Transcripts For CSPAN Boeing CEO Others Testifies On 737 MAX - Part 1 20240713

Safety of the 737 max 8 airplane. He appeared before the house transportation committee. Committee on transportation infrastructure becomes order. I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to request resources. Without objection. I also asked the chair and raking member of the full community the recognize for 10 minutes each of the first round of questions. Without objection, its awarded. I want toegin, explain an administrative matter regarding some of the documents we may use in todays hearing, and that will be entered into the record. Two unanimous consent request in regards to two documents, list a and list b. List b. T on the b a we have been asked that it provides ample authority to release these documents. And the documents from boeing, owings attorney boeings attorneys agreed to these documents. I see nothing that is export sensitive in these documents. Documenttamped every they stepped us as export control. However, to prevent confusion with regards to documents with markings on them, i will be making a unanimous consent request regarding the release of these documents, pursuant to the election control act. Ill be making a consent on this a into the hearing record. This list includes the export control documents on list d as well as additional documents. Theyve reviewed all these documents on both lists and with i would ask unanimous consent that they be mr. Chairman yes. I want to reserve my right to object at this point. The gentleman is recognized. Weve had two remember noting the industries and that includes maritime, transit, you name it and they would love to have the opportunity to get their hands on technology from the Aviation Industry as well. And it concerns me we have talked about this and have gone over this. Making these documents they have all been made available to everybody on the committee. They are putting them out there in the Public Domain i think it is a problem and we are cutting ourselves off at the legs when it comes to the technology. It concerns me in a big way. Having said that, i will withdraw my right to object. I think we can get the answers without peace bu these but i wie that request. I didnt take a backseat to anybody regarding china i voted against the most favored nation status and post them going to the wto and in the u. S. Technology and unfair. Trade practices i dont think there is anything in there that would be of any utility to the chinese. But in any case i recognize your concerns. I just have to finish a briefing this pursuant to section 48202 because withholding such information is contrary and without objection, so ordered. I would ask unanimous consent to enter the records. Without objection, so ordered. Lets proceed now to the hearing. I first want to recognize the families that are here today. A fifth place with families. I dont know if ive met with all of you here today. I want to convey my condolences one year and one day after the crash. A very somber day we shouldnt have to be here if we are and we are going to get to the bottom of this and fix it and see that it never happens again. With that i think the witnesses for being here. The fourth hearing the committee has held given the extraordinary interest i thought that its best to do it in the full committee. I know they told us they wanted to wait until the airplane was ungrounded but i felt it was important to testify before that happened. Something was drastically wrong. As you know the committee is conducting a very robust investigation. Weve never undertaken an investigation of this magnitude in the second oldest kennedy in the United States Congress Committee in the United States congress. We have received hundreds of thousands of pages of documents from public hearing. And we have received tens of thousands of pages from the faa and we have conducted some hearings with the employees and we have others that we wish to interview. We are told we have to be in line behind the justice department, so those are still forthcoming. There are a lot of Unanswered Questions that we need to get to the bottom of. We know that a novel system took these two planes into an uncontrollable altitude after it triggered something to do with faulty sensors these were wired to the one sensor and in may be then acting administrator sat there and i asked them they said yes. Then how could it have been approved to trigger a single point of failure and he had no answer to that. How could they approve it, how could the manufacturer do that and he had no good answer. We will continue to pursue the roots of this. We do know that one was in the first version of the flight manual and in the benign system when it became a radical system that could trigger a catastrophic failure, it came out. Some of that was discussed in the senate yesterday and will be discussed again today from the chief test pilot in the instant message as it seems inexplicab inexplicable. Secondly, we do know that boeing engineers proposed placing and enunciate her in the cockpit, but again it came out in later versions were the actual production version and then it wasnt until after 1 a. M. Air that boeing informed anyone and is still at that point i think softpedaling that it was in the plane and i talked to a lot of pissed off pilot specifically where the backup system lacks how can we be the backup if we dont know something is going to take over a plane . Theres quite a bit of this content out in the Aviation System about that. We now know that boeing and the faa and some pilots would act in four seconds, but they had information that we will get to a little bit later in this hearing. But some pilots might react in ten seconds or longer and if that happens, the results would be catastrophic and result in the loss of the aircraft as it has happened twice. That they got the 12th or 13h iteration. And then to develop the system to go through Pilot Training or recertification. That drove the whole process. Boeing Southwest Airlines 1 milliondollar per plane rebate but the pilots had to be retrained program imagine the pressures from the top on down to the low level engineers who say what . Know know know we cannot have that. That is 300 million for that one other contract. That is a marketing advantage. That the angle of attack disagree light which was a standard feature on all 730 sevens did not work. Unless they bought the upgraded package and that was an inadvertent error in developing the upgraded package. That may be so. And then decided to delay for three years through 2020 did not tell the faa or the customers or the pilots about this until after the lie in air crash. That is inexplicable. They say its not necessary for safe operation of the max. To keep everybody in the dark and have that is there. Its not lighting up. It cant. Was serious disagreement. And it was included in the flight manual. To include something in the manual that does not work and then something that does work to cause catastrophic issues is not in the manual. What is that all about . We know there is tremendous tremendous pressure on production. Whistleblowers have contacted us regarding features that engineers wanted on the macs that were denied because of the rush to get the plane out the door. We have from an internal whistleblower a survey conducted november 16 that 39 percent of boeing employees surveyed experienced undue pressure, 29 said they were concerned about consequences perhaps losing their job if they reported these incidents. We now and know at least one manager implored the general manager to shut down the 737 max production line because of safety concerns a couple months before the tragic crash. There is a lot we dont know. We dont know what would happen. We dont know if the pilots had Simulator Training that replicated the system what would happen. We dont know why boeing designed a plane with a point of failure that is inexplicable and an excusable and unprecedented in the history of mass aviation production. We do know and we have seen pressures from wall street have a way to influence the decision of the best companies in the worst way to endanger the public and jeopardizing the good work of countless hardworking employees on the factory lines. I hope thats not the story that is ultimately written over this long admired company. So we meet today. We need answers. But we also know that we need reform how commercial aircraft are certified and how manufacturers, not just boeing but are all watch and overseen by the regulators. Now today the investigation isnt just getting answers but how to make the system safer. With that i yelled time to the Ranking Member. Thank you mister chairman. Want to extend my condolences to the family and friends i cannot imagine how hard it is to sit and go through this process i will divert from my statement for just a minute and associate myself with a couple of comments the chairman made and i as a pilot have a piece of equipment in the airplane that i dont know about is something that concerns me in a big way. To say that backup system it does concern me but i do want to point out as well that when it comes to airbus it was mentioned with airbus customers wanted to look at airbus as opposed to the boeing product but in airbus the pilot is the backup you cannot shut it off a very similar system in a boeing max you cannot shut it off. It overrides the pilot. Overrides the pilot. Now when it can be shut off when it comes to being a pilot you want to shut off a system that has failed and fly the plane and i have harped on that over and over again and its my hope