebalanced asia which was underresourced but the conce conceptual framework that they have given credit to predecessor on this issue. I think this is an evolution of american thinking in this century about the enlargement of this indopacific and why this is going to matter in the 21st century. I think thats very important. The free and open indopacific, the report that was issued by the pentagon last may, followed up by a state Department Report to show a certain whole of government sort of approach, these are the right principles in that report in my view. Sovereignty is respected no matter a countrys size. We should all rally around that. International law norms are respected and upheld. We should all uphold that norm. Trade is free, fair, open and reciprocal. A little more contentious because you get into what exactly is fair, what exactly is reciprocal. Its the right basic principal around which we can have a discussion. Disputes are resolved peacefully. That fits in with the interest of all the countries represented in this volume, i believe. The heavy on the defense side. It was Randy Schreiber who said america did repeal without replace when it cams to the transpacific partnership. We walked away from the big trade economic package without coming up with a quick substitute for it. We didnt follow up with quick bilateral free trade agreements. We have had trouble building the kind of architecture and finance that we start to see accumulating in terms of the Development Finance corporation. We may that may be about to change. It has taken us three years to fill in that economic basket of engagement in the region. Thats critically important for all of the countries here. The three lines of effort in the report from dod, increasing joint force for power competition, thats something t the United States needs to do to make sure it can deter. But its not mostly what the region wants to hear from us. Officials want to know the United States have the capability. But they want to hear about our Economic Engagement, how we are going to manage the china relationship. Thats why being too successful on that aspect without also marrying it up with some of the economic shows you the strategic aspect. Building emerge with parliamenter parliament er partnership, we need to do that. The third point, encouraging u. S. Allies and partners to cooperate with one another. This panel i think underscores that point. Try to talk about why we do share so many interests. Theres ample room for improvement. I want to just say briefly that three things that u. S. Needs to do better. We need to define our approach to china in a more compelling fashion. By that, more holistic fashion. All of our countries rely on china as part of the global economy. Even though we are at risk of predatory procedures by china. Not constrained by the rules we are constrained by. Strategic competition, yes, the Trump Administration gets that right. Thats a priority because the United States woke up after a decade of sleeping on this on the job and we were cooperating as john lee says in his report while they were competing. Thats exactly right. There was a natural backlash that the Trump Administration pursued here in terms of needing to put a priority on strategic competition. Strategic competition is not the whole of the u. S. china relationship. We know that from the trade deal. We know that from ongoing talks with china. We need to be a little more surgical about what were talking about when we are talking about competition with china. We are talking about competition at the same time we have a cooperative relationship. They both coexist. They will continue to both coexist. Thats part of the bound competition. Same thing with decoupling. As soon as people want to say were going to decouple with china, what are we talking about . If we talking about 5g, artificial intelligence, hightech sectors in the strategy of the 2015 tenyear strategy, yes, we do need to disentangle from that and make sure we are protecting our National Security in the digital age. At the same time, we are not divorcing our economies wholly the way that some want to jump to that conclusion. First point is to make sure the u. S. Going forward better differentiates what were trying to achieve with china and what were not trying to achieve. That will make for a more compelling strategy to rally others around. Thats what we share. We share not total decoupling. We share protecting our National Security and our sovereignty and the rules. While trying to figure out a way to cooperate with china. We need to bring to the table more trade and Investment Development as i talked about. I think were seeing movement here with the development, the private sector, allies coordinating. We will talk more about that. Third point is we need a better answer to where Southeast Asia fits in or korea fits in. I think there are good answers to this. Were about to hear from richard, who is one of the best analysts from Southeast Asia. We were so successful in growing the india relationship i see a dialogue which is one of the dialogues now has kind of theres an article on this last week. It maps the dialogue about how we went from trilateral cooperation quadrilateral cooperation. These are smaller countries that fear big powers fighting over them or fighting in their area. If the strategic relationship is too successful, it may jeopardize the sovereignty, autonomy of Southeast Asian countries. Thats the concern. It doesnt have to. Most southeast all maritime Southeast Asian country leaders, except for one, right now, wants more u. S. Engagement. We will talk about which one that is. Im hopeful. Although the president doesnt love americans, we love filipinos. Filipinos love americans. We have a lot of a lot in common. I think the likeminded countries bring a certain not only capacity, not to mention values, but also in a speed and pace at which Southeast Asias institutions, as central as they remain, asean cannot move quickly when you have a lowest common denominator preacapproac. Secretly sign a deal to allow china action says to the sea of thailand, thats not cooperation we are talking about here to keep a favorable balance of power. With india and europe and australia, japan, the United States and others, we can do a lot to support Southeast Asias strategic autonomy and growth and prosperity. I will leave it there. I want to now thank this great panel. My last thought is that our shared aim should be not to contain china. Thats beijings propaganda point. A lot of chinese believe it now because they have been selling themselves on this point. We are not trying to contain china. That shouldnt be our aim. We are trying to deny any single power exclusive control over the South China Sea, indopacific. China has a shared interest in that. They wont see it now. But eventually, maybe they will. Without further ado, i want to intere introduce richard, who is a resident analyst at gma network in the philippines. He is the author of many things. Richard, i know he has pow powerpoint slides. Thank you very much. Its a pleasure to be here again. Thank you very much for arranging this and the publication. I would like to also add that we filipinos love the United States. We also love our president. Thats where the problem is. Right . I have ten countries and more than ten people to cover within ten minutes. I will try my best. Let me make it clear that asean is not necessarily Southeast Asia. If