All around washington but nonetheless reflecting a real divergence and breadth of thinking, experience and approach. In thinking about these kinds of conflicts with a lot of broad strategic expertise and also a lot of Field Research and handsonexpertise. This struggle is at the new American Engagement Initiative at the Selikoff Center at the Atlantic Council. He has a longstanding scholar, many will know him from his years at the Cato Institute and his most recent book is hes, war and liberty. He is also a former navy officer and is in many ways one of the great skeptics and contrary invoices in American Foreign policy and strategy thinking today who has prolonged time and were pleased to have them with us se in this event read chuck and logan Catholic University is at that center for study and statesmanship, used to be cato as well and is recently written an important article in defense priorities call the case for withdrawing from the middle east and is an advocate of minimizing us monetary footprints and in some ways i think its fair to say that a broad level of progress all of us are advocates of minimizing the footprint to the extent possible as much as todays debate or conversation and it will have a little of itthe flavor of both is just how you do that and how much engagement is reasonable and desirable or to what extent is around in some places with some degree of presence at least the least bad option for American NationalSecurity Policy and getting into that kind of topic with real expertise on south asia is my friend and colleague, maria also who is s an expert on both afghanistan and pakistan, wrote an excellent book a couple of years ago called pakistan under siege. One of the best modern studies on pakistan and i recommend it to anyone and ask many of my students in recent years to read it. She is a David Rubenstein fellow and continues to work on the broader south asia pakistan afghanistan theater as well as nigeria and shes also interested in education and influences peoples fl attitudes toward the state and extremism and finally a good friend and colleague beth brown who has done some of the most extraordinary research ive ever witnessed or read about without throughout much of the world including certainly in the Central Command theater, broader middle east. Of the places where shes done or most impressive Field Research in somalia and afghanistan. Where she is famous or not just hunkering down and a relatively safe green zone to those places which is where you will usually find me if im ever in a place like afghanistan but in the field talking to people, seeing whats happening on the ground remarkable bravery and a lot of preparatory work to make sure that she can get out into the field in places where she will be able to learn so much from her work. She is an ongoing and very active expert in all matters afghanistan, pakistan and brookings but continues to research as well. Drug trafficking, pandemic disease origins, wildlife markets in places like indonesia, china, brazil, mexico and elsewhere. So were delighted to have you join us as well in the audience and we will look forward to your talks in the latter part ofthis discussion. Wanda will have to leave us a few minutes before two but were going to start by my posing a broad question about what have we gotten right and what have we gotten wrong in the last 20 years or so in the middle east and then ill have a similarly broad question foreach panelist thereafter. But on the second round here with us than both of you and your questions so again, very pleased to have you herewith us today and chris, without further ado , the floor is yours my friend. Next to brookings and the institute for monitoring this event. I think that my remarks will be mostly to try to set the concept that i think is helpful and every once in a while to ask how is it that we got here and how is it that were referring to the forever war. Was it truly a forever war or did it start somewhere . Can i speak candidly, it did start after 9 11 and you all know why. I think if you sent to someone on september 10, 2001 at 19 years hence the United States would be spending 5. 5 trillion, would have lost the lives of over 7000 american citizens and women, 52,000 wounded, perhaps an equal number of 7000 or more contractors killed, the project has good data on this. And perhaps 800,000 civilians killed in the various orders initiated after 9 11. They would be surprised i think and say how did this all happen and again we go back to the wereason why it all happened was because of the terrific trauma of the terrorist attacks on september 11, 2001 and the way the United States and other countries around the world reacted after that horrific event. And i think that sometimes, from time to time policy is what it is and policies dont change unless someone changes them. But its part of the reason why we have stayed on this path is because the political incentives to make the dramatic change have not been sufficient to do so. And people come along, i recall that john kerry in 2004 said that he thought that terrorism should be reduced to a nuisance problem. He was viciously attacked for not taking it seriously enough. Even people like john mccain or Mike Bloomberg at various stages said the terrorism problem had beenexaggerated and sometimes he got away with it and sometimes he didnt. So i think its helpful every once in a while to ask if this money spent, lives lost, is it necessary to keep the United States safe, is actually necessary to reduce the risks of future acts of terrorism and so far i havent seen any better assessment of this and my former colleague john mueller whose a fellow course and longtime professor at Ohio State University who is coauthor with mark stewart but back in 2013 estimated that for the cost of what weve espent on counterterrorism since 9 11, we would have do believe that those Counterterrorism Measures were responsible for stopping roughly 1667 times square type attacks. An attack that was attempted back in 2010 in other words work such attacks every single day. And if we dont believe those various measures that had been taken over the broad rubric of the war on terrorism and the forever war are actually essential for useful in stopping both sorts of terrorist attacks, i think we should wonder whether trillion dollars, 5. 