Provide here at the Wilson Center in conjunction with our partners at the National History center, his ttorical perspectiv on international and national affairs. Im christian, i direct the history and Public Policy program here at the Wilson Center and i have the privilege to cochair the seminar with my colleague of George Washington university. So this is a joint interbriz by the National History center, initiative of the american historical association, directed by professor dane kennedy. I dont know if danes with us today. Joint initiative between the National History center and history and Public Policy program here, where in our ninth year of holding these sessions every week. Or during the semester, mondays at 4 00 p. M. And i hope to see many of you again for future sessions. Let me thank a couple of sponsors of this series. Frsz the page center for history in the public interest. As well as George Washington history department. I also want to thank a number of anonymous donors who make these meetings possible. And we welcome contributions from all of you in our audience. Details about how to do so are in the back of the flir or just go to our various websites. A couple of people who behind the scenes do the heavy lifting on getting us organized and making this event possible. Thats rachel weekly, the assistant director at of the National History center. Rachel, are you here today . Back there. Thank you, rachel. Pete, all the way in the back on my program here as well as our talented interns, Cole Faulkner and sung kim. Who youll meet during the q and a a. Where theyll help with microphones as well. We, todays session is sponsored by the Wilson Center sunday motor cory ree Ra Foundation center for korean History Center for Public Policy. Director gene lee is here and were grateful the centers cosponsorship. Before we begin, ill ask eric to introduce our featured speaker today. Let me just ask everyone to turn off your mobile twidevice, put m on silent so we can have good, thoughtful, focuseded discussion. With that, eric. Thank you, christian. Its my privilege to welcome and introduce our speaker this afternoon who is monica kim, currently assistant professor and u. S. The World History in New York University department of history. She is the author of the Interrogation Rooms of the korean war. The untold history published by Princeton University press in 2019. And book exercerpts have appear in a variety of envus including Foreign Policy and asia pacific journey. A member of the editorial collective for radical history review u, she has published in critical asian studies, asian critique concerning the United States, east asia and warfare. Her work has been supported by fellowships from full bright, the institute for advanced study and the Wolf Humanities Center at the university of pennsylvania and today, she will be speaking on the subject of that new book, the Interrogation Rooms of the korean war. Professor kim. Thank you. Thank you so much. Its incredibly meaningful to hear about all the different communities that have f come together to make this kind of gathering possible and im really looking forward to the q a discussion about the book. So when we look ahead to 2020 which seems significant to all of us in this room for various reason, 2020 next year also h d holds another significance specifically in terms of the cokorean war. Next year, the korean war will reach its 70th year of conflict. Without any official end, the korean war is the one hot war from the cold war that continues to this day. For this forgotten war with American Public consciousness, we often take for granted the cease fire signed in july 1953 that holds outright conflict on the Korean Peninsula. The hyper militarized Demilitarized Zone along the 30th parallel in korea is certainly one side of evidence of this war, but today im going to turn to the conditions around the signing of the 1953 cease fire. Namely the one issue on the negotiating tables at that effectively delayed the signing of the cease for over 18 months. In december 1951, all agenda items at the negotiating Table Including the decision about where the cease fire line would be, had all be settled except for one. The prisoner of war repatriation issue. In january 1952, the u. S. Representatives for the United Nations command put a new proposal on the table. Setting off a controversy that would dak 18 more months of fight iing and negotiating to ce to a settlement. Today, i will examine what i consider to be a fund mental shift in the character of the korean war at the beginning of 1952. With the u. S. Governments introduction of the voluntary p. O. W. Repatriation proposal where the korean war shifted from being waged over the violation of a border, the 30th parallel, to being waged over the violation of the individual human subject. The prisoner of war. The war moves from a preoccupation territory over human inferiority. The p. O. W. Issue of the war has often simply been a foot shonot the history of the r war, but by moving into the Interrogation Room, i argue that the issue ill austral straits a critical legacy. Rather the demonstration of the ir resolution of mid 20th century conflicts over former decolinization and ambitions of the United States. So rather than the cold air binaries between communism and anticommunism, im going to be focusing on issues of post colonial sophomore earn sovereignty and the more enduring structures of intelligence and racial ideologies across the pacific and across multiple wars. In other words, im interested in parsing through how u the legacies of the ongoing war informed the every day today. And beyond. The Korean Peninsula. Telling the story of o the korean war results in not only a history of experiences on an intimate scale, but also a hemispheric scale that encompasses the Trans Pacific such as asia and both north and south america and even a global scale that encompasses new delhi, india, and geneva, switzerland. The Interrogation Room provides us a different mapping of the war and the its significance that the usual map that focuses on the 30th parallel in the history of the war. The more traditional sort of visualizing of the korean war conflict. By considering the p. O. W. Issue, we end up with a map of the war on the Korean Peninsula which looks like this. Often considered to be a marichal figure in the war, the p. O. W. And these camps would soon enter the spotlight on the Global Political stage of the war. Im going to be focusing on two camps. The first is the u. N. Camp, number one, which held upwards of over 170,000 p. O. W. S and then camp number five under north korean and Chinese Military control. This was located near the yaufl river and about 300,000 p. O. W. S were in this camp. Ill begin my story today with the most high profile event concerning the p. O. W. Issue during the war which was a kidnapping later called a mutiny by the u. S. Army which occurred inside the camp and im going to end my talk by examining the most infamous memory, lets say, from the korean war, something that is rather ironic giving the wars status as a forgotten war in the United States and the issue is brainwashing so im going to be examining the experiences of u. S. P. O. W. S in camp number five and were going to move from the camp to catch numb camp number five by way of examination of why the Interrogation Room became the subject of intense debate and controversy in 1952 so lets begin. In 1952, six korean p. O. W. S kidnapp eped francis dodd. News of this mutiny quickly reverberated through newspaper headlines up through the globe up through the highest ranks of the military and even into the depths of u. S. Congress. When dot emerged from compound number 76 three days later, the u. S. Army sent in pair troopers, tanks, concussion grenades and tear gas resulting in the deaths of 34 p. O. W. S and one u. S. Soldier. For an event that captured the attention of people across the globe and e lilicited the drama response of the u. S. Military, the kidnapping itself, occurred in rath e untraumatic fashion. In the early afternoon, Brigadier General dodd met with six korean p. O. W. S who had been requesting a meeting with him to discuss certain complaints they had. They talk ed through the fence s you can see. At one point, one of the p. P. O. W. S, this particular fellow right here. Rather large man of considerable strength, he walked through the gate to allow a truck full of tents