you talk about it as an organization, its a small or Medium Enterprise with no human rights. Its different from countries i will try to focus on. Hopefully we will have more people in asean. I left my clicker. You got me excited too much, patrick. Today, im going to talk about asean and china relations. Of course, when we talk about china, were talking about certain policies of the ruling regime in china, not the great Chinese People. We hope the best for them amid the occcurrent epidemic. If you want to understand how specific countries in Southeast Asia are dealing with china, the cycle is important. Ironically, it seems countries outside the asean are more in the acceptance stage, the challenge from china and the necessity to respond accordingly. When we talk about Southeast Asia countries, we fall within bargaining in the case of malaysia when the Prime Minister was trying to renegotiate with china and in the case of the philippines we are between denial on the part of the president and the anger on part of people. Even enteinternally there are diversities. The situation has been considerably worse in the South China Sea over the past few years. If you look at the militarization thats happening there. Its no longer reclamation. Its deployment of surface to air missiles and military equipment, so much so that the admiral talks about the great wall of surface to air missiles. Not only in terms of reclamation activities. China is brazenly and openly treating the coast guard of china as part of the navy. We no longer have this distinction between great hall and white hall. More worrying in recent times we see what i call the militia where china is using militia to harass supply lines of other countries and in some cases even engage in aggressive actions against vessels of other countries as we saw in the case of philippines last june. The good thing is that there is an element of push back because theres an element of acceptance of the threat posed by chinas policy specifically in the South China Sea. In the case of Trump Administration, we see more freedom of navigation operation in ways we didnt see. They are more flexible, aggressive. They are expanded in scope covering new geographic areas. Of course, thats very important to us. We see our european friends joining the fray, not in the same way. They are not conducting navigation operations. But they are conducting some sort of strategic presence in the area that sends the schina that this is not just about u. S. And china competition. Is international community, about certain actions of china that are not with International Law. Thats where the european presence is extremely important. Australian friends have been doing their thing. Among other things, im sure the next speaker will talk about it. The fact of the matter though is when it comes to asean, specifically certain countries, like the philippines, im no longer sure were a u. S. Ally or whether how likeminded we are. Whats clear is that under president duterte we see change. The president s campaign, he is landslide electoral victory. He was questioning the Philippine Alliance with america. When he won that election, he felt vindicated. He felt that the philippino people will stand by him if he wants to change Foreign Policy of the country. The second is the authoritarianization of the government. We see that over the past few years that duterte is facing more compliance with branchs of the state and even outside the state neck niches. Third, under the Obama Administration in particular we saw strategic ambiguity. This was clear during the crisis when there was a sense that we were abandoned by america. It looked like u. S. Was trying to appease china as if they were the aggrieved party not the philippines which was actually able to prove that china was an outlying in the South China Sea. They were able to make their bargaining clear. If you go for a soft landing, you dont assert your rights, we will be nice, not conduct aggressive actions within your water and offer economic deals. This is very important. We see a very brazen personalization of philippine Foreign Policy. Might sound familiar. We see i, me and myself a lot. If you look at the latest position of the philippines, just to go into details, while the philippine and u. S. Alliance has been there, he actually also placed certain breaks or certain blockages in terms of operation of the alliance. There were two important bases. Under the Cooperation Agreement of 2014, the u. S. Was supposed to preposition weapons and equipment there as some deterrence against further chinese encroachment. President duterte nixed that ability. That hampered the cooperation of two countries to keep china in check. The other thing was what i call this diplomacy. China was notsuccessful, they were able to gain more military access. There was a back door military diplomacy going on, including this unpress deacedented and acf chinese aircraft and vessels in the port and facilities. The Philippine Military tried its best to keep the alliance together, including the return of war games and the expansion in the South China Sea, including expansion of joint military activity. Last year we had 280 with america. The highest among any american indopacific partner. We plan to have 318 this year. In light of fess terg hutering rights concerns, the imposition of the travel ban, he first threatened to get rid vfa. He was looking for a quid pro quo. He realized it might not work. He went for the jugular. Its hard to see how the alliance will be as operational where it should be. The vfa is software. It provides a Legal Framework for the stationing of american troops. Alliances like an empty seal. This is the significant problem in our alliance. President detar uterte is out o step. Chinas Approval Rating the latest is negative 33. You have 100 point difference between the two. When you look at service of people, what they want the government to do in the South China Sea, many nine out of ten filipinos want the government to take a stronger stance. President duterte can get away with what he wants because more filipinos are practical. They welcome engagement over confrontation with china. This explains why the president can get away with what he is doing because the public also is embracing some elements of his pragmatic approach. Thats not the end of the deal. President duterte made it clear theres red lines in South China Sea. One of them, if dhie china take advantage of the vacuum right now, that could force dutertes hands. Certain people within the military and defense establishment. It remains to be seen how china will exploit the gap in the alliance. The situation is not really depressing if you look at the big he have picture. Zoom out from the pill fehilipp. Look at malaysia, for six months you saw aggressive pushback on china infrastructure investment. Four months of recrecalibrating. Then we saw surprise. He submitted what was supposed to be submitted by the administration in may 2017. He submitted extended Continental Shelf claim nor northward. This is may 2017. It was crafted a few months after the philippine ar b ar bys award. Of course, when malaysia was kr criticized, he talked about the possibility of arbitration against them. We see some significant and positive shift. Vietnam, i was disappointed with them. We expected them to do a parallel case. They waited it out. Now they were on their own. Now lets see what vietnam is going to