5 trillion might have been better spent elsewhere and more portly might have wondered with her ehundreds of thousands of lives lost along the way were these people would still bealive today. Very much for excellent framing of the questions. Now id like to turn to delia and asked, i know youre no fan of unnecessary deployment to the broader south asia or afghanistan theater ive also read enough of your work to know that youre not of the view that pulling out now would be the smartest decision either i wondered if you could tell us a little bit about your thinking on both afghanistan and pakistan and how we should think about them in the context of the socalled forever wars andthe incoming by ministration area over to you margaret. Thanks mike. Yes, exactly. I think im more gains in the forever war but on policy options, in washington, both increasingly framed as a choice, i know that we should lead better now and we choose staying forever, i think that an untold framing. Th i think theres a middleoftheroad option that forgotten about and thats that we should commit to maintaining a small presence in afghanistan. Until about the deal between the taliban and kabul is achieved this will take a few years, maybe even five years. Ak but thats the hope. During the debates, other painstaking process of negotiation between thetwo parties. Though im not saying that the deal struck in february should be abandoned. Im working within the gray area of the deal as they are and the fact that the conditions were put in place not been met today. So until a pc is achieved, my argument is that it benefits both artists and the United States. This kabul leverage to negotiate the best possible deal is kind of with the comment and crucially try to forbear gains in human rights. And and a good outcome for afghanistan was america, both in terms of our objective of counterterrorism but also in terms of america and the region because we should be clear that any core outcomes in afghanistan down the road will be seen as americas failure and the failure of this forever war. I know that thinking of that war as a forever war is unhelpful because the war has ground down for america but we would be at west end 2 to 3 percent of the height of our resins there. And so all this terminology serves is to make us a politically charged question and unnecessarily politically charged. Id also argue that saying that nothing good can come of gains misses a window of opportunity that we have a with the start of the negotiations there because there are peace negotiations but if we leave now, if we dont leave now that we will fall into that in afghanistan to a greater degree and i dont think thats necessarily accurate. On the contrary if we do leave now the cost is high and we should be clear the future looks grim if we do leave now and dependent on violence and civil war and its ultimately about the sentence, not to sound too grim but thats what it looks like. Just two more points quickly. I think President Trumps decision to wind down troops to 500 which in the last few days is, the conditions for doing this have not been met but hes weakened not only the american position butthat of our allies. And so kabuls position and the only party this benefits is the towel. Then biden comes into power in january he has little room to maneuver and i think the ability to have leverage over the taliban, the ability to pressure the taliban as we need to do the comes thatmuch harder. Perhaps its a possibility that this can be done in thwith 2500 troops. My sense is hes going to increase troops right away not in terms of the first decision we take but thats unpopular but i do think that as President Biden in 2021 thinks a few thousand troops more are what we need to ensure a better outcome, then you should take that decision that if we need to go up to id 4500 again and we should make that decision and we may eventually. The word on pakistan, i think the question of afghanistan has been central to our relationship with pakistan. And of course i found action have affectedhow the war in afghanistan has gone. But i think the last two years and have been on for pakistan. Its been awful in the Peace Process and the relationship between the two o companies so i argue that the best time for us to have a relationship with pakistan is afghan he saw as sumptuous because the people of afghanistan, we can focus on other things in that relationship. Whereas with afghanistan defends due to history was lost, country would become a proxy war and a number of other countries will get done in that pakistan might as well and that is not a good outcome for anyone. Delia, somewhat. The next welcome any stage of the conversation in regards to the topicbefore i welcome argument your paper. So the floor is yours my friend. So much. Thank you for monitoring moderating and install the panelist for participant really happy thanksgiving and as happy as it can be for everybody is watching. Chris is argued that something has gone wrong with the forever war. We dont know how much longer theyre going to go on. They quite clearly failed to achieve the aims that we gradually expanded over time. S i think you can tell a different story where in 2002 you say it was a blow to al qaeda and sent a message to the al qaeda and taliban i want to expand on the what chris said because as you mentioned in your paper i would argue that the so thto achieve their aim that we failed greater honor. He felt power with global and so i think what will animate my remarks here is an interest in trying to situation the greater middle east in a broader strategic, context. When i look at was traditional measures of power. If you look at the greater middle east it seems about 3. 