Transcripts For CSPAN2 Boeing CEO Others Testifies On 737 MAX - Part 1 20240713

The committee on transportation infrastructure will come to order. I ask unanimous consent that security be authorized to declare basis of the hearing without objection, so ordered. I also ask unanimous consent for the Ranking Member of the full committee to be recognized for ten minutes each i will be making to unanimous requests for documents from the attorneys said. I see nothing that is export sensitive in these documents will be making a unanimous consent request pistol into the export control act and make a unanimous consent request to enter the documents on the list into the hearing record. This list includes the export control documents theyve reviewed all these documents on both lists and with i would ask unanimous consent that they be disclosed pursuant to the code. I want to reserve my right to object. The reason for doing that is we have had at least two that i can remember noting the industries and that includes maritime, transit, you name it and they would love to have the opportunity to get their hands on technology from the Aviation Industry as well. And it concerns me we have talked about this and have gone over this. Making these documents they have all been made available to everybody on the committee. They are putting them out there in the Public Domain i think it is a problem and we are cutting ourselves off at the legs when it comes to the technology. It concerns me in a big way. Having said that, i will withdraw my right to object. I think we can get the answers without peace bu these but i wie that request. I didnt take a backseat to anybody regarding china i voted against the most favored nation status and post them going to the wto and in the u. S. Technology and unfair. Trade practices i dont think there is anything in there that would be of any utility to the chinese. But in any case i recognize your concerns. I just have to finish a briefing this pursuant to section 48202 because withholding such information is contrary and without objection, so ordered. I would ask unanimous consent to enter the records. Without objection, so ordered. Lets proceed now to the hearing. I first want to recognize the families that are here today. A fifth place with families. I dont know if ive met with all of you here today. I want to convey my condolences one year and one day after the crash. A very somber day we shouldnt have to be here if we are and we are going to get to the bottom of this and fix it and see that it never happens again. With that i think the witnesses for being here. The fourth hearing the committee has held given the extraordinary interest i thought that its best to do it in the full committee. I know they told us they wanted to wait until the airplane was ungrounded but i felt it was important to testify before that happened. Something was drastically wrong. As you know the committee is conducting a very robust investigation. Weve never undertaken an investigation of this magnitude in the second oldest kennedy in the United States Congress Committee in the United States congress. We have received hundreds of thousands of pages of documents from boeing. Theyve been cooperative in providing the documents and agree that we could use those documents in the public hearing. And we have received tens of thousands of pages from the faa and we have conducted some hearings with the employees and we have others that we wish to interview. We are told we have to be in line behind the justice department, so those are still forthcoming. There are a lot of Unanswered Questions that we need to get to the bottom of. We know that a novel system took these two planes into an uncontrollable altitude after it triggered something to do with faulty sensors these were wired to the one sensor and in may be then acting administrator sat there and i asked them they said yes. Then how could it have been approved to trigger a single point of failure and he had no answer to that. How could they approve it, how could the manufacturer do that and he had no good answer. We will continue to pursue the roots of this. We do know that one was in the first version of the flight manual and in the benign system when it became a radical system that could trigger a catastrophic failure, it came out. Some of that was discussed in the senate yesterday and will be discussed again today from the chief test pilot in the instant message as it seems inexplicab inexplicable. Secondly, we do know that boeing engineers proposed placing and enunciate her in the cockpit, but again it came out in later versions were the actual production version and then it wasnt until after 1 a. M. Air that boeing informed anyone and is still at that point i think softpedaling that it was in the plane and i talked to a lot of pissed off pilot specifically where the backup system lacks how can we be the backup if we dont know something is going to take over a plane . Theres quite a bit of this content out in the Aviation System about that. We now know that boeing and the faa and some pilots would act in four seconds, but they had information that we will get to a little bit later in this hearing. But some pilots might react in ten seconds or longer and if that happens, the results would be catastrophic and result in the loss of the aircraft as it has happened twice. That they got the 12th or 13h iteration. And then to develop the system to go through Pilot Training or recertification. That drove the whole process. Boeing Southwest Airlines 1 milliondollar per plane rebate but the pilots had to be retrained program imagine the pressures from the top on down to the low level engineers who say what . Know know know we cannot have that. That is 300 million for that one other contract. That is a marketing advantage. That the angle of attack disagree light which was a standard feature on all 730 sevens did not work. Unless they bought the upgraded package and that was an inadvertent error in developing the upgraded package. That may be so. And then decided to delay for three years through 2020 did not tell the faa or the customers or the pilots about this until after the lie in air crash. That is inexplicable. They say its not necessary for safe operation of the max. To keep everybody in the dark and have that is there. Its not lighting up. It cant. Was serious disagreement. And it was included in the flight manual. To include something in the manual that does not work and then something that does work to cause catastrophic issues is not in the manual. What is that all about . We know there is tremendous tremendous pressure on production. Whistleblowers have contacted us regarding features that engineers wanted on the macs that were denied because of the rush to get the plane out the door. We have from an internal whistleblower a survey conducted november 16 that 39 percent of boeing employees surveyed experienced undue pressure, 29 said they were concerned about consequences perhaps losing their job if they reported these incidents. We now and know at least one manager implored the general manager to shut down the 737 max production line because of safety concerns a couple months before the tragic crash. There is a lot we dont know. We dont know what would happen. We dont know if the pilots had Simulator Training that replicated the system what would happen. We dont know why boeing designed a plane with a point of failure that is inexplicable and an excusable and unprecedented in the history of mass aviation production. We do know and we have seen pressures from wall street have a way to influence the decision of the best companies in the worst way to endanger the public and jeopardizing the good work of countless hardworking employees on the factory lines. I hope thats not the story that is ultimately written over this long admired company. So we meet today. We need answers. But we also know that we need reform how commercial aircraft are certified and how manufacturers, not just boeing but are all watch and overseen by the regulators. Now today the investigation isnt just getting answers but how to make the system safer. With that i yelled time to the Ranking Member. Thank you mister chairman. Want to extend my condolences to the family and friends i cannot imagine how hard it is to sit and go through this process i will divert from my statement for just a minute and associate myself with a couple of comments the chairman made and i as a pilot have a piece of equipment in the airplane that i dont know about is something that concerns me in a big way. To say that backup system it does concern me but i do want to point out as well that when it comes to airbus it was mentioned with airbus customers wanted to look at airbus as opposed to the boeing product but in airbus the pilot is the backup you cannot shut it off a very similar system in a boeing max you cannot shut it off. It overrides the pilot. Overrides the pilot. Now when it can be shut off when it comes to being a pilot you want to shut off a system that has failed and fly the plane and i have harped on that over and over again and its my hope that this testimony today helps us to understand the decisions boeing made between 21 2009 and 2017 regarding the design of the max. Some of these decisions were reviewed by the boeing organization the Designation Authority that is on behalf of the faa. While the oda was authorized to act as a regulator of the faa they retain the ultimate responsibility and compliance and safety regulations that still lies within the faa. The chairman said we have a lot of other people to hear from and i do want to hear from the boeing leadership at the time of these decisions to get a complete picture i would like to hear from officials over there at the time between 2012 and 2017 these decisions were being made and i hope i can get a commitment and im sure you have no problem with that. We have to hear from everybody. In many times i have said they have revealed problems if these investigations reveal problems with certification then congress should act to fix those specific and identifiable problems and thats the issue to identify what those problems are. In the aftermath we cannot just throw the safety of the Aviation System on one single factor no one single factor contributes to an accident. I heard Safety Experts refer to the swiss cheese model love accident causation. If you use this model you have many layers if you visualize them as slices of cheese with holes to represent the weaknesses, some of those are due to conditions some are active failures. But when an accident occurs when those weaknesses lineup is when you have a catastrophic failure. In context of the 737 max you have to consider all of the layers, all of them with the protection and safety and trying to determine what weaknesses are out there trying to determine what they are. As investigator of the indonesian accident said the non contributing factors would not have happened the crash would not have happened the decided certification of the 737 max is the focus of a number of investigations. Earlier this year boeing took responsibility for the design weaknesses and have been working on a software fix which we are waiting to hear about. What other weaknesses with the faa oversight we are going to address including pilot displays and training and today we will hear about the status of all of those efforts. But i want to hear how they lineup with recommendations of the joint authority the first completed review of the max certification with advanced aviation and Technical Expertise is due out soon. While they did not call for an end to the allegation programs it did highlight bureaucratic deficiencies between boeing and the faa and we have to address those and i know we will. The concern that occurred with the report and is committed to working on these recommendations which is good to say that happens but lastly i want to hear about documents related to the pilots and im sure you will do that other investigations are moving forward as well. Last month the ntsb issued a recommendation report focused on the assumption made on the design and certification process related to Human Factors design and certification cannot be the sole focus of our efforts. I have said this before so with one layer of that cheese mode model, over the last few months other weaknesses that have played a role in these accidents have surfaced. Reports earlier called into evidence submitted into lion air investigation with the installation and calibration of the faulty angle. This was also whistleblower statements raising significant concerns with lion air operations and Maintenance Programs former chief engineer for Ethiopian Airlines found a whistleblower complaint with the recordkeeping and Maintenance Training and also the air carrier went to the maintenance records of the 737 max alleged the day after the accident. Unfortunately operational pressures and robust Safety Culture can negatively impact aviation safety thats another layer of that model. The ntsb has confirmed along with certification operational factors in addition with that review the department of transportation at the request of the committee to begin a review of those standards and the impact and thats another thing i have talked about as a potential problem. I want to be Crystal Clear this is not an effort to blame the pilots. I also dont absolve boeing of its responsibility the New York Times Magazine Article describe the changing nature of the industry of the impact on airmen ship also decadelong transformation of the entire business of flying that they became so automated that the air travel boom could take over the need for more pilots. I was getting letters from airlines all over the world because i had atp on my license they were offering me jobs and to come fly for the. And pilots can master Cockpit Technology but if it fails they have to be able to fly the plane and not by the computer. None of this is a reflection on lion air or ethiopia. They were fighting for their lives thats the bottom line. It is on the broader pressures present today of the global aviation economy and incumbent on the airline whose name is on the side of the plane to make sure their pilots are properly trained to the level they need to be not rushed into the cockpit. That is where some of the blame lies. And ethiopia in particular when the government owns the airline and they put pilots in thei their, something that is above their head is not the pilots fault. Look at who put them in the position to be responsible for hundreds of lives. In line with that swiss cheese moment with those layers of Protection Training and Maintenance Programs they must also be explored with all of the weaknesses have to be addressed is to believe the faa is the Gold Standard in aviation safety and once they certify the fix to the max i volunteered to be the first person right alongside administrator dixon and the first flight of the max eight. Regarding to the max accidents all of those issues need to be addressed but only after we have work that has yet to be completed. Jumping to conclusions only risks more harm. The us Safety Record speaks for itself and i will stand up to anybody who tries to question that it is the safest mode of transportation in history and with that i appreciate the opportunity mister chairman and i look forward to todays hearing. I turn to the chairman of the subcommittee. Thank you chairman. I will be brief i want to get to the reason why we are here today which is to get direct answers from boeing. The faa did release a video Opening Statement you can find my full comments there. In summary the 326 lives lost Ethiopian Airline crashes are constant reminders of the importance of this committees work and if we do not address systemic safety issues in aviation today some victims Family Members are here with us today. Others are watching on live stream and your presence and tireless advocacy are critical to what we are doing today. Thank you for that. You deserve answers. And rightfully you expect congress to act. Following my original recommendations i do want to say i see one undeniable conclusion the process by which the faa is certifying the aircraft is in need of repair. It is no accident there are few airplane accidents and makes it all the more tragic when there is one it makes it even worse when there are two. So the committees Investigation Continues to maintain safety as a guiding principle and use all the tools at our disposal will and i youll back. Now we turn to the Ranking Member on the subcommittee aviation. Thank you mister chairman for holdings hearing today. Yesterday was one year since the lie in air tragedy. I also want to join everyone sitting up here to offer condolences to all the ethiopian family victims. Everybody in this town and to deal with billions of trillions of dollars and these acronyms and process that often makes sense and often times you see people that just forget about objectives. Wire we actually doing this cracks what is the purpose that we go through the regulations and procedures . Why . Its always about people. That is what we are here for four fellow americans and fellow citizens. And it is amazing to me just being here and im sorry to every one of you and your pictures are incredibly powerful. I used to be a rockclimbing instructor we would have somebodys son or daughter or brother or sister and when you are rockclimbing brick if you lose somebody on a rock there is no room for error. Air travel is the same thing you cannot tell them to pull over to the side if there is a noise coming out of the engine. Its not an option. This process has got to stay focused on the risk air travel poses and the fact you cannot pull over to the side you have to have redundancy. There is a lot going on right now with all the different reports and investigations and i will run through those in the moment but there is a lot going on. For example if there truly was one that they could engage that is not the proper redundancy. If you look at the safety and the risk that is posed in this case it is unacceptable. It is unacceptable. A while back i had a chance to represent the state of louisiana and the deepwater horizon disaster and spent time with families there and many days in the court listening to testimon testimony. I do think the judge found there was inappropriate culture on focusing on the wrong objectives and often times people look at economics or how fast can the jet travel but instead this is 100 percent about people. They talk about the whole process and say it was shortcircuited. You can look back at the 7376 or eight or nine the e1 90 or the 95. Or any versions of the aircraft and every single one was 35 certified and approved in a shorter time than the max. Is not just about how long but what we do during the process. What are we doing during the process to make sure that this is a safe aircraft that we are not putting folks at undue risk . I have heard a lot of people talk about a lot of different ideas and solutions and things they want to do as we move forward. And people posing solutions right now and certainly we will extract every single Lesson Learned that we can. But right now we have investigations with the Ethiopian Authority ntsb, the technical advisory board, office of special counsel working with the whistleblower complaints. Secretary of transportation. Boeing is doing an internal investigation. We have so many different investigations going on one thing weve got to make sure we do is focus on facts one thing i have seen in this body and the four and a half years i have been here is not responding emotionally but to fax if are going to do something it may make us feel good but it does not actually respond to the facts. So as we move forward im sure i have left out investigations that moving forward we have got to make sure we are acting on the facts every single outcome and probably have identified have got to make sure we are truly basing our solution on the facts so this doesnt happen again. Lastly, mister chairman your families shared a number of concerns that i think are right on. And i do want to ask that boeing get back to us on these things like bully disclosed the disposing the fix before the plane was allowed to fly if it is allowed to fly again to death find the role of the mcat syste system. To make you could submit those for the record are asked during the question. Thank you. So with that we will turn to the witness for Opening Statement. Ranking member, congressman thank you to the whole committee we appreciate the opportunity to be here today well do our best to answer all of your questions. Before we get started i too would like to acknowledge the families that are here with us today. And again we want to tell you im sorry. I have had the opportunity to talk with some of you and hear your stories. And we are deeply deeply sorry and will never forget. We want you to know that we are committed to making the improvements needed. We are committed. I had the chance to hear some of those stories and listen to personal stories and it does get to a business that is about people and thats where our hearts will always be with boeing those 150,000 people feel the same way and think about this every day. We carry the memories of these accidents with us that the memories they will never be forgotten and that will drive us every day to make the airline safer in the industry safer. We are committed to doing that. Im grateful for the opportunity to be here today to say this to the families personally and let you all know weird learning and we still have more to learn. We have work to do to restore the Publics Trust in military thing possible we can from an accident like this ever happening again. Mister chairman the committee has many questions about the max we will do our best to answer those while still under way both accidents is repeated software called mcas we have talked about that system spotted two erroneous schedule one signals based on sensors based on that we have enhanced it three ways now it takes information from both sensors instead of one before activating. It will only activate a single time and third it will never fly more than the pilot can interact alone and they will also continue to override t6 at any time. Spending over 100,000 engineering and test hours flowing by more than just lights and in those Global Regulators i have flown on a couple flights myself. This has taken longer than expected but we are committed to getting it right during this process we work closely with the faa another regulators to provide the documentation and how they should regular sleep and then to deserve nothing less. Today and every day over 5 Million People will board boeing airplane to phi safely to their destination. And then the rigorous oversight of the committee to reduce accidents by 95 percent over the last 20 years. That we can and must do better. And then we have learned and we are still learning and improving. And then with the new Safety Organization so that all 50000 engineers report to the chief engineer we also hope to rebuild the communities and the families impacted by these accidents prickly pledge 100 million to the effort with Renowned Experts to make sure they can access these funds as quickly as possible. No amount of money can bring back what was lost, but we the at least can help the families meet their financial needs. Mister chairman i started at boeing more than 30 years ago as a summer intern in seattle. As a junior at Iowa State University studying engineering growing up on a farm in iowa. My parents taught me the value of hard work and integrity. And help to land a person on the moon today im still inspired by what boeing does and those men and women who are committed to the legacy. Mr. Chairman, thank you for listening and i look forward to your question. As i stated at the outset with consultation from the minority both myself we will open for ten minutes and then moved to other members in the usual order. Its clear obviously from everything we know in every pa part. Boeings position at least prior to these crashes is an Autonomous System and it operated in the background. Is that correct . Tha that was the design approach, yes. But the question is how do we get to that. This was a Concept Design in 2012 and as you can see in the corner there was an alert indicator so at some point some of the engineering and design staff felt that it would be important to make the pilots aware of the system and to have an indicator light. There was no indication either in the manual or on the flight deck. The intenif the intent was to se failure. Its important to note that the systems didnt fail to. The functionality of the flight was actually the reason it was deleted was because the functionality was incorporated which you can see adjacent to that. When its a relatively benign system that came out of the manual is that correct . I have seen different versions that indicate you have that in the manual and they asked you to take it out and it came out. If i could, to clarify because you are asking a question expanding in a couple areas that i could clarify. The inclusion in the training manual was a process that was occurring in parallel to the extension to the lowspeed operation which i believe is what you are referring to soviet extension to the lowspeed operation, that was done and tested from the period around the middle. We understand that and some of the problems in the way that it was and wasnt tested. Thats good for now. The key assumption was reaction time. With the aoa failure, it activates and its 2. 