that this testimony today helps us to understand the decisions boeing made between 21 2009 and 2017 regarding the design of the max. Some of these decisions were reviewed by the boeing organization the Designation Authority that is on behalf of the faa. While the oda was authorized to act as a regulator of the faa they retain the ultimate responsibility and compliance and safety regulations that still lies within the faa. The chairman said we have a lot of other people to hear from and i do want to hear from the boeing leadership at the time of these decisions to get a complete picture i would like to hear from officials over there at the time between 2012 and 2017 these decisions were being made and i hope i can get a commitment and im sure you have no problem with that. We have to hear from everybody. In many times i have said they have revealed problems if these investigations reveal problems with certification then congress should act to fix those specific and identifiable problems and thats the issue to identify what those problems are. In the aftermath we cannot just throw the safety of the Aviation System on one single factor no one single factor contributes to an accident. I heard Safety Experts refer to the swiss cheese model love accident causation. If you use this model you have many layers if you visualize them as slices of cheese with holes to represent the weaknesses, some of those are due to conditions some are active failures. But when an accident occurs when those weaknesses lineup is when you have a catastrophic failure. In context of the 737 max you have to consider all of the layers, all of them with the protection and safety and trying to determine what weaknesses are out there trying to determine what they are. As investigator of the indonesian accident said the non contributing factors would not have happened the crash would not have happened the decided certification of the 737 max is the focus of a number of investigations. Earlier this year boeing took responsibility for the design weaknesses and have been working on a software fix which we are waiting to hear about. What other weaknesses with the faa oversight we are going to address including pilot displays and training and today we will hear about the status of all of those efforts. But i want to hear how they lineup with recommendations of the joint authority the first completed review of the max certification with advanced aviation and Technical Expertise is due out soon. While they did not call for an end to the allegation programs it did highlight bureaucratic deficiencies between boeing and the faa and we have to address those and i know we will. The concern that occurred with the report and is committed to working on these recommendations which is good to say that happens but lastly i want to hear about documents related to the pilots and im sure you will do that other investigations are moving forward as well. Last month the ntsb issued a recommendation report focused on the assumption made on the design and certification process related to Human Factors design and certification cannot be the sole focus of our efforts. I have said this before so with one layer of that cheese mode model, over the last few months other weaknesses that have played a role in these accidents have surfaced. Reports earlier called into evidence submitted into lion air investigation with the installation and calibration of the faulty angle. This was also whistleblower statements raising significant concerns with lion air operations and Maintenance Programs former chief engineer for Ethiopian Airlines found a whistleblower complaint with the recordkeeping and Maintenance Training and also the air carrier went to the maintenance records of the 737 max alleged the day after the accident. Unfortunately operational pressures and robust Safety Culture can negatively impact aviation safety thats another layer of that model. The ntsb has confirmed along with certification operational factors in addition with that review the department of transportation at the request of the committee to begin a review of those standards and the impact and thats another thing i have talked about as a potential problem. I want to be Crystal Clear this is not an effort to blame the pilots. I also dont absolve boeing of its responsibility the New York Times Magazine Article describe the changing nature of the industry of the impact on airmen ship also decadelong transformation of the entire business of flying that they became so automated that the air travel boom could take over the need for more pilots. I was getting letters from airlines all over the world because i had atp on my license they were offering me jobs and to come fly for the. And pilots can master Cockpit Technology but if it fails they have to be able to fly the plane and not by the computer. None of this is a reflection on lion air or ethiopia. They were fighting for their lives thats the bottom line. It is on the broader pressures present today of the global aviation economy and incumbent on the airline whose name is on the side of the plane to make sure their pilots are properly trained to the level they need to be not rushed into the cockpit. That is where some of the blame lies. And ethiopia in particular when the government owns the airline and they put pilots in thei their, something that is above their head is not the pilots fault. Look at who put them in the position to be responsible for hundreds of lives. In line with that swiss cheese moment with those layers of Protection Training and Maintenance Programs they must also be explored with all of the weaknesses have to be addressed is to believe the faa is the Gold Standard in aviation safety and once they certify the fix to the max i volunteered to be the first person right alongside administrator dixon and the first flight of the max eight. Regarding to the max accidents all of those issues need to be addressed but only after we have work that has yet to be completed. Jumping to conclusions only risks more harm. The us Safety Record speaks for itself and i will stand up to anybody who tries to question that it is the safest mode of transportation in history and with that i appreciate the opportunity mister chairman and i look forward to todays hearing. I turn to the chairman of the subcommittee. Thank you chairman. I will be brief i want to get to the reason why we are here today which is to get direct answers from boeing. The faa did release a video Opening Statement you can find my full comments there. In summary the 326 lives lost Ethiopian Airline crashes are constant reminders of the importance of this committees work and if we do not address systemic safety issues in aviation today some victims family members are here with us today. Others are watching on live stream and your presence and tireless advocacy are critical to what we are doing today. Thank you for that. You deserve answers. And rightfully you expect congress to act. Following my original recommendations i do want to say i see one undeniable conclusion the process by which the faa is certifying the aircraft is in need of repair. It is no accident there are few airplane accidents and makes it all the more tragic when there is one it makes it even worse when there are two. So the committees Investigation Continues to maintain safety as a guiding principle and use all the tools at our disposal will and i youll back. Now we turn to the Ranking Member on the subcommittee aviation. Thank you mister chairman for holdings hearing today. Yesterday was one year since the lie in air tragedy. I also want to join everyone sitting up here to offer condolences to all the ethiopian family victims. Everybody in this town and to deal with billions of trillions of dollars and these acronyms and process that often makes sense and often times you see people that just forget about objectives. Wire we actually doing this cracks what is the purpose that we go through the regulations and procedures . Why . Its always about people. That is what we are here for four fellow americans and fellow citizens. And it is amazing to me just being here and im sorry to every one of you and your pictures are incredibly powerful. I used to be a rockclimbing instructor we would have somebodys son or daughter or brother or sister and when you are rockclimbing brick if you lose somebody on a rock there is no room for error. Air travel is the same thing you cannot tell them to pull over to the side if there is a noise coming out of the engine. Its not an option. This process has got to stay focused on the risk air travel poses and the fact you cannot pull over to the side you have to have redundancy. There is a lot going on right now with all the different reports and investigations and i will run through those in the moment but there is a lot going on. For example if there truly was one that they could engage that is not the proper redundancy. If you look at the safety and the risk that is posed in this case it is unacceptable. It is unacceptable. A while back i had a chance to represent the state of louisiana and the deepwater horizon disaster and spent time with families there and many days in the court listening to testimon testimony. I do think the judge found there was inappropriate culture on focusing on the wrong objectives and often times people look at economics or how fast can the jet travel but instead this is 100 percent about people. They talk about the whole process and say it was shortcircuited. You can look back at the 7376 or eight or nine the e1 90 or the 95. Or any versions of the aircraft and every single one was 35 certified