3 percent of world gdp is on its way down because of oil prices, closer to three percent but the world gdp is depending on how you can take between 3 and a half and five percent of the World Population and no country in the region can forget power outside the borders. Iran cant conjure saudi arabia, saudi arabia, iran, the idea of original oil on his back. Sometimes we have these discussions, what should we do, how can we put the iraqis back in syria and this paper says what do we actually need from syria in a broader strategic contact pipe next. In looking at that i threw on the word on our seemed moderator Michael Hamlin to try to get a handle on what we stand on the persian gulf mission, the sort of broader middle east mission and its not an exact science as everyone knows what on the order of about 70 billion a year in peacetime in addition to the 5 and a half trillion dollars chris mentioned if you can rack, afghanistan and the post9 11 wars. At real money. Thats basically the sort of argument to say 70 billion a year to this . I looked at what we worry about the greater middle east, what are the concerns re we think this resource expenditure warrants. What are they after action mark and i basically concluded that oil is real and terrorism are the main things, their deeply in nonproliferation is a reason that we can talk about i looked about what we worry about when it comes to oil markets. What we worry about when it comes to israel and what we worry about when it comes to terrorism may conclude that having 50, 60, 70,000 troops in this part of the world is not necessary to protect what are actually limited threats to those interests and im happy to go into those in the q a because this is an extremely bitesize version of the argument but i think the central problem here is that the United States has had so few internal and external constraints on its Foreign Policy, its been able to spend a lot of money, almost Unlimited Money times on both mefunds and the absence of strategy is about choice and the countries dont have any need to choose their strategies have become extravagant and i think thats part ofthe problem. Justin, peggy. One quick clarifying question before i go on just to make sure that i understand the soul of your analysis and the term middle east as it used in many different ways. When you talk about 3 to 3 and a half percent ofWorld Population, that your definition of the middle east . From the eastern med to afghanistan, including afghanistan but not including turkey. I have to go back andlook at turkey. One way or another 10th of a percentage point. Thank you for those and now honda over to you and your intriguing on this issue likeeveryone because again , youve been such a soul work of the afghanistan conflict that i believe its fair to say you explain in this market that you have decided these process requires a look at the us military posture and a different approach and of course i very much eagerly anticipate your thoughts on somalia as well so my friend over to you. You might. Leslie, a bit on the comments and its something that justin phsaid. Thats when these things we think about us military engagement, in situations such as afghanistan, somalia or iraq, is to think not solely in terms of the developments and in the us interest and dividends on the ground but also be politicals. This is rarely done in us strategy where once engagement is launched, the predominant way looks at how to make the missions succeed. Rwhether its a military mission or other mission. The second fact that we often go into is thinking that a part of us interests including a very real counterterrorism interest imply boots on the ground. This is us military deployment and this is particularly true about every us interest such as human rights, us economic context. As well as the other geopolitical competition. Those are all very very important interests and we dont want to see us policy lose those interests and frankly those values. This is where we are symptomatic and those are important interests and objectives does not mean they should also be addressed to the deployment particularly. [inaudible] the third point i would make is that there is a real risk of policy that rarely falls into the trap of the tyranny where if you look at engagement and say you have these model efforts we would want to focus on the much more psychologically uncomfortable, much more emotionally uncomfortable utility and marginal cost so ta when we spend 14 billion each year on maintaining our military deployment in afghanistan, we have to ask where else could we put that money . That amount of money could prevent biodiversity degradation around the world. It has significant impacts on preventing a pandemic and a more crucial impact on preventing the pandemic and we see g the devastation of economies, we wouldnt have uthat with development of this period. Yet rarely if you look at the efforts, we also went into couple of the analysis of marginal utility marginal cost with prospects for success and how those change all the time. This is in my view the thing being that we should be applying to the decisions on how we gave engage rather than the notion that strategy looks a certain way always for that scrutiny of rights and affected interests of certain military deployments. Let me come to some of the specifics that you asked very quickly y in afghanistan. First of all i want to emphasize in both afghanistan and somalia even if one mixes that the withdrawal of us forces is right, that doesnt mean withdrawal also be spent at one moment is particularly like area for example somalia is among the top of parliamentary and president ial elections. Can easily end up mbin violence or in the entire region, the tensions between member state governments are at an alltime high drawing us right now as opposed to wasting federal months to get the elections simply quickly amplifies an enormously combustible situation. There is no need to do and i look forward to that policy. Im asking what is the marginal effect, the marginal utility of those deployments. As we wind up a few comments on afghanistan. I agree with the analysis that the you presence of us troops prior to and, then deal with the afghanistan and, then will significantly worsen the terms of the deal may may present the intensification of the war however, afghanistan is in civil war, us troops might be dying in great numbers but 40,000 afghans are dying on a new basis. That rate is intensified. That comment is already dependent on Us Engagement in afghanistan and that is no prospect for diversity even if the United States and five and menstruation increases its military presence it will simply slow down the rate with which the taliban is dependent on the battlefield and tension. I was a supporter of the servers as initially negotiated and every day of negotiations do hours and say the Obama Administration tried to negotiate but the taliban refused, one because the Obama Administration wanted to have the Afghan Government the elite so they have a long history. My last word is i fundamentally dont believe ethat if us troops stay