do. If you welcome at the initial statements coming out of asean, its more aggressive, more assertive than we saw in the past. And indonesia. We saw that he could not deny the public backlash in indonesia in light of more and more aggressive intrusion by china. Because of the expansive nature is not clarified, indonesia is a party to the disputes indirectly. Thats an important factor because indonesia is the biggest player in the region. I will wrap up here. We have to give credit to the Trump Administration. In addition to the regular freedom of navigation operation, we saw expansion of military aid to countries including the philippines over the past three years, doubling of that. We see the u. S. Coast guard more directly involved for the First Time Since cold water, including the taiwan straits. I think Infrastructure Initiative is good. I think the Public Diplomacy part is missing. The chinese are better in terms of selling, getting more bang out of maof imaginary buck. U. S. And other countries, including japan, have significant investment in this part of the world. If you look at service, u. S. Is preferred by majority of countries as the leader in asia pacific. I think the way forward is very important for u. S. And other major powers to emphasize that the discussion of the indopacific, the discussion of alliance is not coming at the expense theres a complimentary rather than supplement to that. I think its important is Capacity Building assistance to asean countries. The u. S. Coast guard and india, japan and others are doing a good job in terms of building capacity and special capacity. I think europe and france could be much more helpful in that front. Not talking about billions, just millions of dollars at most. Lastly, i think we have to have a floor, good friend emerson from stanford talks about this. We have to agree, no matter our perception of china or our perception of u. S. Role in the region, no single country has to have sole control in South China Sea. He doesnt say it but i think thats what we should say on his behalf, and two years ago talked about the possibility of joint patrol of nonclaimant states in the South China Sea. This is just in the realm of rhetoric. To say that in itself for me is relevant. Its a recognition that there is a problem there, and there should be an effort by other countries to keep the situation under control, and wenearing t conclusion of the code of conduct in the South China Sea, whatever that code of conduct is going to be. We have no idea what its going to be. I was just in china two months ago, and it seems they dont know what they want from the code of conduct and were just back and forth on that, congratulating having titles and outlines for the past 20 years. Whats more important than the code of conduct is the so called triple freeze. There has to be a freeze in militarization, and naval exercises. Theres no point in negotiating a diplomatic document if china is changing the facts on the ground on a daily basis. Ill keep it there, thank you very much. Thank you, richard. Richard has just flown in from the philippine, he moves fast, his brain and his body. If you get quarantined, i have no doubt youll be able to right a book in the 14 days or 28 days. I learn chinese. Were excited to have john lee from australia, before that he was the National Security adviser, the senior National Security adviser to Australian Foreign minister, julie bishop, prolific author, including released out of hudson around the chinese economy and what to do about it. John, i think were going to stay seated for the rest of the panel. Thank you, patrick, and its great to be on this panel with colleagues and regional colleagues as well, and thank you dr. Nigel inviting me to contribute in this publication. Of course im no longer in government so i dont speak for the Australian Government. This is an australian giving an australian view but i do deal closely still with our government. These are my thoughts. I thought i would spend really five minutes speaking about some of the australian views and concerns and we can dig deeper into some of the issues i raised through the panel questions. I think its fair to say over the past two or three years, maybe longer, four years or so, australia has shifted from a position where we were largely hedging and by mhedging, i mean we were expanding longterm options. We have moved from hedging and managing our relationship and alliance with the United States to a much more proactive countering role and a balancing role. Particularly against china. In fact, just two days ago, i think we announced a very significant upgrade to our base in the Northern Territory which is jointly shared with american forces. Now, the base that we have at the moment, it only currently holds 2,000 troops, american troops, which doesnt sound like a lot, but thats not the significance. The significance is were upgrading the base to host American Assets and particularly american heavy military assets such as bombers and f 35s, et cetera, and this gives you a very clear indication as to where australia is going. More broadly and of course the Australian Government wouldnt use this language, but i would, we see ourselves as the southern anchor of the American Alliance system and we see japan as the northern or northeastern anchor of the American Alliance system. Now, on that basis, if you look at the geography, Southeast Asia is the geographic and in some sense, the strategic heart of the indoe pacif pacific, and weo the indo pacific construct two years ago which has significance. It used to be east asia and in our Strategic Thinking now, it is indo pacific, which widens the strategic map in a way that i think favors us. Brings in india, and of course its not completely aimed at china, but china is a relevant factor there. Southeast asia, we do see quite frankly as the soft underbelly in the region. For a number of reasons, one, from a pure capacity point of view, Southeast Asia might be a region with, you know, almost a dozen states, but each of those states have a limited capability in and of itself to engage in any significant balancing or counters activities and as a result, Southeast Asian states tend to hedge rather than balance against chinese activities. Now in my view, much of Southeast Asia, and i make the exception in general terms of vietnam, indonesia and a what i hope will be a postduerte philippines. I think much of Southeast Asia is falling into quite a debilitating fatalism about the inevide inevitability of chinese dominance. Much of Southeast Asia, and its reflected in a lot of things. Much of Southeast Asia and this is of concern to australia much of Southeast Asia has normalized chinese coercion, its baked, in the notion of chinese coercion and assertiveness of expectations of the present and the future. Its seized chinese assertiveness and coercion as something that will just always occur because thats the way china is and it must be managed rather than opposed. And i see this reflected, even though this is a diplomatic context, but with consequences, i see its reflected in the whole as the ends approach to the code of conduct negotiations. Now, any binding descriptions on any powers. From our point of view, fell into the trap of trying to negotiate a code of conduct with china and this occurred while a few things were happening. One as richard mentioned, it would have been fine if anyone put a phrase or activities, they