and approved in a shorter time than the max. Is not just about how long but what we do during the process. What are we doing during the process to make sure that this is a safe aircraft that we are not putting folks at undue risk . I have heard a lot of people talk about a lot of different ideas and solutions and things they want to do as we move forward. And people posing solutions right now and certainly we will extract every single Lesson Learned that we can. But right now we have investigations with the Ethiopian Authority ntsb, the technical advisory board, office of special counsel working with the whistleblower complaints. Secretary of transportation. Boeing is doing an internal investigation. We have so many different investigations going on one thing weve got to make sure we do is focus on facts one thing i have seen in this body and the four and a half years i have been here is not responding emotionally but to fax if are going to do something it may make us feel good but it does not actually respond to the facts. So as we move forward im sure i have left out investigations that moving forward we have got to make sure we are acting on the facts every single outcome and probably have identified have got to make sure we are truly basing our solution on the facts so this doesnt happen again. Lastly, mister chairman your families shared a number of concerns that i think are right on. And i do want to ask that boeing get back to us on these things like bully disclosed the disposing the fix before the plane was allowed to fly if it is allowed to fly again to death find the role of the mcat syste system. To make you could submit those for the record are asked during the question. Thank you. So with that we will turn to the witness for Opening Statement. Ranking member, congressman thank you to the whole committee we appreciate the opportunity to be here today well do our best to answer all of your questions. Before we get started i too would like to acknowledge the families that are here with us today. And again we want to tell you im sorry. I have had the opportunity to talk with some of you and hear your stories. And we are deeply deeply sorry and will never forget. We want you to know that we are committed to making the improvements needed. We are committed. I had the chance to hear some of those stories and listen to personal stories and it does get to a business that is about people and thats where our hearts will always be with boeing those 150,000 people feel the same way and think about this every day. We carry the memories of these accidents with us that the memories they will never be forgotten and that will drive us every day to make the airline safer in the industry safer. We are committed to doing that. Im grateful for the opportunity to be here today to say this to the families personally and let you all know weird learning and we still have more to learn. We have work to do to restore the Publics Trust in military thing possible we can from an accident like this ever happening again. Mister chairman the committee has many questions about the max we will do our best to answer those while still under way both accidents is repeated software called mcas we have talked about that system spotted two erroneous schedule one signals based on sensors based on that we have enhanced it three ways now it takes information from both sensors instead of one before activating. It will only activate a single time and third it will never fly more than the pilot can interact alone and they will also continue to override t6 at any time. Spending over 100,000 engineering and test hours flowing by more than just lights and in those Global Regulators i have flown on a couple flights myself. This has taken longer than expected but we are committed to getting it right during this process we work closely with the faa another regulators to provide the documentation and how they should regular sleep and then to deserve nothing less. Today and every day over 5 Million People will board boeing airplane to phi safely to their destination. And then the rigorous oversight of the committee to reduce accidents by 95 percent over the last 20 years. That we can and must do better. And then we have learned and we are still learning and improving. And then with the new Safety Organization so that all 50000 engineers report to the chief engineer we also hope to rebuild the communities and the families impacted by these accidents prickly pledge 100 million to the effort with Renowned Experts to make sure they can access these funds as quickly as possible. No amount of money can bring back what was lost, but we the at least can help the families meet their financial needs. Mister chairman i started at boeing more than 30 years ago as a summer intern in seattle. As a junior at Iowa State University studying engineering growing up on a farm in iowa. My parents taught me the value of hard work and integrity. And help to land a person on the moon today im still inspired by what boeing does and those men and women who are committed to the legacy. Mr. Chairman, thank you for listening and i look forward to your question. As i stated at the outset with consultation from the minority both myself we will open for ten minutes and then moved to other members in the usual order. Its clear obviously from everything we know in every pa part. Boeings position at least prior to these crashes is an Autonomous System and it operated in the background. Is that correct . Tha that was the design approach, yes. But the question is how do we get to that. This was a Concept Design in 2012 and as you can see in the corner there was an alert indicator so at some point some of the engineering and design staff felt that it would be important to make the pilots aware of the system and to have an indicator light. There was no indication either in the manual or on the flight deck. The intenif the intent was to se failure. Its important to note that the systems didnt fail to. The functionality of the flight was actually the reason it was deleted was because the functionality was incorporated which you can see adjacent to that. When its a relatively benign system that came out of the manual is that correct . I have seen different versions that indicate you have that in the manual and they asked you to take it out and it came out. If i could, to clarify because you are asking a question expanding in a couple areas that i could clarify. The inclusion in the training manual was a process that was occurring in parallel to the extension to the lowspeed operation which i believe is what you are referring to soviet extension to the lowspeed operation, that was done and tested from the period around the middle. We understand that and some of the problems in the way that it was and wasnt tested. Thats good for now. The key assumption was reaction time. With the aoa failure, it activates and its 2. 5 degrees every ten seconds, pretty radical. And boeing assumed it would take pilots 40 seconds to realize and react to the stabilizers is that correct . Mr. Chairman, again, as we do what is called hazard analysis to the airplane design that was the assumption that the longstanding industry assumption. Lion air reports that it took eight seconds to react, then we have information provided to the committee by boeing which will now be the second slide. And it says a slow reaction time scenario, ten seconds down to the failure to be catastrophic. Do you think that was clearly communicated to the regulators that a 102nd delay which doesnt seem like a lo a lot of time toe particularly when you look at the report and the cacophony going on in the flight deck when they didnt even know the system existed . Was the faa aware of this document . Mr. Chairman, i cant speak to the specific document though john may be able to. I think its important to note that this part of the design process we use a set of industrystandard practices on the timelines. I understand what the Industry Standard was, but it does cause a little concerned, ten seconds you can say they can do it in less than ten seconds. Platelets are and at the top of their game every day and particularly when they were not even aware of the system i think that is a bad assumption that should have rung some alarm bells. So i mean, do you think n. Roach wrote expected was a mistake to not inform pilots of the existence of the mcas system lacks agreed we made some mistakes on mcas and as we have gone back and taken a look at this moving from a single sensor to a dual sensor it was an important part of that into providing additional training information and feedback we got from the pilots as you noted as part of that and then revisiting these e bees decadelong Industry Standards i think you see a similar recommendation. The question would be why was it just originally won the sensor which again single point of failure as the then acting administrator said in may a safety critical system, but that is just not done and as they said multiple alerts and indications from the pilots were close to the combination of the alerts and indications didnt trigger to immediately performed the runaway stabilizer functio functions. Okay, again, lets just mr. Hamilton, are you aware of any other aircraft out there that has a safety critical system that has depended upon a single point of failure . Mr. Chairman, single point of failure is allowed in the airplane design. Regulation 25. 