It seems one thing to rely on his Mission Command in such a way they were willing to use their own initiative, tactics that might not ordinarily be what they returned to based on doctor and. The willingness of us leaders to take advantage of their own initiative and ability to improvise could be an advantage where you have to use your own Unmanned Systems to come up with a tactic in the absence of the planning staff or higher direction. Might be a former competitive edge. The challenge is the United States military, we are much better positioned to do that, an adversary that is very topdown, inherent distrust in the lower ranks, 100 advantage we have but that is something we have to relearn after 20 years where we practice a lot of Mission Command in a lot of places the ladies are structured. That brings me to a point a lot of people will last, on the writing of the subject you dont have to transition to the robot force of Autonomous Systems right away and even at 10 contribution for Autonomous Systems with operational outcomes. And building a bunch of Unmanned Systems, the way dod could be trying to take advantage of the enormous Tech Industrial base to field Unmanned Systems and ai enabled command control management tools more quickly than it would going to the normal acquisition pipeline. For 64 million question, certainly one thing to talk about all this, the harder challenge is how to do it. That hit home for me. House so many things we are now saying are things we said in the past 20 or 30 years, and metric centered warfare, very similar to many of the things that are said or written out. Why did we not do the things that were so important for so many years. Part of it is we havent gotten the incentives rate. That was what i put in the book. Im a big believer in incentives, we got what we paid for and the way we change that is have to focus on the actual things you are trying to buy so i am a big baseball fan. A position where we are competing and what we are trying to do and measure the outcomes we are trying to achieve so there is an actual process every year with a certain amount of money held in reserve in the beginning of the year by Senior Leaders of the department of defense and congress to say we are trying to reduce the time to close killed chains and enhance decisionmaking advantage of us forces. We need to measure against specific Operational Forces and get away from the broader buzzword and join the command and control operations which you can have an informed debate what they mean but you have to boil them down to specific military problems against realworld adversaries that are not generalized but if you begin competing that out every year you have an ability to see what is performing best and thats the best way to navigate this transition. Much of that force will be our legacy and the question is how can these technologies enable the legacy force to be faster, to scale more significantly, and that is the question how Technology EnablesCurrent Operations and eventually you see areas where new technologies and capabilities replace legacy systems because they are capable of performing better as part of an integrated battle but unless youre measuring the thing youre trying to do, every man for himself, doesnt get you the qaeda datadriven outlook that you can direct a decreasing amount of force you are trying to build and the other piece of that is it creates the incentives for industry to understand if they put their own money to solving these problems they have a path to getting into have a meritbased competition that if they go out and fund a new Management System or aircraft or weapon, there is the prospect that the department of defense has a mechanism of doing that very quickly. Someone shows up with better capability than you dont worry because you will have the opportunity next year. This wont work for everybody. You will be limited with capitalintensive for programs like aircraft carriers and the like, a lot more attempt to put competition not into acquisition competition in the front end but constant operational competition determines what systems you should be putting resources in and scaling them considerably so that you begin to see the apartment of defense moving money toward the things they say are important and that is the thing i look at and certainly from my time on the hill, senior members of congress say is interesting. What they spend money on moves the needle in terms of programmatic choices and Investment Choices on the part of private industry and investment. Some interesting points. That was an interesting discussion. When his requirements, the department of defense bills requirement used in a System Engineering approach where it determines the way it is configured in the future and what future scenarios look like and then they do an analysis to figure out the capability gaps given the assumptions for what the threat looks like and the assumptions for what my available forces will look like 20 years from now. There are a bunch of assumptions built into it and it is a point solution. What you are talking about is different, not a point solution you are driving toward but instead more of a bottomup attempt to improve mission outcome. Here are missions we think are important, outcomes we want to have happen. A range of them barren dish environment in which those outcomes are needed. China. The South China Sea or the baltic or something and that is what you are talking about. The joint staff comes up with outcomes, military problems they want to address and a lot of the job of the department of defense is to harvest their abilities to improve those outcomes. That is exactly right. Unless we are actually focusing on joint outcomes we are trying to achieve we will end up buying a bunch of things that may or may not achieve those outcomes. Part of my problem with the requirement process is just the degree of hubris that is baked into it which is befitting. The experience we had in 30 years postcold war, top of the heap but i dont think that will hold up for us in the future. It is a hackneyed example but if i had to let my own requirements for my mobile device i would have the best phone in america, and in the defense establishment that is somehow no good. I would be more interested, i have to defend large quantities of incoming weapons. I dont care with what i do that. The question, reduces the likelihood, they are smoking holes in the ground. Focusing