used the diplomatic cover to continue to extend its control and militarize its artificial features in the South China Sea. The code of conduct just gave china diplomatic cover to do what it wants to do with apparent backing or inadvertent as in backing. The second reason why were so concerned about the code of conduct is that its terms of reference were on chinas terms. Rather than, for example, emphasizing the role that International Law and the arbitration decision had to play in any future diplomatic agreement, it basically fell into chinas trap. It doesnt really mention International Law. Its more about some negotiated agreement with china which is precisely what china wants. It wants to negate the relevance of International Law. And i think fell into that trap. The third thing i think the code of conduct did is that it inadvertently entrenched this notion that the South China Sea is san issue between nations an china, whereas countries like japan, australia, have an interest in what happens in the South China Sea. I remembered my time in government and post government, i often receive a lot of push back from Southeast Asian friends, why should australia, the United States, japan have more of a role in negotiating some kind of understanding. Well, my response is well only four or five members are claimant states so five or six azian members are not claimant states. Japan, are not claimant states. If every country has inherent interest in what happens to the South China Sea, why should we begin on a basis that it should only be an azian china issue. I would feel for comfortable with that situation if i felt azian falling into chinas trap. By no means is this any fatal or reversible. I worry as an organization and individual countries are falling into the trap. This brings to the point about the views of the United States, in particular the Trump Administration. As many of you know, australia along with japan have been the most robust supporters of a tougher or more disruptive trump Foreign Policy in our part of the region. I use that word disruption deliberately because from our point of view, because china had in the sense normalized its coercive activities, any country is going to be disruptive. If you cant handle disruption or if youre not prepared for disruption, there can be no countering of chinese activities. From that point of view, its not that we like disruption. We felt disruption was necessary. Patrick mentioned that a lot of the Strategic Thinking and operational thinking occurred before the Trump Administration chl. I think thats absolutely correct. Where i give it credit is we have an administration that is prepared psychologically to tolerate risk of action in countering china which at the top, which i dont attribute to the previous administration, so i remember my time in government, we had great conversations with the Environment Administration about what to do about things but when it came to the very top, there was no appetite for disruption or unintended consequences of pushing back against china. So having said that, we tend to support the trumps approach to china, but there are caveats. The first, which richard, patrick raised as well, the biggest mistake that the Trump Administration has made is to just withdraw from tpp because it eliminates the Economic Center piece of any pushback or shaping strategy, and if you look at one of the weaknesses of the pacific contest, if you ask specifically Southeast Asians, do you like equality, sovereign rights and privileges, rule of law, free from coercion, of course we do. Theyre small state, of course they like it. If you look at the alternative chinese proposition, the alternative is hey, you may not like us, and yes, we admit were centric but if you sign up to our world order, we will offer you guaranteed special gains and access to opportunity. Right, so what im trying to say is that when you go around a region now, the chinese largely dont even deny that vary view of the region is hierarchy. If you come up with a special relationship with us, youll benefit. And youll benefit in specific material ways. If you dont, you will miss out. For a lot of Southeast Asia, with the exception of singapore which is still a developing low or middle income region, you know, its very attractive for the shortterm gains or the apparent shortterm gains that china can offer. So we, in australia, for example, we can talk till were blue in the face about Southeast Asians about why you shouldnt sign up it a particular agreement or a particular aspect, but the reality is that often we dont have the capability or framework to offer you some tangible material shortterm gain, and what wer finding is many Southeast Asian countries are inadvertently making shortterm decisions which they say is tactical or pragmatic but they have longterm consequences which favor china rather than any other country. I think clearly an economic approach, particularly in Southeast Asia is probably one of the weaknesses of this administration. Finally, i talked about the virtues of a more disruptive approach to the region by the United States. But let me qualify that by saying australia is a mediumsized company. You know all the smaller and pa medium sized countries need an element of predictability. Particularly allies from their super po super power ally. They also need to know what the institutional landing spot of where all of this is going. So one of the weaknesses i think of the Current Administration is that they dont really tell us allies and likeminded countries where the or what the intended institutional outcome of any kind of negotiation or tension will be or even whether there is an institutional outcome, and australia, despite how robust we are behind the americans, we do kind of need to know what an enduring landing spot on various issues look like, and this is particularly the case with the economic tensions between the United States and china. So patrick, ill end there, and help you to talk about thank you very much, john. Richard has just flown in from manila, john from sydney, the rest of us have walked down the hall. Thats why we have gone in this order, and our colleague, visiting senior fellow at the Hudson Institute from denmark has written extensively about europes role in general in the indo pacific not to mention other places like the arctic. So liza over to you. Thank you, and thank you, for inviting me to present my chapter. I have been apt to right about europe, and i would argue that europe is faced with an ally that is increasingly skeptical of europes contributions, its role in trade, and its contributions to the Transatlantic Alliance, and its also a u. S. Ally that focuses increasingly on its asian partners and looks not so much to europe, but i actually think that has had a lot of positive consequences because it has been a wake up call for europe, a bit rough, but a wake up call for europe to realize that they have to be able to operate more independently and do it through the existing european institutional framework because one small country is not able to exercise sovereignty in a world of u. S. chinese sovereignty. So actually, at this moment, despite brexits support for europeans working together through the institutions is greater than we have seen for many decades and that is partially a consequence of the u. S. Pressures on europe. My main argument would be that it has also made europe realize that it is not wise to just