5 degrees every ten seconds, pretty radical. And boeing assumed it would take pilots 40 seconds to realize and react to the stabilizers is that correct . Mr. Chairman, again, as we do what is called hazard analysis to the airplane design that was the assumption that the longstanding industry assumption. Lion air reports that it took eight seconds to react, then we have information provided to the committee by boeing which will now be the second slide. And it says a slow reaction time scenario, ten seconds down to the failure to be catastrophic. Do you think that was clearly communicated to the regulators that a 102nd delay which doesnt seem like a lo a lot of time toe particularly when you look at the report and the cacophony going on in the flight deck when they didnt even know the system existed . Was the faa aware of this document . Mr. Chairman, i cant speak to the specific document though john may be able to. I think its important to note that this part of the design process we use a set of industrystandard practices on the timelines. I understand what the Industry Standard was, but it does cause a little concerned, ten seconds you can say they can do it in less than ten seconds. Platelets are and at the top of their game every day and particularly when they were not even aware of the system i think that is a bad assumption that should have rung some alarm bells. So i mean, do you think n. Roach wrote expected was a mistake to not inform pilots of the existence of the mcas system lacks agreed we made some mistakes on mcas and as we have gone back and taken a look at this moving from a single sensor to a dual sensor it was an important part of that into providing additional training information and feedback we got from the pilots as you noted as part of that and then revisiting these e bees decadelong Industry Standards i think you see a similar recommendation. The question would be why was it just originally won the sensor which again single point of failure as the then acting administrator said in may a safety critical system, but that is just not done and as they said multiple alerts and indications from the pilots were close to the combination of the alerts and indications didnt trigger to immediately performed the runaway stabilizer functio functions. Okay, again, lets just mr. Hamilton, are you aware of any other aircraft out there that has a safety critical system that has depended upon a single point of failure . Mr. Chairman, single point of failure is allowed in the airplane design. Regulation 25. 1309 actually discusses that and talks about different hazards categories. And this one was deemed to be catastrophic. I know theres three categories. You didnt deem it to be catastrophic although looking at the ten seconds you said it was catastrophic. It was classified as major if i recall. It is one category, and so when we test out the system, we do look at their impact on the airplane when his failures, and we did look at the ten seconds but we also then took a look at the simulator with the pilots and the typical reaction time. Put up another document right in front of you there. 1217, 2015. I dont know if you are aware of this, but this was raised by one of your engineers. Are we vulnerable to a single sensor failure with the implementation or is there some checking that occurs like did you ever received this communication and did you respond to that engineer . I didnt actually receive the communication that im aware of it recently is surfaced and talking with the engineer i think it highlights that our engineers do raise questions and question things but it also follows our thorough process to determine the single sensor and reliability and availability standpoint that the hazard categories. Of course we dont know what happened but there is some speculation here. Pretty delicate Little Things out there actually and now of course the final slide is now as you emphasized Flight Control will compare inputs from both sensors. I guess the question is why wasnt it that way from the number one . Why wasnt it that way from the number one if you can do it now with an expert or software fix or whatever, why didnt you do ithat from day number one, why not have that redundancy . Weve asked ourselves the same question over and over and if back then we know everything that we know now we would have made a different decision. The original concept from a safety standpoint was to build a mcas and extend the system on the previous generation 737. The system that had about 200 million safe flight hours on it one of the safety principles is to take the safe systems and then incrementally extend them. That was the safety concept behind the original decision. We have learned since then. My time has expired and i want to turn to the Ranking Member. You are recognized. Its hard to know where to start. I want to go back just for clarification to the first slide mcas. Can we bring that up . But one that shows the flight deck. The warning lights to me would be and this is have you ever been in your car and the check engine light comes on and its like what the heck does it, but pressure, temperature, vacuum, i dont know what it is. Just a general check engine and stuff thats more important to me is the stuff on the left because it manifests itself as a trend issue. Its a runaway issue which again i go back to training and you have memory items. Every pilot in the United States pilots are taught to have memory items. You instantly go through those when you have a failure. You start through this checklist in your mind. Some of them are even goofy little rhymes or whatever it is to help you remember and you go through each one of these processes. In the case of Ethiopian Air, they never did i still come back to this they never slowed throttles for takeoff and they never put them back. They went right through the maximum certified speed of the 736 or 737 right on through up to 500 Miles Per Hour way beyond the maximum certified speed. Thats the reason they cant manually trim the airplane is because it is going so fast. Ive used the analogy, try going down the road at 70 Miles Per Hour and opening the door and see if you can open the door and let the pressures are against the door of your car. The more pressure, the more fast you were going and faster the more pressure and harder it is to try to reverse the pressures that you go through those memory items and immediately start taking down into the chair man is right in terms of, you know, what is the average is at four seconds to react, ten seconds to react, and i guess that is one of the flaws that we need to be thinking about is you know, i guess we are going to have to Start Building airplanes to the least common denominator in terms of that is a poor choice of words you might say i guess, but the least common denominator in terms of internationally is to start thinking about it, about International Training standards and i know that this one of the things that is being looked at and how they trained. Do they have this memor those ms and can they take them off . You go through and i do that all the time you sit there and take through my memory items, engine failure, trim the failure, whatever those might be. But i guess we are making assumptions, manufacturers are making assumptions about Pilot Training experience and then the aftermath of these two accidents and this question do you believe these assumptions particularly for aircraft are going to be updated outside of the United States, do we need to revisit those assumptions . Congressman, we believe we need to go take a look at those longstanding industry assumptions as you point out those are used across manufacturers, not just blowing and these are things that have produced safe airplanes for decades, so we do believe it is appropriate to take a hard look at those and we may need to make some revisions. I think the report has identified the same thing and we think that would be a good area for us all to broadcast on behalf of the aviation safety. We are committed to doing that and supporting that study and one of the areas for the future we are investing in as we think about the pilot machine interface and how to do that most effectively, and as you pointed out earlier, large generation of new pilots that will be needed over the next 20 years and we need to be thinking about designing our airplanes for that next generation. With the benefit i guess in hindsight its only always 2020 but knowing what you know now what the company have done differently, what you have done things differently in terms of certification of the max . Congressman, yes, we would have. We have learned as i mentioned earlier we made some mistakes. We discovered some things we didnt get right and we own that and we are responsible. Any accident with one of our airplanes is unacceptable and that is our response ability. We own it and we are going to fix it, we know what needs to be done, and that is what we are focused on moving forward. Im going to make a comment here and this is as a result of this the unfortunate part is we lost life. We lost loved ones, friends and life was lost as a result of these accidents. You hope its never going to happen again. The unfortunate reality is one of these days it will happen again, but but i parked on thid this is something that concerned me and ive talked about the i e difference between the United States and Pilot Training and Pilot Training in other countries. But something that concerns me and i want everybody to hear this, in the United States but im afraid of is we are going down the same direction that we are seeing in other countries and when it comes to getting pilots to the point where they can fly. No matter what we can build the most perfect airplane that is never going to cause a problem or get itself into a bad situation and sure enough, sooner or later its going to get into a bad situation and require a pilot to figure out whats going on and been to come back and fly the airplane but here in the United States, i think that we are dumbing down, and again this is a criticism of our system because this is what im afraid we are going to come and i want to think about this as we move forward because i think it needs to be addressed. In the United States used to spend training, install training in your basic piloting skills for your pilots license before you get commercial, before you get your Airline Transport rated, you are taught or you were taught basic characteristics how to get out of this ten. Today you can do that. The structure is not allowed to let a stall fully develop at the first warning this is what it states, the first warning of a stall they have to recover if they fail the check life immediately. That means if the light comes on for the buzzer goes off the have to recover immediately. They cant let that stall develop so we are teaching them how to and this is happening in other countries because many of them do these their system off of the system as well, but sooner or later youll get an airplane into a stall that we are not teaching anybody how to get out and recognizing that we are teaching them how to not get into it but that isnt going to happen. Sooner or later you will get into the problem and this concerns me because we have changed and we have rewritten our and i have a problem with the faa allowing this. We have rewritten our instruction manuals to not allow this to happen, to not allow these items that will ultimately happen, we are not teaching pilots how to fix them and correct them and get out of them and how to save the people in the plane with them. Heaven forbid that should happen. And thats, again, that is concerning to me and it concerns me in a big way. The United States is behind other countries and ultimately going down that road, and i think we have to get back to basic piloting and theres nothing wrong with technology. I think technology is great, but the most important safety component in any airplane is a pilot that can fly the damn plane and not just fly the computer. I think ive got a minute left. Actually i will just yield back. I think the gentleman. How do they do this in the order of [inaudible] to do this in order of seniority and appearance and so, first with the [inaudible] thank you very much, chairman defazio, i cant say enough about the importance of this hearing. I appreciate you being here. The Ranking Member asked if you have flown and had flown and i u even sit in your testimony that you had flown on the 737 cents fueled corrections have been made. That is your testimony. Yes. I flown on a couple of test flights. The chairman mentioned we are trying to get to the root of the problem, so that it doesnt happen again, so the faa, airlines like going, so my questions are really going to whether theyve made any difference, penalties paid or outstanding and essentially to compliance so congress can decide what if anything it can do that everybody has an obligation here. Going into congress. And congress. The record i have, and i asked you did they enter into the Settlement Agreement with the faa in an effort to resolve the multiple enforcement cases against boeing that were either pending or under investigation and that was 2015. I am not familiar with the details of that although i am aware you entered into Settlement Agreements. Surely you know whether you entered into Settlement Agreement. I have asked about the details. Congresswoman, that is correct we entered in 2015. Thank you. Its also true that boeing had to immediately pay 12 million into the u. S. Treasury . As a result of . That is correct. Continuing is it true that they faced up to 24 million in additional penalties through 2020 if certain conditions were not met . Yes, congresswoman, and working with vs aa, they were looking for a including a longstanding agreement with us to build a Good Foundation on elevating compliance. Im asking about the 24 million. My time is limited. Additional penalties if the conditions were not met. It wasnt about the agreement. There was a converted penalty. Now im just going to list quickly the obligations and the improved management and accountability, auditing, supply management, more stringent quality and timeliness of the regulatory submissions, specifications, i could go on. You understood that was the agreement, those were the agreements. Yet in the designing and developing and manufacturing the 737, boeing has run into issues, problems, characterize them as you will come in meeting the obligations and most of these categories would you agree . Congresswoman, we have identified many of those challenges through the macs development program, and some of those were in you had issues needing them. Some of this has resulted in the problems that bring us here today. Congresswoman, i cant give you any specific examples i didnt ask you that. The agreements were made over the course of the five years. Each year we provide a partnership to the faa on how progress im not saying youre not making progress. There is opportunity in the time remaining to get the obligations. Within the last decade, boeing has had to worldwide groundings of relatively newer airplanes, 787 dream liner, 737 max. And encountered many compliance issues in the time since they paid the 12 million settlement payment of and im assuming that it was paid as the faa assessed any additional financial penalties on boeing . 2015 agreement . Know we are not aware of any additional penalties. The time of the gentle lady has expired. First, mr. Crawford. Thank you mr. Chairman. Are you aware of any aviation accident that can be attributed to a single factor . Congressman, no. I think the history of aviation shows the saxophone is our very unfortunate that in many cases that involve multiple factors. Do you agree with that . The Ranking Member pointed out the swiss cheese model. Accidents are typically due to a number of contributing causes. The National Transportation Safety Committee recently issued its final report into the flight finding nine contributing factors for the crash. Other than the design of the aircraft included in this calibration during the lack of the Flight Maintenance documentation and failure by the flight crew to appropriately respond to an emergency situation. To quote one of the indonesian flight investigators, the nine factors happened to have to have an togethe been together if them didnt happen, the crash would not have happened. I have a copy of the report here and ask unanimous consent that it be included into the record. Without objection. Thank you and i will yield back. Thanks to the gentle man and next on our side would be the representative johnson. Thank you mr. Chairman and above witnesses for being here. I would like to ask unanimous consent to put an Opening Statement in the record. The position as the chief pilot on the 737 max was in place at the time of the accident. Who does he report to . Congresswoman, he was an engineer in the commercial airplane division. Im not sure who he departed to directly that he report it to the Engineering Team. He was in the Training Department said he worked with the training organization. Okay, so there was a chain of command. Yes. In march of 2016 comey asked the faa if it was okay to remove all references to the mcas as the flight of operation manual and training materials. When he made this request was he acting on his own outside of the scope of what he was supposed to be doing as a chief technical pilot . Congresswoman, part of the responsibility included discussions on training with vs aa but that is more than a single individual. There is a large team that does that work togethethe work togetd other stakeholders. And typically they will discuss the content of the training manual and make iterations on the manual overtime to try to optimize it with the pilots. He acted on his own and there is a number of people. Did he have any reprimand in any way for this request or was it a Group Request . Congresswoman part of that discussion to include mcas in the training manual was over several years so typically over a multi year timeframe to make decisions to include things or not if they meet our criteria what is beneficial to the pilots. Was anybody reworded financially to remove this requirement to make it simple for you. Know. It is part of our obligation and responsibility to provide the best training manuals that we can. I know the discussion around mcas is included whether to include it or not but our focus has been on provide the information the pilot needs to fly the airplane other than to diagnose a failure. That difference is important safety concept in our training manual to make do you recall any discussion made around anybody objecting to remove this from Pilot Training materials . Congresswoman i cannot point to a specific document but i know there were discussions and debates whether to include it or not. That is part of our healthy engineering culture. We bringing up ideas and debate and discussion to optimize content to make have you reconsidered the removal of this material. Have you have had any discussion to reconsider . To make there were discussions and debates that was happening during that multi year timeframe. I agree but that we understand pilots do want more information we will incorporate that in plights of operations manual. Your time has expired. A quick interjection to the single point of failure there was turkish 981 where a dc10 went down because the rear cargo door went out. Us air 427 the rudder problem which was the subject of hearings in this committee ultimately determined the rudde rudder. We had two of those single point of failure. Then we had the jackscrew on the alaska flight. There have been a number and in this case mcas was a major factor but not the only factor in with that representative gives. Thank you for this very difficult time record during the sensor on the angle of attack there are two but only one was tied into the system . That is correct. Depending on sequencing wet one answer would be on different flights it could be either but it was one sensor at a time. I am not a pilot but i fly frequently. When my friend in aviation talks about how important it is you just cannot pull over on the side of the road. I dont know what you were thinking. And my background if we have problems it is sensor failure it shuts the system down. And redundancy is key. I think we have all learned our lesson we just not depend on one sensor . We tried to rely on a previous architecture we have learned to now going to a two sensor architecture mcas. I am oldschool but every once in a while on stuff that i operate if you reboot i have to agree with the chairman and Ranking Member making sure pilots can fly the plane because we know the systems are added overall with those issues and tragedies but we have to make sure humans can override it so that is concerning to me that airbus does not have that ability to override i think i would be looking at that. But Pilot Training and testing talking about these two catastrophic accidents happening lion air and ethiopia but my understanding nothing against the pilots because they were trying to save their lives that maybe the training wasnt what it should have bed from the reports that i have read if i was bowing a Large Manufacturer large sophisticated pieces of equipment and aircraft what was the plan to sell the sophisticated aircraft around the world to make sure other than relying on regulators . I would make sure the people that are maintaining them and flying them have training and continuing training. So this is one area we can prevent things like this happening and not rely totally on infrastructure itself but the human technology. So your comments Going Forward what will boeing do that you are confident those that maintain and fly the aircraft have that ability and what is boeings role Going Forward . You have a good point that comprehensive global aviation safety where we make additional assessments Going Forward and with the pipeline by most estimates 34000 new commercial airplanes and one and a half million new pilots and aviation technicians we have a responsibility to build that Talent Pipeline also looking at the pilot machine interface as technology is rapidly evolving with future flight deck design also investing in additional infrastructure around the world with additional training capacity around the world. Thats just a few examples. On the case of ethiopian and lion air were there simulators . Exactly. I am not aware what ethiopia has from a similar standpoint. We have a team locally engaged and we will follow up with the details. I appreciate that we rely too much on computers i yelled back. Now turning to the chair of the subcommittee. As we look forward we also have to look retrospective and the process that the focus of the committee longterm investigation. You said yesterday that we made mistakes and got some things wrong can you name three specific mistakes that boeing made in the process quick. Congressman i would point out implementation of the angle of attack disagree alert that was a mistake and subsequently we fix that Going Forward. Second we learned about the mcas architecture that we already talked about that areas to improve their and third the broader area of communication and documentation in a efficient and comprehensive manner. Can you identify the individuals who made these mistakes . Congressman across all three areas these are large teams that Work Together across our company and supply chain the faa and other regulators and airlines some in each of these areas there are broad integrative teams no one individual makes the decision they are Engineering Teams. Does this make an organizational or cultural problem versus an individual problem . It is important from the accountability standpoint that my company and i are accountable. That starts with me. We took some actions. How have you been held accountable for this quick. To your question taking some actions on my position and i fully support that will allow me to focus even more on safety and internal operations i have also taken in management actions there is still other reviews underway if we have to take additional actions we will and in some cases they are not individual but organizational or structural that are deeply important we recently announced changes to safety review board to make them more transparent i now receive weekly reports from the safety review board on a detailed level now reporting to the