in afghanistan beyond the deadline, the taliban will simply accept. I think that is an attempt to negotiate a short delay until the end of the 2021 with the taliban. Beyond that, the common will participate even by a counterterrorism mission. We might say dont care that the element used to trade but translate to which will limit the counterterrorism options or resolve these as going into an openended war which the taliban and this is my last comment here, talk about forever but so many, i would gladly permit an openended war. go into a second round and what i want to do is invite each of you now to respond based on the paper from each other. Thats certainly part of this next phase of discussion. Id like to the order slightly because first i want to begin with i you again but ask medea and bob about afghanistan with a specific question about the Peace Process so i think it makes sense to ask them together although certainly one can comment on the whole region but chris, let me begin you began at a very clear and conceptual grand strategic level your analysis. I want to push you further to ask you where you would like to see the us military presence in the broader middle east be used for any other form of us application of national and as you well know, because youre such a military scholar and you have the experience we have a baby Navy Presence in bahrain. We have a air force base in qatar and a big Army Logistics capability and some air force ability inkuwait. Intimate smatterings of capability going as far south in this broader region of course as djibouti with detective could be in the africom military theater but is still of course relevant to the Central Command and middle eastern theater. With all that in mind as well as afghanistan, could you give us a couple of examples of where you would like to cut but also maybe where you think we should stay . Over to. Thanks, mike. I think we need to differentiate between a steadystate permanent use overseas presence and that additional increment of presence that is connected to the post9 11 war. The United States has had forces some number for various missions going back to the Carter Administration in the 1970s in the persian gulf and in the red sea, around the horn of africa, et cetera. As as a person who believes in a navalal presence, one of the grt advantages of naval vessels is they move likely if youre fortunate company for the chief on on the ship like ihe was years o and the screws are turning at the lights are on y your junior job. Thats good, thats a whole point. The difference in the what of e presence with established since 9 11 is that the physical presence of u. S. Forces in many of these places can become a lightning rod for resistance and radicalism, and even in the most extreme cases, violence. I am reminded the list figure of the war in iraq in 2003 on the argument that were not going to leave forces, to your question, about u. S. Forces in saudi arabia, we would not leave forces in saudi arabia after the attack on Saddam Hussein 2003 because precisely it were a lightning rod for terrorism against the United States. So even advocates for the war in iraq saw the benefit of being able to eventually reduce permanent underground u. S. Presence in the region. I think that also applies to the case of afghanistan. I want to associate myself before she started speaking, i scribbled down some notes about the trends in afghanistan and why if they are moving in and unpleasant direction from our perspective, why isnt that . Its simplyy impossible to deny the presence of u. S. Forces even small numbers of u. S. Forces has been an enormous lightning rod for the taliban who managed to expandco their control over this country over a period of many years. And one last point. A lot of times we hear these forcesnt and places like iraq, around the time of the surge, or afghanistan, gives as leverage in over the opponents, whether its the taliban or the resistance fighters inside of iraq. I want to leverage overce the government we kind it and behave the way we wish them to. Theres not a a lot of empirical evidence to support that. As often is not yet governments that are empowered or encouraged to behave and reckless ways because theyre confident that the United States willl have the back no matter what, the classic moral hazardd problem. I dont wn opportunity. These are openended wars. Acutelye notice more than the people who have been fighting the civil war 442, 43 years. So what we really should be talking about, back to your question mike, is not were the u. S. Military presence should be or should not be, the whether the u. S. Military presence in all of these places is actually contributing to peace, is actually contributing to greater security for ourselves and the people in the meeting in the region. His actual making space for american engagement, or is it at the expense of those things . I think many times we reach for the military hammer i we dont consider the other instruments. And thats where i would turn the question back on you and say , precisely because we approach the things in military terms, we dont take account of the unintended consequences and the opportunity process. What could we be doing instead . Justin, i will go to younext for any questions need to make and maybe youll give me the end of a similar answer of what you just said initially. And i think the title of your paper speaks for itself that your viewers comprehensive. I wonder if i could push a little further task are there some u. S. Military positions, maybe some of the more remote locations in qatar where you see a value in having some residual presence, or do you feel that your recommendation is fairly categorical and we would be better off not thinking of this as a theater where we need the capacity to get involved militarily at all . Over. Its a good question. Maybe its having been proximate to chris for so many years, but i am a navy enthusiast relative to ground forces. Agreements make sense to me. You can conceive of a time in the future where a regional hegemon might emerge in the middle east. I think its unlikely. An access agreement in a port is pretty cheap. As terror bases and things like that, i think these countries need to demonstrate at a minimal level that they were in defense on the part of the United States should something terrible happened. I am not super sympathetic to the