to go through. He stretched his arms, pretended the yawn, then grabbed dodd. They carried him into the compound closing the fence behind him. Whole affair lasted only a few minutes. After they carried him into the compound, they unfurled a large sign over the building and it said we have captured dodd. Stated the sign in english. He will not be harmed if p. O. W. Problems are resolved if you shoot, his life will be in danger. So the reaction from the u. S. Press was pretty immediate. Rumors of the capture of dodd and finally a press release by the army sent the u. S. Press into an absolute frenzy. Front page of the l. A. Times blared eighth army r ordered to free general held by red p. O. W. S. Each statement and each newspaper issued by well, each newspaper and Statement Issued by the u. S. Army echoed a rather similar sentiment. Why had the p. O. Ws who was now characterized as being or yen tall communist fanatics, why had they captured the Camp Commander . Perhaps the most striking detail was a rather unusual request. Quote. It was disclosed that the communists had asked for 1,000 sheets of paper presumably writing paper and that this has already been sent to the island. The purpose was not clear, but the requisite order had been issued so the request for 1,000 sheet of paper points us in the direction of understanding why the kidnapping of dodd incite d widespread anxiety. The events signalled that the script of warfare was no longer predictable or stable. As western powers refine d the laws of war in the aftermath of devastation from World War Two in an attempt to regulate warfare, the outbreak of the ko ree yan war reveal ed a curious situation. It appeared that states were no longer waging war anymore. When the press asked harry truman if the u. S. Was at war on the Korean Peninsula, he replied simply, we are not at war and agreed that the u. S. Military instead involved in what was a Police Action. War we must remember was a privilege accorded to only recognize states. Only sovereign entities could engage in what he famously conceptualized as a duel. A a legitimate extension of policymaking involving two recognizable states and nowhere was the issue of political recognition lead more bear than at the negotiation tables at the village located within the 30th parallel of the Korean Peninsula. The United Nations, which was clearly not a nation state, had especially terrored the conflict as an official blinlg rans and this would be a role that the United Nations would not take up again until the first gulf war. And as for china and north korea, the United Nations did not recognize either sate as sovereign entities, thus in the situation, to define what was legitimate warfare was to define who was a legitimate state. At the u. S. Armys press conference on the dodd kidnapping, the Army Official described the situation as such. Quote, the communists are talking with general dodd. It is a one day pulmoen sew. The camp was indeed not on the periphery of the events o the r war, but rather already in the center of the struggle over the stakes of sovereign recognition in the war. These p. O. W. S who had kidnapped dodd quickly entered the global media spotlight because the f figure of if the p. O. W. Was the most contested topic at the armistice negotiations. The p. O. W. S under custody would be free to quote unquote choose whether or not they wanted to return to their homeland upon the signing of the serious fire. They insist ed this was going t be a space of what they called they quickly pointed to the fact that basically, wait, 1949 geneva conventions calls for mandatory repatriation, we need to have more of a discussion here. It quickly became a flash point of a heated controversy about how to regular gait warfare. As the room came under scrutiny. The nature of the encounter became a measure of the respective states legitimacy in its claims or challenges to ideals of liberal governance. This is what was stunning for me in my reserarch that you have this in a moment where different organizations are putting forward the argument that their ger gags room was quoing to goi to be the most efficacious in terms of democrat processes so i found it stunning and thats really how my deeper dive into this began. My book reveals how dean acheson, the south korean president or north korean p premier were contingent upon thousands of acts of disciplining of possible subjects. So the book opens up in both u. S. Occupied south korea and also japanese american internment camps then follows 4,000 japanese americans to r korea, where they served as interrogators during the cokore war. Traces the post war journeys of w. P. O. S. S to india, brazil and argentina and nmaps out the moouchls from americans through the interrogation networks within chinese and north korean p. O. W. Camps. So obviously im not going to be touching upon all of this in my talk today, but during q a, if you have any questions about some of the other ber gags roops, id be very happy to engage with that. Lets begin with how the p. O. W. Became the central issue on the tables and for that, we need the move back to the white house to d. C. So by august of 1951, the newest addition by the trum administration to basically the National Security counsel joints chief of staff, et cetera, et cetera, truman create ethe skro psychological strategy board and the mandate was to basically create the vision, the kind of holistic strategy for psychological warfare for the United States in front of the cold war. So by august of 1951, the psb had already hone d in on the p. O. W. As a possible site on which to con figure the cold war aims of the u. S. Administration. The psb, would essentially provide a purpose for u. S. Military involvement in the fighting on the Korean Peninsula. It was already a difficult task to mobilize mass support behind what truman conceded was a Police Action under the United Nations. So, since one could not fashion a compelling figure of the enemy for this war, the perform sb turned to fashion a figure of less, the p. O. W. , the presence of two states on the Korean Peninsula, one under occupation in the north and the other under u. S. Occupation after a liberation from japanese colonial rule in 1945, in the south, this essentially created a competition between which type of pute tive dekoll nyization was effective and democratic. After the 1948 election from the south the u. S. And the United Nations declared southern republic of korea the only sovereign state on the peninsula. So essentially, to have p. O. W. S, to, not to repate trat to the northern dprk, the democratic peoples republic of korea, would be to validate the u. S. s project of liberation through military occupation in the south. So the psp proposed to consider the p. O. W. S as essentially what they called political refugees, enabling the United States to adhere at least to the principle if not to the letter of the laws of war like the 1949 geneva convention. So whats very important to note here is that from the outset, the u. S. Emphasizes that individual choice is the key element at stake in this gooet over repatriation and the u. S. Sbar ration room of all places is the democratic governance. The negotiations, admiral libby, he recasts voluntary repatriation as freedom of choice and then he counters and says that mandatory repatriation would be like forced repatriation, and he even goes so far to say that the United Nations command proposal is essentially a bill of rights for individuals. So the shear act of saying either yes or no in the Interrogation Room is essentially framed as a moment of liberal individual choice. But theres something puzzling here. Because truman is essentially arguing that the u. S. Is going to have some kind of authority on this issue, because its going to be able to know the desires of the p. O. W. But how could the u. S. Military claim to know the desires of the 173,000 p. O. W. S. Indeed, who were these p. O. W. S . Among the 170,000 p. O. W. S in the camp, were 50,000 p. O. W. S who claim to be from the south originally, people had been drafted or had joined the northern Korean Peoples Army when it had come to the south earlier in the war, and also, if you think about this, if you are a south korean soldier, and then you are taken essentially as a p. O. W. By the north korean army, but then later on, when the u. S. Military is given the green light to cross over the 30th parallel, and if you have