think that we have common values with the americans and because we have common liberal values economically and politically we will always be good friends. There are differences between europe and the United States, for example, in its preference through working for multilateral institutional frameworks and for prioritizing comprehensive multilateral free trade agreements that puts europe and the u. S. At odds at times. And that means that europe has realized it has to define what is more narrowly in europes interests and what isnt. And this increasing focus on interests rather than merely relying on values, i think, is a healthy process, but because it will help clarify where can europe and the u. S. Cooperate and where are there differences, that means that maybe they have to look to other partners or at least there is something to talk about. That doesnt necessarily weaken the alliance. I think in a way it strengthens it because it will make it clear where do we have common interesting that we can pursue. Putting european interests first is then one of the sort of developments that we see in europe. Just as u. S. Has signaling it will put u. S. Interests first, so europe is increasingly signaling that european interests comes first. That also means that europe is looking to diversify its partnership, not relying so much on the u. S. But these partners are by and large allies and Strategic Partners of the United States. So they would be a country such as japan. It would be south korea. It would be the member states. It would be australia. All of which have good relations with the u. S. But also have some reservations in recent years about u. S. Putting its own interests first, and i think thats a very healthy process, again, because for one thing, it will prevent the u. S. And china from sort of determining the rules of the road so they can sort out their differences. They can decide how things should work globally. That cannot happen if the others partner up without the great powers, and also i think it will push the u. S. And china to take seriously these countrys preference for a comprehensive free trade agreements, tpp was mentioned, for example, and for a multilateral institutional corporation. Then you can say does europe matter at all in the indo par g pacific and do they have any role to play. I think they have a lot of leverage, and theyre starting to use that leverage. It mainly stems from the fact that europe has a position as a trade heavy weight globally. Its a Major Trading partner, both the United States and china, the u. S. Is the eus largest trading partner in china, second largest trading partner, and once europe starts to use that leverage, it will make a difference not only in its own region, but beyond that. Europe continues to prefer Transatlantic Corporation over other partnerships. And that is still because we share a common preference for lots of liberal preferences that other country do not to the same extent. While this cannot be the sole basis for the Transatlantic Alliance, of course it continues to be important provided that both sides acknowledge that their policies may be more complimentary at times, so even if the u. S. Has a preference for using hard power and europe has a preference for using diplomacy and institutions, sometimes more than the u. S. , these can in many cases be seen as complimentary effort that can work towards the same objectives. And provided that is taken seriously, im confident that the Transatlantic Alliance will remain close and will work towards common goals in the indo pacific and beyond. Europe remains the most reliable capable partner in pushing back against china also because its one of the only Global Economic powers that the u. S. Can partner up with. The shared transatlantic identity aligns the u. S. And europe regarding fundamental objectives that we should not forget are important. For example, europe and the u. S. Agree agree that economics rather than on state support. They agree that social political stability comes from information sharing and freedom of expression, rather than surveillance and oppression. And security must be built through freedom of movement and mutual defense obligations rather than spheres of influence and coercion. I think the transatlantic differences are mainly instrumental, and there is a lot of low hanging fruit to be picked if we focus on complementary between the u. S. And europe. U. S. Economic and Security Defense partnerships with asian powers can build a Network Across the indo pacific that will constitute quite a Formidable Force for a free and open indo pacific and it can also open avenues for coordinating Infrastructure Projects to push back or deliver alternatives to the chinese belden road initiative. The establishment of independent European Defense forces that is sometimes criticized by washington i think is key to europes ability to operate autonomously and independently from the u. S. And this is precisely the sort of ally that the u. S. Needs at a time where it wants to, you know, push more responsibility over on to its allies. And europe, i think, is well positioned to do this. It will take some time, maybe a decade or two. This is not something you do overnight. But france has taken the lead in this effort and slowly but surely this kind of force is developing and there is also a European Military footprint in the indo pacific which is supported by an increasing number of countries. Again, i think this strengthens the Transatlantic Alliance rather than we can see. So focussing on these complimentary issues will be key to strengthening transatlantic. We keep running overtime. Thats my fault as a moderator. Theres a lot to say, and its a big region. While doctor has said through an Aircraft Carrier through the indian ocean, the resident big power of the indian ocean is india, its important to let the director of the initiative of the future of indian south asia at hudson talk from her perspective, not least because we have another important summit meeting with President Trump preparing to go to india. Theres a good article in the National Review by our colleagues typically disterburg. Thank you, patrick, and i will try not to be indian, and i will sort of try and keep my talk as brief as possible because i know im the last speaker and im between you and q and a. So five quick points, one, interestingly if we include philippines and europe. Which is interesting. But it sort of speaks to the fact that sort of how far we have come i would say in the last five years, not just the last ten years. Secondly, even though, i mean, population wise, india is the largest. The country along with china in the indo pacific, we are not an ally. Sort of i have in many ways changed what i was going to say after hearing the first three speakers. People who are talking about how u. S. Has changed its policy, u. S. Hasnt done enough, and therefore they need to maybe play a bigger role. India actually is very comfortable with indo pacific because we do like institutional arrangements. We dont like security partnerships. We dont like being forced into something where we dont have an option, and be forced to do something where others want us to do it. So the fuzzier indo pacific remains, the happier we remain. That said, indo pacific helps us one because it helps build us a better relationship not just with the United States but all the partners like japan, i mean, at every speech Prime Minister