idea that we need to be pouring concrete over there constantly. I did this very sweeping article and i want to push a couple of forever wars were openended wars, whatever term we choose to call them. Can we conceive of a time when ,he last u. S. Troops left syria or when the last u. S. Troop leaves afghanistan, or when the seemingly inflatable saudi thirst to blast away at yemen has been faded . Jim jeffrey said famously we were looking for the enduring defeat of isis in syria. I will do those guys are going to sign a treaty. I think that these things almost seem set up to go on forever. One of the questions i had as i heard the discussion about whether we was needed to renegotiate a new deal , whether the taliban noncompliance with terms of the deals that was mentioned causes a recapitulation of what we are trying to do over there . It seems we have many discussions about progress or in the absence of an end state that we are looking for. Its useful to try as best as you can to flush out what the end goal is and how what we are doing at presence present promises to get us there. Michael so now i will come back to the south asia theater, the same questions. You can feel free to comment on a broader range of topics as well. As a do this i will be weaving in a couple of the questions we have received from the audience because they are questions about the kind of in afghanistan peace deal we might realistically expect, and how you would link the prospects to your preferred approach. A number ofo stay months or even years, im curious about the timeframe that you would anticipate for the Peace Process. Perhaps with the u. S. And nato forces already having less over the next few months in the late spring of 2021, what prospects you would see on issues like afghanistans women rights, the prospects for meaningful powersharing between the taliban in some kind of elected government. What would happen to Security Forces . Would they emerge or with the taliban replace the afghan army with its own fighters . There are a number of questions about what kind of afghanistan we are likely to get to based on your own prescription for the Peace Process. That is a pretty big question, but at least it has the beginning with a specific question on how long do you think the Peace Process might take under your recommended framework. That may be a starting point for both of you, and then branch out into what kind of afghanistan you think might follow after a deal. Thanks, mike. Maybe if i can respond very quickly to a point justin made. What is the and state . What is the end state of victory . The end state of victory is a peace deal that has been achieved. In the last american troops leave at that point. That that is an end state the whole region wants. The Pakistan Government says it wants it and the Afghanistan Government wants it. The taliban is the one insisting not leaves regardless are if a peace deal is achieved. And terms of what form i think this might take and how long, i government has been stalling the process a little bit, perhaps in the hopes of a Biden Victory in doing so. But i do think the u. S. Has pushed as much as possible. I think there has been many trips to the region to push this process along. Pointow they are at a where they are still reaching agreements on the tones of the discussion. Becausea long process the taliban in kabul is opposed in what their vision of afghanistan is. This is not going to be easy. But, and there is a real possibility that this could be. Hey dont agree on much at all so its not that i am sure there is a certain outcome that ap still might be achieved, or the possibility of ap still, that is what we should work towards. I would say that with the u. S. Help, pakistan certainly has been helping in this process. Visiting andn pakistans Prime Minister just made a trip for the First Time Ever for him. And he has basically said that towill do whatever he can help reduce violence and help with the Peace Process. Help with ake that grain of salt. With all this help i think an optimistic prediction might be a few years. Three to five years. Takehen what form might it . Some kind of powersharing agreement. Think allhat i and i of the afghanis would want to be in afghanistan, which is democratic. At least thees basic games and womens rights. Wilmington go to work and that people dont get their heads topped off women can go work and that people dont get their heads chopped off in a stadium like they did in the 1990s. That is what we want is a very basic as the outcome. The constitution might take, if he becomes a little bit more like iran, we will have to see. In outcome that both sides except will be the outcome that i think we will have to accept. Just two quick other responses. Think there is a tendency to think of this in the 20 year timeframe. I dont think we should think of the decision in the 20 year timeframe and think about all the cost of it as well as what. S the benefit being achieved we should think of the decision costont of us so that the of the benefit of the fork in the road. I do think afghanistan needs to be thought of in relative in terms of the theater of the world conflict. Should we be spending money on the u. S. Domestically . Should we be spending money on Climate Change or on afghanistan . I am not sure that is the same to think of, but i think its afghanistan in isolation and the cost of the benefit. If you look at it that way it becomes clear. Economists have said it very well. Cost of leaders is high, the cost of gain is low. Not indefinitely, for a few years because of what afghanistan might descend into in terms of the cost of leaving right away. And to other very quick things on counterterrorism and the unintended consequences of us staying. Counterterrorism, i do not think we should doubt the threat of isis and al qaeda and all these other terrorist groups in the region, and what a taliban victory is. That legitimacy . It serves as propaganda. The more we can walk away within the achievement of something that is different than what they want, that is a victory for the United States. And finally, in terms of how the from theefits unintended consequence, yes it benefits from propaganda, but we should be clear that these and a lot ofd from other local grievances and local narratives, and its not that they drive all of their recruitment from the fact that the u. S. Is in the