those north korean troops surrender to the u. S. Military, what ended up happening was that the u. S. Military would look at the south corner p. O. W. S, who are p. O. W. S for the North Koreans, and said okay, we dont know what to do exactly here. So then everybody became p. O. W. S. So, you actually had south Korean Military officials as p. O. W. S. And thats very important to note. Another thing that was important to note is that after the entrance of the Chinese Volunteer forces into the conflict, and the u. S. Military is being pushed back down towards the 38th parallel, there becomes a new sort of informal policy where the u. S. Military is allowed to round up entire villages. So then you could actually have three generations of a family behind the barbed wire fence. This is important to note because it is a population for whom the u. S. Military was supposedly going to be able to very easily ask yes or no, do you want to go back to your homeland. Obviously, for this kind of population, the question is where is home is a little complicated. And also, it really highlights how, in 1952, the 38th parallel is also not considered to be a natural permanent border. Its really showing how artificial this border is on the ground in terms of thinking about where p. O. W. S are considering either home or what theyre fighting for in terms of a legitimate state on the ground. Now, when we go into the Interrogation Room of the u. S. Military, though, u. S. Military turns out to be less concerned about the p. O. W. S themselves, and much more concerned actually with the interrogator himself. So id like to share with you one particular lecture that was given by Lieutenant Commander samuel c. Bartlett jr. , and he was a u. S. Naval reserve interpreter who had been present at this japanese surrender at iwo jima. And this lecture, gained considerable traction and sish lation within the military intelligence section, for training new interrogators at the heart of bartletts lecture which was titled some aspects of interrogation of oriental p. O. W. S, so at the heart of that was a template for the process of what he called procuring information from an oriental prisoner of war. Quote, while the process is not always quite so simple, began bartlett, it may be likened to a drink out of a coconut. You cut the top off with a ma shet ji and pour it out. There are six steps even in this simple process. First, you must get the coconut. Make sure that there is milk in it. If you cannot see the drawing, it is somebody shaking a coconut. Then you cut it open. You remove the milk. Taste milk for poet ability. And the sixth one for which there was no illustration is it you give it to the thirst pi party. So here, the central primary concern is about how good was the interrogator at controlling the interrogation, at demonstrating a superior intelligence, that effectively rendered the oriental as an object, as transparent, as naive. The claim to know the desires of the korean p. O. W. Was superior rash nasht and ability to governor, the simple yes or in that the korean would supposedly give fit all too well into the logic of the knee even oriental, one with no history. And also, what is very important, as i move to talking about interrogators themselves, this really gives aus frame for thinking about the korean war, not as starting in 1950, but really needing to think about military, about tension, about intelligence techniques, that is really forging the crucible of the asiapacific wars, and thinking about a transpacific and a transwar frame, for the korean war. So this is only an ideal template though. Because in practice, u. S. Military interrogation during the korean war had a really critical challenge. And that was language. During the korean war, in the face of a severe dearth of translator, the u. S. Military drafted and recruited japaneseamericans to serve as interrogators and translators for the war. Approximately 4,000 japaneseamericans were in the korean war serving in some linguistic capacity in the u. S. Military. And the majority of them had spent their adolescence in the interment camps of world war ii, behind barbed wire. John fuji, an Associated Press journalist, wrote article describing the interrogation scene on the post battle, battlefield and here you can see that there are multiple people who are involved in interrogation. So you have lieutenant henry j. Picard, who is from louisiana, who is the head of the interrogation team. The team consisted of six men in total. Which includes picard. You have a chinese civilian and a former korean policeman, who did the initial interrogation, you also have a south corner army lieutenant, who had run up in china and was in japan, conversant in mandarin, japanese, corner and two Second Generation japanese americans, we have First Lieutenant hummuss, from salinas, california, and private fred, another of honolulu. Now i found this particular a. P. Article in the very same archival folder of bartletts lech tours and it actually never made it to press and i believe the u. S. Military officials decided to censor this article in part because fuji essentially revealed the labor involved and the numerous contingent variables involved in the production of a single interrogation report. And i would argue that the most important variable was the supposed consent and desire on the part of the japaneseamerican interrogator to fulfill his own role within this kind of racialized hierarchy of labor. And it is very key also to note that whoever was the head of an interrogation team, that person was always marked as either white or caucasian. So let me introduce you to sammy amoto, when sam yamamot arrived on the island, he was actually instructed to persuade p. O. W. S to not choose repatriation to the northern dprk. And in these repatriation screening Interrogation Rooms, he actually didnt have, this is kind of the one time, he didnt have a white u. S. Military Intelligence Officer presiding. And it appeared that miyomoto himself was to persuade the korean p. O. W. To not repatriate by embodies the asian successfully assimilated as a citizen subject of the u. S. So here, his own consent and desire to participate in the u. S. Project was supposed to be instructive for the postcolonial korean prisoner. So in 2007, i conducted a series of oral history interviews with miyomoto, and in describing his experiences, as a 20yearold interrogator on the island, he recollected that almost without fail, korean communist p. O. W. S would usually sit on the ground, they would spit on the ground, before they entered a u. S. Military Interrogation Room. According to miyomoto, when they noticed him, they didnt spit on the ground. And in fact, they wanted to ask him a question. And this is how miyomoto describes the encounter. So the p. O. W. Actually wanted to know, you are in a concentration camp, your own government put you into a concentration camp, why are you not fighting with us . And miyomoto, very notably, actually replied that, im here because i was ordered to come here. I didnt come here by choice. I was ordered to join the army. And i was ordered to study the korean language. And i was ordered to come here and talk to you about this. So inside the u. S. Military Interrogation Room, we have, what, we have a reluctant interrogator, and we have a defiant korean p. O. W. And both really challenge our ideas of what might be happening in and Interrogation Room during the korean war, and certainly, they both challenge the neets id neat idea that the u. S. Was presenting that oriental decolonization had been accomplished and achieved by the u. S. In south korea, and also that in terms of japaneseamerican internment, the japaneseamericans themselves also had accepted that history. Now, during the dodd kidnapping, the one single most important demand that they were making, so bring us back to kota island, so they wanted the cessation of precisely this, of the repatriation Interrogation Room and the reason why they were asking for the cessation of that was they were claiming that the u. S. Was forcing subjects of the dprk to essentially renounce the state sovereign claim over them. So lets return to compound 76 in may 1952. For the three days that dodd was in the p. O. W. Compound, he actually had to attend multiple meetings with the p. O. W. S. The p. O. W. S collectively formed the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Volunteer prisoners of