1309 actually discusses that and talks about different hazards categories. And this one was deemed to be catastrophic. I know theres three categories. You didnt deem it to be catastrophic although looking at the ten seconds you said it was catastrophic. It was classified as major if i recall. It is one category, and so when we test out the system, we do look at their impact on the airplane when his failures, and we did look at the ten seconds but we also then took a look at the simulator with the pilots and the typical reaction time. Put up another document right in front of you there. 1217, 2015. I dont know if you are aware of this, but this was raised by one of your engineers. Are we vulnerable to a single sensor failure with the implementation or is there some checking that occurs like did you ever received this communication and did you respond to that engineer . I didnt actually receive the communication that im aware of it recently is surfaced and talking with the engineer i think it highlights that our engineers do raise questions and question things but it also follows our thorough process to determine the single sensor and reliability and availability standpoint that the hazard categories. Of course we dont know what happened but there is some speculation here. Pretty delicate Little Things out there actually and now of course the final slide is now as you emphasized Flight Control will compare inputs from both sensors. I guess the question is why wasnt it that way from the number one . Why wasnt it that way from the number one if you can do it now with an expert or software fix or whatever, why didnt you do ithat from day number one, why not have that redundancy . Weve asked ourselves the same question over and over and if back then we know everything that we know now we would have made a different decision. The original concept from a safety standpoint was to build a mcas and extend the system on the previous generation 737. The system that had about 200 million safe flight hours on it one of the safety principles is to take the safe systems and then incrementally extend them. That was the safety concept behind the original decision. We have learned since then. My time has expired and i want to turn to the Ranking Member. You are recognized. Its hard to know where to start. I want to go back just for clarification to the first slide mcas. Can we bring that up . But one that shows the flight deck. The warning lights to me would be and this is have you ever been in your car and the check engine light comes on and its like what the heck does it, but pressure, temperature, vacuum, i dont know what it is. Just a general check engine and stuff thats more important to me is the stuff on the left because it manifests itself as a trend issue. Its a runaway issue which again i go back to training and you have memory items. Every pilot in the United States pilots are taught to have memory items. You instantly go through those when you have a failure. You start through this checklist in your mind. Some of them are even goofy little rhymes or whatever it is to help you remember and you go through each one of these processes. In the case of ethiopian air, they never did i still come back to this they never slowed throttles for takeoff and they never put them back. They went right through the maximum certified speed of the 736 or 737 right on through up to 500 Miles Per Hour way beyond the maximum certified speed. Thats the reason they cant manually trim the airplane is because it is going so fast. Ive used the analogy, try going down the road at 70 Miles Per Hour and opening the door and see if you can open the door and let the pressures are against the door of your car. The more pressure, the more fast you were going and faster the more pressure and harder it is to try to reverse the pressures that you go through those memory items and immediately start taking down into the chair man is right in terms of, you know, what is the average is at four seconds to react, ten seconds to react, and i guess that is one of the flaws that we need to be thinking about is you know, i guess we are going to have to Start Building airplanes to the least common denominator in terms of that is a poor choice of words you might say i guess, but the least common denominator in terms of internationally is to start thinking about it, about International Training standards and i know that this one of the things that is being looked at and how they trained. Do they have this memor those ms and can they take them off . You go through and i do that all the time you sit there and take through my memory items, engine failure, trim the failure, whatever those might be. But i guess we are making assumptions, manufacturers are making assumptions about Pilot Training experience and then the aftermath of these two accidents and this question do you believe these assumptions particularly for aircraft are going to be updated outside of the United States, do we need to revisit those assumptions . Congressman, we believe we need to go take a look at those longstanding industry assumptions as you point out those are used across manufacturers, not just blowing and these are things that have produced safe airplanes for decades, so we do believe it is appropriate to take a hard look at those and we may need to make some revisions. I think the report has identified the same thing and we think that would be a good area for us all to broadcast on behalf of the aviation safety. We are committed to doing that and supporting that study and one of the areas for the future we are investing in as we think about the pilot machine interface and how to do that most effectively, and as you pointed out earlier, large generation of new pilots that will be needed over the next 20 years and we need to be thinking about designing our airplanes for that next generation. With the benefit i guess in hindsight its only always 2020 but knowing what you know now what the company have done differently, what you have done things differently in terms of certification of the max . Congressman, yes, we would have. We have learned as i mentioned earlier we made some mistakes. We discovered some things we didnt get right and we own that and we are responsible. Any accident with one of our airplanes is unacceptable and that is our response ability. We own it and we are going to fix it, we know what needs to be done, and that is what we are focused on moving forward. Im going to make a comment here and this is as a result of this the unfortunate part is we lost life. We lost loved ones, friends and life was lost as a result of these accidents. You hope its never going to happen again. The unfortunate reality is one of these days it will happen again, but but i parked on thid this is something that concerned me and ive talked about the i e difference between the United States and Pilot Training and Pilot Training in other countries. But something that concerns me and i want everybody to hear this, in the United States but im afraid of is we are going down the same direction that we are seeing in other countries and when it comes to getting pilots to the point where they can fly. No matter what we can build the most perfect airplane that is never going to cause a problem or get itself into a bad situation and sure enough, sooner or later its going to get into a bad situation and require a pilot to figure out whats going on and been to come back and fly the airplane but here in the United States, i think that we are dumbing down, and again this is a criticism of our system because this is what im afraid we are going to come and i want to think about this as we move forward because i think it needs to be addressed. In the United States used to spend training, install training in your basic piloting skills for your pilots license before you get commercial, before you get your Airline Transport rated, you are taught or you were taught basic characteristics how to get out of this ten. Today you can do that. The structure is not allowed to let a stall fully develop at the first warning this is what it states, the first warning of a stall they have to recover if they fail the check life immediately. That means if the light comes on for the buzzer goes off the have to recover immediately. They cant let that stall develop so we are teaching them how to and this is happening in other countries because many of them do these their system off of the system as well, but sooner or later youll get an airplane into a stall that we are not teaching anybody how to get out and recognizing that we are teaching them how to not get into it but that isnt going to happen. Sooner or later you will get into the problem and this concerns me because we have changed and we have rewritten our and i have a problem with the faa allowing this. We have rewritten our instruction manuals to not allow this to happen, to not allow these items that will ultimately happen, we are not teaching pilots how to fix them and correct them and get out of them and how to save the people in the plane with them. Heaven forbid that should happen. And thats, again, that is concerning to me and it concerns me in a big way. The United States is behind other countries and ultimately going down that road, and i think we have to get back to basic piloting and theres nothing wrong with technology. I think technology is great, but the most important safety component in any airplane is a pilot that can fly the damn plane and not just fly the computer. I think ive got a minute left. Actually i will just yield back. I think the gentleman. How do they do this in the order of [inaudible] to do this in order of seniority and appearance and so, first with the [inaudible] thank you very much, chairman defazio, i cant say enough about the importance of this hearing. I appreciate