region. Thank you very much. Over to you for that broad framing about what you expect from a Peace Process on a number of the other dimensions i referred to and anything else you would like to bring in at this point. On february 29 i published a brookings peace in which i argued that this was a bad deal. At the same time it was the best deal that was obtainable. And the taliban tried to push. Or a different deal one that would only come in after the deal was accomplished and could not get it from the taliban. Surpriseno subprime of the unwavering position since 2007 and 2009 when feelers for negotiations started. Years, the those taliban is significantly more in thel than it has been u. S. Capacity to shape the taliban and its military actions is much bigger. Every day the deal that is obtainable becomes a worse deal. At the same time its a deal that the Afghan Government hates. It is vicious for the deal to collapse. Why . At minimum the deal obligated to share powers with the taliban but more likely it believes that the taliban will be the dominant in the deal. The Afghan Government, and i think many in u. S. Policy and politics would wish for a deal that columbia legs. What is the essence of the deal there . Agreed to suspend military amnesty in exchange for in a minimal term for anyone crimes with very small guaranteedand its to okun representation in the Colombian Congress that needs to compete in the election. Essentially its a deal is not going to jail, not having to fight anymore and having political impact. And it is done badly in elections now. However, that deal is completely unrealistic given the battlefield picture in afghanistan. In colombia the conflict was stalled. Because the conflict was stalled the colombian government agreed to negotiate. But it was stalled at a low level of conflict. In afghanistan is no longer true , so the taliban does not want the deal that columbia legs minimal token of political. Epresentations the presentation in the government, it wants to be the dominant actor and the military has to be acting of the domains with afghan Security Forces dramatic with the pandemic on the United States. When you withdraw the political dynamics and Security Dynamics worsen, the taliban will have the capacity to take over and hold capitals for afghan Security Forces to dramatically amplify deals. Of the important afghan politicians today are defenders andemocracy in human rights women rights. I think that an optimistic scenario would be in iran might , orem where the taliban rather the likely scenario is where the taliban would agree to some elections taking place at a total Authority Level composed of the taliban. Prospect, in odious prospect. Do we have any capacity, but its a real prospect. Is the Columbia Lake deal not achievable unless the policy becomes just staying and hoping and praying that something will break. That is the essence of the policy in 2014. Hanging on and hoping that the taliban will make enough mistakes. That has not happen and i think it is little likelihood that it will emerge. But we have to shape the taliban for other military presence on the ground. The taliban clearly wants to have a working relationship with the United States. , and itn government constantly speaks about the desire to maintain international relationships. It needs to be deployed to shape the talibans behavior, to emphasize the inclusive at of ethnic minorities and some protection for women rights. I want to make too broad comments in concluding. The issue of terrorism. Theerrorism really has been dominant interest the United States has had in engaging in afghanistan. One could make the argument that having troops on the ground weather in somalia, afghanistan, syria or other place in the world gives the u. S. More striking capacity in the air or on the ground than not having a presence. It is absolutely true. The question needs to be raised against the cost. I would say the cost is the oflly threatening emergence rightwing Domestic Violence in the United States, with many of themselvesthat call part of u. S. Open ended military engagement. By combating terrorism abroad, we are creating a fire hose for domestic terrorism and the undermining of it. What threat judge of terrorism is more imminent. In at the same time mitigate the other and not exacerbated. I will leave it at that. Is how i would like to handle the last 20 minutes or so. I have one specific question for you, which i think we can get in before you leave. And then i will take the audience questions on which there are four or five broad themes, and put them all before the remaining three of you all together at once. I will give each five minutes to respond to those one or two questions they find a greater interest or relevance to your research. So before you have to peel off, we have not talked a lot about been one ofq has the longstanding american predocumentations going back to 1990. You basically favored keeping the 3000 or 2500 u. S. Forces who are going to be in iraq when President Biden is inaugurated for some link of time to continue training, air power support, where do you want to see that number phase down quickly . I dont think that we are feeling the same pressures in iraq as we are in afghanistan. The setting is different, so i think there is a good reason to not come into the administration and that the bill should be withdrawn. I think the policy needs to be reconciled with how we handle iran and how we handle militias. Clearly our iran policy is driving proiranian militias into attacks on u. S. Bases that paralyze its advisory capacity the themine counterterrorism actions. So the Trump Administration policy was in some ways the worst of all were when maintaining the costs. At the same time disabling the capacity to engage objectively. Requires a very careful reconsideration of how we handle it and how we deal with it entity that has many factions. Is part of ass state entity. Obviously part of the constitute. But its a militia whose members are designated by the United States as actors. Those are some of the issues. Hat we are grappling with i direct it. Suspect it will become what we need to grapple with in many different parts of the world. How to deal with those cyber acts and those nonstate actors who are hardly pleasant in many who, but at the same time is who within the government. With that i want to think everyone for the excellent