modea, india would like Southeast Asian countries to feel reassured that indias entry into the region is not to overwhelm them. And with sort of australia and europe as well. Third, india views china as a rival right from the 1950s. That has not changed. India has lost a war with china. China has deepened its economic and military presence in every country of south asia, which hurts indias interests. However, india does not want china as an enemy. India does not have the economic or military capability to stand up to china. So with indo pacific while india is a part of it believes in all the shared principles, india has two concerns, one, geographical. From indias point of view, the middle east and sort of the area to indias west is as important as the area to indias east. So afghanistan, pakistan, and the gulf, which technically comes under Central Command and not pacific command, therefore not indo pacific is something india would like to be changed and would like that region to be as important as east and South China Sea. Second part of that is indo pacific is more maritime. Indias concern with china are more land based. So indias concern is that if something happens in the domain, there are a number of countries. What happens if the next india china conflict is on the land border, which has happened in the past, and therefore india is reluctant to sort of confront china too openly when it knows that it may be forced to confront china on its own. And finally, india sort of is a country which unlike most other American Allies or western allies, does not want another country as a security provider. India does not need an american umbrella or a western umbrella. What india would like to do is project part in this region. That is what india would like to do, and sort of ideally, other countries would like india to do that as well. We dont have the economic or military capability to do it. We would like to build that in the next five to ten years so that india can be an indian ocean part its always wanted to. I will stop there now, and happy to answer any questions. Excellent. Very good. Great panel discussion. With dr. Nigel who can go to the microphone. All of us are available for questions. What were going to do with the rest of the 22 niminutes remaing of the program is take questions from the audience or ill be happy to fill in and talk. Theres a microphone over here. We have one right here. Why dont we start all the way on this side right here. We have two microphones. No waiting, please, if you just identify yourself, and ask a question or make a comment. Thank you, university of and i have a question for dr. Ogad, you know that right now the United States is very much concerned about trip with vietnam, as the eu vietnam trade move is moving forward, is the eu concerned about the potential trade deficit with vietnam. Oh, okay. Were going to take a few questions and save this up. But well go right here, and well just keep going down the line. Thank you. Im jeanie wynn. This is for dr. Cronin. Yesterday at u. S. Security and economy commission, admiral blare made it clear that the u. S. Has no consistent and clear policy in the South China Sea. And he also made it clear that i heard doctor said today that the u. S. And india has not yet come to a clear relationship at the top, especially in military projection in the indo pacific ocean. You point out a lot of recommended policies, and i heard from all the panelists that they are concerned because of u. S. Ambivalent policies, inconsistent tpp was withdrew and reservation from the eu and partners and allies. As the one who worked very long and hard on u. S. Policy, what do you think we need to do . Thank you. Thank you. Were going to take these two other questions, right next to you first, and then here. Well take those two and go back to the panel. Thank you. The question for ms. Olgert. What do you think about the difference between United States and eu on the issue of 5g how do you think this will impact this alliance. My name at voice of america, and i have a question regarding the issue. As you know, there is a upcoming leaders talk next monday between United States and korea. So what is the best conclusion or optimal way for the conclusion or for the extension of resuming. Okay. Well, im happy to begin. The intelligence sharing agreement, known as the gesomea is vital for korean japanese and u. S. Interests. Without realtime constant intelligence sharing in the missile age, there could be catastrophe. So it was very important for seoul and tokyo to not rip up this agreement as they were on the cusp of doing a few weeks ago, but rather to reaffirm its long standing sort of need. Not with great fanfare but just as a matter of tech know accurat bureaucratic operation between two countries that are not awe lined with each other aligned with each other, have differences and are key ally in northeast asia, share, going back to interests, we share the basic interests. Put the politics aside, and recognize the common interests that its very important to keep information sharing just as its going to be important across the indo pacific all the way to europe to have maritime awareness, to have the kind of information sharing that will allow us to talk about strategy and policy on tough issues from 5g to trade to security. So this is a con stanstant refr were going to have in the Information Age we live in. Information sharing is going to be very important. Quickly on the question, you know, admiral blare is a friend and i have Great Respect for admiral blare, when did we have this very consistent, pristine policy in the house. When was that period . Because i dont remember that. The fact is the United States has been fumbling around, trying to define, exactly, this was an issue that president duerte was able to use against us, you know, and others saying you werent there giving a Strong Defense so what was the philippines going to do. Were not going to stand up to the pla navy and vietnam of course is in a similar boat but, you know, the United States from a u. S. Perspective wants flexibility, no chief executive, no president , no administration of any party wants to be locked in ahead of time to providing a guarantee without knowing what were guaranteeing and whats the context. So a strong alliance, including with the u. S. Japan alliance, its all about being able to or nato, this is really about being able to or with australia, theres no guarantee that we go to the defense, but theres a high probability we do, and article 5, yes, theres a certain automatic but its why you need constant engagement and debate. What we need in Southeast Asia is to understand the strategic priority of Southeast Asia, something that gets too short riffed in this town too easily, whether we have Maritime Strategy and thinking about the straits and what china historic land power is trying to do, become a historic dominant land power and a dominant sea power at the same time, riding over the sovereign interests of even big states like indonesia but certainly middlesized ones like vietnam and the philippines, you know, thats unacceptable, and we share this common interest so engagement is the key thing here. The second thing as i suggested and i think as john lee suggested and i think richard as well, i mean, theres a heavy economic component here. So we are already very strong. We need to stay strong. We need to preserve deterrence. We need to balance that