you being here. The Ranking Member asked if you have flown and had flown and i u even sit in your testimony that you had flown on the 737 cents fueled corrections have been made. That is your testimony. Yes. I flown on a couple of test flights. The chairman mentioned we are trying to get to the root of the problem, so that it doesnt happen again, so the faa, airlines like going, so my questions are really going to whether theyve made any difference, penalties paid or outstanding and essentially to compliance so congress can decide what if anything it can do that everybody has an obligation here. Going into congress. And congress. The record i have, and i asked you did they enter into the Settlement Agreement with the faa in an effort to resolve the multiple enforcement cases against boeing that were either pending or under investigation and that was 2015. I am not familiar with the details of that although i am aware you entered into Settlement Agreements. Surely you know whether you entered into Settlement Agreement. I have asked about the details. Congresswoman, that is correct we entered in 2015. Thank you. Its also true that boeing had to immediately pay 12 million into the u. S. Treasury . As a result of . That is correct. Continuing is it true that they faced up to 24 million in additional penalties through 2020 if certain conditions were not met . Yes, congresswoman, and working with vs aa, they were looking for a including a longstanding agreement with us to build a Good Foundation on elevating compliance. Im asking about the 24 million. My time is limited. Additional penalties if the conditions were not met. It wasnt about the agreement. There was a converted penalty. Now im just going to list quickly the obligations and the improved management and accountability, auditing, supply management, more stringent quality and timeliness of the regulatory submissions, specifications, i could go on. You understood that was the agreement, those were the agreements. Yet in the designing and developing and manufacturing the 737, boeing has run into issues, problems, characterize them as you will come in meeting the obligations and most of these categories would you agree . Congresswoman, we have identified many of those challenges through the macs development program, and some of those were in you had issues needing them. Some of this has resulted in the problems that bring us here today. Congresswoman, i cant give you any specific examples i didnt ask you that. The agreements were made over the course of the five years. Each year we provide a partnership to the faa on how progress im not saying youre not making progress. There is opportunity in the time remaining to get the obligations. Within the last decade, boeing has had to worldwide groundings of relatively newer airplanes, 787 dream liner, 737 max. And encountered many compliance issues in the time since they paid the 12 million settlement payment of and im assuming that it was paid as the faa assessed any additional financial penalties on boeing . 2015 agreement . Know we are not aware of any additional penalties. The time of the gentle lady has expired. First, mr. Crawford. Thank you mr. Chairman. Are you aware of any aviation accident that can be attributed to a single factor . Congressman, no. I think the history of aviation shows the saxophone is our very unfortunate that in many cases that involve multiple factors. Do you agree with that . The Ranking Member pointed out the swiss cheese model. Accidents are typically due to a number of contributing causes. The National Transportation Safety Committee recently issued its final report into the flight finding nine contributing factors for the crash. Other than the design of the aircraft included in this calibration during the lack of the Flight Maintenance documentation and failure by the flight crew to appropriately respond to an emergency situation. To quote one of the indonesian flight investigators, the nine factors happened to have to have an togethe been together if them didnt happen, the crash would not have happened. I have a copy of the report here and ask unanimous consent that it be included into the record. Without objection. Thank you and i will yield back. Thanks to the gentle man and next on our side would be the representative johnson. Thank you mr. Chairman and above witnesses for being here. I would like to ask unanimous consent to put an Opening Statement in the record. The position as the chief pilot on the 737 max was in place at the time of the accident. Who does he report to . Congresswoman, he was an engineer in the commercial airplane division. Im not sure who he departed to directly that he report it to the engineering team. He was in the Training Department said he worked with the training organization. Okay, so there was a chain of command. Yes. In march of 2016 comey asked the faa if it was okay to remove all references to the mcas as the flight of operation manual and training materials. When he made this request was he acting on his own outside of the scope of what he was supposed to be doing as a chief technical pilot . Congresswoman, part of the responsibility included discussions on training with vs aa but that is more than a single individual. There is a large team that does that work togethethe work togetd other stakeholders. And typically they will discuss the content of the training manual and make iterations on the manual overtime to try to optimize it with the pilots. He acted on his own and there is a number of people. Did he have any reprimand in any way for this request or was it a Group Request . Congresswoman part of that discussion to include mcas in the training manual was over several years so typically over a multi year timeframe to make decisions to include things or not if they meet our criteria what is beneficial to the pilots. Was anybody reworded financially to remove this requirement to make it simple for you. Know. It is part of our obligation and responsibility to provide the best training manuals that we can. I know the discussion around mcas is included whether to include it or not but our focus has been on provide the information the pilot needs to fly the airplane other than to diagnose a failure. That difference is important safety concept in our training manual to make do you recall any discussion made around anybody objecting to remove this from Pilot Training materials . Congresswoman i cannot point to a specific document but i know there were discussions and debates whether to include it or not. That is part of our healthy engineering culture. We bringing up ideas and debate and discussion to optimize content to make have you reconsidered the removal of this material. Have you have had any discussion to reconsider . To make there were discussions and debates that was happening during that multi year timeframe. I agree but that we understand pilots do want more information we will incorporate that in plights of operations manual. Your time has expired. A quick interjection to the single point of failure there was turkish 981 where a dc10 went down because the rear cargo door went out. Us air 427 the rudder problem which was the subject of hearings in this committee ultimately determined the rudde rudder. We had two of those single point of failure. Then we had the jackscrew on the alaska flight. There have been a number and in this case mcas was a major factor but not the only factor in with that representative gives. Thank you for this very difficult time record during the sensor on the angle of attack there are two but only one was tied into the system . That is correct. Depending on sequencing wet one answer would be on different flights it could be either but it was one sensor at a time. I am not a pilot but i fly frequently. When my friend in aviation talks about how important it is you just cannot pull over on the side of the road. I dont know what you were thinking. And my background if we have problems it is sensor failure it shuts the system down. And redundancy is key. I think we have all learned our lesson we just not depend on one sensor . We tried to rely on a previous architecture we have learned to now going to a two sensor architecture mcas. I am oldschool but every once in a while on stuff that i operate if you reboot i have to agree with the chairman and Ranking Member making sure pilots can fly the plane because we know the systems are added overall with those issues and tragedies but we have to make sure humans can override it so that is concerning to me that airbus does not have that ability to override i think i would be looking at that. But Pilot Training and testing talking about these two catastrophic accidents happening lion air and ethiopia but my understanding nothing against the pilots because they were trying to save their lives that maybe the training wasnt what it should have bed from the reports that i have read if i was bowing a Large Manufacturer large sophisticated pieces of equipment and aircraft what was the plan to sell the sophisticated aircraft around the world to make sure other than relying on regulators . I would make sure the people that are maintaining them and flying them have training and continuing training. So this is one area we can prevent things like this happening and not rely totally on infrastructure itself but the human technology. So your comments Going Forward what will boeing do that you are confident those that maintain and fly the aircraft have that ability and what is boeings role Going Forward . You have a good point that comprehensive global aviation safety where we make additional assessments