war representatives association. And dodd signed papers recognizing this representative organization. This active writing by dodd was central to the project of the p. O. W. S. And this is really where actually the p. O. W. S demand for thousand sheets of paper is really significant for us to take notice. Their demand for paper was to create a bureaucracy that would approach the p. O. W. As a subject of a state, not simply a wartime category. Using their position as prisoners of war, these representatives in turn forced the International Community to ask what type of political collective body the dprk was. And to argue that it was a legitimate state. So here, having us really think through compound 76 as being a space of a diplomatic negotiation. So the p. O. W. S were acutely aware of their position on the international stage, and now they were claiming the ability to govern the p. O. W. Themselves. And it was this very claim that became the transgression that the u. S. Military would later label as a mutiny. Now, once the p. O. W. S brought d. O. D. Into their dodd into the compound tent, it was clear that the kidnapping had been carefully advanced in advance. The p. O. W. S had prepared a tidy room for him and a guard was placed there, where pows later in the interrogation would say that the guard was there to maintain dodds prestige. Dodd went to theatrical performances in the evening, really more like a diplomatic guest. He didnt eat the p. O. W. Rations. They got separate food for him through the barbed wire fence. And they even arranged to have a doctor examine him. And this is a p. O. W. Who can served as the compound doctor, not a member of the representative association. I always feel that he seems a little bit startled in his photo. And in his interrogation, he gives us this story. He says that hes called over to the tent, in the compound, to examine dodd, and once he arrived, this is the scene that he sees. Upon arrival at the tent, general dodd was taking a bath in a metal tub made from an oil drum. About three p. O. W. Monitors were washing the generals body. When the general had finished bathing, i examined his finger and knees and observed they were hearing. Then he listens to his heart, he appeared to be in good condition, and leaving, the general gave me a pack of cigarettes. So the scene where dodd is being bathed by three p. O. W. S, and then the careful medical attention that he receives really tows the line between an assertion of a complete surveillance over his body and also the offer of special services to an elite guest. Dodd was unmistakebly a prisoner himself, under the care of of his captor, yet there is no reversal of a binariy hierarchy of power between a p. O. W. Chasm commander and the p. O. W. S. Instead the p. O. W. S carefully mark both dodds body and the space at the compound itself to establish and assert dodds authority, which they then make explicitly contingent on their own authority as a collective of representatives for the p. O. W. Camp. Now, during the war, the u. S. Military was frustrated that american p. O. W. S on the other hand had not committed a mutiny of their own, in the chinese and north korean camps during the war. The u. S. Proposal for voluntary repatriation, along with the insistence that the p. O. W. Was able to exercise individual free will, and execute choice without duress in American Military Interrogation Rooms, this actually later becomes an unexpected doubleedged sword for the u. S. , because after the signing of the cease fire, 21 american p. O. W. S choose to stay in china. With the proposal for voluntary p. O. W. Repatriation, the u. S. Had essentially turned an historically vulnerable figure of the laws of war into a political subject of the International Community. One who can make a choice and was under the egis of the United Nations. However, when confronted with these 21 p. O. W. S who chose to stay in china, the u. S. Military government and public had to neutralize these american p. O. W. S and the potential visibility of their politics, by rendering them again as vulnerable subjects. And this is where Brain Washing becomes the term that grabs the media spotlight. So what did every day interrogation look like . Especially under north korean interrogators . In the mandatory interrogation by the, conducted by the u. S. Counterintelligence core after his release from the north korean and chinese p. O. W. Camp, richard artisani jr. , a Master Sergeant in the u. S. Army, recalled a korean major who was responsible for individually questioning every p. O. W. He was a quote englishspeaking korean. 25 years of age. And it would take about one hour for each interrogation, and p. O. W. S would have to give their name, rank, serial number, and actually the respective incomes of their parents also. After that, this korean major posed a last question that artisani would actually hear at the end of many interrogations to come. And this was, state your hopes and desires. Again, a quote from artisani, he was very sincere, and appeared to have no hatred for americans. And after posing the final question to artisani, the major wanted to explain his own hopes and desires. And again, according to artisani, the major stated that, quote, his individual hopes and desires were for the americans and chinese to leave korea. And for the koreans to leave, to live in peace. So here, i decided to focus on north korean rather than chinese interrogators. Because theres actually a critical difference that comes down the archive, which is that chinese interrogators which were much more interested in technical and tactical information which makes a lot of sense because many chinese troops were on the ground. However, with the north korean interrogators, i find that they were more interested in establishing what you might call a more horizontal relationship with the u. S. P. O. W. , and what i considered to be a form of internationalism. So for example, in december, 1951, which is one year later than artisanis in take interrogation, another p. O. W. Named sheldon foss talks about, experiences a different kind of interrogation, more extensive, by north korean interrogators, so two corner lieutenant colonels, one supposedly named kim, and the other zun, took foss to a korean home outside the camp telling foss that they quote just wanted to have a talk with him on general matters pertaining to life in u. S. And korea, so they give him cigarettes, they give him tea, they give him brandy, they sing together, home sweet home, home on the range, my old kentucky home, and you are my sunshine. Later on, sheldon foss would say to the u. S. Military interrogator that he thinks that kim especially knew these songs because he may have been educated by a u. S. Missionary at some point. So at a certain point, the conversation then takes a turn toward controversial political subjects such as the workers plight in the u. S. , the success of communism in korea and why not in the u. S. , et cetera. Foss then, he actually quotes excerpts from marx and engels as a way to kind of goad more information from kim and zun. And then towards the end of this very extensive interrogation, kim and zun bring foss back to the camp. And as theyre walking back to the camp, according to foss, kim turns to him and says dont tell the chinese about what just happened. Quote, the chinese did not understand the problem. And the cpf was in the as clever as they thought they were. And kim also emphasized that north korean communists were closer to the desired level of development. And before they parted ways, kim insisted and advised foss to make sure that he went to a university upon return to the u. S. , and to study political science. And the university that was recommended to him was the university of new mexico. So in the portrait of these oriental interrogators, as im going through the archives, something very stunning starts emerging. Which is not that the chinese and korean interrogators themselves had attended universities in the United States or they may have, the chinese interrogator may have had longer ties with the oss, right, during world war ii. But it is really these interrogators that make the u. S. Military very nervous, and this is a list of the books that were available in the library of camp number five, which really illustrates pretty extensive understanding and knowledge about literature in the west, that deals with class and with race. Now, for