chief engineer who reports to me. Board has set up a new aerospace Safety Committee that has been chaired now we added admiral richardson with a deep background in safety is a background of that committee and then be aligned our entire Engineering Organization of 50000 engineers now report directly to the chief engineer who reports to me to create additional visibility and independence with a focus on safety. When i hear that and i read the chatter reports and the ntsb recommendations in september and the Investigation Report that there are changes that we need in how we certify aircraft with the faa process that what we have now went too far we need to hold the faa accountable they are supposed to hold the manufacturers accountable im not convinced based on the Previous Report and boeings own actions that is adequate. I would like to hear your view. Congressman we believe there are improvements to the process you are very flavor the delegated authority process that is important to fundamental safety and contributes to 95 improvement safety but we have to make sure we have the balance right and re support the reviews announced on that. If the bookends on this as administrator said 2 billion for the book and is not the rest is what we have today we should pull between those in right now weve gone too far and i yield back. Representative davis. Actually i want to add what my colleague talks about the certification process as he just asked there was one book and of the faa that actually believes could be done with billions more of inspectors of the current certification process. I dont want to see a kneejerk reaction it breaks my heart to look over and see those pictures these are real people who were affected of tragic accidents we are here to get answers but also to make sure we dont see anymore. Many of my constituents who work at your facilities in st. Louis and in illinois i know everyone puts on that uniform to go to work every day it breaks their heart when they see accidents and tragedies they want to make sure no one cuts corners so the certification process what is the sweet spot from those bookends . I applaud the focus on safety in people but as you point out what we are doing is providing safe travel for people around the globe. So we have to get it right. That certification system we have today is solid built up over decades we have seen very significant improvements over the last decade 95 percent is a result of the certain certification system we need to maintain whats good in that system. And then identified a couple of areas and one of those areas is the longstanding Industry Standard of pilot machine interface. We are eager to take a look at that and there are some aged regulations that could be updated with technology and that would also be beneficial. In those as policymakers to ensure we dont have a kneejerk reaction. Not many more in the country fly is much as we do. We understand the safety but thats where safety might have been compromised which is why you are here. I appreciate you admitting mistakes talking about those administrative decisions as a team at boeing to make sure they are not made in the future we have seen some disturbing whistleblower complaints from former executives and the culture that may exist in certain facilities. What are you doing to address that culture is up to par with the facilities that my constituents work at . You raise a good point we want employees to speak up with concerns and issues and a culture for them to speak up. We want to hear their concerns. We conduct surveys with reporting channels and those get immediate followup action. Its important if you look at those whistleblower complaint complaints, this is part of the culture providing visibilit visibility, and i will also tell you i know the 150,000 people of boeing. I know them as you do. These are honest and hardworking and dedicated people we want to do it right and with excellence and a culture where they can my commitment and the culture of our company and john shares this to be responsive to hear employees and take action and do that consistent with our values. I hope the message you take from today is thank you for the job you do on a daily basis but also we expect results. We want to see those results in your facilities. I yield back thank you for being here spirit the representative from california. Thank you mister chairman. But the faa organization known as oda to allow your company to oversee faa activities. The Oversight Office also oversees programs including the 737 dream liner. There are approximately 45 faa employees that work but 1500 boeing employees that work in the organization of the oda program. They were also representing the governments interest of the faa. Do you believe that having employees to oversee all critical safety decisions boeing makes is adequate yes or no. Congresswoman i cannot tell you the exact number with respect to the oversight authority. Did she did ask for the yes or no answer. I cannot answer that that is the faa call i just want to say we fully support their oversight as part of what makes the system safe. Its important doesnt just highlight the culture problems and commitment to safety but also highlighted the failure by the faa to have appropriate oversight of Critical Issues with but it is a critical issue in the wake of these accidents. Thank you mister chairman. I want to return to the market pressures you had to deny a claim it was more economical i would refer during the executive review unfortunately its on the ethiopian plane of the max advantage there was relentless pressure with the next line that no fight simulator required above the communications of the test pilot. We have the pulling from your own employees ultimately there is a determination if it was directly concealed or presented in a fragmented manner. The mcas and its radical form information to the regulators and that is also something we will pursue with their understanding. Let me ask a quick question. I know you know why we are here today. People died on to airplanes over five months and youre helping us to try to delve into what we need to fix because we need to change the law. But this really takes accountability for what went wrong for the death of 346 innocent people on two flights. I hope you can give me a direct response who bears the principal responsibility at boeing for the cascading events that resulted in the air of the ethiopian and lion air flights i know you are ceo and i did happen to look at your compensation last year you got a 15 milliondollar bonus after that crash. Who is taking responsibility and will be held fully accountable . I know that you fired one person. My company and i are responsible for our airplanes. We know there are things we need to improve. We will own that and fix it and we are responsible. I am responsible we are all held accountable and i describe the actions we took earlier as judicial reviews are completed and studies are completed i have accountable my company is accountable the flying public deserves safe airplanes and that is our business. Thank you. Thank you mister chairman i went to pick up with the no Flight Simulator required im a lawyer not an engineer but understand that regulatory distinction between that derivative type is the requirement of a Flight Simulator a disqualifier under the derivative certificate this is one of the safest family of airplanes flying today. Many pilots will fly in the morning a max a second fight the mg of the third flight of the day. One of the markers the customers want is to make a seamless transition to the ng to the max. The times reported the complication grew with airbus it was boeings position we didnt want that derivative type it is the clean is what customers wanted so it was the presumption at that time a brandnew certificate and no new Flight Simulator would be required . I go back to the chief engineer at that time we had product studies as we normally do since 2007 and just like any good company we were looking at both options and looking internally what they have done to come to the market and what the customers wanted was to have an airplane to seamlessly transition. If we talk about who takes responsibility i am concerned we may have had a Regulatory Environment that makes it so difficult for you to get certificate you change all of these changes it is your customers demand you get the derivative certificates and from a regulatory perspective are not complicit to make it too hard to declare that. I would say that is not necessarily any easier. We took over five years to do that derivative which is consistent of a new type so they are very complementary. If you look at the max certification. So if we go back to the ig report when he faa official says it is not as simple derivative of the simple models its complex modifications with novel features it is doing everything he can to be exempt of the new certification rule with the minimal training differences that has nothing to do with the length of the approval process but the economic pressures to meet customer demand of pilot similarity in a continuing mode model. With Engine Technology we determined we can get the same noise reduction with new airplanes. It was a desire from the customers so yes it informed the decisions that we made but not how we approached certification but the Design Choices that we made i appreciate what you said yesterday new Senate Testimony about making american aviation safer. I believe that to be true that to swing the pendulum back too far when he faa official says it is not a simple derivative it is a complex moderation and does have features what role does boeing have two require the faa to sign off instead of saying no . It is not a derivative type you must go back to begin the process again. If oda implemented that decision whether to certify a new type or not quick. I use to run the oda this is not the oda function at all. We discuss with the faa the certification base and what that should be. Ultimately is the faa decision and then we as a company follow that it is not the oda function at all. I hope we bring in those officials so we can ask that question that is the point of failure in this process. This is not a court or a criminal hearing but 346 people died both involving the 737 max it should not have been certified to five by the faa. I set into her hearing earlier this year something went wrong in the certification process of the plane either through the faa itself is at fault through the process or faa or both. After i made this statement so many in the industry questioned me for questioning the process. This committee has a responsibility to get to the bottom of what went wrong of the certification process of the 737 max to make changes to assure the public especially those in this audience and those who lost loved ones to assure them they will not fly and unsafe planes again. Sitting here with accountability i dont know what that means if that means you receive a 15 milliondollar bonus after the plane crashes im not sure who has been held accountable for this. To planes crash even after the first i dont understand. Im an engineer but maybe people are more expert than me but how do you have a single point of failure . But it was raised also another case internal ethics complaint that alleged an engineer recommended the airspeed system be put in but that was because of the potential Pilot Training impact. Mistakes being made is why mistakes are made but the bigger problem is they were made for financial reasons but this is what is so concerning how did boeing allow that to happen how did that certification process allow that to happen . In order to get a new certificate generally it takes a longer amount of time. I think most people will agree. It also risks having most likely prior Pilot Training. All of these point back to ways of saving money and thats a big problem. How do we stop that . It seems mcas was not evaluated. You did not seem to agree with this mr. Muilenburg they found mcas was not evaluated as a complete and integrated function that was to submitted to the faa. Is that true . The mcas system was certified with the faa. As a completely integrated function . Without ever having faa look at as complete and integrated . That is the important piece. I think with the report points out where we support further look that cross System Integration so for example multiple failure mode analysis with Road Conditions thats an area we want to look more deeply. The mcas System Certified to our standards how we do that analysis. It was a completely different system that is something faa should have required and been provided. But in my last few seconds i went to ask the 737 max will boeing require airlines to do similar training for all pilots quick. That is under the regulatory authorities. Will boeing have to give money back to any airline if thats the case quick. Congressman money doesnt factor into this decision. If it is in the contract . Thats my question. My time is up. Thank you mister chairman and thank you for these questions today. In my previous life i was a prosecutor and routinely had to sit with victims and victims families more often. The pain i see in your faces are exactly what i saw. I just want to recognize that for i hope you understand we are taking this very very seriously. I understand last night you had a chance to meet with the victims families. It always had a huge impact on me to do better so i want to hear what it was like for you and what was discussed. Congressman i want to respect the privacy of the families but if you allow me to broadly describe my discussion. We wanted to listen. And each of the families told us they are stories about the lives that were lost. Those were heartbreaking. I will never forget that. We talked about their stories. We listened. Further into the conversation we talked about safety and changes about what my company has learned and what i have learned and our commitment to never let this happen again and preventing any future accidents like this. One thing you want to convey to the families are the stories will always be with us. I wish we could change that we have to remember these people that brought me back to remember literally as a farm kid from iowa what i wanted to work on. And those stories brought that all back. We will never forget that in those commitments Going Forward thats important to us and we will follow up. I never forgot any of those conversations with the victims i remember it like yesterday. I hope that motivates you and your company Going Forward. From an engineering standpoint my colleagues have done a terrific job asking about this issue but im concerned regarding air safety as well and with my chairmanship of this subcommittee im very very concerned about supply chain anywhere in Public Transit we made a lot of noise about new york city and their subway system and i am concerned what you are doing to ensure the supply chain is good and sound and not getting bad actors and also to ensure its not metastasizing to affect the airlines themselves. We do have a Global Supply chain and we do audits of the suppliers and that we have a robust followup process and oversight of supplychain. This is what the faa has asked us to help. And we have done that. And every day to invest more actions to the operation. In addition to that we have 12000 companies in our supply chain that is small size businesses we assist them with Cybersecurity Infrastructure that is across the enterprise and we also have a continuous effort on the cybersecurity not only on systems and products including our airplanes for the future to ensure that nobody can gain access to the airplanes its a very important safety design principle and our team spends time on that every day. On the 30th of march boeing asked the faa if it was okay to move all references to the training material manual that was based on the representation that mcas operates way outside of the normal operating log. I cannot verify the date. So let me ask on march 30th of the same day the chief technical pilot email the faa with the following request are you okay with us removing all references of mcas as we discussed as this is completely outside the normal operating envelope beyond the commercial airlines what they might reasonably experience. Is that correct. That is a process and collectively we reached an agreement that that discussion and that was requested that. As the chief technical pilot on that. So he said it was outside the normal operating envelope beyond what a passenger would experience. Thats right. But they said its outside normal procedures. Referring to the mcas envelope. It should have been inside that system as they approach with higher altitudes and emissions. Mcas did not activate online air but actually it was within the normal operating envelope. Correct quick. Yes mcas reacted to a faulty sensor input. So it repeated this misrepresentation as late as january 2017 after bowling change to operate at lower speeds just before the faa finally certified the plane and then to discuss the changes needed for Pilot Training he reminded the faa we decided we would not cover that and the flight operating manual its way outside the normal operating envelope so in hindsight do you not agree that they do not understand that under that scenario the barrier of the single angle of attack could go under the normal operating envelope quick. I was not here prior to those conversations that was leading up to the Board Meeting and what needed to be presented. You may not be part of it but you are Vice President of boeing and you are an engineer do you not agree in hindsight that they did not understand or downplayed or concealed the fact under a scenario the public failed to act. Mister hamilton answer my question. Congressman i dont know what was going through his mind what he knew were did not know i dont want to speculate. Mr. Muilenburg. The mcas originally is designed to operate outside the normal envelope and then that lowspeed envelope that you have referred to again that is something that was tested and certified with the faa early 2016. You said you are accountable mr. Muilenburg. What does that mean are you working for free until you cure this problem cracks their relatives are not coming back. They are gone. Is anybody taking a cutter working for free to rectify this problem like the japanese would do . Congressman is not about the money. Are you giving up any money quick. Congressman my board will conduct a comprehensive review. You are continuing to work to make 30 million a year after this horrific two accidents that caused all these peoples relatives to disappear and to die you are not taking a cut in pay at all quick. Again the board. See you are not accountable the board is accountable. Your time is expired. Mr. Muilenburg did you fly on a 737 max prior to these disasters quick. I dont recall flying on a max prior to quick. I dont recall flying on a max prior to have any idea how many times quick. I dont recall. Maybe i can count on one han hand. I know at least once before. There are all sorts of things that are coming out between Text Messages and other things that others have said this is a smoking gun i would assume that you would not board an airplane if you believe something was wrong. So here is where i want to transition. Talking about the reports i did from memory. We have outcomes including ntsb Indonesian Air and the boeing board. How do we know this new process has the integrity to where the faa doesnt feel its right but it actually is right . Does that make sense . Before you flew our i flew we believed it was right. Now potentially we will and ground of this at some point how do we know the new process will work to yield the right outcome quick. I would say the Software Changes we are making will prevent the pilots from ever being in this position again. But also the faa is doing a robust and thorough review of all documentation and thats partially why its taking longer im confident when we get through this the faa will clearly say the airplane is safe to make as i mentioned with Indonesian Air others based on what we have seen so far are there any expert recommendations that you disagree with . The ntsb recommendations even the indonesian recommendations we are still reviewing all of them but after my initial look there are good recommendations working with the faa to address those. Are you making those recommendations now on the triple seven act says it goes through certification . Absolutely we absolutely apply those and some of those recommendations and how they want to respond to some of thos those. I would appreciate you getting back to the committee and advise us after looking f recommendations of ntsb and others, advise us of any recommendations you do not concur with. If you can follow up with. And you are part of the airline system, airlines play an Important Role and others. What changes are you making to where you felt it was okay, going through 5 recommendations publicly disclose the fix, clearly defined the utility, address the concerns. And it goes back to defining and ensuring the entire claim is viewed as an integrated system as opposed to components, individually that may not recognize their role in the larger system. The panel requested a break which is quite reasonable. I will recognize the representative and we will have a 15 minute break and return. Thank you for holding this hearing, very important. In the spring and summer of 2018, the former general manager of the 737 program erased safety concerns about production pressure. And involved in the 737 max, boeings rent and washington facility. I am aware of concerns. I like to read from an email sent to the general manager of the 737 program in june 2018. Two months before the plane was delivered. The email comes from a senior manager on the final Assembly Team with a 737 max, i have some safety concerns i need to share with you as leader of the 737 program. Today we have 38 unfinished airplanes located outside the factory. The following concerns are based on my own observations, 30 years, 30 years of aviation safety experience. My first concern he states is workforce is exhausted, employees are fatigued from having to work on a really high pace. Employees make mistakes. My second concern is scheduled pressure in creating creating a culture of my employees are consciously or unconsciously circumventing processes. Breakdowns come in a variety of forms with impact in quality. Frankly, right now, all my internal warnings are going off. For the first time in my life i am sorry to say, on a boeing airplane . The employee was so concerned, recommend shutting down the production. I dont make this recommendation lately. I know this will take a lot of planning but the alternative of rushing to build is far riskier. Nothing is so important that it is worth hurting someone. In december 2018 after the lion air crash. Several times after that, what have you done to ensure safety issues boeing employees raise properly addressed. You went through what you do, it seems this one must escape somewhere. Im familiar with the last communication you referenced where the employee center, retired employee he went on to retire after 30 years. I recall his email and we had several followup questions. I appreciated that he brought up those issues and concerns. We do know our team was running a production line that was operating at 52, 737s a month. It was a heart rate line at that, ramping up production from 4247. What did you do about it . We took a number of actions taking a look at each of the Work Locations in the factory, each of the production stops. We implemented additional quality checkpoints in the process and also just took a look at his concerns. He was not actually in the factory but he raised good concerns. We went back and looked at his concerns and in some cases identified areas where we thought his issues had been addressed and we provided that information back to him but this is part of the continuous process in our factories. It is very very important to set up a culture where safety is first in the factories and that comes with quality as you pointed out. Safe work is also work that is done in position and that is one of the big focus areas. What happens in high rate factories like ours, the production factory, if there is work that gets behind and out of position that is when entries happens so our objective is to make sure it happens in position and that is a safer Work Environment and an area where we have been very focused in safety efforts and we will continue to be. We take those input seriously, we evaluated them and responded and continuing one quick follow up. Did you reduce the rate of production at that time given these concerns . We are running the 737 at that time did you reduce given the concerns expressed . We did not change the production rate. It is important when you change production rate, any change a whole supply chain if you want your 15 minutes we have to break down. We will