conversation so far, for mike for the invitation, and i apologize that i need to leave. Michael thank you. We appreciated and we will continue on with the remaining questions as which there are about four or five. I hope you can each take notes and maybe we will go in that order and ve you five minutes or so to respond to whichever specifics yowould like. One is going to forecast the Biden Administration. And spifically the question is asked about whether president elect bidens previous thouts on this tenet to emphase special forces and stando airpower even before that was invoked. Perhaps there is an t bidentency with team or what the president himself may favor and whether th is along the lines ofhat you have been advocating, and whether that is similar to what President Trump has been doing. In other words, how much disruption do you anticipatend will it be adequate to make you happ base on what we n see in our cristobal. Likely toere biden is go. The second is a question of india, especially in south asia. Should we be asking india to do more . To what extent can india do more in ahanistan . To what exnt can we push i afghanistan to negotiate over taxpayer though its a little beyond its brought within the scope of the fee er wore. But to the extent and the forever war. Feel free to have added. Another question that takes us further east but is pentially thevant as to what extent socalled rebalance to the asiapacific region of the Obama Administrationoing back almost a decade, and to what extent your proposed policy of relative diseagement from e middle east, espeally for chris and justin, to what tent with that facilitate an effo to rebalance prioritize the china threat and the broader indo cific theater and do less and the middle east . Igetting near the end of my questions, but perhaps tts the right way to leave it. We have a few more specific questions on afghanistan. I will apologize to those in the audience, we have had a fair amount of discsion on afghanistan unless the panelists want to go in that direction about what future role the u. N. May have and to what extent economic assistance could be used as leverage to get a dominated government to behave better and protect the human rights and womens righ that were talked about earlier. If y want to tou on that, feel free. But i would like f asked bui would like for you to comment on the Biden Administration, the role of india, and the broader administration of the asia pacific thter, the rebalance policy now being reinvigorated if we can find a way to drawdown from the middle st. If that is something you agree with and favor. Knowths a lot but i you can handle a good chunk of it, so over you. Thank you for you confidence. I will mostly leave the question about india. I will just make one comment on this. To the extent that pakistans behavior of afghanistan is driven by security ccerns, if we could just bracket that someion, the certainly rt of improvement in relationship to india and should help to ease their concerns with respect afghanistan. I will leave it at that. I am mostly going to focus on the first qution. Ustin has a lot to say about the rebalance, and i will leave thatostly to him. But on the question of forecasting biden and where we e and where we are headed, i think this all comes back to what has, startingith the president elect and all of the ople coming in with him, what have they learned from the expeence of the last 20 years . Did they believe that these wars have advanced American Security . Made us more prosperous and more resilient . Have they helped sead American Values . Where did they believe a different approach is warranted . Of this, when you look at it along a generational perspective. E of the great ironies of president elect biden being the oldest man to have this office is the real possibility for a generational shift that is tang place from the baby boomers an my generation to the next generation of milleials. Because i think you see in mucmore interest in american engagement through diplomacy, trade and exchange, and much less for military operations. Point, that has to do with poritization. The main disruption that we have all experieed over the la nine months, not quite, is the fact that we are all doing this by zoo. By disease we had not prepared for and the instruments of power are not suited for u so the queion is are we in the future going to rebalance how we define threats . And might it be, and i hope that it is, that the fear of terrorism proceeds finally after a very long time, and fear of other things that a far more likelyo do more harmr even kill you are evated. And if thats true, then the instruments of power that we need to deal with those other threats will naturally rise to the surface. So the true question is will we see downward pressure on the military budget. Will wsee it on military spending, and will some of that increment of spendg be redirected here at home to rebuild oupower here at home, our infrastrture and educational system, or will it be deborit elsewhere abroad . Nothing that the really open question right now. Michael thank y. Justin, over to you. Justin yesterday, as i started doing this i thought, they will make me try to predict biden Foreign Policy and you assured me i when i have to do that. Now that i do a little bit of the work, i will do myest. I am a personnel or policy guide. That a few appointments we are waiting for. I would be interested to see Deputy Assistant sretaries on down to get a better art of where i thought thgs were most likely to go. In this region, one thing worth keeping an eye on is the emerging israel saudi access that seems to be going with e peace deals that have arty happened not between saudi, but between uae d bahrain, but whether this personal beef between joe biden during one notable visito israel, and den had said we need to stop opping up the saudis more in yemen. There thatme baggage is interesting and worth watching. If it comes to bthe case at s israel and saudi detente that comes together, whether or nothose two countries are really clashing with the Biden Administration. Onhe rebalance i have done a lot of work on this. It is sort of interesti. It was supposed to be called the pivoto asia and if you talk to people in the obama and ministration of the time, they had to stop calling it the pivot to asia because our partners in the ddle east got the vapors. Because