the u. S. Military, they had to create a summary of findings, based on all of the interrogations that the u. S. Counterintelligence core was doing of returning p. O. W. S. And they had to publish a report. Now, in this report, it is very clear that the thing that is really puzzling the most is the oriental interrogator and here they say, well, its true that some physical measures were employed, these considered chiefly of isolation in a small space, a few sharp blows relatively mild beatings and this is all falling very far short of the finger nail pulling and elaborate castration and other tortures popularly associated with oriental captivity. So here what is troubling the military officials and psychiatrists is that if the chinese and north korean Interrogation Rooms are devoid of torture as the americans claim that theirs were, a precarious proximity occurs between the liberal bureaucratic space of the american Interrogation Room and that of the north korean and chinese. The report writers then characterize the oriental Interrogation Room as quote a lesson in the anatomy of seduction and subversion. And they argue that the oriental interrogation techniques, although not outright torture, were not rational and appealed only to base instincts and desires. So this targeting of desires as irrational is key in understanding how race and class mayed a very Important Role in the boards explanation and reliance on the idea of Brain Washing. The p. O. W. S marked for interrogation were either soldiers of color or from the working class. Indeed the three p. O. W. S singled out by the u. S. Military as quote potential me nases to the u. S. Includes an africanamerican, a filipino, and a japaneseamerican. The u. S. Military attempted to portray the internationalism espoused by the north korean and its potential appeal to certain american p. O. W. S, as irrational desire. Thus, the utility of the frame, of brainwashing. Now, the Investigation Report juxtaposes this with what they considered rational behavior exhibited by p. O. W. S in the camps, so for example, the ku klux klan. The u. S. Military evaluation of all of these interrogations concludes that this organization which was formed in most of the camps and the membership included a few wellmeaning individuals who sent anonymous notes, bearing the signature kkk, and beatings were also administered to progressives and informers. So when an american p. O. W. , like africanamerican clarence adams, who is one of the 21 p. O. W. S who decides to stay in china, when he announces after the signing of the ceasefire that he is now repatriating to the u. S. As an act of protest against Jim Crow Society in america, we can understand how the experience of threatened violence by White Supremacy was neither abstract nor distant for american p. O. W. S in p. O. W. Camps along the yalu river. So at first glance, it appears that these, the u. S. Military really incorrectly theorizes the oriental interrogator. But i think that the deeper anxiety, at the heart of this inquiry, was that the oriental interrogator might have correctly theorized the american u. S. , the american p. O. W. , or soldier, or citizen. In fact, the underlying fear i guess we could sum up in one question, would be what if the oriental knew the american better than he did himself . So in the u. S. Foreign policy history, the korean war often garners significance because it was the catalyst in effect for the implementation of nsc 68, what is often called the blueprint of the National Security state for u. S. Cold war ambitions. Theres an operative statement made by the secretary of state dean atchison and director of policy planning paul nitsa in 1953 when theyre reflecting back on u. S. Involvement, on the Korean Peninsula, in june 1950. And the quote goes, and i think quite a few of you already know this quote, the quote is, korea came along and saved us, right . Korea came along and gave us the impetus and the reason to implement the broad vision of nsc68. Atchison then goes to state on a little bit more in detail, he says, quote, korea moved a great many things from the realm of theory and brought them right into the realm of actuality and the realm of urgency. Now, what is remarkable about these lives of interrogators and p. O. W. S is they attest to a critical shift that happened on the level of Global Politics during the korean war. Through the Interrogation Room, both ordinary and exceptional, we see how the individual person became the terrain for warfare and also its just ad bellum, in the mid 20th century during the post colonial war that was supposedly officially not a war. By moving the story into the Interrogation Room, we can extend the significance of the korean war, this currently ongoing war, much further than it being a onetime flash point. Interrogation also was not a onetime event. It was a veritable landscape ordinary people had to navigate and negotiate over and over again. We can extend the histories to before the korean war outbreak in june 1950, to both the intelligence and interrogation networks established by the u. S. Cic, and south korea, and going back to the japanese american internment camps in arizona and beyond, and we can also follow someone like clarence adams, who was from memphis, tennessee, and he had decided to stay in china, in anticipation of the cultural revolution, he then decides to come back to memphis, tennessee. Hes hounded by the fbi. Hes called up by the house of unamerican activities committee. And also, hounded by the kkk. Hes unable to find work in memphis, tennessee, because of this red baiting. And so he sets up the very first chop suey Chinese Restaurant in memphis, tennessee. So on the level of the on the ground experience of this war, we must ask exactly where is this ongoing korean war, and its legacy . Where is the korean war in our ever day . Thank you very much. [ applause ] thank you so much. Now, we open up for comments and questions. The ground rules are simple. Please wait until youre called on. Wait for the microphone to reach you. Please use the microphone. And identify yourself before you ask your question. I will take cochair prerogative to start off with what is perhaps a basic question, to ask you to elaborate on one of the things of talk and something you go into at great length in the book, and this is the meaning behind and the nuisance to which voluntary repatriation is put. So could you say just a little bit more about how the u. S. Arrives at this policy that proved to be so sticky in negotiations, what kind of informed that thinking . Is this really about kind of creating a space for liberal individualism where an individual can then define, visavis states where, in this case, he or she wants to go . And the extent to which this is a doubleedged sword. So the end of the paper talks about those who do, from the american side, who dont go back either, and this proves to be a propaganda bonanza for the North Koreans. So what started off as something the americans were really pushing, wound up hurting them to some extent, at least in the propaganda realm or am i misreading that or mishearing that . Thank you, eric. So the voluntary repatriation proposal, so again, historians have thought about this as a real propaganda ploy. And it is. Right . However, it really touches upon this moment, i think, where you have a war thats called a Police Action and not officially a war. And this idea that to conduct a military intervention on behalf of an imagined individual on the ground, this i think is the key element here, where u. S. Wars of intervention, theyre not going to be considered official wars anymore, but they are always waged on behalf of an individual on the ground. So 1952, i feel that this is a moment where that kind of hallmark and shift happens. Also, for the voluntary repatriation proposal, the psp is really thinking about the p. O. W. , because theyre looking ahead to the San Francisco peace treaty conference with japan, and they are concerned that globally, the u. S. Is not having the same kind of support as it did immediately post45. And so to again create a p. O. W. , an individual, whom the u. S. Was going to rescue, this really was considered to be a possible buoying of u. S. Kind of pudgemonic power and also an example of the promises of the liberalism. Great. Thank you. Lots of material here. And lots of questions come to mind. But lets me sk also perhaps start off