recess the committee at 15 minutes. [inaudible conversations] the committee on this side. Representative babin. Thank you very much. I would like to join the others in acknowledging those in attendance today lost loved ones in the accident and offer my sincerest condolences to you. Thank you for being here today. In the interests of time, i want to get right to it. Instead of my questions being directed to one of you specifically of would like to address to both of you and let you decide who is best fit to answer. I think there is a feeling that after the lion aircraft crash in indonesia, boeing did nothing in terms of addressing the cause of the accident and since the second crash in ethiopia we have heard a lot about how the information gleaned from these tragic accidents helped to ensure they are not repeated. With that in mind, what did boeing do after the lion air crash to ensure those circumstances were not repeated . And do you have any specific examples of Lessons Learned that you can share with us that have positively impacted the entire commercial aviation arena beyond just boeing or the max specifically if you can give that to me, one of you, as quickly as possible. I will ask mister hamilton to answer that. I also need a statement on a question about a concern that had been brought up by retired employee. I responded to a question about whether the Vice President and the program had talked to me and that was incorrect. My initial reception of that input was directed on the employee and i want to clarify that to make sure it is right and we did followup and i referenced several actions that were ongoing in our factory and the letter from the employee addressed several of those topic areas but i want to clarify that was separate from the actions we were taking. I have some other things i want to say. My previous role i let the activation team, including once the chairman announced earlier and led corrective action in the hours following lion air, we convened a group of experts from around the company and started postulating on what could have happened given the limited data that is available, we quickly identified this could have been a scenario. We started running that through our labs, running scenario planning and was the flight data recorder came up later in the week to verify what we had we started working on a software change immediately and started working that and the safety board determined that was not enough, the software change to mitigate the risks and we determined the captain of lion air was trimming out the airplane when he handed over control, it didnt follow the assumptions we based the design on. He may put an operational mantle i have some other things i want i will submit those for the record but i want to use my remaining time to be clear about something. As unfortunate as these tragedies are, system sometimes failings we will continue to learn from them until they dont fail. In the meantime we need highly trained humans in the loop to make judgment calls when things go awry. That means ensuring operators of these complex systems know how to triage problems to put a plane safely on the ground in case of an emergency. The day before the lion air crash when the identical problem occurred in offduty pilot riding in the cockpit correctly identified the problem and guided the crew to save the airplane. Let me be clear, this plane absolutely should not have been on the air october 29, 2018. Another human error. This is an indicator welltrained crew could have averted this disaster. All that to say there are plenty of things they should have done better, also human errors. Im sorry to say even on this committee there are those who claim boeings decisions were made only with the almighty dollar in mind. Are we under the illusion boeing makes money when tragedies like these occur, hard to imagine boeing would suppress information that would make the public safer and their product ultimately better. We should use these opportunities to seek out solutions, not try to hang blame on a company that has desire to keep their companies as passenger save as we do. 5 Million People fly safely on boeing planes every single day. We must be careful not to erode American Leadership when it comes to safety and aviation. America is unquestionably the Gold Standard when it comes to commercial aviation and boeing has played a major role in getting us to that point. Just for the record i serve no parochial interest in boeings commercial Aviation Program in my district, 36 in the state of texas so i yield back and submit my further questions. I think the gentleman. Since you made the clarification about the response, i want to get this straight. You heard directly from this individual, the individual who four months before lie on air said he was hesitant about putting his family on a boeing airplane after he complained about schedule pressure and the workforce. Did he respond to you directly . It was via a letter. Not sure it was electronic or physical but in response to my follow up, he said he didnt reduce production at that time despite an exhaustive workforce and all the other concerns, you didnt reduce production because you are concerned about your supply chain. Reflect on this for a second. You are highly paid ceo, vaunted American Institution and as mister cohen pointed out and i pointed out at the beginning. And you have a 15 million bonus. You say people are held accountable. This gentleman flipped the company after 30 years in the industry because his concerns werent being addressed but leading us to believe they were significantly addressed. I just dont buy that. I recognize mister mitchell. Mister garamendi. Sorry. No need. You were carrying on a line of questions i want to pursue. Dennis muilenburg, youre the chief executive officer, do you set the pace for the company . Do you set the standards to q do you set the purpose and goal of the company . That is part of my responsibility. So the answer is yes, you do those things. Yes, sir. As the chairman just said that you receive a 30 million renumeration from the company in 2018 . In stock etc. . I recall my salary was 23 million that year. Then i suppose this is incorrect, came from the seattle times, says 30 million. You have at least three employees that have left the company. Adam dickinson, rip lytic and whistleblower and charlotte, all of which said the companys goal is profit over quality. Are they correct . Those comments are not accurate. What is the companys standard for quality over profit . Our core values in this company top that list, safety, quality and integrity. I see. In 2016 when boeing started asking for time and Cost Reduction as part of the performance evaluation the gentleman that said that, mister dickerson, is he incorrect . That is not what happened in 2016 . Congressman, i am not familiar with the specific communication but it is true that we incentivize our team to perform from a cost and schedule standpoint as well. Is that contrary to quality and safety . Congressman, no, it is not. Which is most important . Most important, clearly, safety comes first. The 737 max to prove that is incorrect . I disagree with that premise respectfully. It is true that we operate in a competitive environment, we are the last remaining commercial airplane builder in the us. It is a competitive environment. You are the most recent to have lost two airplanes with 326 people died as a result of a problem with your quality and your airplane. Is that correct . Safety and quality are top priorities. Safety and quality go hand in hand with operational excellence. Will you talk to me about the quality of the kc 36 . Would you like to go into detail about the lack of quality in an airplane that the Us Government is purchasing or wants to purchase from you, the kc 36 . You want to talk about the inability to keep cargo in place . Shall we talk about the quality there or would you like to talk about the quality of the dream liner . Congressman, we have had some improvements to make on quality. You have a systemic problem in your company. You are reaching for profit which incidentally was very very significant in 2018, was it not . 15 billion cash plus significant increase in profit. You are driving profit, youre not driving quality and not driving safety. Congressman. Just give you 3 examples. I disagree with your premise. Our Business Model is safe airplanes. That is the only sustainable Business Model for boeing. We work in a long cycle business, it takes 5 to 10 years to bring a new product to the market. When those products come to market they are used by customers for decades for military and commercial customers, the only sustainable Business Model for our company is safety. That is why we lasted 103 years. Three of your principal product lines, the max 737 max, kc 46, and the dream liner have quality issues. Certainly the case of the max, they have a serious safety issue and i would posit the reality that you are pushing profits over quality and safety and those three examples of your main product lines, i see i am out of town so i have to yield. I think the gentleman. Now i will turn we are talking 346 live here. We refer to it as an accident. You need to stop talking about accident. And this is far from that. Safety begins to design. I met individually with the safety people and this is what troubles me. The word assume was you too often for my comfort level. I was ceo, we didnt build aircraft. Making assumptions, you will not hear that in the public venue. We talk about changing your culture. I challenge the faa to change how they approach things, a separate team, a red team or something to test assumptions was the worst thing in the world our assumptions. You talked about restructuring your team which you do with safety. Who will test assumptions in your organization given assumptions killed people . That is a responsibility i count on for what we call our engineering function. As we recently announced, we have realigned all our engineers report directly as opposed to the program. Time is limited. And if you have a separate group doing it independently outside the other decisionmaking, there is pollution, impact on that, totally independently. How are you doing that . In addition to the realignment internally typically in all our design programs you bring in external experts, we often bring in senior advisory groups, we will bring in nonad groups sometimes he will tap a team from another part of boeing to do a nonadvocate review and other parts of boeing to get across checks so we use resources from a number of areas. I ask for the sake of the committee here, explain how you are Going Forward with testing your assumptions on in light of where we are, what are we going to do about it. We have to look forward based on the experience you had and i challenge assumptions in the faa. Mcats is going to operate in the background. It is in the foreground. The march 4, 2014, slide that was shown earlier. Two days or less of training would be required. The problem is mcats wasnt referenced in a training manual so it just doesnt matter. Right . The training was focused on trying to respond to the effect of a failed mcas which we call a runaway stabilizer. That is what we got. That is included in the training. How the pilot will respond. That was in the manual. It was not based on a variety of pilots or the lion aircraft. How do you train on something that hasnt said heres what happens under those circumstances. How do you train for that . One of the things we need to learn is provide more documentation which we are doing. The intent is the training was to train on Failure Modes, runaway stabilizer, we have learned we need to provide more information and that is what we are doing Going Forward. Operating on the basis that profit is somehow evil. I was the ceo of a private company. I dont believe that incentivized boeing to do things that are adverse. Competitive pressures youre dealing with from airbus had an impact. I dont care about your management teams bonuses which are compensated to your board. I will say get it was a much Smaller Company i was ceo of but if i was ceo of a company, that i was responsible for, that was mine, and i own 30 of the committee, i would be sitting my letter of resignation to the board of directors because im responsible. One last question, simple yes or no. Have you submitted or offer your letter of resignation to the board of directors . Congressman, i have not. Im responsible, it happened on my watch. I feel responsible. My dad taught me you dont run away from challenges and this is a challenging situation. My responsibility is to stick to it, and to get ready for the future. We have a responsibility to do that and im confident that that is what we will do as a company. Thank you. Mister johnson will be in next. I would like to extend my heartfelt condolences to the families affected by these two tragedies, looking at the faces of the deceased, their lively smiling faces, i am deeply saddened that they are no longer with you. And match the grief you must feel, and thank you for being here. Dennis muilenburg, i trust you would agree the crews of lion air 6 flight tenant Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 were faced with multiple alerts and indications during the accident sequences, correct . My understanding of the accidents is that is correct. He would agree they had airspeed indicators . I believe from what we understand they had airspeed disagree as well as other altitude disagree indications . That and also stick shaker alerts as well. You would agree they received various other cautions and warnings during that period . That is my understanding. The National Transportation safety board reported in october in reference to these tragedies that, quote, multiple alerts and indications can increase pilot workload. Do you agree with that statement . Yes, that makes sense. The ntsb further observed, quote, Industry Experts generally recognize an aircraft system should be designed such that the consequences of any human error are limited. Do you agree with that statement as well . I believe that is consistent with our design approach. The ntsb went on to note, quote, the industry challenge is to develop airplanes and procedures that are less likely to result in operator error and are more tolerant of operator errors when they do occur. Do you agree with that statement . That is what area we learned from both of these as an area we need to revisit our longstanding principles and Design Guidelines around that. That is an important area for us to address. You would agree in terms of the design of the 737 max and the 730 max, angle of attack sensing systems were not designed such that the consequences of human error were limited. You would agree with that . We said we identify areas we need to improve related to pilot workload. That is one of them. The sequence that was not designed to accommodate let me put it like this. You would agree the 737 maxs angle of attack systems were not designed such the consequences of any human error were limited. It was this one was not designed to accommodate the possibility of human error. In dealing with that system. The company, indicated in Court Filings you try to stop all litigation in the United States and ensure as far as the indonesian crash, any litigation would be confined to indonesia and not the court system of the United States, correct . I cant comment on that. Im not familiar with the details of that. Are you here to say your company would not take efforts to protect itself from the Us Court System insofar as the victims of these air crashes are concerned . If i could take that question we will get back to you. I dont know the answer. You are attempting to settle things out of court with 100 million Fund Available for claimants, correct . The 100 million fund you are referring to we recently set up that is completely separate from Legal Proceedings as being administered by mister feinberg. That is intended to be completely separate from any Legal Proceedings with the idea we can work quickly, assist families and communities. Does the system cause the aggrieved individuals family, next of kin to have waived the ability to go to court later . The 100 million fund if i understand what you are referring to is completely separate from any legal proceeding. One participating in the 100 million fund would not bar them from litigation. That is correct. They are completely separate. Im incredulous that you dont know whether your company is attempting to avoid the us courts for liability regarding lion air, seriously, you dont know that as a fact . It seems like it would be a pretty big thing. Us courts, go to indonesia. We go through this with the maritime industry. We are mariners on these foreign flagships arent allowed access to us courts and youre telling me you are not aware of your legal strategy regarding indonesia . Im not familiar with that strategy. I have a legal team. My focus has been on safety. We will get back to that. You may want to comment on this. The indonesian governments final action report identified 9 contributing factors that resulted in the crash of lion air flight 610. One of those factors with the absence of guidance or more detailed use of trim in the flight manuals and flight crew training that made it difficult to respond. I bring this up in the context that it was reported that after the initial certification, this was discovered after the plan was certified, the adjustment was greater by a factor of 4 than what was certified. Can you address that . You are referring to mcat authority for highspeed. Originally we did wind tunnel testing and determine we need to do something for the handling characteristics and that is where we developed the original mcat during flight testing in 2016 we identified there is additional work to satisfy for a lowspeed and that is where we use to address that. There is a difference in the authority but that is when you are going lowspeed you need to stabilize a little more and to get a pitching moment you need to address the handling quality. My question, according to the indonesian government was the training based on the original certification or did it take into account both certifications with the flight manuals and crew training adequate to address both situations . We were open and transparent with the faa on the authority between high and low speed through certification and development and prior to certification, that decision the question, did you provide adequate, detailed instructions for both situations . Having conversations about what should be in the training manual we were accounting for both high and low speed. Was inadequate . We wanted to train pilots on how to react in the behavior of the airplane regardless what is causing a great allies stabilizer is something we thought crews could take action. We learned we need to take further action. There is also criticism about the fact boeing tendss to use the same design for planes rather than build a new plane and in the case of the 737 max, anil design required the system because you use larger engines and move them forward. Is that accurate . We have updated the safety requirements certified through the years and as you develop a new type of design of airplane you find things that you make software chains to address that. We were in the process of a totally new design. For the 737 max you have early trade studies . We were looking back in 2007 at a brandnew airplane and those were being developed and looked at and we made a decision in 2011 to proceed forward. Was the decision based on what is the best, safest design. Pilots fly a family of airplanes and from a safety standpoint it is important the crews are able to transition from one airplane to the next without thinking of ng. They want them to feel and operate the same way. That is a matter of time and training. I want to say this, hearing some of the questions directed toward you today i do not think boeing in any way it intends to produce an unsafe product. I do think having worked in engineering, mistakes are made. Sometimes people make decisions that have very bad outcomes. That might be an issue here. I have children who fly. I fly. Every week. I think everybody in this room flies a boeing product. When they put on the seatbelt they want to know the plane will take off safely, fly safely and land safely and that ought to be the sole point of this hearing. Retribution or anything like that will be handled in courts of law from the perspective of transportation safety. I yield back. I think the gentleman. Dennis muilenburg, this took me 30 seconds. June 13th business insider, the company is arguing for the cases to be moved from the us to indonesia and you would have us believe you are not aware your legal team, they are so far distant from you you dont talk to them, this hasnt been discussed with the board. In oregon, she had to pay the claim. When a big claim came, couple million bucks against the city, she was involved. City manager was involved, the legal team was involved, everybody was involved. Looking at hundreds of millions, billions of dollars of claims and youre trying to move to a country and this expert says having a trial in another country with it even legal culture, the scope for closer scrutiny of boeing would render the case is worthless and you dont know that that is happening . That youre making that pleading . Im aware of those articles. As i stated earlier. Would you please respond to the committee after you consult with your lawyers have they filed to move these cases to indonesia, in any court in the United States or do they intend to . We will follow up with that information. I have been concerned about some of the Text Messages and emails that have come out, documents for this case especially those technical pilot named mark fokker. Let me ask about those. Boeing has Cannon House Office building thousands orders pending. Is that correct . I believe we have 4500 aircraft in backlog. Many of those airlines that operate outside the United States. The majority of the backlog is outside the United States. I want my constituents to feel safer when getting on one of your planes in las vegas or west palm. Let me ask about these emails. He sent these at the same time he was discussing concerns about the m test system. He talked about flying around the world, Jedi Mind Tricking customers into purchasing your aircraft. Im not sure what Jedi Mind Tricking is that he uses it frequently. One of the emails says 6 30 a. M. Here, just getting ready to hit breakfast, tried to Jedi Mind Trick these people into buying airplanes. Heres another one. I have been working the certified 7378 max with all the regulators all over the world led by the aeg. It was a huge deal but i got what i wanted. I usually get what i want. A little later he says things are calming down a bit for my airplanes at least for now. Im doing a bunch of traveling the next few months, stimulator validations, Jedi Mind Tricking regulators into accepting the training that i got accepted by faa. I would ask you what Jedi Mind Tricking is and given these comments is it fair to say your company misled foreign regulators to get your aircraft certified. Im not sure what he meant in those emails, we havent been able to talk to them. He has legal representation. And he thought that we would try to trick customers or deceive customers is not consistent with our values and would not be tolerated. Im not sure what he meant but that is not our approach. What is your approach when it comes to International Customers . What is your responsibility especially those that have less stringent Pilot Training requirements . We work with regulatory authorities around the world, those decisions are made by the jurisdiction. The faa and other regulators support that. We work with airlines and those other countries and together we work on training standards. Those are decisions by the Regulatory Authority and that jurisdiction. Since that captain is no longer with you have you changed or modified in any way your engagement with foreign regulators or are you using Jedi Mind Tricking approach . I appreciate your question. I can tell you i am not sure what he meant. That does not represent the people of boeing, does not represent the people who work with our international regulators. You are not trying to Jedi Mind Trick us on this committee . Im telling you the truth. I yield back my time. I think the gentle ladys time remaining. I am a star wars fan so i know what Jedi Mind Tricking means. Here is one other observation i would like to make, bringing up your 15 million bonus, boeing has established 100 million. Each of the 436 families would receive 1 of your compensation last year. That does not seem to be consequences, you are responsible and these families get 1 of what you get paid and you talk about your upbringing as a farm boy. I appreciate that. I grew up different as a teacher, i carry golf clubs for rich people. You are no longer in iowa