when i pivot away from you i am not looking at you, i am looking over here. We had tcall it a rebalance. I really do impress on my time that the middle east is eating yo lunch. , itou look at this document was not the fullhroated jtin lon the case for withdrawing from the middle east, but it was really about the state of interest that were enunciated the middle east and what was needed to hieve those interests. If you think there will be resource constraints for the United States going forward, the indo pak ople are really going to be looking at that bucket of money and i think it a good thing. My former colleague is always on abt interservice petition. The best arguments that you can get for whas wrong with o or another comesrom guys inside thbuilding you want them money for themselvefor their little mission. I think that competitionn terms of how we think about the world can produce information for us tanalyze what we think about our own security. Thank you very much. I would touch on bo the forecasting and abide in administration as well as the india estion. Very quickly, i think i mentioned some of this in my remas, but i am very curious to see what a Biden Administration does in terms of whether or not it stays on for the afghan Peace Process, and who the secretary of defense will be. Think those two decisions will tell us a little bit more terms of where the biden administtion will go, but i and takewill take this the 2500 tros as they are an aim to make a decision on the response. We have heard that term before. It wld be harder on the taliban. It ifden ministratio conditionsre not met, they will tell them the conditions are not t, unlike the trump unlike the trump adminisation. Ere is a tendency, or expectation that we have that it ll benefit from the expertise of what the people in the pentagon are telling the decisionmakers. So i ahopeful it is a decision that will be taken and it will be alo some of the lines that i have been advocating for, at the very least, keing a 2500 troops until there is much more clarity on the conditions of the deal being m. India ande of pakistan and afghanistan, pakistans decisionsorever in afghanistan had been affecd by the threat pastan had felt from india. So indiana has been the sector that has lood over pakistans behavior. So for threat on india on its wanted border, pistan the serious strategic dt on the western border and that defined the decisions of afghistan. Pakistan now argues it has moved that is the official line. But what we could see is that because india has not been involved in e afghan process, it has really made pakistans fear when it comes to involvement in afghanistan ove the las couplof years. Playing a big role in the Peace Process. It really has not cultivated a retionship with the taliban to be able to have any leverage over it. So it has actually made pakistan feel more confident and secure and has allowed it to become a key partner of the Trump Administration in helping along the discussion. Benefitthat has been a on the unmet assessment. So my argument would be, right two other quick things, india and pakistan are not in a great plac his has to do with everything that began with the attackast februarybut then with the evocation of error time he. But there are fingers bein in india at acts of terroriswithin pakistan. That, its a pea process, the ahan Peace Process does not come to a full afghanistannd receives into some kind of andation of civil conflict combined with the fact that we have a Biden Administration that people expect will be essential in the u. Srelationship with india. Pakistan has a central fears of indias involvementnd afghanistan will come to the floor. That will inspire the turto strategic depth. Investing in these thin that it considers friendly at the extent of others that it migh be considering to others. Th are the best outcome for the region an for india and that means that pakistan will focus more domestically and perhaps focus on an economic and trade partnership with afghanistan, onomic ownership with the. S. And its existential frs will have less of a role to play in e decisionmaking. Michael lten, all three of you, thank you very mh. Thanks to our colleagues and team at Catholic University and Atlantic Council in brookings and the crles koch ititute. And evebody with u today, we appreciate your participation and we wish you all a very happy thanksgiving. Signing off. The u. S. Senate is back today at 3 p. M. Eastern after the thanksgiving break. They will work the nomination of a u. S. District court judge for southern mississippi. A procedural vote is scheduled for 5 30 p. M. Eastern. You can follow the senate live on cspan2. On tuesday treasury secretary Steven Mnuchin and Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell will testify on the response of the respective agencies to the covid19 pandemic. Watch live coverage from the Senate Banking committee at 10 a. M. Eastern on cspan, online cspan. Org or listen with the free cspan radio app. Tonight on the communicators netflix founder and Ceo Reed Hastings and business professor erin meyer discussed the unorthodox Workplace Culture behind one of the Largest Tech Companies in the world in their book no rules rules come netflix and the culture of reinvention. You have to do what you think is right to help the customers in the company. You cant be trying to please your boss, meet. You are not allowed to let me drive the bus off the cliff. You have to fight for the benefit of the company. And in general we say dont seek to please your boss. Seek to please the customers and to grow the company. So we want people to actively think independently, not just to implement their bosses wishes. Watch the communicators tonight at eight eastern on cspan2. Next a look at the role of latino voters in the 2020 election. Speakers include dnc chair tom perez and leica project cofounder mike madrid. They discuss some of the similarities and differences with the Latino Community in voter turnout in arizona, florida and texas. Ucla and Aspen Institute hosted this event. Todays event promises to be an engaging and informative postelection analysis of the 2020 president ial election and the latino vote. Theres no question that 2020 would be a year to to remember for the ages. More americans voted in the 2020 elections than any other in modern history with over 65 of eligible voters casting a