by asking a little bit about your sources here, at the home of the National History project, where we are obsessed with Empirical Data and ar kifl source, and i would love to hear a little bit more about the archival, the source, foundation, for your work, and secondly, perhaps also in conjunction with that, maybe you can just tell aus little bit, how you came to the subject of your book. So thats quite a bit. Well i came to the book through the archive. And i knew that going in, i wanted to write a history of the korean war that was more bottom up than topdown. Also as Second Generation koreanamerican, i grew up with this war, but the war was both everywhere and nowhere at the same time. It was nowhere in terms of the history textbooks. It wasnt spoken about either within my family. But it certainly was everywhere. And i understood that it was a huge part of and thinking through how global geopolitics, which we often think about as happening at very elite levels, that actually ordinary people are navigating and understanding global geopolitics themselves. And interrogation became a place that seemed to really crystallize these kinds of knowledges and navigations. So because i was starting out with a bottomup kind of perspective of the korean war, i went to the Inspector General files, of the u. S. Army, because the Inspector General investigates soldiers complaints. So im going through these files. And im very much focused, as i think we all would be, on the content of the interrogation reports and summaries. And then one day, i noticed that the name of the interrogator was someone like George Yamamoto or jimmy tanaka and thats when i realized that i had entirely taken for granted what was actually happening in the Interrogation Room, what language it was in, and jimmy or, jimmy tanak or George Yamamoto, they sounded like japaneseamerican names to me, so that also opened up an entire line of inquiry for me. So as im going down further, in terms of that research, at the same time im also really looking for different kinds of interrogation reports, having a sense of, for example, there are investigation case files, for the camp, theres over 300 of them, in terms of any investigation into murder, suicide, harm, injury, and so that became one place to sort of understand what was happening in the p. O. W. Camps. What became very clear by doing that was that the u. S. Military Interrogation Room was certainly not the only time a p. O. W. Would be interrogated. And this became very important for me in the book, which was to show literally an ecosystem of interrogation, where you would have south corner paramilitary youth groups organizing within the p. O. W. Camps and creating their own Interrogation Rooms where they would interrogate p. O. W. S coming out of u. S. Military Interrogation Rooms so it is something about that kind of density of experience and how people were negotiating that, that was very important. Another thing was a lot of freedom of information acts, as you would know, from the work at National Security archive, and so what happened with that, with the good work of archivists at the national archive, after nine years, over a thousand interrogation case files, and these are the interrogation case files of u. S. Counterintelligence corps, interrogating u. S. P. O. W. S, returning from north korean and chinese p. O. W. Camps, about their experiences of interrogation. So it is a bit of a roomful of mirrors. But i decided that, okay, if i really go through this, and if i can see certain kinds of patterns, or things that are somewhat surprising, because theres a lot at stake for these u. S. P. O. W. S coming back, they know that if they say anything that sounds like at all that they had quoteunquote been sympathetic, or had really learned something, lets say, from north korean and chinese instructors at the camps, that they could be marked for the rest of their lives. However, many startling things came to the for. And so thats what i was really looking at. Thank you. Lets open it up. Who would like to start . Start up front here. And if kuwait for tyou could, w microphone. Its coming. You know the role. Was there any fallout from the u. S. Experience of involuntary repatriation at the end of world war ii . So i asked myself that very same question. And certainly, you would assume that its trumans concern over that very question that then spurs on this voluntary repatriation proposal. However, when you look at psp decision making, this is less about visavis whats happening in terms of western europe, and the soviets, and much more about creating an individual thats going to, or a subject thats going to rally a kind of american consensus for u. S. Involvement, continued involvement in the korean war. Yes . Im, thank you for your presentation. I just, i have a new site that the war is not just about a political decision, but its about matters of human beings, including some p. O. W. S and a lot of interrogators, so my question is about the decision that was made by, at the time, actually in 1953, the south corner president decided to release many anticommunist p. O. W. S from korea, actually his decision was not about repatriation but is about some individual choice, and his political decisions, it would become the fundamental bedrock for making the mature defense treaty between two countries . What do you think about his decision . So i have an entire chapter dedicated to that very question. It is a very important question. So i guess for those who might not be so familiar with all of the details involved with this, because the south Korean Military was under the aegis of the u. S. And United Nations command, south korea, there was no south corner delegate at the table at pung mon jong. So singmonri used the p. O. W. Issue as a way to articulate certain kinds of limits that he wanted to put, in terms of u. S. Ambitions. Visavis what was happening in the korean conflict. Its also an important thing that youre bringing up. When he decides to, so it basically happens at midnight, right, so its midnight, and south Korean Military all over the peninsula, at different camps, they cut open the barbed wire fences at certain camps and it is the anticommunist p. O. W. S who come out and often the story about this moment is this is sing mundri being realistic, et cetera, et cetera. However, if you look very closely about who is helping coordinate that very mission, lets say, there are anticommunist southkorean youth groups who have organized within these p. O. W. Camps, and they are within the same history as the anticommunist youth groups like northwest young mens association, who were very close in working with the u. S. Cic during the u. S. Military occupation. So its, on the one hand, simply a continuation, right, of that kind of close collaboration, and the kind of power that it really shows how much power paramilitary youth groups had gained over the on paticcupatio period and theyre now considered basically by sigmund ri, as an extension of his own military, right . So absolutely, him doing that was, was a statement of, assertion of his own kind of sovereignty, right of sovereignty, over his own military. Thank you. Yes. Thank you for your talk. My name is micah kepsick, a junior scholar here at the Wilson Center. I wanted to ask about the recasting of repatriation, as voluntary. As im working for a Research Unit both at my Home University which is researching voluntariyness, and i wanted to ask how, if you could talk about the direct connection, about the legitimizing of the u. S. Intervention, by recasting it into voluntary repatriation, to the geneva convention, the condition venti convention of 1951 and how, or if there are direct connections to later repatriation, on a global level, that is based on voluntary repatriation . Thank you so much. So the somewhat surprising thing when you kind of go a little bit further into, for example, Something Like the red cross archives, with the discussion around the 1949 geneva conventions, and there was a whole discussion, absolutely, about repatriation of p. O. W. S and soldiers post45. And the u. S. Delegate and also the soviet tell gat botell gat both voted not to allow voluntary repatriation so that mandatory repatriation had to be the case. And for me, with this, with the korean war case, the reason why it gets a little difficult to kind of peel back the layers, is that the whole issue about voluntariness, which