military strength with the kind of foresight of looking ahead. We want to work and develop the Digital Economy of this region in the future. We want to be there for decade. Well have more programs here in the coming days and weeks, i think youll be surprised, showing that we are going to be here for decades. Were going to be, you know, talking to vietnam, talking to indonesia, yes even working more in the philippines because duerte does not write the entire relationship of the u. S. Philippines, there are opportunities with malaysia and australia and europe, india and japan, korea and other countries have huge opportunities to participate in this, and china too. If theyre willing to abide by a set of rules that we can hold them accountable to. Not cheat on. I need to stand aside here, and let answer a couple of questions addre addressed to her. Thank you for the questions which points to the more central differences between europe and the United States. Europe has made it a preference in the past years to make to stress and go ahead with free trade agreements with asian countries. So it has done that with a number of other countries and including japan in later years. And i think and it does so following the World Trade Organization rules. Europe is using this to show america this is a key point for europe, free trade agreements with wuto rules, and it is not very bothered about trade visits. This is not in europes view, you know, the baseline of the republic relationship to look at it from that perspective. Its one of the issues that europe has been quite active in trying to show the u. S. That europe will, you know, go a slightly different way. That doesnt mean we dont still both support the basic Common Market economic rules of the road. But in the implementation of those rules, europe has a clear preference for institutions and free trade agreements to stay in place. With regard to the 5g, there is of course a gain. The response that the institutions have interfered, because they dont actually have power to do that with regard to 5g so the countries themselves have decided whether they should let huawei in or not. So my own country, denmark, have decided to exclude huawei and go for erickson, and other countries have said they wont exclude huawei, but they will make sure they dont get Vital Information out of it, and the u. S. Disputes that thats possible so the end result, i think, will not be that Security Corporation will end but of course the u. S. Might have some reservations down the road on sharing information with country that is include huawei and their telecommunications framework. That being said, i think were in the early days of a western response to that challenge, and europe and the u. S. Agrees that its a problematic, you know, that china has used the Taylor Communications infrastructure in problematic ways, and there is a problem that needs to be dealt with and that is a challenge, and i think, again, thats the important point here. This is something where europe and the u. S. Agrees and theyre trying to work out a response that can deliver an alternative to huawei in the end, a competitive and viable alternative. Again you dont do that overnight, but we have seen from other businesses, for example, the ship building industry in europe, which has had have competition from china which threw unfair trade practices or market economic practices that that industry changed and its still viable in europe. I think the same will happen in many cases that, you know, the industries and the public sectors of europe and the u. S. Will find alternatives down the road that will mean that we will have, you know, we dont have to rely on huawei as the cheapest invest solution. I want to ask briefly the other three panelists a quick question because im going to ask about maybe what might come out or what should come out of a trump modi summit. Whats likely to happen on the joint request that china and philippines are facing. Is that going to be a model or never going to happen, i want to first turn to john and amplify from an australian perspective, you know, the concern on the 5g, and how australia in general is trying to strategically work through these challenges. You know, this is of quite high importance to australia because australia was really the first country to explicitly ban huawei from our 5g rollout, which incurred a lot of anger from china. Now, to be fair, australia could make that decision relatively easily, not just because of intelligence considerations but because we didnt really have huawei in our fractuinfrastruct unlike other countries like britain, it was relatively clean from an infrastructure point of view to make the decision. Nevertheless, the decision was made on the merits of intelligence, our main concern we have with britain is they have misunderstood the potential applications of 5g. Britain has said they confined huawei to what they call the edge, not the core, which you can do in 4 g and 5g. If 5g fulfills its potential, we believe theres no such thing as an edge and a core. If youre in any part of the network, no matter how minor, you can actually affect other parts. Its a technical reason we disagree with the british view. More generally with the 5, any agreement intelligence or otherwise no matter how long standing, no matter how historical, it tends to degrade over time if the interests of the countries dont align. Right, so the broader concern is that if the united kingdom, for example, takes a fundamentally different view of canihinas ro in the region and the world, invariably thats going to lead to problems with the existing 5 i configuration, so my personal concern right now. I dont like the 5g decision that Boris Johnson made. My particular concern is i hope london does not think now that youll try to forge a special relationship with china. I mean, weve all been through, in our region, weve all been through the experience where you try to forge a special relationship with china, and it doesnt quite work out. London hasnt really been through that part yet, so my broader concern and imperative would have been this huawei decision is not desired by the united king to forge that special relationship. That would do structural damage to t 5 is. When duerte came to power, i think theres a lot of respect for standing up for filipino nationalism. A lot of americans can understand that. Is he actually getting from china what he sort of claims to be or are the chinese pushing around the indonesians as well as the vietnamese, how do you see this . Because this idea of, you know, whos going to jointly develop the resources around reid bank, for instance, where theres a rich hydrocarbon supply. Is a fundamental question about the rules of the road for the future in this region. How do you see this going in the next year or the remainder of duertes term. This is where i take issue with the common wisdom. Sure, economics matter, but what kind of Economic Engagement we are talking about. The first thing that i take an issue with is for instance, 3p. Symbolic it makes perfect sense for america to put forward tpp. On the ground in malaysia and other countries, there once excitement about giving certain types of powers that could violate sovereignty of people. You dont have to be a leftist to buy into that argument. I think it was more important to replace the tpp with something more relevant to people, and thats where Infrastructure Development comes in the picture. Everyone talks about china is transforming the world, my question is in the philippines for instance, where are the chinese projects. Show me, i can show you, yes online. And all sorts of dodging investments by china, but where are the big ticket Infrastructure Projects . I can show you the japanese projects if you look at the measurement of the prompts in like places like japan has more than two times. 