on the outcome and what comes together as the thing for these expensive resources will require that too. It a rating on that so there is an understanding is what is funded. Another way to do this next year that raises the question, how do we Design Software so companies have that opportunity, even if they win it next year. You have a system that has already been developed for some parts of a system or systems that will introduce your capability into and you want to incentivize companies and not tell them where you give up your it in the process of competing, most of it. Theres lots of opportunities to create a model or environment where companies can retain their intellectual Property Rights while also modifying systems on a regular basis. In terms of bringing in other peoples systems and integrate them with your own. To me this is one of the core problems. The departments right to criticize industry or itself for too often in recent years being beholden to solutions from industry where they have been locked in black boxes that they have been incapable of updating themselves moving at the Speed Technology is allowing them to move. That is true and valid. The backlash against that will lead to the belief that it should alter government and our experience of the f 35, the government will build its own highperformance aircraft. It is just nonsense. The real challenge is figuring out the parts of the architect of the government has to own and defined to ensure that you do have scalability and accessibility in the future. Things like the Applications Program interface, reference architecture, to certain standards. Those are the things the government has to define but that allow industry to be entrepreneurial and creative. I dont think it is difficult. The way we saw this play out is you had a handful of major movers hammer out a set of architecture standards and iteratively improve it as we go which is why i have an Apple Computer that is running, a google application when writing microsoft word documents. No one amended that had to be so, it is mostly creating incentives for people to play together in a way that people can develop applications on top of it. These new things can be developed without a sense that i know what the future will look like in 10 years and build for that. It hasnt worked well for us. We tried to do that in the past and will get worse if we try to do it in the future. Mostly trying to determine the core things the government has to define to turn industry and the private sector loose on these problems in a way to get the best capability and rapidly evolving capability but the government can still have confidence that we put together and the same way when i buy a new center, the architecture that im running in my environment here it is totally doable and these are things i come back to in the book. This isnt witchcraft. These are things the military and servicemembers are doing every day in their private lives. The reason we shouldnt do this. To close out, seems one of the things you have to do is incentivize industry from a financial perspective and make it easier for new players to offer a solution to these military problems but they are used to getting 20 time returns, dc money to support 10 or 20 x return and if you are getting 10 returns it is not a very Successful Use of dc money and they have difficulty seeing the value and try to compete for dod dollars. Is there is a way they incentivize companies that are used to much higher returns on the commercial side . They can do better as far as creating better incentives. The reality is working in the defense space, the commercial software, there needs to be a baseline set of expectations you can do better than a 2 or 3 industry, or a 20 return is a doable proposition. From the government standpoint they need to get out of the mentality, controlling the process of industry that they pay 1 billion and now that industry got 2 bottom as opposed to 400 million of industry getting 20 profit. At the end of the day we are aligned toward what is important. Creating incentives you will see more companies and engineers, interested in National Defense if the government is buying the emerging technologies they say are important, founders and investors put in one bill. From the standpoint of why is Silicon Valley or the technology not doing more, a lot of this boils down to if you are buying and deploying scale more engineers thought they would make a successful career doing National Defense work and more Companies Getting founded and more private investments going into modernizing National Defense optimizing advertising social media. A degree of supply and demand, if they do and put money behind what is important, you significantly see industry respondents traditional industry, look at a lot of these attempts at Unmanned Systems, aircraft weapons, things that are struggling for funding, they get canceled prematurely, to traditional industry, something to be prioritizing, the portfolio, traditional offerings are getting funded at a considerably larger increments. Absolutely. Thank you for being with us. Chris rose, the most recent book, the kill chain defending america in the future of hightech warfare is available right now. Im sure it is available many places in addition to amazon. Thank you for being with us and good luck on the book. Thanks for having me, pleasure to chat with you. A lot has your fingerprint and influence. I give credit where credit istake the blame for what i got wrong. A pleasure to be with you and appreciate the opportunity. Thank you for being with us. This is bryan clark signing out. This morning the House Rules Committee meets to debate legislation related to the impact of the coronavirus on the u. S. Postal service. Live coverage at 11 eastern on cspan2, online, cspan. Org, listen live to this cspan radio apps. Weeknights featuring booktv programs as a preview of what is available on cspan2. Tonight beginning at 8 00 pm eastern a look at books about democratic president of nominee joe biden and the upcoming president ial election on booktv on cspan2. Thanks for joining us. I am the codirector of c sack at stanford and senior fellow at the fellow institute for international studies. We are honored to have tom z. Collina talking about the button thee new Nuclear Arms Race and president ial power from truman to trump which puts readers on the front lines and offers how this secures a safer future