Transcripts For CSPAN3 Boeing CEO Govt Officials Testify On 737 MAX 20240713

This hearing will come to order. Thank you all for being here today. One year ago today, lyon air 610 crashed into the sea in jakarta indonesia. All 189 people on board were killed. A few months later, an Ethiopian Air flight departed, and flight 302 experienced problems shortly after takeoff and crashed. All 157 persons on board died. Both of these accidents were entirely preventible. We cannot fathom the pain experienced by the families of those 346 human beings who were lost. Many family members are here today and we appreciate their attendance. I appreciate many of them meeting with members of the committee over time. As chairman of this committee, i promise their loved ones were working to obtain a full answer as to how to prevent future tragedies. These families deserve answers, accountability and action. And the public deserves no less. The type of aircraft involved in both accidents is a 737 max 8. Manufactured by boeing. International aviation safety regulators began grounding the max the day after the ethiopian crash. On march 13th, federal Aviation Administration formally grounded the aircraft in the United States. The maxs return to service is contingent on boeings work with the faa to work on fixes to the mcast system. International regulators also need to be verified that it is safe to fly. As a certification process continues, many questions remain about boeings actions. And the faas actions during the design, development, and certification processes, as well as the operation of the max. Todays hearing is divided into two panels. Let me know for senators, that the committee will follow regular order in recognition of both panels. The five minute rule will be enforced strictly. Denn Dennis Mullenberg will testify. He is joined by a witness who will provide Technical Expertise. Robert somwalt and chris hart. Chairman somwalt oversees the ntsb which recently released recommendations regarding the max 8 certifications. The jetr has submitted recommendations to the faa. He is a private citizen today who agreed to lead the jetr. We have many concerns that boeing should address today. We need to know if boeing and the faa rushed to certify the max. In particular, critics have focused on the mcast development and testing. Boeing has been criticized with the communication with the faa, particularly after the system was modified to activate at lower air speeds. The jetr also criticized the faa for relying on outdated regulations, guidance and certification procedures and foiling to incorporate realistic human everybody into his assumptions. Boeing and faas assumptions were called into question about pilot reaction during mcast activation. These questions were specially important for stressful situations with multiple alerts going off in the cockpit. Our witnesses should address the company and safety regulators actions regarding max certification in general and mcast in particular. The process for certifying the max necessitated a closed partnership between boeing and faa. Under a decades old system called Organization Design authorization, or oda, the faa has delegated certain certification activities to the oda holder. In this case, boeing. While the oda has been used to certify many aircraft over the years, some have criticized the system for permitting an inappropriately close relationship between companies and their safety regulator. Indeed, email correspondence dating from as early as 2015, between the maxs former chief technical pilot, mark fortner, and faa personnel released on october 18th reflect a disturbing level of casualness and flippancy that seem to corroborate these criticisms. I was disappointed to learn of a november, 2016, instant message conversation between mr. Fortner and a colleague in which he acknowledged misinforming the faa. Boeing should have notified the faa about that conversation immediately upon its discovery. Although faa is not testifying today, let me express my frustration with the agencys lack of responsiveness to my request dating back to april of this year for documents relevant to the 737 max as part of the investigation that i opened as chairman based on whistleblower disclosures. The relationship between regulating agencies and organizations they regulate is important. But so are the internal reforms that boeing has implemented. Witnesses should provide their views on whether or not reforms are needed. I invite mr. Mullenburg to describe the steps boeing is taking to improve aviation safety and to insure that technical experts never experience undue pressure to put profits and relationships ahead of safety. The committees oversight is not limited to past actions. The reviews note that future Aircraft Systems are likely to be even more complex and interdependent than current mode models. Managing interfaces between humans and machines will become even more important as automation increases. At the same time, commercial aviation is set to continue expanding around the globe. Many future pilots will fly in countries without the same training requirements and Safety Standards that we have in the United States. We welcome the witnesses thoughts on how to improve Design Development and certification in the future to account for these major changes. This hearing will by no means end our inquiry. Additional oversight hearings will be held. The committee will review the final lyon air report which was released on friday as well as the Ethiopian Airlines report. The committee will consider the recommendations and findings from all investigations and rooevz. I now recognize the distinguished Ranking Member, senator cantwell. I too want to take a moment and recognize the families who have lost loved ones in both the Ethiopian Airlines and lyon air tragedies, some of whom are here with us today. I cant imagine the loss and the enduring pain you must feel. I thank you for your vigilance on this issue, just as we have seen the families of other crashes help us for the future. These families, millions of Airline Passengers and 150,000 Aerospace Workers want to know what were doing to fix what went wrong and what did go wrong. To date, we havent gotten all those answers. Hopefully todays hearing will help provide some. But one thing is crystal clear. If you want to be the leader in aviation manufacturing, you have to be the leader in aviation safety. Aviation demand, especially for 737s is exploding to 101 growth over the next ten years. Something like 35,000 planes and 3 trillion. I think thats actually 20 years. We cannot have a race for commercial airplanes become a race to the bottom when it comes to safety. The company, the board, cannot prioritize profits over safety, safety always has to be job one. So it is troubling to hear that boeing may have skirted the faa certification process over a desire by airlines to have more fuel efficient planes but without Pilot Training. This issue of lowering standards is permeating through all of aviation. Were dealing with it here in the committee, my democratic colleagues have led the charge to try to stop companies coming here to say they dont want to have the same training for copilots on the regional jets because they dont have enough pilots or the issue my colleague has championed on rest requirements for cargo pilots having the same requirements for rest as passenger planes. Thank god captain sullenberger made it clear when youre in an emergency, the pilot and copilot dont have time a lot of time to communicate. Thats why today we need answers to how the first 737 max certification process was done, and we especially need transparency on this process of review before the 737 max is put in the air again. The public needs to know and fully understand what testing, what review, what processes were conducted both by boeing and the faa before this plane is put back in the air. We also want to know today about boeings Safety Culture. Whether boeing employees raised safety concerns that were not listened to. Whether there was enough testing and complex information into a cockpit alert system we all know was flawed. And whether there was even enough data presented to the faa. These are all questions that are important, including outsourcing of engineering and coding. There are many questions about software and cockpit information and overload. Laws are clear when it comes to the standards for certification. Yes, software and automation flight training, better rest requirements for pilots have all led to ten years between 2009 to 2018 as the safest ten years in aviation history. But more software and more automation without robust Third Party Testing and validation will lead us to where we are today. We should note that the last five aviation accidents have all involved this issue of automation and pilot response to automation. Whether its lyon air, ethiopian, the asiana, french or qua quantas 330 accidents, th. Thats why i introduced legislation with my colleagues to implement the recommendations of the ntsb safety board and the Inspector General report on Better Safety management systems, better cockpit prioritization and a new faa center of excellence on flight automation and human fatherctor. The faa needs the best engineers to stay ahead on this Human Behavior response to new automation. Were dealing i see people here on the transportation automobile side. Its the same issue in advanced vehicles. What automation exists and how do humans respond to it. I look forward to hearing about findings on improving the safety review process weeeeeincluded in this legislation. I would just say again, our sorrows are nothing like the families who are with us today. But i do want to know that 737 max accidents have struck at the heart of everyone in the northwest. Soon after the crashes, a seattle firefighter approached me and asked if i thought he could get a job at boeing. I want to go there and make sure we make the safety right. Everyone feels that way. Generation of workers have dedicated their lives to excellence and safety. This isnt a question about line workers, this is a question about a corporate view from chicago, whether there is enough attention to manufacturing and certification you should take offense to the fact that people say its a Great Company not being run correctly. So for the 346 people who trusted boeing without a Second Thought weer need to get this right. These families are counting on us. Thank you, mr. Chairman. You have submitted an extensive written statement. It will be entered in full in the record at this point. Youre now and i understand mr. Hamilton will not be making a formal statement. Mr. Mullenburg, youre recognized at this point to summarize your Opening Statement for five minutes. Thank you. Thank you for being here. Chairman wicker, Ranking Member cantwell, committee members. Thank you for the opportunity to join you today. We share your commitment to aviation safety. Before we start today, id like to speak directly to the families of the victims who are here with us. On behalf of myself and the boeing company, were sorry, deeply and truly sorry. As a husband and father myself, im heartbroken by your losses. I think about you and your loved ones every day, and i know our entire boeing team does as well. I know that probably doesnt offer much comfort and healing at this point, but i want you to know that we carry those memories with us every day. And every day that drives us to improve the safety of our airplanes and our industry. That will never stop. Im grateful and humbled to be here today and to be able to say these words to the families directly. I want to convey our absolute commitment to safety or commitment to learning. Our commitment to rebuilding the publics confidence in what we do. And to preventing accidents like this from ever ever happening again. We will never forget and thats our commitment Going Forward. Mr. Chairman, i know this committee has many questions about the max. Well do our best today to answer all of those questions. And while one of the accidents is still under investigation, we know both accidents involved the repeat activation of a Flight Control system called mcass which responded to erroneous signals from censors that measures the airplanes angle of attack. It will now compare information from both censors instead of one. Mcass will activate a single time. Third, mcass will never provide more input than a pilot can counteract using the control column alone. Pilots will have the ultimate to override mcass at any time. We spent over 100,000 enge thering and test hours. We have flown more than 800 test flights. I have flown on a couple of flights myself. This has taken longer as expected, but were committed to getting it right. During the process we worked closely with the faa and other regulators. We provided them documentation, had them fly the simulators, answered their questions and regulators should rigorously scrutinize the max and return to flight when theyre satisfied with its safety. The public deserves nothing less. Mr. Chairman, today and every day over five Million People will board a boeing airplane and fly safely to their destination. Decades of cooperation and the rigorous oversight of this committee have reduced accidents by over 95 . No number other than 0 accidents is ever acceptable. We can and must do better. Weve been challenged and changed by these accidents. Weve made mistakes and we got some things wrong. Were improving and were learning, and were continuing to learn. We established a permanent Safety Committee, stood up a Safety Organization, strengthened our engineering organization. Were helping to rebuild the communities and families impacted by the accidents. We have pledged 100 million to this effort and have hired Renowned Experts in this yaarea. No amount of money can bring back what was lost, but we can help the families meet their financial needs. Mr. Chairman, i started at boeing more than 30 years ago as a summer intern in seattle. I was a junior at Iowa State University studying engineering. Having grown up on a family farm in iowa. I was awe struck to work at the company that brought the jet age to the world and helphead land a person on the moon. Today, im still inspired by what boeing does and the remarkable men and women who are committed to its outstanding legacy. These heartbreaking accidents and the memories of the 346 lives lost are now a part of that legacy. Its our solemn duty to learn from them and we will. Recently, theres been much criticism of boeing and our culture. We understand and deserve this krutny. But i know the people of boeing. Theyre more than 150,000 of the most dedicated, honest, hard working men and women in the world. And their commitment to safety and quality is unparalyzed. We know our work demands the most excellence. Mr. Chairman . Thank you vurery much. During my Opening Statement, i mentioned an instant message conversation, and then a series of emails. The instant message conversation was between the 737 max chief technical pilot and a colleague. And it expresses concerns about the operation of the mcass. Boeing knew about this instant message for months but failed today share it with the faa until recently. With regard to the emails, again, mr. Fortner, the former max chief technical pilot, calls for removing any mention of the mcass Flight Control system from the flight crew operating manual. He talks about jedi mind tricking of regulators with at least one person who works for the faa. With regard to the instant message conversation, when were you made aware of the existence of the november 2016 messages . Mr. Chairman, as i recall i was made aware of that message earlier this year. It was part of a document gathering process in response to a government investigation. It was after the crashes . You were made aware of it this year . Sir, as i recall, i believe it was prior to the second crash was it your decision to wade wait months before disclosing this to the faa . At this point it had been identified as a document in response to an Ongoing Investigation and i relied on our council tool provide that to the appropriate authorities. Okay, what did the councsel tell you . Im going to supply it to the Justice Department or get it to the appropriate authorities . Mr. Chairman, i dont recall having a specific conversation about which authorities. Again, as part of the investigative process our intent to cooperate fully with the request and to provide that to the appropriate authorities, i think over this time period this year we provided on the order of half a million pages of documents in support of various requests do you agree this should have been provided to the faa . In retrospect. Senator, as i became familiar with the details of the document over the last few weeks, as i expressed our disappointments and concern with how this came to the faa, i think you heard the same from administrator dixon. I called and apologized for how this had come through the process. I was involved in the document production process but counted on our team to make sure the right authorities were notified. We should look to the team then. Boeing has now turned over all such safety related communications to the faa related to the 737 max . Senator, our Team Continues to cooperate with all request for documentation. Im sure that additional documents will be provided over time as theyre discovered, as would be normal to the process. Well cooperate fully with the request. It seems to me that a request shouldnt have to have been made with regard to that item of conversation, certainly. When did you become aware of the emails that i referred to in the second part of my question . About jedi mind tricking regulators. Senator, just recently ive been informed of the details of those emails and the instant can you give us an idea of how recently over the last couple weeks when it became public news. You did thought know about it up till then . Sir, i dont recall being wreefed on the details of those documents any time prior to that. Can you see that this raises much concern about the level of coziness between boeing personnel and faa regulators . Mr. Chairman, i understand the concern there. Were doing our best to provide information as part of the process. I can tell you that the comments, the values, the approaches that are described in those emails are counter to our values. That no way would meet any expectations i would have for our team or employees. So i understand the concern, share the concern. I want to convey its thought consistent with our values as a company at all. This series of emails has only in the last few weeks come to your attention, is that right . Senator, as i said i was aware of the documents that were being produced as part of the investigation. Thats what i recall from earlier this year. I dont recall getting briefed on details of these documents. Those details are things i learned of over the last few weeks. Senator cantwell. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I have a lot to go through so were going to try to move quickly through it. Was boeing aware of the defects in the mcass system which it failed to disclose to the at the time the aircraft was in development and certification . Senator, as you know, the mcass development occurred over a lengthy time period, about a sixyear Development Period of the max. We have learned from both accidents, and weve identified changes that need to be made to mcass. We did during the Development Process follow our certification standards and longstanding Industry Standards behind the design. Weve learned are you saying answer the question, mr. Mullenburg. Senator, could i ask you was boeing aware of defects in the mcass system which it failed to disclose to the faa at the time the aircraft was in development and certification . Senator, i just have to question ill say the premise of the question. As part of our Development Process, we do identify hazards and Failure Modes they were disclosed . That was part of the failure mode analysis that we share as part of the certification process during that time period. You think everything that you were aware of was disclosed to the faa as it relates to defects in the mcass system . Senator, as we get to defects, things we need to fix, weve identified three areas that we talked about needing to address. One was the single sensor feed. That was a piece of the architecture that was shared with the faa. The fact that the system would operate more than once during a flight, that was part of the design description. And the authority of the do you know what mr. Faulkner is referring to when he says unlowiu unknowingly lied to the faa or jedi mind tricking . Im not sure what he meant by that. He doesnt work for boeing anymore, weve been trying to contact him. Heres my concern. If you dont know what he meant, then you also dont know what wasnt disclosed. And so we dont know if there are things in the mcass system that were defects that he or someone else knew about that werent disclosed. So i hear what youre saying, that theres a lot to discover in a process, but id like to go over the specifics about what was tested. And did boeing test the consequences of the mcas reliance on a single sensor . Senator, we tested a broad array of different aspects of the mcass system, set of Failure Modes. We did thorough flight testing. John, if you want to comment on the details there . Yes, senator. 737 mg is one of the safest airplanes look, were trying to understand what got tested. Did you test the reliability of the aoa censors in general . Did you test the reliability on a single sensor . Did you consult with the pilots on the lack of guidance on mcass and the fly manuals . Did you test the sensors degree of alert to thesuinsure reliabi. These are things from the report. If you did, and you have data and it was provided to the faa thats what we want to see. Senator, we did test the mcass on command inputs to the state system due to whatever causes were driving it. Not specifically due to an aoa sensor. We assessed that hazard level, we talk which now do you think is wrong . In hindsight, senator, yes. Thank you, because i agree. Senator, if i could add a point to that, as john pointed out, we relied on the long stngistn standing standards heres the thing im very confused about which is the larger issue. We want to get this right because we want to go forward. We know theres going to be automation in many aspects of our lives. This robust testing that must occur and third party validation, i just dont thds how you have censors on the outside of a plane and youre going to let that send a command to the inside of the plane that basically says trim the plane 2. 5 degrees and all of a sudden youre going to be yelled at from somebody saying pull up and at the same time youre being forced down in your nose and you have seconds to respond because youre in take off. That doesnt seem like a lot of robust test waugz dons done. I have a few seconds left. I want to just look, i think this whole issue of air speed is a major issue at large for all of us to get right. The sector. Those crashes about automation, even the air france crash is related to a faulty tube. I dont know how much we should be trusting things on the outside of the plane to give commands to the inside of the plane when they can be damaged. I want to know youre improving the Safety Culture. The issue of woeth reporting, people not being able to talk to faa, oversight and the machinists, boeing quality inspectors, their work being taken over. I want to understand that a Safety Culture is going to exist. Senator, if anything i can leave with you today, i want to reinforce the safety of boeing. We encourage our employees to speak up when there are issues. Some of those have been public. We respect and expect those inputs. We take action. We have recently made a number of improvements. We moved all 50,000 boeing engineers to report directly to our im going to ask you to come back on the boeing quality. Two different issues. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Now i have the the duty of telling the distinguished whip hes limited to five minutes. Thank you. The mcass will better prevent erroneous act vase. Could you speak to why some of the change s being made were no considered in the initial development of the system. You raise a very important point. As john began to allude to, the original concept was an extension of what we call the system on the 737 mg. That is a single sensor system thats been proven safe in flight, more than 200 million flight hours. One of our safety principles is to minimize change from model to model. Thats a good standard safety process. That was the concept between the original design. What weve learned from both accidents is we made mistakes. One is the idea of going to a dual sensor feed, sthinstead of single. Those are improvements weve identified. We take responsibility for that. We feel responsible for our airplanes. We know there are fixes we need to make. We own that and were implementing those fixes Going Forward. As we discussed possible improvements to the certification of aircraft, it would be helpful for you to explain how safety is supposed to be integrated into the process all the way to flying at 30,000 feet filled with passengers. Since these crashes, weve heard concerns about whether boeings relationship with the faa is too cozy. And we want a certification process thats efficient and promotes u. S. Competitiveness but one that prioritized safety. So what would you say to address the concerns that have been raised to regulatory capture. I agree with the focus in that area. I would say that over the last couple of decades that improvements that have been made in aviation safety are because of strong government oversight. It theclud the delegated authority process as its structured has contributed to safety of the industry. I mentioned in my comments theres a 95 improvement in safety over the last two decades. Some of that i believe is associated with the delegated authority. We have to get the balance right. Its important we have strong faa oversight, but we also tap the Technical Depth the teams can bring to the table. Thats the concept. If we need to rebalance it, i fully support evaluating that concept, looking at the details and making sure weve got briefly explain, if you could, how boeing and the faa Work Together to certify aircraft . Senator, i could but i think mr. Hamilton is a deeper expert on that. Senator, the faa is in control of a certification process the whole time. Let me walk you through the process very quickly. It starts off by identifying the requirements to certify the airplane. Thats the Sole Authority of the faa. It establishes the certification basis of the airplane. The second step is identifying the methods of compliance to those requirements. This is how youre knowing to show the airplane design meets the requirements. Again, the faa is the Sole Authority. Thats their action. The third step is in doing the testing, the analysis, and the documentation that demonstrates the airplane meets those requirements. And that is done by boeing in our case for the outcome. Theres a review of those documents to validate they met the requirements. That can be done by the faa or oda who or it can be a combination. Unit members do oversight of the oda, they do oversight did you find compliance as they expected. And then they do systemic oversight of the entire system. Mr. Mullenburg, how are you working to thesure coming back to this issue of safety that employees who raise concerns, even if they inhibit your ability to get a product to the market quickly are taken seriously, and importantly those concerns are raised to the top and not brushed aside . Senator, in my role as the ceo i take that responsibility very seriously. We have a number of ethics hotline avenues employees can use. When it comes to dedicated authority, we have surviey tool we deploy. We know we can improve. One of the areas ive taken recent action on is to restructure our Safety Organization. We have created a new Safety Organization. The Vice President reports to my chief engineer who reports directly to me. They have responsibility for all safety related accident investigations, our oda process and also responding to any employee concerns. Thank you, senator. Senator klobuchar. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I also want to give my sun sear thanks to the people who are here who lost their loved ones in these two crashes. I think youre here not only for them, and it must be hard to hear all this technical issues when you think of your brother or sister or father or mother or son or daughter. I want you to know that we want to get to the bottom of this and we want to change this. Id start with where senator thune was going. Our recent Inspector General report found that 4 of Airline Manufacturers employees are responsible for conducting the certification. Certified by the faa, that they conduct conduct conducted oversight. One manufacturer arrived 95 for their own aircraft. What can you tell us the percentage that boeing does on its own aircraft . I cant do that off the top of my head. How many engineers Design Systems for the company and then certify those same systems for the faa . We have approximately 1,000 members that work, not just what percentage of them then certify the safety as opposed to having the faa certify the safety . Roughly 1,000 members who are working with the faa to find the kplu compliance. Its across the whole airplane we have about 50,000 engineers at boeing. About 1,000 of them are operate in this area that john is referring to, unit members. These are members who have the authority and the train well follow up. Im trying to get at when the faa steps in and when you certify it yourself and well get that later. Two months after mr. Fortner sent these messages expressing safety concerns, he asks the fbi to remove mention of the mcass automated Flight Control feature from the 737 max pilots flight manual and course. A change the faa approved in 2017. Notably Indonesias National Transportation Safety Committee confirms the lack of knowledge was one of the key reasons for the crash. How often are things like that left out of the training you give to pilots . First of all, one of the things weve learned from both these accidents is that we need to provide sdilsh information of the mcass to pilots. As we develop our training manuals, our idea is to provide training on pilots so they can respond to the effects of failures as opposed to trying to diagnosis failures. Thats a very important distinction. More information in the training manuals is thought necessarily safer. But as we understand from both these accidents, we need to provide more information on mcass to enhance safety. We do try to include information in the training manuals do you think its acceptable that pilots flying airlines without knowing about these key systems . Systems . Our approach is to train folks on the effectses of failures. In this case, the mcas system fails in uncommanded movement of the horizontal tail. That is whats in the training manual and we try to train pilots to respond to the effect of the failure as opposed the to diagnosing. Let me move on to two more quick things. After these terrible crashes that claimed 346 lives, do you think it makes sense for these aircraft to be allowed to fly in some countries and not others . Because the faa says each country can can make its own decision. Senator, we respect the jurisdiction for regulatory authorities around the world. So you think its acceptable . Yes r or no. Thats up to the regulatory authorities. Not a decision we can make. We respect the authority of the regulators. Youre saying the same thing again so im going with a yes. While there have been several fakctors that have contributed o the plane crashes, one that was particularly troubling was high lighted in an article in tthe Washington Post which found the lion air had a faulty line of attack sensor which gave pilots unreliable information the day before it crashed. Do you think thats a problem and what steps can be taken to change that . Senator, in the case of the angle attack disagree alert, we got the implementation wrong. I mentioned the in comments up front we made some mistakes. We made a mistake in that implementation. Once we discovered it, our engineering teams quickly convened a safety review board. They confirmed it wasnt an operational safety issue and the faa subsequently concurred with that, but none the less, we got the implementation wrong and weve addressed the faults in the process. We have fixed that and the angle of attack disagree alert will be standard on all maxes going f forward. Senator fisher. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to recognize and offer my sympathies to the people that are here today and the people who are at home who have lost loved ones in these crashes. I hope we can get answers of this hearing so these issues and mistakes will not happen again to cause future loss of life. There are notes that boeing made several other dhangs to the 737 max that differed from the earlier model such as structural changes that would accommodate the new engines on the plane and other advanced technologies. Senator thune touched on this with the delegated authority. Was boeing delegates authority over the certification of those changes as well sm. Senator, i cant answer that question because there were a number of changes. Again, those are done in e and evaluated jointly with the faa. John, you want to comment on any specifics there . There was approximately 92 certification plans at the max which encompass ed all the different change to the airplane. The faa reviewed eight of those initially and are you looking into the certification processes as part of your review of the 737 max . Senator, yes, we are. I asked my board to set up an independent review committee headed by admiral bastiony about five months ago and that committee did its work, provided inputs that were actinging on and with the other authorities, were taking a hard look at that and are looking forward to taking action on those reports. Okay. Also the joint authoritys technical review included a recommendation that states quote, if any Flight Control surface is used in a novel manner, the faa should be directly involved. This is based on the observation that the faa was not aware of mcas and they were delivered to disconnected groups within the process. It was difficult to recognize the impacts and implications of this system. Do you agree that the communication between boeing and the faa is fragmented to the point that relevant information on mcas was not provided to the agency . Is this what you were referring to when you talked about getting the balance right . I think you raised some good points there. I think one of the areas we can improve and weve seen it in the jatr report and others is system wide integration. Cross System Integration amongst the different technical exp expertise areas and improvements in documentation and communication and again we found areas where we could and should have done better. Do you think those steps will improve communication with the faa . I do. Do you think the faa has a responsibility to also change its process to improve commu communication . Senator, i believe the faa does, but i b wouldnt say thats only the faas responsibility. We at boeing need to make improvemeim improouchlts in communication. The boeing 737 airplanes are based on a Type Certificate. That was originally provided in 1967 i believe. And it has been amended to address the different 737 models since then. That technical review notes that quote, some elements of the design and certification remain rooted in the original 1967 certification of the boeing 737100. Does boeing or the faa review the elements of the 737 that are based in the 1967 certification for continued safety . When new models of the airplane are produced . Senator, if i could ask john to field that question. Senator, as you know, theres a single Type Certificate for the 737, but as the sign design zooin has evolved with each new generation of airplanes, the safety stan r dards on which the airplane is designed have also evolved. Yes, there are amendments that a design might reference back to an earlier amendment level, but those might be are likely changes that have not changed in the family of airplanes since the original design. An example might be some of the structural elements. However, we have stepped up in many areas voluntarily to later amendment levels to demonstrate that still meets the latest standards in compliance. Thank you, senator fisher. Senator blumenthal. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you to both our witnesses for being here today and important to the relatives to have lost loved ones. If you could please stand so we could thank you all. Thank you for being here. If you could please stand. Thank you. Go ahead and hold up the photographs that you brought. Youve been very kind to. I was going to ask you hold those photographs up because i understand that for security purposes, you cant. During the hearing, but just for this short period of time. So thank you and if the time keeper could start senator blumenthals time over. Thank you very much to the family members. Thank you very much. As i watched those loved ones and as i reviewed this file and as i sit here today, my anger has only grown. These loved ones lost lives. Because of an accident that was not only preventable as the chairman said at the start, but was the result of a pattern of deliberate concealment. Boeing came to my office shortly after these crashes and said they were the result of pilot error. Those pilots never had a chance. These loved ones never had a chance. They were in flying coffins as a result of boeing deciding that it was going to conceal mmcas from the pilots and the best evidence is this message from Mark Faulkner saying in effect, were going to conceal mcas. Delete it from the manual used in training. When did you become aware of the fact that mcas was not going to be included in the flying manual . Senato senator, first, if i could express my deep sympathies. Youve done that. And i apologize for interrupt i ing, but i want to know specifically when you became aware of this effort. Senator, i cant reference that email and im im not asking about the email. Youve been asked about the email already. Im asking you about boeing policy as reflected in this email. Its chief test pilot deciding he was going to mislead pilots who were then going to take passengers into the air, these loved ones, and turn those planes into flying coffins. Senator, im not sure what mr. Faulkner meant by that email. I can tell you that certification and training materials are not determined by one individual. In fact, let me just interrupt you again. In the 1600 page original flight manual of of boeing 737 max, the aircrafts new mcas Computer System was mentioned only once. Once in 1600 pages. In the glossary of abbreviated terms. So when boeing came to us and they said its the pilots, inexperienced pilots, you were lying to us as well. Senator, if i could try to respond to your question. First of all, the premise that we would lie or conceal is just not consistent with our values. Well, i know its not consistent with the values that youre articulating heerk but let me just since my time is limited, move on. Would you agree that this system of certification and oversight is absolutely broken . The lesson here. Isnt it . That boeing lobbied the congress for more delegation and now we have to reverse that delegation of authority. Would you support those legislative efforts . Senator, again, i support taking a hard look at the delegated. Im not asking you for a hard look. Im asking you for a commitment here because you have the opportunity to make things right. Senator, im not familiar with particular legislation. Boeing asked for the legislation that exists right now. Will you commit to supporting Reform Efforts such as many of us on this committee have advocated . Senator, well commit to participating in those Reform Efforts and providing our inputs. Well, i agree that your input would be valuable. Im looking for input in support of reform. That will stop outsourcing by the faa and i might add the faa has been really dispoiappointinn its disclosure to us. This is an example of the kind of disclosure the faa has given us. Total redaction. Ive asked for full disclosure of documents. The faa has failed to provide them. Ive asked for the faa to return my phone calls. Its failed to do so and i think the faa is part of this problem as well. And the it is the result at the end of the day, rush iing this process. Im using the chairmans term, putting profits over safety, rushing the certification process with you in charge of that certification and prioritizing speed and cost over safety and my time is expired. But the folks who really deserve time here are the people who lost loved ones. Thanks, senator blumenthal. This post er is entitled mcas lives in both fccs. If you can provide a copy of that, well admit it into the record at this point without objection. Thank you. Thank you. And mr. Hamilton, let me just ask you, when it says mcas does live in both fcc, what does that mean briefly . Sure, the mcas function is replicate d in the two Flight Control computers on board the airplane so each Flight Control computer previously received its input from one aoa sensor to a left to the right side. In the Software Changes were making Going Forward, now both Flight Control computers will receive di ta from both senatss, compare then if they agree, activate. Senator. Sq have you determined that t failures that resulted in the tragic consequences were they failures in the policies and protocols that boeing had in place or was it a failure to comply with toehose protocols a policies that resulted in these consequences. Senator, in some cases, we relied on these long standing Industry Standards, policies, and certified to those and were now raising questions around those. That gets back to this pilot Response Time discussion that we had earlier. In some cases, we missed on implementation as i mentioned with the angle of attack sensor, but overall, we did follow the certification process and steps, but none the less, weve learned from both stents and accidents and the fixes we need to make are clear. So the fixes are both in policy and then making certain that the policies are followed once the new policies are in place . Senator, i believe both are true. Yes. Thank you. And i assume theres other certification and developments at boeing that are always on going. Have you changed your behavior and or policies for the certification and Development Process for other pieces of equipment, other aircraft that boeing is now proceeding towards certification . Senator, we have. We have learned, but were still learning. I mentioned earlier the change the our safety review board structure, that is a big change. The Safety Organization. The realignment of the engineering team, those 50,000 engineers. Were also look at the long standing asupgss behind how we design as we look at next Generation Products like the triple 7x as an example so we are taking a comprehensive approach to those updates. As this committee looks at certification as we look at the faa, what suggestions does boeing have for this committee when you look at any policies or failures at the faa . So the way i would view this is we have two Major Organization involved in this process. One is the manufacturer, boeing. The other is the federal agency that is there to certify. My asunlgs is that neither one did things right and what have you learned about the faa that we should know as we look at the faa now and in the future . Senator, we have a great deal of respect for the faa. Ive worked with them for many years. Have a great deal of respect for them and their professionals i know the faa taking a hard look at investigations and is committed to making changes. Do you have suggestions what changes they should make . Senator i dont have specific recommendations for you, but wed be glad to follow up on that if it would be useful. Thank you. Where are we now in the 737 max. Seems like every week an airline believes theyre going to have that plane flying again or that certification is nearby. What is status . Senator, were in the final stages of the process so we are currently testing the final Software Updates when ready and with the faas approval, well proceed to a certification flight in the near term. Ske subsequent to that, it will be the faas responsibility to issue an airworthyness directive. Thats work were proceeding on over the next few weeks and months, butten i think important again that the airplane will return to service when its safe. This is not going to be timeline driven. We are committed to answering every question regulators have and the airplane will fly when everyone is convinced its safe. Thats the most important thing here. It troubles me that to get to that point is certainly its taken so long. We want the right circumstance before were flying again. But it suggests to me there was much more significant problems with the max 37 if it was previously certified yet now it takes so long, its something more than just a glitch. Its its more than a minor change. That makes me concerned about the process that allowed it to be certified in the first place. What am i missing . I think you raised a good point. Our official effort year was focused on the mcas updates we talked about. Around the middle of the year as we were evaluating the other inputs and data, we identified some additional safety enhancements we could make. Not something required for certification, but something we thought while the airplane was grounded was the right thing to do. And a safety enhancement. Rather than waiting to do that later after return to service, we as a company and with the faa decided we would take the extra time for those additional Software Updates. Thats the work weather been doing through the summer and into the fall. Thats designed to add Additional Software redundancies throughout the Flight Control computers and that is the final software were testing. What i want to convey here is this is really the culture of boeing and i understand the questions that are being raised. But when our teams find opportunity to improve safety, that goes to the top of the list. Thats the top priority. And if it takes time, if it takes money to do that, thats where were focused and thats why the its taking longer than i think some anticipated. Id request your thought on the follow up on thoughts about the faa. Senator marquee, senator udall and peters. Thank you, mr. Chairman. And let me begin also by expressing my sympathies to those who lost loved ones in the two 737 max crashes and id like to thank if families that are here today for your continued attention to safety and for working to prevent future tragedies like we saw here. Over the years, our Aviation System has become the safest in the world, but these tragedies certainly remind us that we cannot rest. Safety cannot be taken for granted. There is no doubt from what weve heard from in the testimony today that many mistakes were made and the consequenceses were unfortunately tragic. The report frs technical experts underscore that as Technology Becomes complex, the debate b about how to move forward cant be simply about a one size fits all Regulatory Regime versus a let the free market just police itself type of approach. I believe a new paradigm may need to be dweveloped to addres the regulatory challenges associated with very complex technology. Thats something this committee needs to weigh heavily into. As you know, the Bp Oil Disaster in the gulf of mexico killed 11 workers, lasted 87 days and upwards of 65 billion. And in the wake of that z disaster, it was revealed that the oil and gas industry had lobbied for the reduced safety precautions that could have prevented that disaster. We often hear in congress about how much regulations industry. However thoughtful regulation plays incredibly Important Role in protecting the public. So im curious if boeings view has change nd the wake of this human tragedy as well as the of cost this company is facing right now. Has your view changed in youve talked earlier about having a balance. Clearly, something is wrong with that balance. Please let me know if your thoughts have changed recently. My thoughts have changed. We have learned lessons from these two accidents. And the families that are here with us today, the pick htures saw, theyre heartbreaking. They remind us of the importance of the work we do b and the paramount importance on safety. Thats what makes this industry great. Its part of the fabric of the industry. It should give us pause to take a hard look at that. Not the hard look. You said we need to look at the balance. Has it gone too far to allowinging industry to police itself . Senator, i dont know if i can characterize it that way. My sense is that we all have the same objective here. We want the safest industry possible. Our objective. My sense is is that we could look at the balance, that there are refinements that would be r worthy. Do you think its out of balance now based on what happened here . Do you think we have to not just take a look at it, but seriously understand that the balances may be out of whack if we delegate too much to industry and dont have impartial eyes and make sure the Regulatory Regime is sufficient, that you have impartial eyes looking at factors, that its going to save lives and you wont put a company through the cost you have. Is it out of balance now, yes or no . Senator, i think it can be improved. I completely agree with you on the importance of strong oversight. Ive worked in this industry for more than three decades from airplanes to safety craft. Peoples lives depend on what we do and strong oversight from the government is the key to our successful, the safety of our industry. So i didnt know we have a shared objective there and we will work with you on examining any improvements we can make. We have a mutual interest. The ntsb report indicated the faa and industry have historically used highly trained test pilots to verify the safety of new aircraft models rather than average pilots who typically have less experience. Does boeing use pilots with average training and eck appearance . Senator, our boeing test pilots are experience eexperien qualified pilots. We work with airlines, the faa, the regulators to bring other pilots in from around the world as part of the evaluation, but i think as youre pointing out is is we look to the future again, we want to make sure the testing were doing is representative of that future pilot population. Thank you. Thank you, senator peters, senator cap tow. Thank you, chairman, rank in member as well. I want to say first of all families who are here, my extending my sympathies, but also my gratitude for you coming forward through your pain. To bring to us to congress, which is not an easy thing to do, your frustrations and probably stronger feelings in loss of your loved ones. I will say that when flight 3407 whent down in buffalo in the early 2009, the families that came forward to us, i was on Transportation Committee in the house side made such an incredible impact and has made flying on our Regional Airlines much, much safer because of that. Hopefully that will be what the result of this is for you today and for all of us. Mr. Mullenburg, particular attention has been called to the fact that boeing later in the Development Process in the max revised the range of flight conditions that could lead to activation of the mcas but that boeing did not photofi the faa of these changes at the time. This is troubling if in fact this is true. Was boeing not obligated by the faa to report changes like the ones i just described . Senator, i believe youre referring to the low speed extension and ive seen those same reports, but they do not reflect the facts. The extension of mcas low speeds was done in a rigorous way in a very visible way. There was testing done on that from the mid 2016 time frame to the early 2017 time frame including flight tests, including flight tests with the faa on board. The faa was aware of the low speed eck tension and ultimaext and ultimately certified that. And i believe faa had leadership has publicly stated so a false report then. I believe a false report. I believe the low speed extension was fully certified with the faa. Okay. Another report thats been out in the media and among is that after the second flight went down that boeing actually actively lobbied the faa to keep the planes in the air. Can you respond to that . Senator, could you clarify your question . After Ethiopian Air went down that there was quite several countries had expressed a, had limited the flight of that plane. We had not done that yet in the United States. Theres media reports that boeing was actively lobbying the faa to keep the planes in the air at that time. In this country. Is that true . Senator, let me clarify what was happen nging in that time frame could you make it brief, please . Yes. We immediately after the accident reached out the if faa and other authorities to understand what happened in the stent. What has maaviation safe is tha we make decisions based on data. We didnt have data so we were looking to understand what happened. There were early reports that the airplane has some kind of a low speed, low altitude problem that turned out to be incorrect. So we with the faa were pursuing data to make a good safety based decision. That was our position with the faa when data became available. Satellite day that that was fehred to in the media. Again with the faa, we came to a conclusion that there could be similarities between the two accidents and that led very quickly to a decision to ground the fleet. Well i think you know in rhett respect, it was pretty obvious, i dont want to say conclusively so, but there was a problem and a consistent problem. The other thing really bothered me about this whole thing, but between the lion air crash and the Ethiopian Air crash, it defies logic to me that some of these folks who wrote emails or sent Text Messages did not come to you and to the expertise of the engineering of these engines and of these planes and say this is what we were talking about. Was there any reas wul within your company after the lion air crash and dont tell me because you didnt have the official report that would have maybe saved those people in that Ethiopian Airplane . Senator, i think about that decision over and over every day. And if we knew everything back then that we know now we would have made a difference. The question, did people come to you at the highest levels, at any level and say wait a minute, this is sounding familiar. Yes or no . Senator, after the first accident, we convened our broad Technical Team across boeing. It wasnt any single individuals or small team. It was a broad team. We brought all those expertsaas trying to understand what occurred. We issued an operational bulletin to remind everyone of the training and the emergency scenario. Around the particular system . Around run away sabtabilizer and at the same time, we began work on software update. Thaupg. Are you saying the faa did know about the 2. 