Going Forward and with the pipeline by most estimates 34000 new commercial airplanes and one and a half million new pilots and aviation technicians we have a responsibility to build that Talent Pipeline also looking at the pilot machine interface as technology is rapidly evolving with future flight deck design also investing in additional infrastructure around the world with additional training capacity around the world. Thats just a few examples. On the case of ethiopian and lion air were there simulators . Exactly. I am not aware what ethiopia has from a similar standpoint. We have a team locally engaged and we will follow up with the details. I appreciate that we rely too much on computers i yelled back. Now turning to the chair of the subcommittee. As we look forward we also have to look retrospective and the process that the focus of the committee longterm investigation. You said yesterday that we made mistakes and got some things wrong can you name three specific mistakes that boeing made in the process quick. Congressman i would point out implementation of the angle of attack disagree alert that was a mistake and subsequently we fix that Going Forward. Second we learned about the mcas architecture that we already talked about that areas to improve their and third the broader area of communication and documentation in a efficient and comprehensive manner. Can you identify the individuals who made these mistakes . Congressman across all three areas these are large teams that Work Together across our company and supply chain the faa and other regulators and airlines some in each of these areas there are broad integrative teams no one individual makes the decision they are engineering teams. Does this make an organizational or cultural problem versus an individual problem . It is important from the accountability standpoint that my company and i are accountable. That starts with me. We took some actions. How have you been held accountable for this quick. To your question taking some actions on my position and i fully support that will allow me to focus even more on safety and internal operations i have also taken in management actions there is still other reviews underway if we have to take additional actions we will and in some cases they are not individual but organizational or structural that are deeply important we recently announced changes to safety review board to make them more transparent i now receive weekly reports from the safety review board on a detailed level now reporting to the chief engineer who reports to me. Board has set up a new aerospace Safety Committee that has been chaired now we added admiral richardson with a deep background in safety is a background of that committee and then be aligned our entire Engineering Organization of 50000 engineers now report directly to the chief engineer who reports to me to create additional visibility and independence with a focus on safety. When i hear that and i read the chatter reports and the ntsb recommendations in september and the Investigation Report that there are changes that we need in how we certify aircraft with the faa process that what we have now went too far we need to hold the faa accountable they are supposed to hold the manufacturers accountable im not convinced based on the Previous Report and boeings own actions that is adequate. I would like to hear your view. Congressman we believe there are improvements to the process you are very flavor the delegated authority process that is important to fundamental safety and contributes to 95 improvement safety but we have to make sure we have the balance right and re support the reviews announced on that. If the bookends on this as administrator said 2 billion for the book and is not the rest is what we have today we should pull between those in right now weve gone too far and i yield back. Representative davis. Actually i want to add what my colleague talks about the certification process as he just asked there was one book and of the faa that actually believes could be done with billions more of inspectors of the current certification process. I dont want to see a kneejerk reaction it breaks my heart to look over and see those pictures these are real people who were affected of tragic accidents we are here to get answers but also to make sure we dont see anymore. Many of my constituents who work at your facilities in st. Louis and in illinois i know everyone puts on that uniform to go to work every day it breaks their heart when they see accidents and tragedies they want to make sure no one cuts corners so the certification process what is the sweet spot from those bookends . I applaud the focus on safety in people but as you point out what we are doing is providing safe travel for people around the globe. So we have to get it right. That certification system we have today is solid built up over decades we have seen very significant improvements over the last decade 95 percent is a result of the certain certification system we need to maintain whats good in that system. And then identified a couple of areas and one of those areas is the longstanding Industry Standard of pilot machine interface. We are eager to take a look at that and there are some aged regulations that could be updated with technology and that would also be beneficial. In those as policymakers to ensure we dont have a kneejerk reaction. Not many more in the country fly is much as we do. We understand the safety but thats where safety might have been compromised which is why you are here. I appreciate you admitting mistakes talking about those administrative decisions as a team at boeing to make sure they are not made in the future we have seen some disturbing whistleblower complaints from former executives and the culture that may exist in certain facilities. What are you doing to address that culture is up to par with the facilities that my constituents work at . You raise a good point we want employees to speak up with concerns and issues and a culture for them to speak up. We want to hear their concerns. We conduct surveys with reporting channels and those get immediate followup action. Its important if you look at those whistleblower complaint complaints, this is part of the culture providing visibilit visibility, and i will also tell you i know the 150,000 people of boeing. I know them as you do. These are honest and hardworking and dedicated people we want to do it right and with excellence and a culture where they can my commitment and the culture of our company and john shares this to be responsive to hear employees and take action and do that consistent with our values. I hope the message you take from today is thank you for the job you do on a daily basis but also we expect results. We want to see those results in your facilities. I yield back thank you for being here spirit the representative from california. Thank you mister chairman. But the faa organization known as oda to allow your company to oversee faa activities. The Oversight Office also oversees programs including the 737 dream liner. There are approximately 45 faa employees that work but 1500 boeing employees that work in the organization of the oda program. They were also representing the governments interest of the faa. Do you believe that having employees to oversee all critical safety decisions boeing makes is adequate yes or no. Congresswoman i cannot tell you the exact number with respect to the oversight authority. Did she did ask for the yes or no answer. I cannot answer that that is the faa call i just want to say we fully support their oversight as part of what makes the system safe. Its important doesnt just highlight the culture problems and commitment to safety but also highlighted the failure by the faa to have appropriate oversight of Critical Issues with but it is a critical issue in the wake of these accidents. Thank you mister chairman. I want to return to the market pressures you had to deny a claim it was more economical i would refer during the executive review unfortunately its on the ethiopian plane of the max advantage there was relentless pressure with the next line that no fight simulator required above the communications of the test pilot. We have the pulling from your own employees ultimately there is a determination if it was directly concealed or presented in a fragmented manner. The mcas and its radical form information to the regulators and that is also something we will pursue with their understanding. Let me ask a quick question. I know you know why we are here today. People died on to airplanes over five months and youre helping us to try to delve into what we need to fix because we need to change the law. But this really takes accountability for what went wrong for the death of 346 innocent people on two flights. I hope you can give me a direct response who bears the principal responsibility at boeing for the cascading events that resulted in the air of the ethiopian and lion air flights i know you are ceo and i did happen to look at your compensation last year you got a 15 milliondollar bonus after that crash. Who is taking responsibility and will be held fully accountable . I know that you fired one person. My company and i are responsible for our airplanes. We know there are things we need to improve. We will own that and fix it and we are responsible. I am responsible we are all held accountable and i describe the actions we took earlier as judicial reviews are completed and studies are completed i have accountable my company is accountable the flying public deserves safe airplanes and that is our business. Thank you. Thank you mister