17, 20 break down. In places like the philippines, you only have eight chinese projects. So i think a lot of us are semicritical of china also buy into the chinese propaganda, chinese is taking over because they have economic initiatives to put forward. The third layer is it was never about matching china. It was about bringing in quality investment, investments that create jobs for the people. It was creating sustainable development, infrastructure and development, and i think malaysia is an interesting example of that. They have been overwhelmed by actual chinese investments, but we want quality investments, we just dont want any kind of investment, especially if this is corrosive capital, and good governancing. The second major disagreement is when it comes to the code of conduct negotiations between china, the nature of the problem has changed. The idea that code of conduct is, you know, china is playing along, and everything like that. I think thats a snapshot from the past. What we see is a worrying trend, and at the same time, encouraging push back, so the field is shifting. So the field has shifted because if you look at the outline of the code of conduct, first draft, single draft of the code of conduct. China is making a new proposal. Our concern is it will not be legally binding. What is the added value, you are reselling what you already bought, which didnt work, 2002 onwards, now suddenly china is implying theyre fine with legally binding but whos law, right, or if its International Law, which interpretation of International Law. This is where its worrying and more so, china is injencting ne comma demands, according to this code of conduct, only us can in the South China Sea. From now on, keep out other countries or there could be no military exercises with external powers obviously u. S. In the South China Sea. Suddenly you dont want a legally binding code of conduct if its going in that direction. So it seems at least some more sensible were saying, wait, china is asking too much, which ties me to your question, the joint Development Agreement between philippines and china, even if its just symbolic, its important because were currently supposed to be negotiating code of conduct, the philippines is the coordinator, so china will try to use whatever propaganda or pr they can get out of it, and say to the rest of the region, see, the philippines, supposed u. S. Ally who took us into court is open to join development, at least in principle, maybe vietnam want the same thing, so what happens between philippines and china has implications for the rest of the, and luckily or happily or whatever, so far the problem with the joint development is it could violate not only philippine continue b philippine contribution, i dont know how the hell is the government going to square the triangle. It has to be consistent with the chinese constitution, the filipino constitution. I can see two outcomes that would work with china. Come up with an agreement, half is a secret. Well never know about it. They will release an outline, and keep the rest a secret. The other one will be the negotiations will go on and theyll get a preliminary deal and use that to push for the agenda. What im saying is that causing the joint Development Agreement is good for china no matter what they get out of it in terms of the premutations of result. What should be clear to the filipino people is we are negotiating this joint Development Agreement or whatever it is essentially under shotgun with a time bomb, right, the time bomb is philippines are going to run out of their own resources and the shotgun is the chinese warships in the area. In that situation, i dont think you can ever get a fair deal out of that. This is what should be clear to the filipino people. A vital voice. Going to get the last word here in terms of trying to think through whether this vast promising, growing, india u. S. Relationship has some effective, you know, hand holes that were actually making progress on are we going to start to see something specific and concrete out of this very promising cooperation, where theres clear strategic desire but what do you think . So on the visit itself, it will be a lot more optics as eve knows about the hundreds of thousands of people, not necessarily millions of people that will line the streets. Millions of people. Millions of people in the event. However there are a number of defense deals, about 5 billion worth of the naval helos, helicopters, the u. S. Is selling the integrated air defense Weapon System and a couple of others which have come through. The economic deal may not. As of now. However, its important to bear in mind that the Strategic Partnership is not, u. S. Strategic partnership is now at the stage where it doesnt really matter who the president or Prime Minister are. This is the fourth american president backtoback whogone the u. S. , to india, im sorry, two republican, two democrat. Doesnt matter who the Prime Minister was, whether it was bjp or congress or any other party. Every indian Prime Minister in the last two decades has welcomed u. S. President s. Its a strong relationship. Its a strategic one. It needs a lot more effort from both sides. And its not going to be as easy for each country to navigate it as it used to be, as it was for u. S. To do it with its allies. India is a difficult country to work with. Well, on that note. What a great panel discussion, dr. Nigel, we thank you for everything you have done to pull this together. Thank you to the panel. Please thank the panel. [ applause ]. John charles freemont brought the Pacific Coast into the United States. At the beginning of the story the United States didnt have a Pacific Coast. There was a territory in oregon that was disputed with fri brit and california that belonged to mexico. Fremont encouraged the american settlement of oregon, and took part in the american conquest of california just in time for the gold rush and so he did play a real role in changing the map of the United States. Npr morning edition host steve inskeep, how jesse and john fremont mapped the west, invented celebrity and helped cause the civil war. Sunday night at 8 eastern on cspans q and a. Follow the federal response to the coronavirus at cspan. Org coronavirus, you can find white house briefings, hearings with Key Public Health officials and interviews with Public Health specialists, review the latest events anytime at cspan. Org coronavirus. A senate panel is investigating the vetting process for International Military students. The review was ordered after a saudi student shot and killed three Service Members at a naval base if pensacola, florida, in december. The Senate Armed Services subcommittee meeting is chaired by senator joni ernst of iowa. Very good. Okay. Good morning, everyone. Well call this subcommittee on emerging threats and capabilities to order, and the subcommittee on emerging threats and capabilities meets today to receive testimony on the department of defense review of the december 6th, 2019, insider attack