farm boy, the ceo of largest aircraft manufacturer in the world, you are earning a heck of a lot of money, and you are not chairman of the board anymore. Members of the board get a court of 1 million a year. There have been consequences, one guy got fired, the chief leader of the program. With that who am i recognizing . Ms. Miller. Thank you. To all of you, my heart goes out to you having lost the Family Member in a horrible crash, while it was not an airplane, i do know the consequences to children that dont have a parent and spouses that are missing their loved ones and it is so hard. My heart does go out to you. Also i think it is very important that safety and quality should always be the highest priority for Airline Manufacturers. We need to be prepared if Technology Fails us with the new Technological Advancements in all our industries it is a possibility that one day there might be a time we have to decide whether to put our faith in our training and our intuition or all new machines. Millions of people fly every day and while there is new technology in the Aviation Industry it is critical that pilots be prepared as a mechanical problem occurs. With that being said as we move forward into the future it is of the utmost importance that we continue to advance and Perfect Technology before introducing new equipment into the market. We can support innovating and new technology as an added benefit but we also cannot overlook safety, efficiency or quality in the Aviation Industry. Restoring confidence in air travel is not a political issue. It is a societal issue. Our world has become so much smaller once we were able to fly and it is imperative that the Airline Manufacturers perfect new technology and guarantee safe, flawless and exceptional airplanes. Dennis muilenburg, can you quickly walk us through the Safety Assessment evaluation boeing conducted for the mcat . I will attempt to do that. John will be more fully with details. Do it together if you need to. We conducted the typical safety review boards and Safety System analyses as part of that development. Safety is one of the parameters we look at through the design, test, and certification process that ultimately leads to the certification by the faa. That was a swift process consistent with our normal procedures. John, if you want to add details . Any time we bring forward a new system to that effect, we do failure effects and analysis of when something is going to fail, what is the effect of that and then do a hazard assessment where we look at all the different faults and make an assessment based on what is the hazard category for regulation and then we build a fault tree which is a topdown look at the probability of these events happening and this is all built to regulation and then we put together some Safety Assessment which culminates all the information from different actions and that is the compliance with deliverables we submit to the faa. Did boeing evaluate pilot response to erroneous activation . We evaluated the mcat operated pilot response would be. Did show that it could trigger other alarms . We considered that in the analysis. In your testimony you mentioned your dedication to safety and the time you spent traveling to different boeing teams. How can we restore confidence in air travel and guarantee industry transparency and communication from top to bottom . I believe those changes start with us, my company, our restructure. I mentioned a number of changes we made internally around safety structures and Safety Organization, new board Safety Committee realigning our engineering workforce. Those are all actions we are taking to increase focus on safety and transparency and that is part of rebuilding confidence. We are also paying close attention to independent review and other actions we might take together to improve the certification process. Those actions will help as well. And we still have a lot of work to do to rebuild the Publics Trust and we need to make sure the changes we are making to the max today will prevent accidents like this from happening again. That is our focus and it is going to take time to rebuild the publics confidence once we get the airplane back and we are working sidebyside with Airline Customers and the flying public to help rebuild that confidence. I yield back my time. Thank you, mister chairman i too joined with my colleagues in offering our sympathy and concern. As representative graves said, this is all about you, but people. Cant imagine what you are going through but i am so glad youre here to keep us focused and it is all about the people impacted. My question has to do with the certification process. That report, the technical review found despite significant advances being made since the max was originally certified in 1967 these advances have led to significant improvements in the safety of air transportation. The max failed to incorporate many of these designs and Technology Advancements as they were deemed impractical. What is the reason boeing failed to include the latest safety features like the ones boeing included another aircraft like the 787 dream liner . Let me take an attempt at that. As we develop a product, i want to go back to one of the biggest ways we can have safety is for pilots to transition from one plane to the next. I have to have a big difference. Whether it is the crew alerting system or how the system operates. What you are saying is you did not include these improvements because it was difficult for the pilots to transition . We went crews to think about which model they are in so they, the training they have gone through applies to either model and they handle each airplane because when you walk on the airplane you want the pilot to be comfortable flying that product. The question is that as you point out this is an aircraft originally certification, certified in 1967, has not had a full certification since in the reason had to do with the ease in which pilots could move toward different aircraft of the same family. I want to go on. J atr report found there are no federal criteria for determining when the core attributes of an existing design make it fundamentally incapable of supporting the safety advancements introduced by the latest amendments to airworthiness standards. For the faa, they dont have federal criteria. When you have to go to a full assessment versus this. What criteria does boeing use to decide the original design and have a recertification . There is a regulation in part 21 that defines when you need to do that. We follow the process and have conversations with the faa. The faa has no specific standard, boeing just follows no specific criteria that you use independent of lack of standards the faa specifies . We follow the faa regulations. Last question. Im very unclear what the answer means. The report also found the requirements of an amended certificate certification process focuses only on change and areas affected by the change which may fail to recognize the whole aircraft system which could be affected by seemingly small changes. Do you agree with assessment by the jatr report . We are taking a look at all the recommendations from the report. There are 12 recommendations that are being considered. One of those is systemwide analysis. That is a potential area of improvement Going Forward. That is an action we look forward to supporting and making appropriate changes, and area worth looking at. You are looking at the report, decided how in the future aircraft designs that seek to fall under an amended certificate rather than a new Type Certification you are discussing and looking at when an amended time for full certification is needed . We look forward to working with the faa and the rest of the industry on any changes when you apply for one versus the other. The certification, you upgrade to that, safety requirement when you make change to the airplane. The requirements the max is certified to even though it is amended is meeting later safety requirements with later versions of the 737. Let me offer families and friends of the 336 men, women and children who lost their life in this tragedy. I believe you are sincerely sorry as well. You wake up with the responsibility for a large organization. There are interests like profit and production rates, promoting that product, and the 150,000 people, not proficient and confident. To achieve the most important value. According to Indonesia Air report during discussions and medications with the faa beginning in march 2016 boeing proposed removing am cast from the flight crew operators manual and differences tables. My concern here is that boeing did not give the pilots the information that they needed. And what makes it particularly troubling is sort of like the environment in which this is happening. A lot of this has been raised and brought to your attention. An environment in which your chief technical pilot talks about Jedi Mind Tricks to convince regulators to accept a lower level of training. I dont know what a Jedi Mind Trick is but i know what a trick is. Its particularly troubling when boeing has the expertise, you have the data, far superior to what the regulators had and the chief guys on your team thats interfacing with the regulator is playing tricks to negotiate down training levels. Coupled with the fact that as the chairman put on the screen, your promotional material as you build your 737 max lee, millions will be said because of the commonalities with the nextgeneration 737, we facing contracts with southwest. If you dont have to use simulator which is much more expensive to train a pilot, if you have to use simulator, of 1 million rebate. This is the environment that we are observing in boeing and it questions whether or not that profit and promotion is undermining safety. I want to ask you this question. Mr. Mr. Cohen was asking you abt from the same line, indonesia and report. Boeing considered that procedure required respond to any mcas function without it with an existing procedures and the crews are not expected to encounter mcas in normal operation. Ask about the mill operation, mr. Cohen did. Existing procedures, thats the runaway stable later trim but theyre not the same procedure, are they . Into, procedure. When you havent mcas them its not a failure but when the mcas is the fact that its not the same emergency procedure as of right away stabilizer trim. Actually, when the mcas were to fail or if a a motor or to refill the various causes runway stabilizer speedy let me ask you this. Stabilizer trim fails, i i cane manual trim button or i can control the column, and if it is a true run away stabilizer trim i wont be able to disrupt that failure, is that correct . No. With the runway stabilizer you can counter it if i can write and adopted the result that it want than i go to the cutoff, greg . Then go to the cutoff procedure. But with the mcas failure i can interrupt the stabilizer trim failure, isnt that correct . Thats true. It happened 15 times in the Indonesian Air, didnt it . Yes. Right. You would think you dont put in the documentation because emergency procedures are the same but, in fact, its not. What im wondering is, when you look particularly at the indonesia error, the very first time the mcas fails is when the flaps go to zero, full retraction. You provided no information in any of these manuals that said hey, you know what, when you o to full flap retraction, you are activating this new system. Isnt that right, that theres nothing in the manual that tells a pilot when it activated the system, is that right . That is correct and where making changes now to add that material to the training manual. And the mcas was probably the first Computer Software system that manipulated a primary Flight Control in the 737, isnt that right . The first, not a pilot induced Flight Control. The first Computer Software system that actually manipulated a primary Flight Control. Thats mcas, is it . The autopilot that is put on the airplane everyone knows the autopilot. Aside from the autopilot, isnt that right, mcas with the very first Computer Software, yes or no . Or you dont know . Chief engineer . I guess the word youre using i would say the autopilot does satisfy that. Second they would be the mcas would be the second one, right . Theres a damper function that moves independent of the pilot. Do you have in the quick reference handbook do you have a procedure for addressing a failure on that . I you probably do but you dont have it for the mcas. Thats you didnt give them the information they needed. Congressman, thats one area where weve learned and were we coming back and adding that information to the manual. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Boeing aircraft, i been asked by number of constituents, when you fly the 737 max . I will say publicly, given the scrutiny a go i will fly it as soon as it is allowed to go back in the air because i believe it is most scrutinized aircraft in the history of this country. I do want to talk about some of the containing questions mr. Garamendi had. Boeings tanker theres applying to the military, it has some significant issues. However, when a similar situation, the pentagon require it fire only once, only once. Why on the 737 max was another approach taken where it could and did fire repeatedly as my colleague says significantly . What was why the difference in approach given a similar issue with the aircraft, similar concern with the aircraft . So the mcas was, again it was designed for an approach to solve when pilots to fly and so oftentimes, they make over correct and fly back into the stall but it was intended that in a stall condition speedy let me stop you. I understand stall. You havent answered my question. Why the difference between the tanker where the pentagon required it on the fire wants . That was quite curious as are going through, taking that aircraft, and the commercial aircraft had a repeated and, in fact, accentuated, even change the standard, went to a more powerful emotion, ultimate. Why the difference ask what motivated that . The air force, thats a requirement for the tanker that we follow. Congressman, if i could add a bit to that. John is correct. The concept behind mcas on the tanker was for a different purpose, a different part of the flight envelope as interest in it. We can provide Additional Details on that but the reason the designed design requiremene different is that it was designed for different part of the flight envelope and for different handling qualities purpose. We could follow up with the details. I appreciate that but lets be honest about it i think faa, boeing made it a problem where to apply the flight envelope in terms of mcas because it occurred within the flight envelope and occurred catastrophically. We are back to my early question about assumptions because of a failed. Question for you. When doing the simulator testing, i saw some documentation that it wasnt possible to simulate no ankle or attacking or flawed angle attack data to test pilot response that, in fact, it wasnt included as part of the similar so, therefore, there was no way to figure out whether for mexicans would work or ten seconds nevermind all the other things that could happen. Could you shed some light on that . We evaluated the mcas failure. We did not actually input a faulty sensor input because we couldnt simulate that. We simulated the actual mcas failure let me ask you a question. You got how many other sensors on the aircraft . Are the any others you didnt simulate in order to test the aircraft in terms of aircraft performance or pilot response . We can follow up with you on that. I would like an answer for the committee because im astonished that only with information which i braced as well to the pilots training requirements for the pilots regarding mcas. That, in fact, it appears to me in your Testing Process you didnt test whether or not flawed data from a single aoa would, in fact, cause catastrophic problems, which, in fact, it did. They couldnt test similar. They didnt see because he didnt have. They had other problems but they didnt see that. Youre pilots which are more experienced, some that are flying this aircraft so i would appreciate that information. I what you back. Thank thank you, mr. Chair. Thank the gentleman. You did reach the point mr. Hamilton responded about why the repeated actuation at a very radical angle and you said sometimes pilots tend to over correct and can fall back into a stall again. That kind of contradicts your whole reasoning that the kind of figure this all out in for mexicans and fly perfectly. I think he just created something that goes back to your other study which said it takes as long as ten seconds, the plane is going in. Without i recognize mr. Malinowski. Somewhat mr. Espaillat. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I first want to continue extend my condolences to the families today. My family something similar tragedy with flight 587 back in 2001. I know the kind of hurt that many of you are going through, so my heart goes out to you and sympathies to you all. Mr. Muilenburg, the National Transportation safety board recommended that the federal Aviation Administration developed standards for improved aircraft system diagnostic tools that help the pilots better identify and respond to the kind of failures a met. Will you provide this committee with your absolute assurance that any future boeing airplane will include such a system . Congressman, im not exactly sure what system youre referring to. Ive smite with the ntsb recommendation and it is one were taking a look at. Are you committed to following those recommendations provided by the ntsb to upgrade and improve your boeings so that in the future you will not have these kinds of tragic . Congressman, were currently in evaluating the recommendations. We think that area certainly one we want to look at. Get into the details you cannot give us any assurance whatsoever that any of those recommendations that were given by ntsb come you as of today, you are completely sure that you include them in any future boeing production . Congressman, our intent here is to evaluate all of those recommendations. We havent completed those evaluations yet but any opportunity we have there to improve safety is certainly whats the timeline for the evaluation . When you think you will be completed with those evaluations . Those recommendations are made to the faa. We will have to work with the faa another want to move forward with adopting those recommendations. From this entire horrible experience theres not one modification, theres not one single meritorious change that you make in the production as of today, right now . I think as result of these actions where making changes to the software, the airplane, making mr. Chairman, the United States, procedures. What kind of changes have you made for the airplanes . For the airplanes . We are making three changes to the software that address the mcas issue. We are making additional changes that further address pilots flying toward stall and addressing some of those issues as well. Are any of those changes included in these recommendations by the National Transportation safety board . I think when you look at the recommendation the talks about the max it does address that first one. Thank you. My next question really quickly is, mr. Muilenburg, the joint authorities technical review reports, the report states that the mcas used to stabilize trim to change the column force fuel, not trim the aircraft, and that this is a case of using the Control Surface in a new way that the regulations never accounted. While i understand you personally maintain that the max was designed and certified to the companies standards, will you agree that this is an example of where the regulations have not kept pace with changes in the industry . Congressman, i dont know if i would characterize it is not keeping pace. It is true the mcas implementation is new and different, and we are evaluating what Lessons Learned we have from that. So again, all the recommendations are currently being evaluated and were going to take a hard look at all of them. Just let me conclude by saying i know all of this has to be assessed. I remember back when we had flight 587, the time it took for their particular changes that could be adopted immediately that are nobrainers and these families i think deserve to hear from you with regards to what kind of improvement you will make. Passengers may consider getting on a boeing in the future and to think its incumbent upon you to give responses to the families and this congress. We are making a number of Software Changes, as i mentioned, that will prevent the pilot from ever getting the situation ever again it also i would tell you as the faa is diligently going to all the documentation, they are taking Lessons Learned from these accidents and applying criteria to us that goes above and beyond what the current regulatory standards are. So i would say we are working to a higher level of standard already with them. Thank you to both of you. Thanks, mr. Chairman, i yield. Mr. Balderson is recognized. Thank you, mr. Chairman. First i want to thank the families and loved and in the victims that are in attendance today. Your strength does not go unnoticed by anyone in this room, and those watching on tv. So my thoughts and prayers are with all of you and thank you so much for being here. Mr. Muilenburg, thank you for being here. Following the ground of 737 max, boeing stated in a cbs news report safety and quality are absolutely at the core of boeings values. Speaking up as a cornerstone of that Safety Culture and we look into all issues that are raised. When the 737 max was being certified, what procedures were in place to ensure the safety concerns from designers, engineers, test pilot or mechanics were properly investigated and addressed eyeballing . Congressman, in addition to the specific updates that john described on software and training, which are an important part of that answer, we are also making significant restructuring of how we do our work. We have set up a new Safety Organization that will report to a new Vice President reporting to our chief engineer creating a direct line of communication back to me. We have restructured all of our safety review boards within the company so that they are elevated, and again provide more ready access, detailed access to safety data, any safety concerns that may be raised come through this new organization. That includes setting up an updated anonymous reporting system. If we have any employees that have a safety concern, if wish to remain anonymous they can report it up through that system. That will come directly to me and it will also independently go to our aerospace Safety Committee inside of our board of directors to make sure all of those get the right response. Thank you. My followup, did boeing have a process to ensure the safety concerns when a whistleblower reports were made available to the faa during certification of the plane . Congressman, yes. Our intent it is share this information. Again, as we gather data, safety concerns are raised, our intent is to always try to share information with the faa. And i know thank you. Youve discussed recent action from boeing to enhance safety. These include having all boeing engineers report to the boeing chief engineer as well as new and honest reporting system. You just talk about that. Can you provide more information on how this anonymous reporting system will work . Congressman, i would be happy to follow up with information. It will be modeled after our existing ethics hotline structure, which has proven to be very effective, and our intent is to have a similar model here. If helpful we can provide Additional Details on how it is structured and how it works. Yes, please. Thank you very much. Do you believe it should be mandatory for aircraft manufacturers to immediately provide the faa with safe reports or safety concerns that have been filed through the companies internal channels . John, you can comment on that. We actually have a Bulletin Board, an electronic Bulletin Board where we take all the data comes in, anything that meets criteria the faa established and reporting to them, we have visibility of that. If we are potential safety issues that we can post as to the board as well. The faa can then do an independent review of that. Thank you mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman i get back my remaining time. Thank you very much. Thank the gentleman. Now mr. Malinowski. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Muilenburg, we have been over a lot of this but just to be clear. Its fair to say that boeing push the faa and regulatory agencies around the world to not require Simulator Training to fly the max . Our design objective was level be training. Understood. Of course we have been over the issues with the manual, not including information on the mcas system. With all of that in mind, let me ask you just very simply, was boeing aware that mcas could pose under realistic realworld circumstances the catastrophic risk . Congressman, as part of that broader hazard analysis that john described earlier, we evaluate a broad set of scenarios and thats included in that system Safety Assessment document. In the faa. We have another slide i think that me be worth looking at if folks could put it up. Thank you. This is from a presentation that boeing developed for the faa in december 2018 after the lion air accident, before the Ethiopian Airlines crash and as you see the slide states if the with the loss of one angle of attack sensor and the other received aa bad reading, the situation was quote potentially catastrophic before crew recognition of the issue. And underneath it states, crew training support, crew training supports recognition that appropriate flight crew action. So it does appear from this and other evidence weve seen that boeing understood how important crew training would be to prevent these kinds of crashes within a month of the first crash. Given how quickly boeing came to the answer and before many details of the first crash were available i have to assume that you are aware before the first crash as well, and yet you actively worked against Simulator Training. Do you have an explanation for this . Congressman, ill try to answer that and i dont know, john, if you want to jump in on that. So the training that they recognized, when you transition to a max Simulator Training and the original injury tray, that basically would apply here. If you are new to the max that would be Simulator Training that would be required as part of that, and so thats how that item got addressed. Let me also ask you this going back a little bit in time. Did boeing lobby for the provisions in the 2003 aviation bill that establish this oda program which delicate summary of these basic decisions about whether a plane safe to fly the industry, did boeing lobby for this provision . Im not suddenly with the details back in that timeframe but boeing has been engaged in the oda process and discussions over that time. Mac. Its probably come is a fair to say that since that time period, boeing has vigorously lobbied the faa and lobbied congress to lobby the faa to speed up the certification process . Congressman, we have advocated efficiency in certification and tried to do things official across all the stakeholders. Where we can provide better interfaces in exchange for data. Efficiency in the process is been very bureaucratic claims but i think that means yes, i do think its worth something reflecting on because i think this is, theres a larger story here. Theres a reflexive reflexive tendency among corporate lobbyists in this country always lobby for streamlined and faster provisions and less regulation. And here we have the case, because they see it in the companies interests, and it we have a case 46 people died, number one most important. 346. 346. How much money did boeing lose in the Second Quarter of 2019 . Congressman, we wrote off millions of dollars. Can reflect a little bit on this . Is this one of the lessons youve learned that perhaps this reflects a a pattern of lobbyig for faster and faster procedures to make it easier for you to get planes to market, is not necessary in the Companies Best interest . Congressman, i have to disagree with the premise under the question. We never lobbied for something thats going to harm safety. If there are places where we can gain efficiency, the idea is to always enhance the safety of the regulatory system. That is our intent. We have no desire to reduce safety. Our Business Model is about safe airplanes, and that is the only stable approach. So i understand the point you are making but our intent is to try to be part of the regulatory system that drives safety. I yield back. Thank the gentleman. We would now go to mr. Stanton. Thank you, mr. Chairman. As result of this singular focus in getting the maximum as quickly as possible, and actions that were taken and many that were not taken, 346 innocent people lost their lives. Today weve heard a lot about the mcas and a troll in these tragedies. The evidence our committee has outlined today and in the months leading up to this hearing shows boeing did not even follow its own design requirements when equated this mcas system and put it on the max. Heres what deeply troubles me. That only did you feel to follow your own design requirements for mcas but you also went to Great Lengths to id mcas, the existence of mcas from your customers and even from pilots who are vital to the safe operation of the max. Mr. Hamilton, you are boeings chief engineer. Its your job to make sure mcas worked properly. I want to ask you a few questions about boeings internal mcas requirements. Those design requirements were described in detail in boeings own coordination sheets and these sheets are updated as mcas moved through the design process, but two sheets, one from march 2016, 1 from june 2018 did not change, even after boeing started using a newer more powerful version of mcas, these to make sheets were never changed. Even more than a year after the 737 max entered service, there were still no changes. First slide, please. Id like to focus on this slide on to make specific design requirements of mcas. Design requirement number four, you can see highlighted on the screen, says quote, mcas shall not have any objectionable interaction with the piloting of the airplane, unquote. My time is short so i need yes or no answers. Mr. Hamilton, the mcas affect the piloting of lion air flight 610 . The crews always have the ability to override mcas with the switches on the wheel. Let me ask it another way. Did the pilots in the lion air flight struggle to counteract the activation of mcas system . As you look at the flight data recorder the captain continually trimmed out the mcas inputs multiple times. Date mcas affect the piloting of the few open airlines number 302 . That accident is still under investigation. I think we will need mr. Muilenburg, you are the ceo. The buck stops with you. You are ultimately responsible for making sure that you adhere to your design requirements. That didnt happen here, did it . Congressman, again, we have learned some things from these accidents. Were coming back and were updating the mcas design, and the training materials. Every as we went through our process we, at each step, tried to make the decisions that are consistent with the process and the data that we had, but clearly we didnt get it all right. Mr. Muilenburg, are you willing to give a yes or no answer to that direct question . That didnt happen here, did it . Petrol a yes or no question. Tough question but deserves a fair and direct response . Congressman, i tried to give you my direct response. Its a complicated question with a speedy reclaim my time. Mr. Hamilton, design requirement number 11, you can also see on the sly pickett says quote, mcas shall not interfere with dive recovery, unquote. Did mcas affect the dive recovery of lion air flight number 610 . Ultimately, after multiple mcas inputs that the yes or no question. Its a tough one but it deserved a yes or no answer they did mcas affect in any way the dive recovery of lion air flight number 610 . The mcas wasnt trimmed out as we send it would be. It cause airplane to go into a dive. The crews are not able to recover from. Was mcas a controlling factor into the dive as noted in the final act action report as released by investigators . Did mcas affect the dive recovery of eq Airlines Flight number 302 . Yes. Mr. Muilenburg, a cer would ask you the same question. Did mcas affect the dive recovery of lion air flight 610 and ethiopian flight 302 . Congressman, we know mcas was a factor in both accidents, and the were a number of things occurring in both accidents. We know mcas with the contributive factor and we know we need to make some updates to it and thats what were doing. Mr. Hamilton, i appreciate your direct answer to that question. This is back to mr. Muilenburg. Did boeing built delta meet yon design requirements as a relates to mcas . Congressman, we are still evaluating everything we learned from this accident. I think what you see here is there are cases where we have implemented against the requirements set where weve learned we need to make some improvements, and thats what were doing with the updates. Its clear the design of mcas stabilization system was fundamentally and tragically fatally flawed. The lion air, e. G. In error tragedies just dont show the flaw, they also show the system did not even need boeings own design criteria. Its Crystal Clear to me through the course of this investigation that relinquishing approval of mcas by the faa was a great mistake with severe consequences. Safety must be our top priority, and Congress Must act. We owe nothing less to the victims and their families. I yield back. Will now move on to ms. Mucarselpowell. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Ive been sitting here listening to the testimony, and i think its clear to me that so much of what weve heard today and also some of the testimony from yesterday is that to a large extent this is a story about a company cutting corners, taking shortcuts, sacrificing safety to achieve maximum profits. And at the and what is it that we have to show for it . 346 lives were lost due to the negligence of what happened in those two flights. Mr. Muilenburg, to me its very important to focus on the families of the victims that as you see are sitting right here. I know that the Company Started the boeing Financial Assistance fund, which provides 15 million and Financial Assistance to the families of the victims, and 50 million to support education and economic empowerment. So by my calculation that comes out to 144,500 to each of the families of the 346 people that were killed in those two flights. My question, my, my first question, did you ever reach out to the families before boeing made this announcement in july . I did not reach out personally. Thank you. How did you communicate about this fund with the families that should created this fund for them . Congresswoman, our reach out to the families is an area where i think we clearly needed to improve. I feel terrible about these two accidents, and and having spent time talking to the families the last but my question is how did you do that . How did you communicate to the families about this . Are boeing Global Engagement team reached out. We had connections back into both ethiopia and indonesia working with her airline so you never personally reach out to any of the family . I did not personally and again that something i regret and i i had done. Thank you. How did you and how are you networking with the families to determine the best way to use these funds . Congresswoman, a couple of things. One, for the first 50 million you identified weve asked mr. Ken feinberg an expert in this area to administer that fund. Hes already making progress with many of the families and we will continue that. On the second 50 million, we have engaged with the families. That was one of the topics of discussion at our meeting last evening and we will continue that Going Forward. Thank you, mr. Muilenburg. And it was reported in this article that, by cnbc, that the families of the 737 max have only until december 31, 2019, to file a claim with boeing with the boeing compensation fund, is that correct . Congresswoman, im not sure if thats the deadline, but my expectation speedy why is there a deadline . Its not something that speedy that are so many families are trying to seek basic justice. I want you to take a look at them for just one second because obviously you havent spoken to them. Congresswoman im going to continue. Thank you, mr. Muilenburg. Can you assure us today that if these families accept these funds they were not in any way hinder anybodys ability to sue or take any legal action against the company. Was yes, congresswoman, this fund is completely separate from any illegal activities. So you give me that assurance today . Yes. Thank you. I want, per unanimous consent introduce this article that i found faa discovers new safety concerns during towing 737 max test. Without objection. Thank you. Changing subjects. Are you expecting this paragraph, the 737 max, to fly in time in the near future . Congresswoman, we are working the faa on that. We have currently set a baseline when the fourth quarter, this come towards the end of the year. Soon. Because i have lost all confidence, mr. Muilenburg. I sit on the transportation and infrastructure committee. Ive been listening to your testimony. I heard your testimony yesterday and i think many of the families have asked for your resignation. And i have thought for a long time, i do want to blend you but at some point you have to take full responsibility of the negligence of these two flights. I want to ask you are you going to be stepping down as ceo of boeing . Congresswoman, i no. Congresswoman i saw Something Else. Boeing increases ceo payroll that 23. 4 million last year. This was last year. Congresswoman my company i think at some point to build trust and confidence in your company i do agree with you. There are thousands of employees that work and discovered that dont deserve to be put through this but it is you as ceo who takes full responsibility and ive not heard you doing that. With that i use back my time. Congresswoman, if i could respond to that. I am responsible. I take responsibility for these two accidents that occur on my watch. I feel responsible to carry that through. As i mentioned earlier, i grew up in apartment i would. My my dad taught me responsibility. What he told me was when youre faced with challenges, carry through i do want to run away from the challenges. My intent is to see this through. I think thats part of mr. Muilenburg, have you had begot an ounce of integrity you would know the right thing to do is to step down. The gentleladys time has expired. I would now recognize the Ranking Member, mr. Graves. Would you like to finish what you were saying . Congressman, thank you. Again, i understand the congresswoman see you here and i respect those inputs but as i said, the way i was brought up, when faced with a tough chumps like this something that occurred on my watch i have a keen sense of responsibility to see it through. I think thats part of what i owe to the families and to their members pick and im committed to doing that. To me this is about being responsible, and ensuring safe travel for the future. Thats my focus. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Allred. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I want to begin by offering my sincerest condolences to the families who are here today. As a father of an 18 18monthold child on particularly devastated to see the babies in these pictures. I do believe that boeing is a Great American company and thats part of why i am so frustrated we are here today. I also want to say that the faa has failed in its duty to make sure that we fix and we must ensure on this to the prefix of this process to make sure that this never happens again. Industry capture of safety regulations in any area is not only dangerous to the public, its bad business. This has cost boeing dearly. It is cost our airlines dearly. Thats what is so important we get this right. Mr. Muilenburg, i hope that you are gathering from todays hearing that our concern is a with the mistakes that were made but we are certainly concert about that but we understand mistakes happen, even the greatest Companies Make mistakes. Its the concealment, its the purposeful concealment that bothers so many of us. With an obvious financial drive behind it. That the pilots didnt know about this is unacceptable. That you implemented this new system and that airlines rely on you to deliver a safe and reliable aircraft, and you did not do that is unacceptable. And that we on this committee only always finding out some of the information last month and you come here telling us how sorry you are about what is happened, but yet you have to have whistleblowers tell us this information about whats going on inside boeing. We only got some of this information on october 18 about these tax that a going on with some of your people. You have not fully complied with us. We had to fight and scratch for all the information we have to try and fix this system. And that makes me angry and it makes me feel like your use of the work of accountability has a very different meaning than mine. Now this is not about pilot error. Ive heard my colleagues mention pilot error. This is about catastrophic design flaw and regulatory failure that has caused us to lose hundreds of lies two of your aircraft have gone down. In dallas where i represent we have two airlines, Southwest Airlines and American Airlines both of which have extensive hubs in my area. They have invested heavily in your aircraft. This grounding and these catastrophes have cost them over 1 billion. Then canceled nine their hardworking employees are feeling the financial effects of your negligence. Now, when the 737 max flies again, after it has gone through the needed changes that are just now being done which i think some of this process is shown you knew shouldve been done in the first place, it will be a profitable aircraft for your company. So my question to you is, how will you compensate the airlines and their employees who have lost so much due to your negligence . Congressman, we have been working with a number of airlines including american and southwest. As you mightve seen and are less Quarterly Report we took a charge of several billion dollars associated with what we call customer compensation. Those discussions with those two airlines and many others around the country and around the world ongoing, and our intent is to make things right with our customers. We feel terrible about the impact its had. We know the flying public is been effective. We noticed these airlines have been affected. We know that communities have been affected, and we have delivered engagement, approach with each and every airline and we are working our way through that. And we set aside a Financial Impact associate with that that you have seen in our public reports. We are going to be following this closely because there are employees of both his airlines have no role in this, who are doing their best, been impacted by this. I fly southwest twice a week. Every time i get on the plane summit asks them what of the flight attendants whether not it is a max. You have a lot of work to do. Yield back. Thank the gentleman. Ms. Davids would be next, the vice chair of the subcommittee. Thank you. First, id like to get extend my condolences to the families that are here, and i appreciate your continued willingness to show up and be a part of this process. Aviation is extremely important to kansas. The state that i feel from at our state has a strong aviation history and its vital to my states economy. Its vital to the u. S. Economy. I think you know that already. Mr. Muilenburg, to piggyback off of so many of the, so much of the question weve heard today and what we heard rum you today and what we heard from yesterday in the senate, you have reiterated the time of the gentleman has expired again boeings commitment to safety and Pilot Training, that weve seen a number of documents the committee has reviewed a number of documents with an emphasis on it effort to minimize Pilot Training requirements for the 737 max. My interest is having you provide some clarity on that. Inconsistencies that we hearing and seeing. Would you agree that Pilot Training is important to boeing . Yes and dwindling market the max to potential Airline Customers, did they assure the customers that if they purchase the next in the unlikely they would need to put their pilots to timely and costly similar training . One of our design requirements that we work with our Airline Customers was to do a we call level be trading, computerbased training as a design objective. I have some slides this, i have a Powerpoint Presentation from a 737 max training that one of the marketing officials provided from july 2017 which was a few months after the faa certified the max. Can you go to the second slide, please . This graphic shows the quote if you look in the box. We have marketed two days previously in a three to four hour course is now been approved. Mr. Muilenburg, after the certification did boeings marketing representative emphasized to potential customers faa have reduced the length of Pilot Training that point had originally expected . Congresswoman, im not familiar with those discussions. John, do you have any awareness . We can follow up on that question. Okay. Well, its clear from this slide that boeing had expected a Different Number of days entering them would ultimately ended up with. So this slide here contains text from an email chain in August August 2016 from chief technical pilot mark fortner which announces to a large group at boeing the faa approved the level b training and that it was first of all the entire email contains a lot of explanation point turkey was very enthusiastic and he noted that quote this home is more than three years of times and collaborative efforts across many business units. You can see the rest of the texture. Mr. Muilenburg, level be designation means the 737 max was subject to computerbased Pilot Training requirements and not more expensive similar requirements contract . Congresswoman, thats correct for the differences trend between the models. The baseline training for the 737 max is a 20 they Training Program that includes significant simulator time. So in a separate email chain next slide we are very familiar with this quote by this time in the day. Mr. Faulkner tells an faa official he was working on Jedi Mind Tricks and regular into accepting the training come that he got accepted by the faa. Mr. Muilenburg, the push across boeing to limit piloting requirements on the max despite the Company Commitment to safety and Pilot Training is clear from the question refer today, the slides referred whats up right now, this is your chance to provide some clarity on how you mesh all of this information with your continued statements about commitment to safety. I think its a very good question and that the idea here is that to incremental training, adds to safety. We dont make trading decisions based on economics. We try to make trading decisions based on safety, and as john pointed out earlier speedy if it was a pace of economic what was a based on that youre trying to push to reduce unsafe on safe operations, sy of our Airline Customers receive the 737 max. They also fly 737 and a typical pilot any given day may have flight on and in g and a max. Its speedy what youre saying sounds inconsistent with information that weve been seeing that your committed to safety and youre not taking into account the Economic Impact of the Pilot Training the people would have to do. The last thing i want to say is based on what was said, can you tell us right now if this article is correct and december 31, 2019, is the last chance families are able to file claim for the boeing compensation fund, that you will extent that . That is only two months now, and that seems completely ridiculous that people only have until december 2019. So congresswoman, until those mentioned earlier i had recalled that deadline but i can tell you that something we can extend and i will give my team that direction. If there are families we can help and more time is needed, we will take the time. Our commitment here is to try to help the families. And i know monetary help never relieves the pain. It never will, but hopefully we can help the Community Spirit i do want to do any kind of artificial timeline on that, so if that is the constraint, we will remove it. Yankee. I yield back. Thank you, chairman. To the families and friends of those who perished, thank you for bearing witness to what was really lost in the catastrophe. I would like to explore with you, mr. Muilenburg, some of the financial forces that may have contributed to the catastrophe as a relates to the corporation, if you would answer some simple some simple questions and yr no format. One of your primary duties as ceo is to focus on increasing the price of the companys stock, is that right . One of our objectives is to increase the shareholder value, yes. Is your total compensation or realize gains tied to boeing stock performing well . Thats one component of it, yes. Mr. Muilenburg, do you know what the stock price was when you became ceo . Congressman, i do not. It was 140 a share. That was on june 5, 2015. What was the stock price at the last trading day before the Ethiopian Air accident this year . Would you know that . I dont know. Let me help you. It was 422 per share on march 8. So in a in a little over four s your Company Stock grows, it tripled from 19992009. It went from 42 49 a share, from 20152019 it tripled from 140 per share to 422 a share. Very significant. In fact, you and your board authorized a 20 billion Stock Buyback Program in december of 2018, two months after the lion air incident that help drive up the price of rolling stock. You own shares of Company Stock, correct . Thats correct. So in short, you benefited personally from increasing the stock price. In fact, a report from the american prospect shows you made over 95 million from 20152018. You were pocketing almost 2 million a month, almost half from stock dividends. The way i see it, your relentless focus on stock price and your Companies Bottom line may have negatively affected employee performance. Would you agree . Congressman, i dont agree with that. Our Business Model is about safe airplanes. So you dont think that employees felt pressured to perform . Congressman, the realities of the competitive and vipr, the pressure to perform is there, but that is never equal to safety. Safety speedy but in november of 2016 boeing conducted an internal survey which, in which over 40 of employees stated they felt undue pressure. A boeing employee said quote, boeing management was more concerned with cost and schedule than safety and quality. Another, adam dixon said, a boeing engineer said, his managers warned him, quote, very directly and threatening ways, in the quote, that he was at risk if targets were not met. Its pretty clear theres been a culture of greed and compromising safety at boeing. Mr. Muilenburg, you did everything to drive profits over safety. You started recertification requirements or regulators at every corner, and your employees even admit the line to the faa. There are basically two ways that this plays out. You either truly didnt realize you had a defective plane, which demonstrates gross incompetence, and for negligence, or you did know if you have a defective plane but still try to push it to market, in which case its just clear corruption. Either way, mr. Muilenburg, you are the captain of this ship. A culture of negligence and incompetence or corruption starts at the top, and it starts with you. You padded your personal finances by putting profits over safety, and now 346 people, including eight americans, our dad, on your watch. Today, you said you make mistakes and you are accountable. If exum bank isnt reauthorized and the max is left grounded you might be asking us for abella. That bill, the exim bank is before the Financial Services committee. I think it is time you submitted her resignation, dont you . Congressman, i respectfully disagree with your premise and what drives our company. Well, whether or not you or your colleagues are incriminated in the ongoing criminal investigation, the facts remain peoples either gross negligence, incompetence, or corruption. You are at the top i think its pretty clear to me, to the families of the victims and the American Public that you should resign and do it immediately. I yield back, mr. Chairman. Next with the ms. Fletcher. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for being here today and thank you for holding this very important hearing. I join my colleagues and expressing my deepest condolences to the families and friends are here with us today, and those who cant be here with us and, of course, they are in our minds as are the victims. I think that really needs to remain our focus as we are here today. We convene this hearing to get the facts and understand better what we can do as members of commerce to prevent a tragedy i kiss from ever happening again, and we understand that these are real people whose lives have been affected, liza been lost and life seven forever changed. And so i remain aware of that and we want to do what we can. And so one of the things that has been an issue with touched on all of it earlier today but of what you follow up on is this delegation of certification authority. This is a critical place where Congress Needs to reassess whether this is a program that should continue. And i understand and their been questions about this earlier, that boeing was really able to avoid installing some of the latest safety features are using this amended certification. And i think both boeing and the faa failed to evaluate the impact of mcas on the whole aircraft system because of this. So mr. Muilenburg, my question is for you first. The recommendation faa needs to ensure engineers have open lines of communication to the faa certification engineers without fear of punitive action or process violation. The agree with that recommendation . We agree with having those open communications. And what changes, if any, has boeing make to improve the relationship and sure boeing employees have access any to make safety determinations . Congresswoman, one of the changes we announced roughly two weeks ago now was stand up of a new Safety Organization that is centralize within boeing, direct reporting later chief engineer who reports to me. That would include our oda representatives. I think that will enhance transparency. We have mum multiple underway, including standards, includes a restructuring of all of our safety review boards across the country. They now are integrated companywide. Were setting up a new design Requirements Organization that as technology continues to evolve we can do a better job of sharing those technologies and requirements across the company and weve realigned our Engineering Organizational structures so all roughly 50,000 boeing engineers report directly to our chief engineer. Thank you. There are additional actions underway and investments for the future so that list, consider that a set of initial actions with more to follow. Thank you. I want to move on to a couple of things before my time expires. Were any boeing employees to punitive actions for failing to report to f. A. A. Staff . Congresswoman, im not aware of any such cases. If there were cases like that, we dont accept retaliation. There is no tolerance for retaliation. I cant personally say im aware of any, but let me check the records to see if there are any there. Thank you. Id appreciate that. From a policy standpoint we do not tolerate retaliation. I would appreciate if you could get back to the committee on whether any employees were subjected to punitive action or you dont know that sitting here today for a fact. Another recommendation is that the jtr recommends increased f. A. A. Involvement in safety critical areas currently delegated to boeing. I understand that boeing has implemented these to internal. Have you any to the delegation process that congress can help with as we evaluate these issues . Congresswoman, were start to go evaluate those opportunities so discussions are ongoing with the f. A. A. And others. We think the area of Human Machine Interface and how we set those Industry Standards and the requirements for how pilots operate in a high workload environment, thats a place where we can together on new standards. There are also some older regulations currently on the books that could be updated to take advantage of new technologies and were identifying a specific list this that area. Those are two examples and i would anticipate there will be more. Thank you. I see ive exceeded my time, but if you could send those recommendations to this committee. That would be much appreciated. I thank you. And i yield back. Gentle lady, representative. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, everyone and thank you for your patience in being here today to hear some of the answers from boeing. Thank you to those of you who are in the audience and c condolences to your family, as well as of those in the Airline Industry as they listen carefully to what were saying here today. Mr. Muilenburg, i wanted to ask you questions about mcat. Following the air flight 6 canada air flight last year, they issued a bulletin for the 737 max. Uncommanded nose down stability trim due to erroneous angle of attack, a 0 a during flight. While the bulletin skribd described what could happen to aoa failure and quote, repetitive cycles continue to occur unless the stabilizer trim system is evacuated. Not one bulletin says what causes such a i have a copy of a flight manual bulletin tbc19 page 51, i would ask that this be entered into the record. Thank you. Sir, why was mcast not mentioned in the november 6th bulletin . Congresswoman, im going to ask john to add to this one, but its what we were attempting to do with that bulletin is to again remind pilots of that existing emergency procedure runway stabilizer and the reference to multiple inputs is the behavior that you would expect the airplane to see, as a result of mcast, so the idea is to provide the pilots information about the behavior of the airplane as opposed to diagnosing the specific system so that was the intent. So the intent was which one . The failure mode that it mcast could cause, rather than provide details. Since then the feedback from the pilots we know we need to provide more information on mcast itself in addition to the effects of mcast and thats part of the update were making to the training manual. In providing the effects of mcast would it have been easier or to summarize it by using the term mcast. It perhaps could have . One thing weve learned, pilots would like the definition itself in addition to the failure mode. And whats useful for the pilots. How large are the training manuals . I cant comment on that. Theyre pretty substantive . I saw you knowing your head, sir. Do you want to add anything . Well, they are very substantive in size, but we do go through a process of trying to evaluate whats the right level of information in there. We can incorporate all kind of information. In hindsight and in response to the pilots request we are going to put material in the training manual on mcas. Well tell exactly what the needs and a lot more information to address this. So, is that the decision as to why it was ultimately excluded because it was seen as what, not something that the pilots would have again, our intent was to provide information on how to fly the airplane not necessarily diagnose the system failures and thats always a balance that we try to get in our training materials and clearly here we need to provide more information for the pilotsments so the reference to mcas was excluded the reference to mcas excluded in order to not bring attention to the system pilots were unaware about it . No . The intent was to provide the material that the pilots would need to fly the airplane rather than to educate them on the system details. Thats an area where we fell short and we need to provide more information. So in that same bulletin quickly, boeing described ow arizoni air erroneous, and alt et cetera. And if they went off simultaneously in a cockpit, a pilot would be confused about . Congresswoman, when you have an aoa in the case of lion air that was miscalibrated, once you have a threshold and difference in altitude then it would trigger that altitude disagree. And then an air speed disagree, they would they may not come on at the same time, but theyre probably fairly closely linked together on that. Okay so the question was, would a pilot be confused how to respond and then i yield back. So the omb was really about, if you have an aoa issue, it can trigger number of different indications in the flight deck and to help you identify what could be going on, and if you have the stabilizer moving, then perform the run away stabilizer procedure. We subsequently went out at the request of our customers with a detailed message about mcas and explained what it was. Thank you, mr. Chair and i want to start by also offering my condolences to the families that are here and those that loved ones that have been mourning all those lost in these unfortunate tragedies. Mr. Muilenburg, im going to dispense with what a lot of my colleagues have already touched on and just dive into some really poignant specific questions. So a very brief answer is what im looking for. Boeing did not consider erroneous mcas activation to present a catastrophic risk, correct . Let me repeat that, boeing did not consider erroneous mcas activation to present a catastrophic risk . Congressman, i believe that the hazard analysis if thats what youre referring to, john, help me out. So the single mcas is that correct or not . A single mca is. You used the word catastrophic. Yes. Yes. Thank you. And as a result of that lower classification risk boeing did not perform detailed evaluations, Failure Modes, effect analysis and faulty analysis to fully understand the extent of erroneous mcas activation, im looking for yes or no. Weve used thorough analysis that we used and we did consider multiple inputs into mcas. Did it do the failure mode and faulty analysis, yes or no. No. In similar tests, boeing didnt do erroneous activation to the stabilizer motion, correct . Congressman, i believe we went beyond 2. 5, i think we went to 3. 0. If you could follow up that would be great. Boeing didnt consider erroneous mcas activations in those tests, did it . Boeing didnt consider repetitive air roanion mcas activations in these tests . We did consider multiple mcas inputs. Did boeing assume would be the redundancy to save the airplane during an erroneous mcas activation. We assumed that pilots would recognize it and trim it out and so is that a yes . Yes. In retrospect, given the erroneous activation of mcas played a Critical Role in both 737 max crashes, would you agree this was a broad assumption that the pilots were the backup . We used Industry Standard thats been around for a long time and around pilots actions and in these cases, that assumption did not play out in these so is that a yes or a no . Its an assumption that didnt play out and i think its one of the things that we need to address Going Forward. So that would be a yes. Restate your question and ill in retrospect given erroneous activation of mcas played a Critical Role in both 737 max crashes would you agree that this was a flawed assumption that the pilots were the backup. I would say the assumption needs to be addressed. So yes. Yes. Thank you. Mr. Chair, i yield back. Thanks, gentlemen. We begin what will hopefully be a brief second round. I appreciate the witnesses and the members of the committee who have hung in there do you know how many 737 max Southwest Airlines had ordered from boeing prior to the lion air crash . Congressman i dont know the exact number, but we can find it for you. Well, were told its 280 and do you contest the fact that Southwest Airlines would have gotten a 1 million rebate per plane had the pilots had to go through simulator or d training . I believe that was part of the contract structure we had with southwest. Did you have contracts like that wither 0 customers . Congressman, i dont know if there are any other customers with that specific clause, but thats 280 Million Dollars that would have had to have been paid i think a real key issue is how we got to this point and how mcas was not in the manual. Thats been my question since way back when. Lets move on to undue pressure key learning and next steps, slide. Slide. There it goes. This was a survey which was provided to us by a whistleblower. It was in 2016. If we go to the next slide, i am concerned about consequences if i report potential undue pressure, 29 . And if we go to the next slide, when these engineers are also ars, lines are frequently blurred between when the engineer is acting in an applicants smb role and when theyre in ar role. That with a 2016 and ill give you in a minute a chance to respond, but it seems like you didnt pay much attention to the survey and the undue pressure because we then have, and i may have read it improperly before, but he says he was the leader of the 737 program. He was writing to the general manager. Talks about work force exhausted, schedule pressure, im sorry to say im hesitant about putting my family on a boeing airplane. Thats two years later. It doesnt seem like anything was done to relieve the undue pressure and this culture where people were afraid for their jobs and there was confusion, you know, which also points to why we need to change this process between cmes and wait a minute, which hat do i have . And switching hats. In 2003, i dont understand how this is going to work when i voted against this process so someone works for boeing, paid for boeing and someone else works for boeing and paid for boeing and this person is stove piped, and firewalled, theyre not responsible to boeing, but to the regulator and apparently thats not so theyre going a Development Engineer or the ar. So, i mean, what happened between 16 and 18 . Apparently not much. Can you point to any significant steps taken to change the culture and relieve this undue pressure . Congressman, i can and john will feel free to add in as well. First of all, this survey is a survey that we proactively do with our oda team. The goal here is to identify any sources of undue pressure. So in this case, the these are the survey results that we proactively sought and we gathered all of these results and weve shared them with the f. A. A. And weve taken followup actions associated with these inputs. But then thats good, but im asking for like really concrete examples when you have the leader of the 737 Team Two Years later work force exhausted, schedule pressure, it doesnt sound like these things were effective. Congressman, if i could, im attempting to answer the question. Yeah, go ahead. Its a very important topic. Sure. Youll see on the survey data here over 90 of our employees are comfortable raising issues and i think the number is 97 understand the process for doing so. Those are those are very high scores. Wed want to them higher, but we try to have a culture where employees speak up and take an issue and we can take action in response. Thats the culture that were trying to invent advise. Now, i will say that its true that we have Competitive Pressures every day, we operate in a tough globally competitive world, but that never, never takes priority over safety. And i know weve had this discussion, but i can tell you our culture as a company, the only longterm sustained Business Model is safety. And thats because their airplanes last for decades and having a culture where people are willing to speak up, including the people that responded to this survey, is part of creating that culture. John, you might be able to comment on specific actions weve taken . And i think theyre two separate things. This is actually looking at the ars and undue pressures and thats a defined area that the fa has us act on. We do recurring training with the manufacturers and the quality about how they deal with ars and how this needs to be treated and what is undue pressure and we do take followup actions and we do audits and the f. A. A. Has come in and actually audited what we did and they have agreed with what actions were taken. He think, you know, the other pressures that were alluded to later or two years later was not an ar, to my understanding, and i think thats just it talks more about the pressures that and again, as i mentioned earlier, i did receive a letter from that individual and i think he raised some good points, things that we want our people to raise. Subsequent to that evaluated those, we talked to our 737 te team. But you didnt reduce the production rate as you said earlier. You stated 52 i dont want to prolong this too much. Production rate stability, again, sir is better for safety, consistency in the factory is safer for our workers. Unless its moving a little too quick. So just to go back to the issue of how this all happened, and it started with a phone call in 2011. I brought that out at the beginning. You had an exclusive boeing customer who called and said cant match airbus, fuel economy and no pilot retraining necessary. Were buying all airbus. And then you have in your you know, i mean, the story is that we didnt rush except you were looking at i mean, you have a 50yearold air frame here some of which, some of the reasons the problems we have and you know, why you had the developed mcas as oppose today a more stable platform, were dealing with a 50yearold air frame. You know, youve still got, you know, hydraulic controls, youve got, you know, youre in the newer planes, my understanding is when you have something serious going on, you actually get prioritization in a more visible way. The disagree light didnt even work and were told that safety is paramount. People werent pressured, things werent rushed, but i just dont i just dont buy that and you know, instead of building a clean sheet design, you might have lost market share for a year or two to airbus, but then you would have come along with a fabulous 21st century airplane that probably would have been better than the airbus and you wouldnt be going through what youre going through today. You know, that was a critical mistake that was made back then and i believe it exerted pressure throughout the organization from the top down and its going to be very hard, very hard to restore confidence, you know, and again, when you have the guy who is a leader of the 737 program saying im hesitant, im sorry to say im hesitant of putting my family on a boeing airplane, thats very sad comment on what has happened to the culture of the company. With that, representative. Thank you, mr. Chairman, i just want to ask a question to clarify my question about Computer Software, you may recall that question. I want to pre face, i know the difference between hindsight and at the moment. Hindsight everything is clear and today we see mcas as more of a part of the Flight Control system, but i still believe that mcas at the moment, while you were designing and promoti promoting, its a big deal that you underappreciated. You have the Flight Control and surfaces like the stabilizer and controls, right . Cockpit controls like the yolk or the control arm. You have linkages on the two. All of the Flight Control services operate by a cockpit control input by a crew. The mcas as i understand it, is the only Computer Software that actually operates a Flight Control surface without crew input. Is that true . No, sir. You say yo or yes or no . No, sir. It moves the Rudder Service in spoens to wind gusts up to 3 degrees, so crews dont put any input on that, it just happens automatically based on okay. Fair enough and i appreciate that clarification. The emergency procedures, im you know, i think that mr mr. Muilenburg youve he thinks med in testimony and even when mr. Carbajal was asking questions. The condition is an unstablelizer trim movement occurs continuously. Which means the stabilizer goes down, which means the nose is going to go down, you try to make the correction, either the trim button or the yoke and youre not getting any relief. Thats a run away stabilizer trim, right . Yes or no . That could be a how it might behave. Uncommanded stabilizer trim movement owe can yours continuously, stabilizer goes down, the nose goes down, right . Right and if its continuous, i do the control, either the trim button or control yoke and i dont get any relief and the quick relief handbook says that when you say you dont get any relief if i do the trim button or control column and take my hands off, it would still be going down. That sounds like multiple failures going on, if somebody is driving the stabilizer in the initial spot and Something Else thats im talking an unstablelizer trim movement continuously and the trim the nose moves down. In which case if i trim and nothing happens that would be a run away stabilizer trim. That would be a run away stabilizer trim, but thats two different and if i have a run away stabilizer trim, but with the mcas its not continuous. It moves to a stop it stops and i can do some correction like think did on lion air and five seconds later on lion air mcas activated again. So the concern i have is when you say that the emergency procedure should be the same, but the conditions are different. One is continuous and one is intermittent. It happens, it stops when i provide input, and then it kicks in again. And i know youve got litigation pending and maybe thats not why you want to answer the question, but congressman, let me try and yeah. So the run away stabilizer procedure, whether its caused by mcas or some other failure mode, the procedure is to trim the airplane, manage your power and then hit the cutout switch, if it continues. So but as a pilot dont you recognize it because like it says in the qrh, its continuous. Right . Is that right, its continuous. I think the difference youre pointing out, theres some run away stabilizer modes where its one continuous. Right. In the case of mcas its still a continuous movement, but it can happen multiple times weve multiple time theres nothing in the documentation that says what continuous is. Pilot says continuous means i try to change it and it aint changing, thats continuous. If it changes, but then comes back, thats not really continuous thats intermittent and this is where and this is where and so wi with you said youre making changes in documentation. I really hope that youre looking