chairman i went to pick up with the no Flight Simulator required im a lawyer not an engineer but understand that regulatory distinction between that derivative type is the requirement of a Flight Simulator a disqualifier under the derivative certificate this is one of the safest family of airplanes flying today. Many pilots will fly in the morning a max a second fight the mg of the third flight of the day. One of the markers the customers want is to make a seamless transition to the ng to the max. The times reported the complication grew with airbus it was boeings position we didnt want that derivative type it is the clean is what customers wanted so it was the presumption at that time a brandnew certificate and no new Flight Simulator would be required . I go back to the chief engineer at that time we had product studies as we normally do since 2007 and just like any good company we were looking at both options and looking internally what they have done to come to the market and what the customers wanted was to have an airplane to seamlessly transition. If we talk about who takes responsibility i am concerned we may have had a Regulatory Environment that makes it so difficult for you to get certificate you change all of these changes it is your customers demand you get the derivative certificates and from a regulatory perspective are not complicit to make it too hard to declare that. I would say that is not necessarily any easier. We took over five years to do that derivative which is consistent of a new type so they are very complementary. If you look at the max certification. So if we go back to the ig report when he faa official says it is not as simple derivative of the simple models its complex modifications with novel features it is doing everything he can to be exempt of the new certification rule with the minimal training differences that has nothing to do with the length of the approval process but the economic pressures to meet customer demand of pilot similarity in a continuing mode model. With Engine Technology we determined we can get the same noise reduction with new airplanes. It was a desire from the customers so yes it informed the decisions that we made but not how we approached certification but the Design Choices that we made i appreciate what you said yesterday new Senate Testimony about making american aviation safer. I believe that to be true that to swing the pendulum back too far when he faa official says it is not a simple derivative it is a complex moderation and does have features what role does boeing have two require the faa to sign off instead of saying no . It is not a derivative type you must go back to begin the process again. If oda implemented that decision whether to certify a new type or not quick. I use to run the oda this is not the oda function at all. We discuss with the faa the certification base and what that should be. Ultimately is the faa decision and then we as a company follow that it is not the oda function at all. I hope we bring in those officials so we can ask that question that is the point of failure in this process. This is not a court or a criminal hearing but 346 people died both involving the 737 max it should not have been certified to five by the faa. I set into her hearing earlier this year something went wrong in the certification process of the plane either through the faa itself is at fault through the process or faa or both. After i made this statement so many in the industry questioned me for questioning the process. This committee has a responsibility to get to the bottom of what went wrong of the certification process of the 737 max to make changes to assure the public especially those in this audience and those who lost loved ones to assure them they will not fly and unsafe planes again. Sitting here with accountability i dont know what that means if that means you receive a 15 milliondollar bonus after the plane crashes im not sure who has been held accountable for this. To planes crash even after the first i dont understand. Im an engineer but maybe people are more expert than me but how do you have a single point of failure . But it was raised also another case internal ethics complaint that alleged an engineer recommended the airspeed system be put in but that was because of the potential Pilot Training impact. Mistakes being made is why mistakes are made but the bigger problem is they were made for financial reasons but this is what is so concerning how did boeing allow that to happen how did that certification process allow that to happen . In order to get a new certificate generally it takes a longer amount of time. I think most people will agree. It also risks having most likely prior Pilot Training. All of these point back to ways of saving money and thats a big problem. How do we stop that . It seems mcas was not evaluated. You did not seem to agree with this mr. Muilenburg they found mcas was not evaluated as a complete and integrated function that was to submitted to the faa. Is that true . The mcas system was certified with the faa. As a completely integrated function . Without ever having faa look at as complete and integrated . That is the important piece. I think with the report points out where we support further look that cross System Integration so for example multiple failure mode analysis with Road Conditions thats an area we want to look more deeply. The mcas System Certified to our standards how we do that analysis. It was a completely different system that is something faa should have required and been provided. But in my last few seconds i went to ask the 737 max will boeing require airlines to do similar training for all pilots quick. That is under the regulatory authorities. Will boeing have to give money back to any airline if thats the case quick. Congressman money doesnt factor into this decision. If it is in the contract . Thats my question. My time is up. Thank you mister chairman and thank you for these questions today. In my previous life i was a prosecutor and routinely had to sit with victims and victims families more often. The pain i see in your faces are exactly what i saw. I just want to recognize that for i hope you understand we are taking this very very seriously. I understand last night you had a chance to meet with the victims families. It always had a huge impact on me to do better so i want to hear what it was like for you and what was discussed. Congressman i want to respect the privacy of the families but if you allow me to broadly describe my discussion. We wanted to listen. And each of the families told us they are stories about the lives that were lost. Those were heartbreaking. I will never forget that. We talked about their stories. We listened. Further into the conversation we talked about safety and changes about what my company has learned and what i have learned and our commitment to never let this happen again and preventing any future accidents like this. One thing you want to convey to the families are the stories will always be with us. I wish we could change that we have to remember these people that brought me back to remember literally as a farm kid from iowa what i wanted to work on. And those stories brought that all back. We will never forget that in those commitments Going Forward thats important to us and we will follow up. I never forgot any of those conversations with the victims i remember it like yesterday. I hope that motivates you and your company Going Forward. From an engineering standpoint my colleagues have done a terrific job asking about this issue but im concerned regarding air safety as well and with my chairmanship of this subcommittee im very very concerned about supply chain anywhere in Public Transit we made a lot of noise about new york city and their subway system and i am concerned what you are doing to ensure the supply chain is good and sound and not getting bad actors and also to ensure its not metastasizing to affect the airlines themselves. We do have a Global Supply chain and we do audits of the suppliers and that we have a robust followup process and oversight of supplychain. This is what the faa has asked us to help strengthen and we have done that. And every day to invest more actions to the operation. In addition to that we have 12000 companies in our supply chain that is small size businesses we assist them with Cybersecurity Infrastructure that is across the enterprise and we also have a continuous effort on the cybersecurity not only on systems and products including our airplanes for the future to ensure that nobody can gain access to the airplanes its a very important safety design principle and our team spends time on that every day. On the 30th of march boeing asked the faa if it was okay to move all references to the training material manual that was based on the representation that mcas operates way outside of the normal operating log. I cannot verify the date. So let me ask on march 30th of the same day the chief technical pilot email the faa with the following request are you okay with us removing all references of mcas as we discussed as this is completely outside the normal operating envelope beyond the commercial airlines what they might reasonably experience. Is that correct. That is a process and collectively we reached an agreement that that discussion and that was requested that. As the chief technical pilot on that. So he said it was outside the normal operating envelope beyond what a passenger would experience. Thats right. But they said its outside normal procedures. Referring to the mcas envelope. It should have been inside that system as