is individual choice, ends up being cover, right, for what is happening on the grown, which is that the 30th parallel is not operating as some kind of discrete boundary between two separate states, and two separate peoples. And that actually, whats really happening is on the ground, is people, how do you say, so that p. O. W. S themselves are arguing that actually we are p. O. W. S, our states have a kind of claim to us, et cetera, et cetera, and then the u. S. By fashioning this as kind of a choice, then also continues basically what the 38th parallel has thrown into relief, which is that for nobody on the Korean Peninsula at that point, does anyone think that decolonization actually finish, right . There is no agreement about what a liberated sovereign choern post colonial state. Is so by moving the pieces so quickly to voluntary and individual choice, it really bypasses this more critical structural material element of everyones experiences and what is really at stake on the ground. Im a little confused, im bruce guthrie, who is also still confused, in your talk, you talked about the japanese interrogators who were americans, or whatever, was that, were the same teams interrogating both camps in the north and in the south . And you talked about the 21 who decided not to repatriate to the u. S. , although you only had pictures of 20, how many on the other side chose not to be repatriated . Okay. So maybe ill start out with the numbers question. The numbers question doesnt quite get at the full story. But for korean p. O. W. S, those who could repatriate to north korea, they repatriated over 90 . And you could say the same thing in terms of south korea, so the propaganda win lets say for the United States really happened more in terms of chinese p. O. W. S. However, an historian named david check chang is coming out with a book specifically on looking at chinese p. O. W. S experiences, and he discusses how the choice about whether or not to go to china or to for mow is a at the end of the ceasefire was not related to the kinds of provisions that the u. S. Had laid out but it was very much prewar, right, political life that had already been built in among their communities. So for the interrogators though, the japaneseamerican interrogators they were working for the u. S. Military, and so the u. S. Military, because of chinese and then asian exclusion acts which were passed in late 1800s, not a very large koreanamerican community to draw upon. Once the korean war breaks out. So thats why they turn to the japaneseamericans. Because they reason that, well, korea was colonized under the japanese, many of them probably remember japanese, and perhaps they would talk in japanese. And so thats why they turned to the japanese americans. And either asked them to volunteer, or also drafted quite a few of them for the war. As you can imagine, the korean p. O. W. S, this is about five years after liberation, theyre not necessarily going to be so keen on speaking japanese in the Interrogation Room, but that is kind of the larger sort of structural reason why the u. S. Turns to japaneseamericans. Just a quick followup, were you able to find any documents relating to the rationale behind employing japaneseamerican force this . I mean was this a purposeful yes, yes, so precisely what i had just mentioned, so that does appear in documents. And there is a whole discussion also about again, what i mentioned about kind of this racial, sort of almost hierarchy that starts happening, so the japaneseamerican interrogator was not considered to be as loyal or as reliable as a white caucasian interrogator. But the japaneseamerican interrogator was more loyal and more reliable than a korean civilian translator. Right . So you would always see a kind of matrix, lets say, in different configurations of people being employed for these interrogation teams. Thank you. Hazel smith . Hi, hazel smith. Thanks for that really interesting stretch and i am sorry i missed the first five minutes, i had to come from somewhere else, i have, first of all, i think the real, for me, it was so fascinating to hear all of them peer cal material from your research, i mean this whole interesting dimensions about ethnicity, and the japanese interrogators, and multiple levels of meetings that brought to interrogation at the individual level and also in terms of what that meant for the state, absolutely fantastic, and i really found, you know, it is clear that this is a massive contribution to knowledge, and i cant wait to see the rest of the book. I want it ask you though, of all of these various interesting things, whats your big takeaway . Because i get that this is a contribution, a, really a contribution to knowledge, i guess that were looking at this complicated relationship between the individual and the interrogators, and this brings a whole different level of analysis, to one were thinking about, both wartime and postwar peace, and i get that almost on sort of a truism level, the policy of voluntary quoteunquote choice, there would be some level of hope and aspiration that maybe all of the North Koreans would choose to go elsewhere, and that would support the ideology, which people believed in, that North Koreans were, were just all soviet puppets. So all of those interesting things have challenged, quite rightly challenged the overall views. But whats your big takeaway from this, in terms of how would any of this, any of these insights that youve got apply to other wars, to other peacebuilding processes, to how we think, for instance, about these days, knowledge that is gained from defectors, so whats the big takeaway from it . Thank you so much, hazel. So certainly, for me, once im deep inside the writing, with all of the research, one of the things that really came to the fore for me, is writing a history of the korean war, and taking very seriously the stakes of formal decolonization, right . And not necessarily being just within kind of the cold war buy nary of the u. S. And soviets. That probably at this point seems rather obvious once youre on the ground, right . And what i was really interested in, so first of all, often, when we think about Interrogation Room, right, a lot of the outrage coalesces around torture. And i was actually much more interested in figuring out what kind of landscape, lets say, right, does interrogation actually create on the ground, in terms of work there, and peoples experiences. And so as i was going further and further into that, i then realized that, okay, Interrogation Rooms, and the kind of reliance here on the individual person, and the Interrogation Room is not supposed to produce information, right . The Interrogation Room is supposed to produce a certain kind of subject. And the u. S. , which is often saying that this is, you know, other states kinds of projects, the u. S. Is absolutely right there in terms of that project. And then you have that kind of resonance in terms of thinking about selfcriticism, right, and this kind of, and north korean and chinese, this selftransformation, in terms of positioning yourself as an individual visavis the collector, right, for the u. S. What i see is that kind of logic, lets say, you can see that operating also on the level of, for example, the kind of different strategies that start developing in terms of bombing. So for the perform sp, as theyre really concerned about the p. O. W. Issue, theyre also saying, well, in order to im pocket what is going on at pum rungjum, we are also going to create a leaflet, right, campaign, where individuals on the ground, well bomb, leaflet bomb different civilian site, and people can choose whether or not they leave the site, before the bombing happens. And so because of the u. S. Bombing of north korea, that it was so devastating, as i was doing more work, to realize that the language, lets say, of kind of voluntariyness, to see how that actually also helps facilitate the development of Something Like mass bombing, right . This is when i was like, okay, theres something going on here, in terms of Interrogation Rooms, that actually have to do with a kind of fashioning of warfare, that is really a hallmark i think of the United States, especially in the latter half of the 20th century. All the way in the back. Hi, how are you guys . My name is caroline desen, im a student at the George Washington university studying international affair, thank you a lot for being here, i really enjoy