at an emergency procedure, a Quick Reaction procedure, okay, that expressly addresses mcas and the intermittent changes. Thats one of the Software Changes, its no longer intermittent, it can only operate once. Thank you, mr. Chairman, i yield back. Thank you. Mr. Muilenburg, yesterday in response to some media reports and a question about them, you denied media reports that say that there was significant changes to the mcas extension not fully vetted by the f. A. A. You said it was fully vetted. , but the indonesian was to simply accept the submission. It seems theres a difference f. A. A. Stepping a submission as the f. A. A. Fully vetting the changes. So, if that was the case, do you and this gets to the kind of heart of some of these certification questions whether its enough or too much had as been given through the authority to boeing or to any other manufacturer. Can you help me square that circle, what fully vetted by f. A. A. Means versus what fully accepted submission means . It seems theres no way to square that stircle. Congressman, do you have a comment you want to yeah, congressman, i think theres been some implications here about the oda and what the role was. The system Safety Assessment, the certification deliverable was retained by the f. A. A. It was not delegated to the oda until the very end after the f. A. A. Had reviewed it and provided comments back to the oda, and said, if these comments are incorporated in the systems assessment, then the ar is delegated to find compliance. The f. A. A. Had reviewed that document for several months. And congressman, if i could just add in to try to square this off to the comments you heard yesterday. What i was referring to was during the time period mid 2016 to early 2017 the fact that we extended mcas to the low operation envelope that was discussed with the f. A. A. In many ways, and we constructed multiple flight tests, some of those included f. A. A. Pilots on board that aircraft and ultimately led to the certification of the airplane with the mcas software, including the software to extension to low speed operations and that were talking about two ends of the same equation there. So, i appreciate that. I know you wont mind though that were going to continue to go through the documents youve provided us and go through f. A. A. Documents as well to clear that up from our end of things. And congressman, i do think weve identified some areas where we need to improve the documentation in some cases, recording of decisions, and making sure those were communicated to all parties and thats one of the areas of improvement that weve also identified in working that jointly with the f. A. A. And related to that sort of the paper trail side of things, mr. Hamilton on october 20th, statement from boeing referenced the fact that mr. Portner, his comments in these text message exchanges reflected a reaction to a Simulator Program that wasnt functioning properly as opposed to how many of us read it, that being an mcas not turning and him making his comments na he did. However, if its only from my understanding if it doesnt matter if it was just a simulator problem or if it was deeper mcas, theres no paper trail that im aware of yet that tells me anything was mixed, whether it was mcas problem that was fixed or if its a simulator problem that was supposed to be fixed. If were using the simulators that are supposed to be fixed in order to test the 737 max, i dont feel any better about that either. So, is there a paper trail to report this, to whom, who is ultimately responsible for exceeding the simulator, if that in fact was what it was, and can we and i hope we can get those documents. As well, i want to ask f. A. A. The same thing, not just who how far up the ladder does he have to report, but across the f. A. A. And letting them know about the simulator. Congressman, again, were not completely sure what he meant in that message. Well, join the crowd. It appears that he was working on a simulator and hes referencing the low speed extension of mcas. Right. We need to confirm that. We do know that he was working at that time in a simulator, at least our best understanding he was at that time working on an unqualified simulator. It was a newer simulator that was being brought up to standards. It was not yet at a position where it fully represented the airplane itself, and would he have known that . Was he supposed to have known that . And why was he he into you that he was operating again, our understanding, we havent talked directly to him. Our understanding is that he was in a Simulator Development process and it appears from his comments that he was surprised about some feature of having spent some time in simulators, its not uncommon for us to have to work to the software to have it fully be representative of the airplane over time. Regarding the paper trail on that simulator, i donten if we have any details on that well follow up. Im over my time and there are other members. So, thank you. Ive got to thank you, chairman. Mr. Muilenburg, i would like to talk to you about the aoa disagree alert and that boeing recently admitted that the aoa disagree alert on the 737 max that was supposed to be a standard feature on all max planes was inoperable on the m max, on maxes where they didnt purchase the option. The optional aoa indicator. It seems as though 20 of the Max Airplanes purchased the aoa indicator, so the aoa disagree alert was inoperable on 80 of the aircraft. Does that sound right to you . Congressman, i cant give you the exact number, but its correct that it was not implemented correctly. We made a mistake on that and we discovered sdovrd it a discovered it and subsequently thats good. When did boeing learn that aoa wasnt operable on 80 of the aircraft. I dont want to guess on the timeline, but it was discovered by engineers when did you personally know about it. I dont know the timelines, there was a lag between our discovery and it being reported to the f. A. A. And was there a lag between the discovery and your finding outten a then the f. A. A. Finding out . Congresswoman, the communication timeline on the aoa disagree alert was too long. The communications were not done the way we should have done them and thats one of the reasons weve revised our review board structures. So i agree with you that it was too long. I also want to just note the issue of candor, that congressman allred brought up as relates to the communications that boeing had with the regulators and its customers, and thus the flying public. So it was only after the lion air accident, as i understand it, when boeing learned of the defect. It waited three years and 2020 to actually fix the problem . So congresswoman, 2017 is when we identified the discrepancy, we immediately convened and whether it was a safety issue or not. We analyzed and determined it was not critical for safety of flight. We notified the f. A. A. The lion air accident. The f. A. A. Independently convened their own safety board. So before you you continued to manufacture the max and distribute it to the customers. At that time were you providing those max aircraft with a known defect to your customers without telling them that . Congresswoman, yes, the airplane did not conform to the specs that disagree was not working. Im not sure why we didnt notify the customers of that. Who would have been the one to decide not to notify the customers . Was it your Marketing Team . Probably somebody on the Engineering Team on the 37 program. It might not be a safety critical thing according to you, but this certainly raises ethical issues, i would say and issues of candor, which weve been talking about. And i want to bring up i think weve got a couple of slides here. Okay, so this is the cover of the flight crew operations or fcom delivered to lion air 2019. This is one full year after blowing earned of the 737 Max Airplanes that it didnt, which they didnt purchase the aoa indicator on, that it wasnt fully functioning and that lion air didnt purchase the indicator and disagree i think i need the next slide that the disagree wasnt operative. So this shows the august, 2017 that boeing became aware that the disagree alert wasnt working and it wasnt until after the lion air crash in october 2018 that they let the f. A. A. Know. I guess regardless of whether or not youve classified aoa disagree alert as a safety feature or critical safety feature, it was required on the aircraft, was it not . It was part of our configuration spec, but theres no crew action associated when you get the disagree message. So crew awareness. So, youre saying so it was part of your what . Congresswoman, it was part of the airplane baseline. It should have been implemented on the airplanes. It was not correctly implemented. We made a mistake. A safety review board was brought together as john described. They came to the conclusion that they could implement that in the 2020 time frame, in the next software cycle as y referenced. How do you decide which things are baseline that youre not going to adhere to and which ones you are . Congresswoman, we missed on that one. We made a mistake, we made a mistake and weve owned up to that, we need to fix it, one of the reasons my time has expired. Hopefully well get to ask you another question because at some point need to get to how we make sure as legislators that this doesnt happen again. I yield back. Thank you, chairman defazio. I want to circle back to another topic that is related to information given to the operator, which is the Pilot Training following the lion air crash, with uns once there was a determination to work on the mcas system. Theres been ongoing conversation as to what additional Pilot Training, if any, would be required. So i just want to make sure i understand. I have a couple of quick questions. Following the lion air crash, boeing began developing a Software Update for mcas, correct . Right. And as part of the update process does boeing need approval of associated pilot standards by the f. A. A. Flight Standard Service . Not necessarily for that specific change time. Its my understanding that in december of 2018 boeing met with the f. A. A. Transportation Evaluation Group to validate the max, the system enhancements, correct . That was subsequent, yes. And part of that conversation was that the f. A. A. Task in the boeing training related to the software fix would be documented in the f. A. A. Flight standardize board report. What level of Pilot Training did boeing propose to the f. A. A. . That would have been level b training, the classroom or cbt, computer based training training. Would it surprise you to boeing recommended level a training at that time . Im not aware of that. Youre not aware that boeing recommended level a Pilot Training instead of level b . No, im not aware. Mr. Muilenburg, were you aware that boeing recommended level a training instead of level b . No, im not aware of that. Well, according to a letter from boeing to the f. A. A. , boeing represented that for the mcas enhancement level a training would only be required and boeing stated in the letter that its position, which i have the letter in front of me and happy to present to you all, that boeing believed that the ration rationale for the regular recommendation was still applicable and that boeing believes there isnt a difference relating to mcas Flight Control law doesnt affect pilots knowledge, skills or flight safety. Do you still believe that statement is true . With the Software Changes being made, it was going to prevent the mcas from operating like it did in the accident flight, yes. You still believe that level a training to be the appropriate level of training . If the Software Changes will prevent the pilots will ever seeing that type of condition aga again. Do you understand that the f. A. A. Responded to that by saying that they didnt they cautioned boeing that level a training may not be the appropriate level of training and that while they were at that level boeing was breeding at its own proceeding at its own risk. Were you aware that to continue at level a training boeing would be proceeding at its own risk . Congresswoman, im not, but we can certainly follow up on that and we will. And its my understanding following to exchange between f. A. A. And boeing, that the f. A. A. Said that it would be okay to proceed with scheduled flight simulation tests. Are you aware of that part of the process, the flight stimulater tests were scheduled . Do you know when those were earlier this year . What time frame are you referring to . Well, the simulator tests were scheduled for march 13th, 2019. Are you familiar with those tests . I recall that there were some simulator tests done in miami around that time, yes. And what date did the Ethiopian Airlines crash take place . It was in march of 20 march 10th, 2019 before the simulator tests. Thank you, mr. Chairman, i yield back. Thank you, gentle lady. I just want to in response to a previous question i believe mr. Hamilton said that the f. A. A. Was completely aware of the much enhanced mcas system, but the finding of the jatr was finding f 2. 7a, the f. A. A. Was not completely unaware of mca schs colon, however, the information and discussions about mcas were so fragmented and delivered to disconnected groups within the process, it was difficult to recognize the impacts and implications of the system. If the f. A. A. Technical staff had been fully aware of the details of the mcas function, jj schj js jatr team, an independent, would require the paper for utilizing the stabilizer in a way that it had not been previously used. Mcas used the stabilizer to change the column force field not to trim the aircraft. This is a case of using the Control Surface in a new way that the regulations never accounted for and should have required an issue paper for further analysis by the f. A. A. If an issue paper had been required, the jatr team believes it likely would have identified the potential for the stabilizer to overpower the elevator. So theres a breakdown there and weve just got to determine whether its intentional, unintentional, how much of it lays on boeing and how much in the f. A. A. In this case, they seem to be laying a lot of it on boeing and the communications. Mr. Brown had a quick clarification. Thank you, mr. Chairman, i really appreciate it. Mr. Hamilton, in response to my questions about the Flight Control systems and the role of Computer Software, you offered up two examples. One is the yaw damper and the other is the autopilot. These systems, both of them as you know, are engaged by switches on the flight deck by the pilot. The switches and the operations are clearly documented in flight and training manuals. The crew knows when theyre activated. In fact, i know that at least in the case of the yaw damper and maybe even the autopilot, theres a warning light when it fails. Those systems are not in the same category as mcas which operates behind the scene so ill just conclude by saying, at the moment during the design, development and promotion of mcas, mcas was the only Computer Software that operated the Flight Control systems without knowledge from the pilots or pilot input. And for me, as a pilot, thats a big deal and not just in hindsight, but at the moment during the design, development and promotion, it should have been a big deal to everybody involved. Thank you, mr. Chairman, i yield back. Ranking member. Thanks, i want to just an interpo of clarification as well. Theres been a lot of emphasis put on aoa indicator in the cockpit, whether it should be in the cockpit or not in the cockpit. Theres a difference between an aoa indicator and aoa sensors. And aoa sensors had an impact, but aoa indicator, its not a primary flight system, its not a second of flight system. In all of my thousands of flight, i dont think ive been in a plane with aoa in it. Theres been emphasis placed on aoa indicators in the cockpit and its a little frustrating because to be quite honest with you, those are more for, for a maintenance reference than they are for theyre not a flight instrument by any stretch, but with that mr. Chairman, i appreciate this hearing. Thanks, gentleman. Im told that ms. Davis has a brief question. Ms. Davis. Thank you, chairman. So the certification process is my primary concern here, as a legislator, as a member of congress who sits on the tni committee. Our job is to create the framework under which regulations will be promulgated. Those will be the things that keep the public safe. The first thing i want to say, this might be the first time in boeings history that were facing a situation where the culture of the companys top management was controlled more by a profit motive because of shortterm concerns than by the longterm Business Model that you keep bringing up of safety. Based on all of the things that weve seen here today, im interested in figuring out how we make sure that as we come up with that framework, that might need to be reevaluated, whether its the Type Certification, amended Type Certification or when we drill down into it, what gets into a manual or not and how much Pilot Training is required. Ive heard you say a number of times the system can be improved and im wondering if you have some specific areas that we, as legislators, need to be looking at . Congresswoman, i appreciate that question, and while weve had some challenging questions today, i think we have a shared objective around safety of the Aviation System. We believe there are several areas where we can Work Together, some are on the regulatory front. Weve discussed earlier, things around Design Guidelines, some of the longstanding Industry Standards i think need to be revisited. There are some regulations on the books that could be updated to take advantage of new technology. We believe what is the longstanding Industry Standards . Pardon . Whats the a longstanding Industry Standard that you specifically think that we pilot reaction times and various Failure Modes and scenarios. What we assumed on pilot reaction times, for example, in mcas failure scenario, we think its time for us just to revisit those from a sfri industry standpoint especially for digitally enhanced airplanes Going Forward. We think there are opportunities for us to Work Together on talent development, the pipeline for future pilots and maintenance technicians. Do any of the longstanding Industry Standards that you think need to be looked at include things that as a manufacturer you would be in charge of . Well because the two things that you mentioned have to do with Pilot Training. Okay. The first one has to do with actually with design criteria. John, you wanted to i think its both. I think theres advisory circulated that should be updated, but also, our own internal guidelines and design guides that need to be updated from what were learning from these two accidents. Weve also updated our design Requirements Organization internally to do better cross sharing, cross defense of military sectors. I think thats an area where the government can help. I think investing in future simulation technology, taking advantage of Virtual Reality and augmented Reality Technologies to enchance Pilot Training students is another area. The science of Human Factors and how we design for the future, another example. Do you think that, what about when it comes to Type Certification and the improvements or advancements technologically that have been made. Weve spent this time talking about the family of 737s that got the original certification in 1967. Where is there what do you think we need to be doing about making sure that as lots of new technology and an entirely new system is being integrated into an aircraft, that were doing our jobs to make sure that this doesnt happen again because youre talking about a lot of improvement that youre already making that it sounds like we need to be making sure that the f. A. A. , as regulators, know about those things before we run into a situation like this . Yeah, i would recommend and this is one of the recommendations that the f. A. A. Work with industry on part 21, on the changed product rule and looks to see if there are any enhancements required in that area. I yield back. I believe this will be the last questions. Ms. Craig has not yet had an opportunity to request questions and i recognize her. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I know its been a long day for the families of the victims here and i just want to say my condolences to each of you and thank you so much for being here. Ive been in and out of this hearing almost all day today and during a previous iteration of life when i worked in business, you know, my job was in medical technology and in that sector, theres something called the ma data base. If theres an Early Warning of an issue, we were required to report those things publicly, our customers were required to report those things publicly and many of the questions ive asked as weve had a number of hearings with the f. A. A. And with others is how do we create moving forward a more robust postmarket reporting system for issues that occur . My first question, really, mrmr. Moo muilenburg, in hindsight when should you have grounded this plane . Congresswoman, weve asked our selves that question many, many times, and if we knew back then what we know now, we would have grounded it right after the first accident. If we could have saved one life, we would have done it. Thats thats what we would have done. Mr. Muilenburg, i spent the last four years of my Business Career as the head of global hr for a fortune 500 company and ive seen tough decisions firsthand from the inside. Theres been a lot of conversation today about your compensation and earlier this afternoon, you indicated that, well, thats up to the board of directors. Ive pulled up the proxy statement from 2019 and did a little back of the envelope calculation. What i want to make sure is that the people who loved those who died sitting in this room today are assured by you that boeing executives who now regret not acting and making decisions understand the pain that theyre going through. My back of the envelope calculation, just on the number of underlying Stock Options that you still have that are or are not vested, that just in Stock Options and i understand that boeing moved from Stock Options to performancebased rsus and restricted stock, Many Companies have done that. What i want to understand is that you are not going to personally benefit and profit over the swings in the stock price over this last year because if i look at Morgan Stanleys report, they expect once these planes are ungrounded, your stock potentially to reach 500 a sure. And i know thats a long way from there today, but you said earlier today that your board of director makes compensation decisions, back in of the envelope Stock Options up to 500, youd have another 30 million, thats based on the price at 75. 97 the options were issued at. I had how this works. If your board in february when they meet to issue your performance grants and your restricted Stock Options award you Stock Options for the 2019 time period, will you commit to this committee and these Family Members sitting here today to decline those awards . Congresswoman, we dont issue Stock Options so im trying to i want to answer your question, but our board will do a comprehensive review, theyll make their decisions of its not about the money for me and its thats just not why i came to boeing. Thats why i said i understand you dont get Stock Options the ones in 2013 you have vested and youll make millions of dollars from those. When your board meets they could decide to give you performancebased rsus this cycle this time around or they could give you restricted stock units. Will you commit today to decline those awards if your board chooses to give them to you . Congresswoman, im anticipating that this years annual bonus cycle in zero. Thats not where im focused. I didnt come to this company for money. Thats not why im here and i my board will do their work that i believe we already announced last week we expect our annual bonus cycle to be a zero payout for our executives this year and that starts with me. Thank you for being here and thank you. Mr. Chairman, i yield my time. I thank the gentle lady. I ask unanimous consent that the record of todays hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided answers to any questions that may be committed to them in writing and some were submitted here today. Were going to leave the last minute or two of this hearing now so you can watch it online anytime at cspan. Org. The u. S. Senate about to gavel in to start the day. More work is expected on a 2020 federal spending bill which covers several departments, including transportation and housing and urban development. Those are expected throughout the day. Now, live to the senate floor on cspan2. The president pro tempore the senate will come to order. The chaplain, dr. Black, will lead the senate in prayer. The chaplain let us pray. Most high god, your steadfast