they approach with higher altitudes and emissions. Mcas did not activate online air but actually it was within the normal operating envelope. Correct quick. Yes mcas reacted to a faulty sensor input. So it repeated this misrepresentation as late as january 2017 after bowling change to operate at lower speeds just before the faa finally certified the plane and then to discuss the changes needed for Pilot Training he reminded the faa we decided we would not cover that and the flight operating manual its way outside the normal operating envelope so in hindsight do you not agree that they do not understand that under that scenario the barrier of the single angle of attack could go under the normal operating envelope quick. I was not here prior to those conversations that was leading up to the Board Meeting and what needed to be presented. You may not be part of it but you are Vice President of boeing and you are an engineer do you not agree in hindsight that they did not understand or downplayed or concealed the fact under a scenario the public failed to act. Mister hamilton answer my question. Congressman i dont know what was going through his mind what he knew were did not know i dont want to speculate. Mr. Muilenburg. The mcas originally is designed to operate outside the normal envelope and then that lowspeed envelope that you have referred to again that is something that was tested and certified with the faa early 2016. You said you are accountable mr. Muilenburg. What does that mean are you working for free until you cure this problem cracks their relatives are not coming back. They are gone. Is anybody taking a cutter working for free to rectify this problem like the japanese would do . Congressman is not about the money. Are you giving up any money quick. Congressman my board will conduct a comprehensive review. You are continuing to work to make 30 million a year after this horrific two accidents that caused all these peoples relatives to disappear and to die you are not taking a cut in pay at all quick. Again the board. See you are not accountable the board is accountable. Your time is expired. Mr. Muilenburg did you fly on a 737 max prior to these disasters quick. I dont recall flying on a max prior to quick. I dont recall flying on a max prior to have any idea how many times quick. I dont recall. Maybe i can count on one han hand. I know at least once before. There are all sorts of things that are coming out between Text Messages and other things that others have said this is a smoking gun i would assume that you would not board an airplane if you believe something was wrong. So here is where i want to transition. Talking about the reports i did from memory. We have outcomes including ntsb Indonesian Air and the boeing board. How do we know this new process has the integrity to where the faa doesnt feel its right but it actually is right . Does that make sense . Before you flew our i flew we believed it was right. Now potentially we will and ground of this at some point how do we know the new process will work to yield the right outcome quick. I would say the Software Changes we are making will prevent the pilots from ever being in this position again. But also the faa is doing a robust and thorough review of all documentation and thats partially why its taking longer im confident when we get through this the faa will clearly say the airplane is safe to make as i mentioned with Indonesian Air others based on what we have seen so far are there any expert recommendations that you disagree with . The ntsb recommendations even the indonesian recommendations we are still reviewing all of them but after my initial look there are good recommendations working with the faa to address those. Are you making those recommendations now on the triple seven act says it goes through certification . Absolutely we absolutely apply those and some of those recommendations and how they want to respond to some of thos those. I would appreciate you getting back to the committee and advise us of any regulations you do not concur with suggest help us to better understand what changes boeing is making going to stand your part of the system. So what changes that where you felt it was okay . I was going through five recommendations from families to publicly disclose and address the concern of the culture within boeing to prioritize the wrong thing to ensure there were efforts not to conceal and that the entire plane is viewed as an integrated system versus components that dont see their role in the larger system. We will follow up with all of those. We have one more member than the panel has requested a break which is reasonable for 15 minutes and then we will have a 15 minute break and then we will return. Thank you for holding this hearing in the spring and summer of 2019 did the former general manager of the 737 program ever raise safety concerns on boeings employees on the final assembly in the washington facility quick. Yes i am aware some concerns. Yes. I would like to read from an email that was sent june 2184 months before the lion crashed two months before the plane was delivered to lie in air. The email comes from a senior manager on the final Assembly Team for the 737 max. I have some safety concerns that i need to share with you as the leader of the 737 program. Today we have 30 unfinished airplanes located outside the factory the following concerns are based on my own observations and 30 years of aviation experience. My first concern he states the workforce is exhausted and employees are fatigued from having to work at a very high pace for an extended period of time fatigued employees make mistakes. A second concern is schedule pressure is creating a culture where employees are even are either deliberately or consciously circumventing processes these breakdowns, and a variety of forms impacting quality. Frankly right now all my internal warnings bells are going often for the first time in my life i am sorry to say that i am hesitant about putting my family on a boeing airplane. The employee was so concerned he recommended shutting down production. And he states that dont make this recommendation lately. I know this would take a lot of planning but the operation to continue to build this far riskier nothing we do is worth hurting someone. This employee also wrote to you personally in december 2018 after the lion air crash speaking with the assistant counsel several times after that. What are you doing for the safety issues the employees raised . It seems that this went somewhere. I am familiar with that last communication where the employees sent i believe i previously retired employee. I do recall that email and we did have several followup sessions for i told him i appreciated the fact he brought up those issues and concerns we do know our team running that production line running that at a high rate line at that point running two per month and ramping up production. What did you do about it quick. We took a number of actions to take a look at each work location within the factory and production stops. We implemented additional quality checkpoints in the process. We also took a look at his returns. He was not in the factory at that point but raised good concerns. We took a look and in some cases we identified areas where his issues were addressed to me provided information back to him. This is the process in the factories. Its very very important we set up a culture where safety is first in the factories and that comes of quality as you point out. And safe work is also work that is done in position to go thats one of the big focus areas for us. In the production factory if it is out of position thats when injuries can happen so our objective is to make sure its a safer Work Environment and thats an area we are very focused in our safety efforts and will continue to be. Are makingn. War, we it easier for you to watch the impeachment proceedings. Go to our impeachment inquiry page at cspan. Org impeachment or video on demand. And we have added a tally from the associated press, showing where each House Democrats stands on the impeachment inquiry against president trump. Follow the impeachment inquiry on our website, cspan. Org impeachment. Your fast and easy way to watch our coverage anytime. Our cspan campaign 2020 bus team is traveling across the country, visiting key battleground states, asking voters what issues they want president ial candidates to address during the campaign. Something i want the 2020 president ial candidates to address is gun violence. I do not believe there is one clearcut answer. I believe we have to have the conversation to keep disasters from happening. A question i have for the candidates is how are you going infight the rising crisis drugs and also in health care. What is important to me is fixing our criminal justice system. How we can rehabilitate our offenders. Positiven support a relationship between the community and law enforcement. How can we fix our mass incarceration rate. People impacted by the heroin epidemic. How can we focus on helping prisonn poverty, the pipeline. It is also important to focus on. How can we help our juveniles with the c. Issues important to me include autonomy. I feel rights are not currently being protected, so it should be. Announcer this is from the campaign trail, part of cspans battleground states tour. Announcer democratic president ial candidate andrew yang hosted a town hall in marshalltown, iowa, halfway between cedar rapids and des moines. Several iowa polls show mr. Yang averaging at about 3 . Iowa holds its caucuses in less than 100 days on monday, february 3. [applause]