your book and im excited to finish it. So my main question is surrounding the general frustration i have with the whole war in korea being discussed as a proxy for u. S. And ussr interest. And i understand that that man tests itself to a certain degree in square gation rooms back to you both sides were trying to get the prisoners to choose their own identity, and their way of life. But i was wondering if you could talk a little bit about more about how the Interrogation Rooms and korean war itself shaped north and south korean identity, and those ways, because before japanese colonization and everything, there was no two koreas, so how did the Interrogation Rooms and that interpersonal connection create two koreas . So i think im going to, well, thank you for that question, i think maybe the best way to approach that question is to think about the legacies, right, of, so with people, within the Interrogation Room, of the korean war, are negotiating and having to anticipate different kinds powers. Right . After the war, how are they then continuing to do that . And how does that impact actually how social and political relations play out . Now, for for south korea, one thing that i had realized through my research was that for the p. O. W. S in the camp, when they were, for example, released, so they all knew that at sam point, that they wanted to stay in south korea, but there was a lot at stake, though, because being p. O. W. S, they were always going to be marked as, quote unquote, suspicio suspicious, right . And for those of them who were not from south cree yekorea, th didnt have the village and kinship networks to show other people to show theyre reliably either communist or reliably anticommunist. And so one of the things that was very important for me to take a look at is it okay if i just sure. Is actually so these are many more interrogation moments. So i had mentioned earlier about the paramilitary south korean youth groups, the anticommunist ones, and in the p. O. W. Camps, again, as i had mentioned, they had created almost their own kind of system of interrogation that was in play with u. S. Military interrogation. And what began happening was they incorporated tattooing practices and so with the high stakes of thinking about whats happening with in the leadup to 1950, under u. S. Military occupation, there was unbelievable civilian massacres that were happening, and the whole line between how you were considered to be communist or anticommunist was incredibly precarious. And so p. O. W. S began to use tattooing as a way to either mark themselves as being reliably anticommunist, so that even beyond the barbed wire fence, they would be considered to be anticommunist or this could you could also look at this practice as a way to possibly punish people and to prevent them from going to the dprk, to north korea, because they would be tattooed as such. And im bringing this up because the way the u. S. Military portrayed these tattooing practices was this was barbaric, they dont understand rational political governance and this is why theyre resorting to tattooing. But actually, this this is coming out of, actually, their experiences under u. S. Military occupation and the support of these rightist paramilitary youth groups that extend into the p. O. W. Camps of the korean war, so i know that doesnt quite address the fullness of what you were asking for, but i think thats one way for me to think through. How are people if this is one way that we can see people on the ground negotiating and understanding global geopolitics, then according to them, what is the global geopolitics postceasefire and also according to the global geopolitics, what do they consider to be the possible opportunity for thinking about peace . On the Korean Peninsula. So this raises a question thats been on my mind and that has to do with the extent to which at least the american sector, how much control do the u. S. Military actually have over the camps, themselves . I mean, theres a whole operation taking place here with these rightwing youth groups that clearly, i mean, and this is these are folks who are ostensibly somewhat allied with the United States, but the u. S. Does not control. The North Koreans, the chinese, also control their sectors and discipline their populations. So does the United States military not attempt to impose some greater degree of control or order because they cant . And then the flip would be whats going on on the other side in the 38th parallel, we dont get a clear as clear a picture in what you write about that, but there is a sense that you do have different groups of american prisoners, you refer to the kkk in one of those slides who are disciplining those american p. O. W. S who might become more sympathetic, so clearly the North Koreans and chinese dont have control, fully, over their p. O. W. Populations, either. So this was just something that struck me, i was wondering if you could reflect on. Thats a great question. This, im going to use this also to fill in a little bit more of the question you also asked me. So the paramilitary youth groups in the u. S. P. O. W. Camps, youre right, it doesnt really seem like the u. S. Military has all that much control but thats actually precisely the point. So the uscic, which had developed incredibly Close Relationships with these paramilitary use groups during the u. S. Occupation period, is replicating precisely that relationship here. So the uscic, counterintelligence corps, is very much not only in touch with with the paramilitary youth groups in the p. O. W. Camps but they have actually placed people there, right, who they consider to be important conduits, right . So youre right that theres no absolute control at all. Just like the u. S. Military occupationing there wasnt necessari necessarily control over the paramilitary youth groups, theyd provide the kind of information i think there was something along the lines of i think only 89 american intelligence intelligence people available during the u. S. Military occupation period, which is just not enough for covering all of south crkorea. Right . So they really relied on these groups. Another thing, this opens up another legacy of the fwhwar ine occupation period which is the uscic helps create the korean counterintelligence corps at the end of the occupation period which will then develop later on into the korean cia. So these these longer legacies that are structural and you could also say maybe the u. S. Doesnt control the korean cia or the nis, however, theres a very deep and embedded relationship there. In terms of the u. S. P. O. W. S north of the 38th parallel, yes, the the north korean and chinese guards and instructors, whats very what was so frustrating for the u. S. Military psychiatrists about the u. S. P. O. W. S was there was no fence around any of these camps. Near the yelu river. So they kept on asking why, why have these u. S. P. O. W. S never why didnt they attempt to escape . Well, i think they didnt attempt to escape because they might have stuck out a little bit maybe in terms of if they went into a korean village i think, you know, theyre hedging their bets on that one. But whats very interesting, again, also, about the north korea and chinese interrogators and the instructors was that youre right, they didnt want to have perfect control because it ended up being a project about persuasion. Right . And opening up that kind of space, right, for either you can call it political solidarity, you can call it political propaganda, but i think if they had exerted a lot of control, that would have been very difficult for them to argue for that. Thank you. So, youve only been able to touch upon some of the many issues in the book, but just fyi, the book is available for purchase outside of this room. Where you can read about the subjects covered and many, many more. Next monday october 7th, we welcome author james mcadam, speaking about vanguard of the revolution the global idea of the communist party in a presentation entitled mel colo colom ancholy. You can join us for reception next door. Thank you to our participants at the seminar and, of course, thank you to monica kim. Thank you very much. [ applause ] youre watching American History tv. All weekend, every weekend on cspan3. Part of the new york public librarys schomburg center, lupidus center, hosts an annual conference. 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