5 trim, not. 6, but 2. 5, the faa knew about that . Yes, senator, youre referring to the low speed extension, the 2. 5 degree trim. The faa did know. Thank you. Participated. Senator udall. Thank you, mr. Chairman and thank you to the Ranking Member for having this hearing. And mr. Mullenburg, you know i first want to say to all the people that stood up, that im very moved by you being here d your losses are very, very i think heartfelt across the committee here. And you know, the thing that really bothers me is knowing that its preventable. It makes it even more outrageous. That we havent made the kind of dramatic changes that i want to talk to the ceo here about. Mr. Mullenburg, you showed some emotion when these folks stood up and everything. What should come from that emotion is some action to do something to really make a difference. And for this committee to call around the solution thats really going to move us forward would require you to step forward and specifically say what you support and i havent seen you do that in all the questions. Youve been asked overand over again, what would you support. The its absolutely clear that its too cozy a relationship with the faa and your airline and so what is is it youre going to commit to specifically in term of reform. Thats why youre up here and thats what we want to see you do is to weigh in with us this is what would make a difference. What would make it safer. This is what make sure we dont lose passengers like this in the future or the crew. Senator, while i respectfully dont agree with the characterization of the cozinesss with the faa, we respect the faa. Thats very important to us. We have taken a number of internal actions that we think are meaningful as they relate to our own internal reforms on safety. We are engaged in the legislative process. I appreciate your invitation for us to be involved with that. I know there are more stake holders. As you heard from me earlier, we are committed to strong oversight in the Aerospace Industry. Its part of f what makes this system safe. We have a shared objective and if there are things that we can do to make it better, we will. I dont know john if you have any specific ideas there. Thank you. Senator, you know, one of the big issues we used an Industry Standard assumption on pilots and how they would react and that proved incorrect in these two accidents. So in terms of things i think we need to change with the faa, we need to revisit some of these regulatory guidances and make sure theyre up to date. I would even tell you theres probably some regulations we advocate as part of the faa reauthorization bill. Ten regulations that faa should work with industry to update based on tong o ed on thats ou. I used to be the lead administrator for the oba and we have a respectful relationship with the faa, but we have our differences of opinion sometimes, but we discuss those, we work it out. On what how were going to comply its not a cozy relationship. Its a professional relationship. Its a relationship that didnt work for the consumers and for r your employees that went down in those flights. You and others in your company blamed the deceased pilots. And the culture of the countries where the crashes occurred for the accidents, but from what weve seen in the last year since the first crash, it app r appears that boeings own culture is more blameworthy for install iing a faulty system th resulted in too many deaths and could have caused more. This culture starts at the top and thats why ive been asking you for the specifics of what you support and i hope after this hearing, you will come forward and when theres legislation out there, say this is going to make it better and come up here and spend time to build a consensus to get this done. I think the large powerful interests that are a part of this dont want reform. They want you to tinker around like youre talking about, but they dont want to see reform. If boeing could not garruarante that pilots were preprepared to fly these jets, your company should not have sold them. Did anyone at boeing question, hesitate or raise any issues prior to selling the 737 max 8 with this software to lion air or ooet yoan yan air . Senator, first, we look forward to responding to your request there and providing inputs on the reforms. To your question, we do rely on the airlines and regular ra torre authorities around the world as part of this integrated system to make sure were fielding airplanes and crews that can fly safely. I do think its important for me to clarify a point that you made earlier. We have not blamed the pilots. I know thats been reported, but that is not our company position. And it never will be. We are responsible for our airplanes. We are responsible. And we own that. Regardless of cause. Any accident with one of our airplanes with unacceptable. That change is welcome, but about the culture without from your earcompany early on. Thank you. Mr. Mullenburg, the jagger published 12 main recommendations. Will both of you get back to us . Senator, we will. Thank you. Senator marquee is next. Ognizin families who lost so much on this flight. Many of you are here today including michael and nadia, the parents of samia, a university of massachusetts amherst graduate and resident of sheffield, massachusetts, who was tragically killed on the ethiopian flight. The losses that the family and all of the families suffered is absolutely inexcusable. And we will remember that as we move forward in the drafting of legislation. We will do it in the memory of your families. One thing is clear to make sure that safety is our top, top priority. That it is built into every plane and never for sale. Unfortunately, our current laws only prevent aircraft manufactures like boeing from selling elements for an additional price. Existing rules allow companies to charge extra for non critical safety enhancing features and boeing actually does charge more for those technologies. The 737 max aircraft involved in the indonesian and ethiopian crashes lacked two safety enhancing features. An angle of attack indicator and a disagree light. Both of these technologies would have help ed the pilots recognie the faulty sensor readings were causing the planes automated Flight Control system to push the aircrafts nose down towards the ground. With that knowledge, the pilots may have been able to take more action to prevent these crashes. The indonesian report specifically cited the lack of a disagree light as contributing to the lion air tragedy. Shamefully, the law allows boeing to treat these Safety Technologies as a la carte addons that airlines can obtain by paying an extra fee. Safety. Not like xm radio or Leather Seats on a plane. Safety. Is a la carte. Safety is an added on feature. These tragic crashes have made it all too clear that there should not be any distinction between critical and noncritical safety enhancing features. Thats why ive introduced my safety is not for sale legislation. My bill will require aircraft manufacturers like boeing to offer or provide any technology that measurably enhances safety without an Additional Charge to airline carriers. If you believe that safety should never be for sale, the question is why was it . Now youve seen to now recognize that the disagree light should be standard. But you have yet to say the same thing about the angle of attack indicator. And whether or not that should be offered for free. Or whether or not each airline should be given the option of not building it into the plane for free. So i think youre, you have to make a decision here. In terms of where youre going to go because otherwise, your disagree light is still on coming from boeing to these safety features. So i want first of all to answer whether or not according to the wall street journal you agree that boeing did not include the disagree light b even though the same light was standard on other models of air pelinis. Is that correct . Senator, i feel i need the respond to your earlier point about selling safety. We dont sell safety. That is not our Business Model. And i do want to clarify your points on the angle of attack indicator. Thats a system we have offered as an option to airlines. Some airlines dont want it. More information on the displays is not necessarily safer. Do you agree to do that . Senator, yes. Weve announced the angle of attack disagree alert will be on all planes Going Forward standard and the indicator will be available as an option. So given your stated support for the principle behind my legislation, will you support my legislation that ensures that you offer to provide any technology that measurably enhances safety . Would you agree to support that legislation . Senator, i havent seen the specific legislation. I think the principle around focusing on safety is the top priority. I agree with that. Its a worthy pins principle. Id ask if we can take a look at legislation. The word is free to an airline for anything that measurably impact safety. We dont sell safety and not our Business Model. Thank you. Thank you senator marquee. Senator duckworth. Thank you, mr. Chairman. So im here to put some of the issues here into laymans terms. I want to first of course my sincere condolences to the families here, but also to the families in ethiopia and indonesia who are watching this hearing or will be watching this hearing. I dont speak but for the indonesias [speaking foreign language] what i said is we will as senators get to the bottom of this tragedy and continue to investigate this and will not stop because you see boeing sells its aircraft to the world an we in america have a well, well earned reputation as leaders of aviation in the world and i want us to reach that shining example once again. Pilots know that tragedies dont occur in a vacuum. Catastrophic outcomes result in failures that often overwhelm the failures of at the control of the aircraft. We call it in aviation the accident dhan. There are many links in the accident chain this must happen that eventually overwhelms the pilots and result in the crash. Many of these links happen with boeing and the decisions in the development of the 73 p max. Let me talk about what has happened here. You put a sensor, which is standard, but you allowed that senator to override the pilots input in this system. So in every other 737 aircraft, theres the function of the you can pull back the pilot, the cutout, and that will override the uncommanded nose down attitude. That is standard. That is the basic assumption. As you put, as you said, you use an Industry Standard on how a pilot would react because to a malfunction like that. Nose down, every pilot including helicopter pilots, you pull back. But what you did was you put an mcas system into an aircraft. You didnt tell the pilot this is system was in there and you put in a function in order to mcas to work the wii you wanted it to work after the pilot does uncommanded reaction to the nose down in every other 737 cut out thats the end of it. In the 737 max, after five seconds, the system resets and it pushes the nose right back down. The pilots had exactly three seconds to pull nose down, pull up, now we got to do a new procedure that did not exist in previous 737 models, which is the electronic cut out switch because you have now put into a system that overrides the pilot in command of that aircraft so youve been telling this committee that yes, you use basic pilot reactions, yes, thats true, but you have not told this committee the whole truth. Time and again, this is my frustration, boeing has not told the whole truth to this committee and the families. Yes, the pilots did exactly what they were supposed to do, but five seconds later, especially if that sensor is still stuck, it overrides what the pilot does and pushes the nose right back down again. Three seconds, pilots best friend is time and altitude. And on take off, there is no altitude. And hes got no time. You set those pilots up for failure and when i sent you a letter asking you to answer several questions, it took boeing over five months to respond. I only got the answers the day before you and i met and one of the questions i asked was what date did boeing discover that a stuck angle of attack vein would result in mcas issuing persiste persistent commands with Unlimited Authority to trim the nose down. In laymans terms, if this vein is stuck, mcas will continue to provide faulty directions and will keep pushing that nose down over and over and over again. No matter how many times and experienced 73 p pilot pulls back on the yolk, five second later, reset, nose back down. You knew in 2016. You knew in 2016 that this was happening. And your team at boeing decided we didnt need to fix that. Because of techniques and procedures, but the problem is that technique and procedure ss to pull back and thats it but you added something else. You put in a system and you didnt tell pilots about then put in an override by resetting the system five seconds later. Boeing is the company that build flying fortress that saved europe. I remember watching b 17s fly above the, it is a storied aircraft that has rescued the free world. And yet, you knew about these problems and you continue to put them into system. The system into place and when you ask you to answer these questions, you have told this committee and me half truths. Which is why im so upset. You have not told us the whole truth and these families are suffering because of it. Thank you, senator duckworth. Members of the committee, at this point, senator scott is defer iring his time to the chairman of the subcommittee, senator cruz. Youre recognized, sir, for five minutes. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Mullenburg, i have to say testimony here today has been quite dismaying. I want to focus on the Text Exchange thats been publicly reported on. Between mark forkner, boeings chief technical pilot for the max. And mr. Gustofson, who was propromoted to chief technical pilot. I believe thats the case, senator. So this exchange is stun ini. Mr. Forkner, shocker alert, mcas is now active down to m 2. Its running rampant in the sim on me. At least thats what vince thinks is happening. Gustafsons response, oh, great, that means we have to update the speed trim description in volume two. Mr. Forkner, so basically, i lied to the regulators unflowingly. Gustafson, it wasnt a lie. No one told us that was the case. Forkner. Im lefing off at like 4,000 feet. 230 knots and the plane is tr trimming itself like crazy. Im like what . Gustafson, thats what i saw on sim one, but on approach, i think thats wrong. Forkner. Granted, i suck at flying. But even this was aagreenlgous. That exchange describes what happened in lion and Ethiopian Air. The men and women who are gathered here with the fphotos f your loved ones, 346 people are dead. Because what these chief pilots described as e gree jous and crazy, thats their language. Boeings internal language in this exchange. Now what i find truly stun inin boeing handed this exchange over to the department of justice in february. In march, i chaired a committee on these two crashes. Boeing did not see fit to give this committee this exchange. Nor did they give it to the faa or the department of transportation. But what i find most stunning is your testimony here today that you said you first learned of this exchange a couple of weeks ago. These are Senior Leaders at boeing. In an exchange saying and i will quote again, so i basically lied to the regulators. Look, i practiced law a lot of years. You had your lawyers look over this document. And they read a Senior Leader after these crashes had occurred r, saying they lied to the regulators. Mr. Mullenburg, how in the hell did nobody bring this to your attention in february when you produced this to the department of justice . How did you just read this couple of weeks ago . Senator, again, to clarify my earlier comments, i was made aware of existence of this kind of document, this issue, as part of that discovery process in the investigation early in the year as you pointed out. At that point, i counted on my counsel to handle that appropriately. And did you read this exchange . I was made aware documents were being produced. That is passive voice and disclaiming responsibility. Youre the ceo. The buck stops with you. Did you read this document and how did your team not put it in front of you, run in with their hair on fire, saying we got a real problem here . How did that not happen and what does that say about the culture at boeing if they didnt give it to you and you didnt read it and if you didnt say i want to read and see what happened, your testimony here earlier today is were not sure what they were talking about because hes not at boeing anymore. How did you not in february set out a nine alarm fire say we need to see what happened because 346 people have died and we dont want another person to die. Senator, as you mentioned, i didnt see the details of this exchange until recently. And were not quite sure what mr. Forkner meant by that exchange. His lawyer has suggested he was talking about a simulator that was in development in that time period. Thats where he was working. That could be the case. We dont know. I fully support diving deep into this and understanding what he said and what he meant. But i could also tell you that in that same time frame where his original message was made mr. Gustafson still works at boeing. Correct. Yes, he does. Have you had that conversation with him . Senator, my team has talked with patrick as well. Have you had that conversation . Senator, i have not. Thank you, senator cruz. Senator tester. Senator cruz, if you could have that reduced in size and we will enter it into the record without objection at this point. So ordered. Senator tester. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and Ranking Member for having this hearing and i know for the two folks on the panel this morning, it is probably a painful morning for you. But the fact is the infinitely more painful for the folks sitting a couple of rows behind you. You have said many times that mistakes were made and obviously they were. Unfortunately, that admission was made after 346 people died. And there are a lot of reasons, whether its pilot error. And i didnt listen to the whole thing, but you damn well better sell safety. I fly four legs a week and a lot not for the grace of god it could have been me on one of those airplanes and we expect there to be safety. Obviously something went wrong. And its not first time. Theres the situation here that was pointed out several people have pointed out to you and nothing was done or to your leadership team, south korea whistleblower that talked about debris being left in the planes. Those technicians were removed. Theres casey 46 finding wrench bolts in trash inside a new airplanes. That was in june of this year. There was a cargo 777. You get the deal. It goes on. And the question that you didnt answer, that is what do we codo . What do you do . Ill be more specific. I believe theres a cozy relationship and i dont believe that quite frankly time and money are no object because theres also plenty of examples. For example, in 2014, faa made regulatory changes to Safety Standards that would have required changed to have max add new crew alerts. Boeing appealed to seek an exception arguing it would too much money. 10 billion, which is a will the of money. But the truth is that it b wouldnt have happened if faa would have been doing their job and if you would have known what the hell was going on. My question is, and i know there was a push a number of decades ago about privatization of federal government. I think thats how we got here. Is privatization of government. But why dont we just turn over the certification back to the faa and let them do it and then they would be the ones sitting at this desk and not you. Why not do that . Well senator, we share your focus on safety. And i can confidently say that our number one priority. Okay, cool, but we failed in this case and theres a whole bunch of people back there going through incredible anguish because we failed. Senator sh, i agree. And we feel lets get the question. And look, i can pivot with the best of them. I know how to pivot. I know when people are pivoting. Youre pivot iing. Tell me if you would support having the faa do the certification. Senator, we believe that delegated authority process that we have has crypted to improved safety over the last two decades. We are open to improving it. But the idea that we can tap the deep Technical Expertise of our Companies Across the Aerospace Industry is a value bable part of the certification process but the faa is the Certification Authority and should be and should continue to authority, i should continue to be. But they really arent. You can say they have the ultimate responsibility, but the truth is if the issues arent flagged by the oda, by your people, by your people doing the certification, the faa never does it because, quite frankly, it would cost more money to have the faa do the certification. Its cost you money so we could pay you so it would have no reflection on the taxpayers. The question becomes, im going to tell you what, when the faa says you dont need to do this and you come in and say, no, you dont need to do this. Its fine if nothing happens but when 350 people die, we got a problem. And you bring up the point that sandra cruz brought up that there was plenty of information out there on this. And nothing was done. And so the whole thing about, you know, when it comes to safety, time and money are no object, is not the record certainly doesnt show that. Senator, i understand your points and criticism. I think its true we operate in a very competitive world and we are the only large airplane commercial airplane maker left in the United States. We do have Competitive Pressures around the world. But i can also tell you that never takes precedence over safety. But it did in our Business Model i think it could absolutely be argued it did in this case. I heard senator duckworths questions. Boeing has an incredibly valuable name. I have to tell you, and i told you this some time ago, i would walk before i was to get on a 737 max. I would walk. Theres no way. And the question becomes, when issues like this happen, it costs your company huge and so you shouldnt be cutting corners. I see corners being cut. And this committee has to do something to stop that from happening. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, senator tester. Im going to ask that mr. Muilenburg answer on the record his opinion of the current oda system, whether should be modified in answer to senator testers question. Senator johnson. Thank you. Let me add my condolences to the surviving family members and friends of the victims of these tragedies. Mr. Muilenburg, among many failures it strikes me there are two proo i marry failures. The design process and secondly after the first crash. Lets concentrate on those two things. Tell me if im getting this right. The 737, very Successful Air frame. More fuel efficient engines were available so you wanted to include them in an upgrade of that air frame, correct. New fuel efficient engines and other ens hansments. They created Different Air dynamic for that aircraft, correct . Thats correct. Is the mcast system, is that a standard type of automatic pilot type of Software System on planes . Is that standard . Whats on the max is unique to that airplane. It was put in there specifically because you added a type of engine to a known Successful Air frame which made that less stable and required a you called it a runaway stabilizing. The 737 has a family called the speed system. Unique because of the Engine Design . We tailor the software of each one of our airplanes so that they optimize the handling qualities for the unique airplane configuration. Going into the introduction of this 737 max, you realized that that air frame was changed because those engines then required this mcas system for stabilization. That was one of the additions we made to create the handling qualities we wanted for the pilots. We also made some changes to things like the vortex generators on the wing. Its an integrated solution to create again, you were well aware that this Design Change created something that required an mcas system. So, now fast forward. You have the lion air tragedy. According to senator cruz, the email that he sent up there, which i believe was written on november 15, 2016, just a couple weeks after that lion air crash, there are people, it sure appears in boeing that knew exactly or certainly suspected what went wrong because they integrated in the design you had an mcas system to take care of this eventuality in the flight characteristic, correct . Senator, again, im not exactly sure what was meant by that traffic, that email traffic, but i can tell you in that time frame it seems pretty obvious, doesnt it . I mean, doesnt it seem pretty obvious . Again, you are you are engineers. You understand how this was designed. You understood you need an mcas system to make up for that instability and then something happen happened, i would think, diagnosed pretty fast. Im reading these things. Im not a pilot. Im not an aerospace engineer. And yet im scratching my head going, whoa, something really bad happened. Why didnt you react faster . Senator, completely separate from that email traffic and what it meant our team very quickly after the lion air traffic we evaluated the data and we saw mcas was involved so we began to take quick action immediately. It doesnt have to do with that email. Thats not relevant to that discussion. Our team was identified thats exactly my point. The fact it took another tragedy to actually ground the airplane so you could actually have a true a fix that worked, is i think whats on the stable here. And the diagnosis, why didnt we react . Why didnt we ground that aircraft a lot sooner so another tragedy wouldnt happen . Senator, we have asked that question over and over. You know, if we knew everything back then that we know now, we would have made a different decision. The decision that was made at that point with the data we had, we quickly convened a safety review board. The faa coming out of that confirmed the continuing air worthiness of the airplane and issued that officially. That was the safety case that was built. Senator, as you point out, weve learned from the second accident. And if we could go back, we would have made a different decision. We have learned. We are making those improvements to mcas. Thats where our focus is Going Forward. Well, boeing is an important company. Its important for our economy. I want to see you get this right but you have to properly diagnose this. You have to accept responsibility for what happened so we actually can make those changes. Both within boeing and the faa. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, senator johnson. Senator rosen. Thank you. And i want to thank all the families that are here today who lost their most loved ones. Their deaths should not be in vain. We have to prevent future tragedies from happening and in order to honor the member of these 340 souls and the empty chairs they leave behind this thanksgiving and christmas and on and on and on. You said Additional Information wasnt available. I want to touch on mcas and brazil. According to news reports when the brazilian Civil National aviation came to the u. S. In 2017 to test out the max 8, they determined that changes made to the old 737 were significant enough that they needed much more information from boeing and were going to provide it for their pilots. When they eventually published their Pilot Training requirements, they were therefore able to flag the mcas as one of the changes the pilots needed to take into consideration when flying the max 8. And yet for United States pilots, mcas wasnt mentioned in their manual. So, mr. Muilenburg, why was this information not flagged for your other customers who had 737 maxes in their fleet . Did you prevent your company from sharing these differences to other regulatory bodies or operators . I have here the brazilian manual. They decided their pilots should learn this. Why wouldnt you provide it to the United States pilots . Senator, i cant comment on the details of the brazilian document. Let me more broadly make the point that thats exactly how the process is supposed to work. We provide information. We evaluate with the regulators in the various jurisdictions what should be included in the training. We have no desire to hide features of the airplane that pilots were told they were reporting back to you and it was significant enough for them to put this in their manual, then why wouldnt you consider that it was a significant change . Senator, i understand your point. That was a decision that was made in brazil. Again, im not familiar with the details of that one. But the discussion let me just ask you this question then. Moving forward, will you commit to making it a practice when other countries are clearly paying attention enough to make significant changes to their pilot manuals based on major operational changes that boeing will send these notifications of changes to the other users of these other aircrafts so at least they have the opportunity to train their pilots . You denied them the opportunity, sir. Senator, we are committed to sharing that information. Thats part of our international collaboration. I also want to note, again, the discussion around mcas training and whether it would be included in the training manuals, that was an active discussion with the faa and it was a decision made based on safety. Again, we try to put information in the training manuals that focuses on the effects of failures and things valuable to the pilots. Its not always the case that more information adds to safety, although in this case, we understand this and this is one of the additions Going Forward. Brazil thought it added to their safety. But i want to touch a little on senator fischer, the question she raised earlier. All these changes have taken place, of course, over the years. And this plane is still working off its original certification from 1967. This is despite the fact that pilots have told me the max 8 is in no way functionally similar to the original 737s that took to the skies 52 years ago. As said in the last hearing we had, seems to me like there have been so many significant modifications, its almost as if you took a canoe and turned it into a cruise ship. Mr. Hamilton, can you tell us how many derivative certificates boeing has received for the 737 since initially being certified over 50 years ago . Senator, i dont have the exact number in my head. Its approximately, i think, 14. 14 or 814 . Im sorry 14 derivatives. 14 derivatives. Let me take the action to follow up and get you i appreciate that. The last thing im going to ask. Do you believe the 737 max is functionally the same plane that was certified in 1967 . Senator, as i mentioned to the earlier senator, Safety Standards have evolved as the airplane has evolved. And one of the important things to understand is whats really important also is for the pilots as they transition from an earlier version of the 737 to the newer version that the airplane behaves and handles in the same way. That was important from a handling characteristic standpoint. Important enough for brazil to mention but not us. With respect to that, senator, there is a joint operation Evaluation Board that determines the training. But other regulators can determine what training they want to do above and beyond based on their information. I dont know the specifics of the brazilian document you were referencing. We can follow up on that. Thank you. Thank you, senator rosen. Senator blunt. Thank you, chairman. So, mr. Muilenburg, i dont want to absolve you from the opportunity and responsibility to go back and look at that long question from senator tester and answer it for the record. But for now, one of the sources one of the central thoughts in that question was, why shouldnt we change this process and go back to where its no longer cooperative or the faa takes full responsibility. Give the answer to that. Should this process be changed where the federal government is fully responsible with employees only hired by the federal government . What impact would that have on safety . Senator, i believe the data clearly shows that creation of the delegated authority process and its implementation has enhanced safety over the last couple of decades. I mentioned earlier about a 95 improvement in aviation safety over the last couple of decades. I think a portion of that at least can be attributed to the delegated authority process. That doesnt mean we shouldnt refine it, reform it over time. But the fundamental process of strong government oversight combined with deep industry Technical Knowledge in the right balance is a strong safety process. And i firmly believe thats one of the things thats contributed to aviation safety. That process demands oversight and we are fully supportive of strong oversight, but we also fully support the idea of tapping deep industry Technical Expertise and that combination is the safest combination. And what do you think the view of the industry technicians is of their responsibility there, do you think they feel the right level of both responsibility and liability of providing the information that they need to provide . Senator, they do. And i can tell you thats the culture of our company. And i respect the comments that were made today and the questions that have been raised about our culture. We deserve the scrutiny, but ive been at this company for 34 years. I know the people of boeing. You all know the people of boeing. These are 150,000 people that every day come to work because they have an important mission. They are honest. They are resolute in their efforts. They are committed to safety. Thats our culture. And every employee at boeing, thats just how we think about the work we do. And were going to continue to improve as a company. Im not saying weve done everything right. As i noted today, weve gotten some things wrong but this is a Great Company with a great legacy thats committed to excellence. Where we can improve, we will. Where with he can learn, we will. But our culture is safety. Thats the culture at boeing. Its been that way for 133 years. Mr. Hamilton, i had two or three questions that actually senator rosen just asked pursuing that further. But youve got a 1967 certification thats had 14 variants since 1967. You have a significantly different plane, just based on the 14th variant of the original plane. What difference do you it think it would have made if the certification process would have been would have gone back to the recertifying a new plane. Would that have made a difference in the mcas system or youve been doing this a long time. What difference would it have made if we hadnt built on the previous half century of this planes history and just started with a new plane, would that have been better or worse . You know, in part 21 of the federal regulations, it spells out the change product rule, which is how you assess for a derivative type certification. And its a process thats in the usfas regulations, also in european and other countrys regulations. And it requires you to look at all significant changes and step up. I think theres an assumption here that derivative type cert is les robust than a new type cert. I think when you look at a new type cert, you often have some exceptions or equivalent levels of safety very similar to what you see on a derivative. Im not sure it would have necessarily resulted in a safer airplane. It might have driven some different design decisions, though, but fundamentally, one of the things that happened in these two accidents was this assumption around how we expected crews to respond under certain situations which prove to be not it did not happen. And i think, you know, thats a fundamental issue that we have to address in the industry. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, senator blunt. Senator blackburn. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here today and for taking our questions. I will tell you this, as youve responded, youve addressed senator, senator, senator. I think you should be addressing victims because theyre the ones were asking questions on behalf of. And theyre the ones who have come today on behalf of their family members. Another thing i want to ask you, youve mentioned a couple of times a lack of awareness of emails or documents or communications. And, mr. Muilenburg, we have something around here before we vote, we say we read the bill so that we know whats in it. If we need to ask questions, we ask questions. And we develop that awareness that is so necessary to make good decisions and to have a full view of the situation that is in front of us. And it is disconcerting to hear someone whos to be the leader of a company to say, i wasnt aware or i didnt know or hadnt read that, nobody made me aware of that. I depended on that. You know, we call that passing the buck. And it is your responsibility if youre going to lead the company to have that awareness, so have you at this point read each and every page of every document that is relative to this situation in this case . Senator, i cant say ive read every document, every page. I know weve provided more than half a million pages of documents as part of the production process over the last year. I accept your input and your criticism. I am accountable, our company is accountable. Accountability starts i appreciate that, but i think it is unsettling to hear you say, i havent read that. Let me move on. I do believe youre in the business of safety as a priority. And even though you say you dont sell safety. Lets talk a little bit about the simulators because you had pilots that were training in the simulators as well as training in flight, correct . Youre referring during the max development, senator . Yes. Okay. So, the simulators that were being used for training, were they built by the same engineers with the same components, the same sensors, the same systems as the max system . Senator, we have a wide variety of simulators. Some of which are called conformed simulators which represent the actual hardware and software of the airport. We have other it is true some of the pilots were not training on this specific simulator . And then you also you know, mr. Peters had started down a line of questioning with you about the pilots and the pilots that were trained and you only had highly experienced pilots in simulators before flying the new max system, correct . Senator, i was referring to our boeing test pilots. We also have pilots from a number of other regulators, airplanes why would you not choose pilots with a variety of experience, a wide range of experience . Because there are pilots with a wide range of experience that are going to be in that cockpit, flying that plane in real time. Senator, i agree with your view on the they of having a variety of pilot experiences involved in the testing process, but again, our boeing pilots are not the only testers in the process. Lets take it this way. What changes are you going to make in the simulators and in the training that is going to bring to account for human factor . Senator, we made several changes and have more to come, about you to start the baseline Training Program for the max is roughly a 24day Training Program, which includes heavy use of simulators, advanced simulators. Weve also modified the computer based training for the inkra mejs training between the ng and the max. Weve added visibility to the training materials for the mcas system that weve talked about. That new training is all currently being evaluated and will be ultimately certified by the regulators to make it a baseline in the program. Were also investing r d significantly in advance let me ask i appreciate all of that and appreciate your answer. Prior to these occurrences, did you feel that your training was not sufficient . Senator, no, we implemented the training that was planned and certified for the airplane. Okay. Yield back. Thank you, senator blackburn. Senator scott. Thank you, mr. Chairman. First off, my heart goes out to all the families. I just cant imagine, you know, the impact on these families for these tragic accidents. I come from florida, so air travel is pretty big. Pretty big deal for us. 126 Million People traveled to florida last year, and a lions share came by aircraft. So the safety of everybody is really important. Mr. Muilenburg, the president and ceo of your commercial airlines was let go after this. So, whats your process to hold people accountable to make sure this doesnt happen again . Senator, first of all, my company and i are accountable. I believe that accountable starts with me. Every action we take has tlid to focus on safety. I have also taken some management actions. Again, those are focused on Operational Excellence and safety Going Forward. As other reviews are completed, if we see additional actions that need to be taken, we wont hesitate. But some cases accountability also includes processes and organizational structures and that gets to announcement we made on our new safety review board, our new board Safety Committee and the realignment of all 50,000 of our engineers to our chief engineer in terms of reporting structure. All of those accountability actions are important and all of them are focused on safety. So if anybody if any of whether its engineers or nonengineers, if somebody has a concern in the future about safety, whats the process youve created to make sure it gets to you and you can react to it . Because ultimately, if youre the ceo, the buck stops with you. Senator, thats been one of the key learnings from this whole process. We need to learn visibility on safety issues that might come up at the ground floor level. So, a couple of things weve done there. One is restructuring our safety review boards so i now get a weekly update on safety review boards from across the boeing enterprise at a detailed level, which i find to be very helpful. Weve also with the stand up of our new organization under beth pastor, instead of having those safety teams under our businesses they report up through our chief engineer. Any safety concerns that employees have will come through that organization. We set up a new anonymous reporting system for those employees that might want to make anonymous reports to facilitate that and we continue to have a full range of ethics hot lines across our enterprise that encourage employees to make their inputs. We have a culture of asking our employees to speak up. We want them to speak up. We want to make sure theyre heard and that we take action. Have you made any changes at the board level to increase the accountability for all employees . Well, senator, our board has been very engaged in this entire process. One of the things now about six months ago, i asked our board to set up an independent review led by admiral bastiani. They came forward with a number of recommendations. Our board will continue to be engaged in that process. And this new this new Safety Organization that i talked about, in addition to reporting to the chief engineer and to me, it also provides independent audit, if you will, back into our board. And our board has set up a new aerospace Safety Committee thats now permanent, headed up by admiral jeanbastiani. We added a new board member, admiral richardson. Hell be a member of that committee. Our Safety Organization will have an independent reporting line to them as well, which i think is a good discipline process. I had to provide so i didnt hear all of the testimony. Have you made recommendations to this committee things at the federal level we should be doing differently, make sure whether its boeing or airbus or anybody to make sure this doesnt happen again . Senator, weve discussed a number of options there. We have learned and there are some things we need to fix that are related to the airplane design and training and xhuktsz. We also think there are some opportunities to reform our processes and how we pork together as a government in industry. And were very of any actions that would enhance safety. Thank you. Thank you, senator scott. Thank you, chairman. I want to stress my sympathies and condolences to the family members here. We have a safe commercial Aviation Industry in america but i think we always have to look at ways to improve the industry, airlines, faa, congress, so im sure its difficult for the family members to be here but its important that youre here. I want to thank you for that. Im going to start with a bit of a parochial question. Mr. Muilenburger, mr. Hamilton, alaska airlines, my states airline, its a very good airline. Its certainly critically important to my state. I know it is to the Ranking Members states as well. They fly almost all 737 boeings. We alaskans travel a lot. Ive had many constituents in the aftermath of these max crashes that have asked me, are the 737 that we are flying on all the time in alaska to and from seattle and other places safe . So, can you can both of you assure my constituents that these 737s are safe, that are such an important component of the alaska air travel . Senator, the 737 ng fleet that alaska operates is a safe fleet. Its a safe airplane. And its got about 200 million hours of air safety track record behind it. Mr. Hamilton . Yeah, i agree with mr. Muilenburgs comments. I agree with mr. Muilenburgs comments. I also want to state that we have a weekly meeting that we review all the reports coming in from the fleet as to whether or not they are potential safety issue or not. So, the max issues that were focused on here with regard to 737s are not issues that exist with your other line of 737s, 80 0z, 900s . No. Thats correct. Let me ask i know the house side was looking at this, as we focus, as this committee is, on the tragic Lessons Learned from the max 737 accidents, should we also take the time to ensure that the other 737 models that are receiving less attention now are nevertheless, continue to be safe and to take the opportunity to look at the faa certification process on those to make sure that that is not bedevilled with some of the challenges were discussing with regard to the max . Would you agree thats an opportunity to not just focus on the max but the overall process to reboot the focus, both at your company and also in the faa on safety . Senator, i believe there are a number of independent reviews under way right now looking at that broader certification process. Some of which have begun to report out. We support that broader look. So, models that arent just the max . All models. Were taking an endtoend comprehensive look at the certification process. I believe there are a number of government independent reviews focused on that. Let me ask you from both of you. I keep hearing from Safety Experts the importance of what they refer to as functional safety. That is the way that different systems Work Together with the operator as opposed to looking at each system as its added to a new model in a vacuum. And it seems to me that this issue of functional safety is a core issue as it relates to the max given what has happened. Can you tell the committee about what your companys approach to this issue of functional safety is when adding new systems to an existing aircraft like the 737 . Obviously there was a failure here on that issue. How are you working to improve that . And does the faa do enough to focus on this idea of functional safety, not just the individual additions to existing and older models . Ill ask john to take that question. Yeah, senator, i think it starts with a requirements breakdown of whats airplane level requirements, component requirements and then validating at the component level, system level and at the airport level how any change met the requirements and interacted across the system or airplane level. You also talked about regulatory requirements. Yes. Does the faa focus enough on functional safety . So, theres been some rather recent changes in what we Call Development assurance. That i think is continuing to mature. And, again, this looks at the functional safety and some of the things you really focused at is the breakdown of requirements and how different systems interact with that. So i think we as mr. Muilenburg pointed out, some of the recent Industry Committee reports have discussed this and i think what well support those recommendations and the faas actions Going Forward. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, senator sullivan. Thank you to the panel. We appreciate you being with us and im sure well be questioning you further as we continue to get more reports. Our second panel of witnesses will be escorted in now. We thank you two gentlemen for being with us. The second panel, as ive said before is mr. Robert sumwalt, chairman of the National Transportation safety board. And the honorable christopher hart. Mr. Hart is the team chair of the joint authorities technical review, which we use the shorthand of jatr for. And mr. Hart is a former chairman of the National Transportation safety board. And theyve been waiting patiently during these 2 1 2 hours. Gentlemen, we appreciate you being here. You have submitted testimony. We ask each of you to summarize your testimony in five minutes. Mr. Sumwalt, well begin with you. Youre recognized. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, chairman wicker, Ranking Member cantwell and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. This afternoon i will address the ntsbs recent recommendation report regarding the 737 max certification processes. This recommendation report issued last month contained seven recommendations do you have your mic on, mr. Sumwalt . Its on. But ill move closer. These recommendations are the result of the ntsbs involvement as an accredited representative to the indonesian governments investigation into last years lion air crash and to the ethiopian governments investigation into this years crash involving the Ethiopian Airlines 737 max. The ntsb participates in foreign investigations in accordance with iconix 13 which details the standards and recommended practices of International Aviation accident investigations. Under annex 13, the state of occurrence leads the investigation and the u. S. Has the right to participate in the investigation when it involves a u. S. Manufactured or u. S. Registered or designed aircraft such as the 737 max 8. This is so that any design or manufacturing issues can promptly be addressed by the faa and the manufacturer. As an credited representative to these crash investigations, the ntsb initiated an indepth examination of the u. S. Designed certification processes used to certify the max. The issues we identified revolve around three basic areas and our safety recommendations are centered on them. First, the system safety assumptions used by boeing for the mcas and ultimate accepted by the faa did not use realistic pilot recognition and correcttive actions in response to uncommanded Flight Control inputs. Quite simply, the assumptions boeing used did not consider or account for the impact that multiple flight deck alerts or indications could have pilot responses to mcas activation using scientific methods and application of Human Factors principles to improve cockpit design, procedures and training. We believe that the use of validated methods and tools to assess pilot performance when dealing with failure conditions and emergencies would result in more effective requirements for flight deck interface design, pilot procedures and training strategies. Finally, we believe that manufacturers should develop and incorporate in airline cockpits mechanisms that would allow pilots to better diagnose, prioritize and react to multiple alerts and alarms. The pilots in the lion air and Ethiopian Air crashes were faced with multiple oral and visual alerts. Research demonstrates that emergency situations would increase workload and require additional effort to manage effectively because of the stress involved and possible confusion regarding which actions are necessary to resolve the problem. Each of our seven recommendations are detailed in my written testimony. In closing, it should be noted that the ntsb investigators continue to examine the design investigator fiction process and we may issue additional recommendations in this area if warranted. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and i look forward to your questions. Thank you, mr. Sumwalt. Mr. Hart, youre recognized. Thank you, chairman wicker and Ranking Member cantwell and members, thank you for inviting me to this hearing today. I would like to give my condolences to the family and friends of the passengers and crew on lion air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302. The faa created the joint authorities technical review because these crashes revealed a need to review the robustness of the aircraft certification process. The jatr, which included representatives from the faa, f nasa and nine other civil authorities were created to review the max certification process to determine whether the appropriate regulations were applied, to assess whether compliance was shown and to recommend improvements. I commend the faa for seeking this process per review and making it public. The max grounding was unprecedented. Two previous mcgroundings were the income Donald Douglas when an engine separated from the wing and the boeing 787 in 2013 due to battery fires. In those two groundings, the airplanes were rendered unair worthy. Because the airplanes were unair worthy, pilot compensation was not an issue. Because those groundings resulted solely from airplane problems, the country where the airplanes were manufactured made the grounding and ungrounding decisions. The grounding of the max, on the other hand, involves automation that usually worked but sometimes failed. When it failed, some tie lots knew how to respond but some, including those who crashed, did not. Because the scenario was not just an airplane problem but a problem of airplane system pilot interaction, every country that licenses pilots must also be involved in the grounding and ungrounding decisions. As automation complexity increases, i anticipate future problems are more likely to be of the airplane pilot type rather than airplane only. After three jatr meetings in seattle in which boeing and the faa were very open and helpful, and extensive work between the meetings, the jatr gave the faa a compilation of team members recommendations in 12 areas and we did that on october 11th. Some of the recommendations to address how a single system failure may create issues in other systems. A process based largely on compliance should also address safety. As systems become more complex, the likelihood increases with applicable regulations will not ensure safety. Moreover, as systems become more complex mitigation of hazards through design minimizing reliance on pilot action as primary means of risk mitigation. Delegation will probably be more prevalent as relg laters encounter increased difficulty, hiring and retaining technology leaders. Thus, although the recommendations do not address the desirability of recommendations they query for example, whether Inadequate Communications resulted in the failure to address the effects of evolving the maneuvering characteristic augmentation system, mcas to a more aggressive system. And query qul Inadequate Communications resulted in the failure to address the effects of modifying mcas from one scenario to another scenario. Other recommendations relate to the faa standards regarding the time for pilots to identify and respond to problems. Jatr members recommend whether standards are. Bshg on the ability of pilots to respond appropriately. These two crashes are the latest of several recent crashes in which pilots encountered scenarios they had never seen before, even in training and responded inappropriately. Increasing complexity and reliability exacerbate pilots responding to problems theyve never seen. Increasing complexity exacerbates a challenge because it reduces the likelihood that pilots understand the system. In conclusion, members hope their remss will improve aviation by improving the certification process. Thank you for inviting me and i look forward to your questions. Thank you, gentlemen. Is the work complete regarding the max for either of your organizations . Mr. Sumwalt . Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. We are continuing to go through scores and scores of design certification documents and we are looking if we need to make additional recommendations, we certainly will. To answer your question, our work is not completed. Mr. Hart . Our work is completed because we were told to review the situation and give recommendations to the faa. We did that on october 11th. That completed our work. Thank you for asking. So, this particular jatr, joint Authority Technical review, is over and disbanded . Thats correct. All right. Lets talk about the time between the first crash and the second crash. It was it was evidence pretty clear after the first one, after the lion crash, that the mcas system was not working correctly. Is that true, mr. Sumwalt . Yes, sir, that is correct. Mr. Hart, there are many factors, but little dysfunction of the mcas was central. Thats correct. And at that point, what notice was sent out to other airlines and to the pilots to make it clear that that was the main problem . Mr. Had chairman, as you are aware today is the oneyear anniversary of lion air. On october 29th was the crash. I believe it was october the correction, november the 7th when the faa put out an air worthiness directive to require certain procedures procedural modifications. Was that a typical air worthiness directive or was it highlighted an an Emergency Air worthiness directive . Im not sure. Chris, do you know . Air worthiness directive pretty much by definition are considered emergencies, so i think this one was definitely one that is supposed to command the attention of the entire industry. Mr. Sumwalt is consulting with staff. Its fine if he supplements that. But this was a red flag sent out about the max and it is mcas part of it, is that correct . Would you would you either of you ja gentlemen quarrel that this was a red flag warning . It was an entrywide warning that everyone who flies this airplane needs to know about the issue. So to that extent, yes. Well, is there a way we could have made it more explicit . Was there something about this advisory that didnt get the job done, mr. Hart . Im sorry, but i cant speak for the faa and their decision process on how to handle this. The decision process to have the air worthiness directive within days of the second crash was intentional to get the word out as quickly as possible, but im really i was not privy to the decisionmaking process. No, but in im talking about the way it would typically have been received internationally and in the Aviation Industry. This would have been taken seriously and given a heightened bit of attention, is that correct . Thats certainly the purpose of an air worthiness directive, yes. How people responded to it, i dont have a good answer to that. Okay. Did i hear you say, mr. Hart, that some pilots reacted in one way, which was sufficient, and some pilots did not, for whatever reasons, do that . If you could elaborate on what you were telling the committee. Yes, thank you for that question. I was referring specifically to the fact that in the lion air crash, the day before that crash can, that same problem was encountered and the pilots responded to it appropriately. Well, what do you think there was a failure at lion air to notify the other crews that a problem had occurred, it was resolved in this fashion, and we need to be mindful of it . Do you know if that was communicated between the flight that did land safely and the one the next day . Unfortunately, i do thank you for the question. Unfortunately, i do not know the details of who told what to whom. Whether it was the mechanics, the other pilots. I dont know the details of what happened the day before was transmitted to the subsequent pilots and subsequent mechanics. Mr. Sumwalt, do you want to clarify anything youve said based on some advice youve been getting . In fact, it was an Emergency Air worthiness directive issued by the faa, as mr. Hart has indicated. So, that is a term of art. An Emergency Air worthiness directive . Thats correct. That means it does not allow for Public Comment. Oftentimes for a normal air worthiness directive, the faa has to put it out for Public Comment unless its an Emergency Air worthiness directive. Is it fair for me to characterize that as a red flag . Well, as chris hart indicated, it does indicate there was something that needed immediate awareness within the aviation community. Senator cantwell. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I thank the second panel for being here. I wish there were as many people listening to this as the first because this is the hard work that we have do in getting this right and moving forward and i so much preach mr. Sumwalts recommendations and, mr. Hart, your committees recommendations. My colleagues and i, snorl duckworth, senator blumenthal, have already introduced legislation on the ntsb and other recommendations last week. Hopefully well be able to move forward on those. You heard the discussion, i believe were here for this issue about what happened in the cockpit and the level of distraction, which i think is the point mr. Sumwalt, of at least two of the recommendations we put in our legislation, that is your recommendation, that the faa direct boeing to have clearer corrective actions from uncommand systems. And that there be this some sort of resolution that theyve had in other planes to the cockpit situation so were not bombarding pilots. Also that they develop the same kind of assessment. Now, when i read the circulars, and ive read many, its pretty clear to me that this already should have been done. I mean, its pretty clear that you have to talk about the effectiveness that when you submit a plan for a plane, you have to submit this alert plan. Well see well find out at some point what alert plan was submitted and what was reviewed. Its very clear that you have to have this effectiveness intended for human machine integration you know, people understanding the alerts, compatibility with other displays and warnings, ensuring the system is telling the pilots what to do. So, listen, i appreciate your recommendations. And we are going to get them. Into law, trust me. The question becomes like, what are we doing on top of something that isnt already clear here, what is it were doing that people dont understand . What is it were doing here to make this system safer . The reason i ask this, because as i said in my Opening Statement, i actually believe this is the issue du jour. I think it is for automobile safety on more avs and airplanes. Theres going to be more integration into the cockpit. So any time youre taking over command of that plane with a response, we need to know and we need to understand that functionality. So, what are these alert system requirements that were asking the faa to do both for the max and for all planes . What is that really giving us that we dont currently have now in the statute . Well, thank you for the question, senator cantwell and thank you for your leadership and advocacy on this issue. We did identify holes in the design certification process. Id be glad to get into some of those holes and what those recommendations are. But i dont want to dominate your time. I defer to you. Well, my question was, why do you think this is important . You actually dont think the details are there . Thats correct. We really what the long and the short of it, woven throughout each of the seven recommendations is that we found that with when pilots are faced with multiple alerts, theyre not performing or reacting in the way that boeing thought that they would react when they developed their design assumptions. And what about Safety Management systems for aerospace manufacturers, what about that recommendation . The ntsb has has found the benefits of Safety Management systems in many modes of transportation, including aviation. We dont have specifically a recommendation for an sms for the manufacturers, however we do believe that when youre properly analyzing and assessing your risk, that is improving safety. So i think personally that would be a good idea for manufacturers to have a Safety Management system in place. What does that mean to most people trying to listen to this conversation, post the one we just had . What does that actually mean that happens . Ive always looked at Safety Management systems and i like the term Safety Management instead of Safety Management systems because its an active thing. We want to manage safety the way we would manage other vital business functions. So, theyre generally thought to be about four tenets of sms. One is Safety Risk Assessment where youre actively assessing your risk and managing those risks to an acceptable level. So, thats a key component right there of a Safety Management system. Well, this issue of Risk Management is critical and thats what i believe, is you have to say, what are the highest risks so you can focus on those. No one thought the change of a new system that took outside information, controlled the plane, gave different commands that gave different alerts, that do different things. It wasnt tested. We have to implement this. The faa was given this, i dont know if it was a directive or nudge before, but then they pulled back on a rulemaking in 2014 on this system management, but you believe others are recommending this is what we should go for because it creates this robust conversation, is that the best way to strib it . As a safety practitioner, i agree with that. The ntsb has not really gone on the record to have a recommendation from that but from a safety practitioners perspective, again, when youre managing your risks, youre managing safety. Thank you. I see my other my time has passed so, senator blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you, senator cantwell. And i want to express my appreciation to senator cantwell and senator duckworth. I had a lot of questions for our previous witness, which unfortunately i didnt have time to ask. One of them would have been, why did he call the president of the United States . In effect, circumventing the faa if they were really going to respect safety . Are either of you aware of the call or calls that were made by mr. Muilenburg to the president of the United States seeking to prevent grounding of these airplanes in the immediate aftermath of the second crash . Senator blumenthal, im certainly not aware of that. I sat in this hearing in march when you asked mr. Elwell the same questions. Im not aware of that. We were not involved in the decision to ground the aircraft in any form or fashion. Mr. Hart . It was not within the purview of the jatr. We were looking at the certification process to decide how to make it better. The fact of the matter is the United States of america were among the last nations to ground those aircrafts, correct . Thats certainly my my understanding. Us and canada. And normally the United States would be at the forefront of safety, correct . Mr. Hart . Good question, senator. Just for your awareness, i am on record through an oped on usa today to waiting to see if they had enough data to see if it is a oneoff event, and because if not, they will be grounding airplanes after every crash. And if it was a oneoff. In a retro spespect was it ae decision . After the fact. And just saying well, everybody had the same data at the same time, but the faa has a reputation for waiting for the data to react. Let me ask you. Your report found that key aspects of the mcas functions such as the intended function description, and the interfaces and architecture were not directly visible to the faa in a straight forward manner through the certification deliverable documents. I am trying to put that in simple english that you would use in a usa today article. They did not do full fair disclosure to the faa, did they . In simple question the system was complicated enough and challenging enough that the communication was stifled and the communication did not get to where it needed to be when it needed to be there. I think that answers my question. And that is something that we should correct, correct . That is something that the jatr has recommended correcting and yes, it does need correcting. The wall street journal has report 234ed that the boeing employees felt undue pressure in regard to safety and one of the saying that boeing was more concerned with quantity rather than quality and safety. Did your investigation reveal that undue pressure of the employees of boeing to move the safety process, and im sorry, the certification process at the expense of safety . Thank you for the question. Our investigation and the review found enough concern about enough undue influence that we recommended it is reviewed next time for the next certification process. You indicated in the testimony that you thought that delegation would continue which seems contrary to what we have found here so far, and a lot of the thrust of the questioning has been to reverse delegation. So, i hope that maybe we can have your further thoughts on that issue. Let me ask one more question of mr. Sumwalt. This past sunday the New York Times reported on the boeing efforts to undercut Regulatory Oversight early and often and the story of boeing to sabotaging the rigorous safety is chilling to all of us and more reason to keep the 737 max grounded until the certification is really and truly independent and the system is reformed. What are your views on the amount of the Delegation Authority from the faa to boeing . Shouldnt we reverse the delegation that exists right now . Senator blumenthal, thank you for the question. The ntsbs role in all of this is to serve as an accredited representative to each of the respective accident investigations. As such we looked at the design certification processes of the 737 max and we issued the seven recommendations. We have not looked at the oda process. That is not something that we have done. Why . Well, because there are approximately 79 organizations that have oda approval. We have about two people who have the expertise to dwell into the design certification issues and we have devoted those energies to come up with the seven recommendations that we issued one month ago and that is an enormous task, and im under the impression that the usdot is doing a study of this issue. As are numerous other entities. Thank you. Senator duckworth. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman sumwalt, welcome. At the hearing that was head before this subcommittee, you were asked a simple question concerning lyons air 610, and the question was what should the pilots have done and you responded as follows, i flew the 710 for years and i believe that for the flintstone version they flew, and i believe that the first thing that you would do is to oppose the motion by pulling the yoke back and that would engage the brake, and the stabilizer brake. And that is the most reliable human response is to pull back on the yoke. Would you concur with this view . Yes, i do. I have actually looked at the procedure, and it says to grasp and to hold it firmly, but as you know as an experienced pilot, your natural reaction would in fact, if it is going in direction that you dont end it to, you should oppose, and which it should in the older mod ols of the boeing that i flew the 727 and the 737 that would engage the stabilizer brake and stop the stab from riding, but as you pointed out in your earlier round, it will not do that when mcas is active on the 737 max. Right. So that is what i would like to add to your response is the critical importance of the column cutout function and whether aft or forward, it is not limited to the very old 737, but in fact, according to the former boeing engineer who was responsible for the development of the 757, the 767 and the 747400 in every boeing airplane, and in every boeing airplane until the 737 max, the stabilizer is stopped by column motion only. So you dont have to do another step. And nothing else. There is nothing to reset and pushes the nose back down five seconds later , and that is it every other model of 737s, but with the max, the pilot also has to apply the same threesecond window or the mcas which the pilots did not know was installed on the aircraft could reset and put the nose back down. So now you are telling the pilot, you have pulled back and natural reaction and you have overrode it, but now you to trouble shoot for a system that you dont know exists that is overriding the pilots command in pulling back the yoke. Are you aware of boeing notifying the commercial 737 pilots before air crash that when it is enabled it is going to cut tout aft safety function, that is, overriding the safety function. Senator duckworth, im under the impression that just as you said that prior to the two tragic crashes that information was not widely known within the piloting community. Thank you. Mr. Sumwalt, the mcas malfunction should have been rated to hazardous rating, because the aft was cut out and stabilizing the trim rate which made this likely of overriding it and so if boeing had done this and rating it a major hazard, we would not be where we are today. Would you agree with that . It changes how they refort thpo the faa, is that correct . Yes. There is only one angle of attack sensor if it were at a higher hazard category it would have required the imput of two. I would like to enter peter lemmys flaw assumptions path into the hear rening record. Without objection. Mr. Sumwalt, can you talk about the accident chain and the concept of these decisions that pile up and leads to those lion air pilots for example fighting to save that aircraft. And how these decisions add up. Yes, as we know, senator duckworth, the ntsb was an accredited representative as well as the ethiopian accident, and we participated closely with both of them, but since the lion air has wrapped up, we have worked closely with the indonesian authorities and we commented on their report and we feel that their report, the indonesian report, the knkt report is comprehensive and we are satisfied with that report. So i think that report outlines the chain of events and it is not just one factor, but several issues that led to that crash. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you, senator duckworth. Senator cruz. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Chairman sumwalt, the ntsb report that you mentioned stated that the ntsb is concerned that the pilots response to the mcas operation were not consistent with the underlying assumptions with the response that boeing used based on faa guidance for the faa flight hazards as part of the mcsa flight 737 flight designs. Why do you think that boeing made the wrong assumptions . Senator cruz, thank you for the question. What we do know is to simulate the mcas or the assess the less hazard level, they put the boeing test pilots in the engineering sim lay toulator an they were flying the trim started moving. They wanted to see how the pilot would have reacted. And if they reacted the way that boeing expected them to do, then they said, okay, well, a pilot will immediately recognize the problem and notice because the nose is pitching down, and notice, because it is increasing the pressure on the control wheel and one other thing, they would in a stab trim wheel was moving. That is all correct, but what boeing failed to account for in the assumptions is that the mcas could have failed for another reason, and the mcas could have activated a angle of attack to lead to numerous alerts and warning in the cockpit, and so with the low angle of attack, a low air speed indication on the primary flight display and a stick shake warning, which is rattling the stick to get a noise, and warning or raally th said air speed is low, air speed is low. So the fact is that the boeing only e valg waited the pilots with the stab trim selfmoving and think did not simulate or replicate how multiple failures could affect a pilots performance. And why did the faa processes not catch this . Not catch the failed assumptions . Well, it is a great question, senator, and im not sure that i know the answer to that, and that is why we have issued the seven recommendations is so that the design assumptions can be realistic. We found in three incidents in the two accident flights and plus the lion air flight prior to the accident that we have seen three case where is the pilots did not perform in accordance withhe assumptions that boeing used. And is a bird strike one that engineers should anticipate and that regulators focusing on the airplane should anticipate. I believe so and think do in the certain areas, and i dont know how it might apply to this, and conjecture that the bird might have taken out the aoa sen, so and i dont know if that is a part of the total Risk Assessment for the 737 max as it is relating to mcas. And any indication of boeing or the faa considered the possibility that a bird attack would shear off the sensor . I do not know that, but i will get back to you with that if youd like. Thank you very much. Mr. Hart, one of the key findings of the joint technical review report is that the faas visibility into the report was incomplete and fragmented. Jatr then went on the say that if the faa had been more involved in the certification of the mcas and this quote would have likely resulted in Design Changes that would have improved safety. Based on the jatr findings, why would the faa accept incomplete and fragmented Safety Information from boeing and what can be done to fix that . Thank you for the question. That is the purpose of the recommendations that the communication process that the oda be less bureaucratic and complicated so that the communication is not undermined by the complex si of the siity situation. And so the faa was not aware of the weak system tomorrow bust system, and the faa was not aware of the details of how adequately the transformation of the mcas from a high speed wind up turn correction to a lowspeed angle of attack correction, and where the assumptions were considered in that process and the communications to the faa were not adequate for it to be fully aware of the impact of those issues. Thank you. Thank you, senator cruz. Senator blumenthal. I have just one question, and you may consider it outside of your expertise, but the ceo of boeing told us today that they made mistakes and regretted them and wanted to take action and response to do the right thing for the families of those affected the loved ones of the victims, and boeing has said it will take responsibility for the lion air crash that resulted in the deaths of 189 people in asia, and the Ethiopian Airline crash that killed 157 people, but it has filed Court Documents for the lions air crash indicating that it is going to move to turn the venue of the case to indonesia where the claim was maintained if settlement talks fail. The case was filed in the Northern District of illinois where boeing is head quartered as you know resolving the claims in indonesia seems a lot less likely to provide justice to those families there. Is no seventh amendment right to the jury trial and no requirement of discovery. There is no rule allowing for depositions. Would you agree with me that equity, fairness, justice would argue in favor of keeping these cases in the United States . My friend chris hart is a harvardeducated lawyer and a Harvard Law School graduate and practicing lawyer in addition to a pilot, and if you would like to defer to him, that is fine. Absolutely. I am a harvard attorney so to speak, but i dont know anything about the litigation strategy to be able to comment on what they want to do litigation wise and it is way out of my lane, and jtr did not consider it, and i dont consider myself competent to add to that. And dont you think that the United States courts of justice would be better than the courts of indonesia . Thank you for the question, but i am not enough of a litigator to give you a competent answer. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thank you, senator blument l blumenthal, and so we are going to close this hearing now. May i ask one more thing. Yes, you may. Thank you for the second round. I wanted to hear from the testimony of the company that they believe they did know that the faa did know about the level of trim, and i believe it is going to be a big issue and we will hear more about this. But you would hope that a plan at the very beginning of the certification would include that data and they would make decisions, but i am concerned that the level of automation, and technology and human response and i want to see the best engineers. I believe it is when the Automobile Industry and toyota went through this and we didnt know what happened, and so we called nasa and said, will you look at the code and figure out what happened. I dont want to call nasa to look at the software code, but i want the faa to be the best Technology Engineers in understanding problems with software, and problems with automation, and challenges with human response, and that is why part of the legislation is that center of the excellence for the faa. Just by the way, i have done two other center of excellence, and one only composite manufacturing, because the faa didnt know enough about the composites to certify the plane and one on biofuel, because they also dont know how the certify the fuel sources for planes if they dont understand jet fuel themselves. Okay. So, im a believer that we give the faa the extra resources and the tools to stay ahead or at least know the right parameters of the debate, but isnt the right parameter of debate have to focus on the Human Technology interface today . Isnt that where we are . We saw ten years of making it safer, and yet, this level of the integration has told us that five of the last accidents were all around this. So i think that, you know, for me, and Many Americans waking up, wondering what is a pidto tube, and giving commands and responses to the inside of the cockpits without the understanding, and so i feel that the faa and we have had this discussion with captain sullenberger, and that we need to have a center of excellence for response, and what do you say about that center of excellence . Thank you for the question, and it also gives me the question to senator blumenthal raising the same issue. I think that first of all the type of the problem that we will see with the airplane safety in the future is not things falling off of the airplane like the dc10 engine, but it is the pilot piece. And the human factor issue is what we will be finding and so i am totally on board with the recommendations that were made. Two problems. One is that the reference is to multiple things going wrong at the same time, and i would add to it, that it is also never having seen it before in training, and this is the challenge, because we are seeing it in the first time of the realtime for the series of accidents where it has happened an unsuccessful, and the one exception was sully when he had the situation that he had never seen before in training, and he handled it masterfully. And listen, i think that i have consulted him a lot about this, but that is why he came to us, and after the coegan air and he said do not change the regulations on the pilot on the regional aircraft, because you dont have enough time to talk. So if you are going to develop a system for certification to i. V. G it to the faa, then the faa has to know the parameters of the human response and what the pilots are capable of. We need more data if this is the route on the innovation, then we need to know more about what is the factor and i dont want to speak for him, but his perception is that it is where you have to start, because you dont have any way to judge the system if you dont understand what the limitation is. That is going to my point that the leading technologists in the rapid advancing and innovative technologies, the leading technologists is not with a regulator, and that is not a faa problem, but International Certification problem, because the regulators cannot hire and lead with the leading technology, but they will be with the companies. And i want the faa to have enough Data Information and understanding to ask the right questions, because if they are not asking the right questions because they dont understand the technological impact, we are going to have a problem. So we have to make sure they understand the r d and the composite and the biofuels and the cockpit automation. That is why the adequate information is so crucial, straight to your point. Thank you for making the point. I yield back. Thank you. Mr. Blumenthal. One question. If the faa were to pay enough to offer career opportunities, would that affect your judgment that they cant hire the leading technologists as you put . I cant speak to the totality of the circumstances of why the regulators dont have those people, but it is probably part of it, yes. I am really discouraged and frankly somewhat skeptical about your view that the faa should be doomed to failure and has to outsource safety. I dont mean to suggest that they are doomed to failure, but that why the clab raty process of the delegation is going to continue, because there is no way in my view in the way that things are currently situationed that they will have the expertise within house to do it without the collaboration. Putting aside the word collaboration, we hope to prove you wrong. And by in fact incentivizing financially and otherwise people with those skills to go to work with the faa, because that is where the disinterested and the independence safety function belongs. If you outsource safety, that is doomed to failure. Iing agree with you that is ideal, senator blumenthal. Thank you for the members of the committee who have participated throughout. I have to say it is one of the most difficult hearings i have ever participated in. I know it has been difficult for the family members still with us in the room. Some have had to leave. Let me reiterate what i said at the outset, and that is this committee under my leadership and senator cantwells leadership is working to obtain as full of an answer as possible. We owe it for the public and the families and the victims. You have my assurance that we are not finished with the work. That said, the hearing record will remain open for two weeks. 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