there were the strong personalities within downing street and the strong personalities that went on to dominate and the toxicity within the whole decision—making process at the time. he didn't defend that, per se, but he did note some kind of defence about how the strong personalities were needed and it is not surprising they were there at the time because it is those people that i got the government to where it was in the first place. he government to where it was in the first lace. . ~ government to where it was in the first place-— government to where it was in the first lace. ., ~ ., , ., first place. he talked about his own decision making _ first place. he talked about his own decision making process _ first place. he talked about his own decision making process and - first place. he talked about his own decision making process and how . first place. he talked about his own i decision making process and how that was influenced by people outside government and he changed his views it became apparent the severity of the virus. , ~ , , ., the virus. yes, i think this is a question _ the virus. yes, i think this is a question that _ the virus. yes, i think this is a question that all _ the virus. yes, i think this is a question that all of _ the virus. yes, i think this is a question that all of these - question that all of these decision—makers get asked, at what point do you start worrying? just before the break he was saying by early february he wasn't worried, but then he started seeing the news, the likes of italy going down with coronavirus quicker than the rest of europe ad, and he talked about lockdown and how it was a policy that nobody had really heard of let alone thought of considered a true possibility, but he said for example in lombardi with the first lockdown happened, it suddenly became a realistic possibility of a way of dealing with it and he was talking about how by early march it had started to become something being discussed properly and shortly after that it became a reality. all the politicians and advisers and scientists have been asked at what point did you start worrying about this and really considering this is a true problem. michael gove said borisjohnson was taking in all the advice, but was thinking and concerned about this issue of overreacting. michael gove suggested that the british government had fallen foul of that in the bse crisis years ago were it had overreacted to a scientific issue, a problem with the virus, obviously not in humans, but the concern that bse could be transmitted to humans. this issue that if you overreact, what is the economic impact? michael cole said of course was a massive economic impact when you had a lockdown, but this issue of weighing up lockdown, but this issue of weighing up the balances and it soon became clear that in the end there was no other way out, that lockdown became a necessity, but those considerations were being taken in early march. she considerations were being taken in early march-— early march. she talked about the cabinet office... _ early march. she talked about the cabinet office... in _ early march. she talked about the cabinet office... in fact, - early march. she talked about the cabinet office... in fact, we - early march. she talked about the cabinet office... in fact, we are l cabinet office... in fact, we are going back to the inquiry because they have just restarted, we will go back to the evidence being given by michael grove —— michael gove. is there a thought that goes through your head _ is there a thought that goes through your head that you should have been given _ your head that you should have been given a _ your head that you should have been given a contrary opinion on that point _ given a contrary opinion on that point given the information you had and how— point given the information you had and how things played out in the intervening years. we were too slow to lockdown initially in march. i believe that we should have taken stricter measures before we eventually decided to do so late in october. i believe that while it was admirable that we succeeded in building testing capacity so quickly, that the strategic approach to who should be tested and why and what the tests were for was not as rigorously thought through as it might have been. i am also concerned that we did not pay enough attention to the impacts particularly on children and vulnerable children of some of the measures that we took. i also believe that the approach that we took towards ppe requirements deserves at the very least reflection.— deserves at the very least reflection. ., ~' , ., deserves at the very least reflection. ., ~ , ., ., reflection. thank you. on the 2nd of march there — reflection. thank you. on the 2nd of march there was, _ reflection. thank you. on the 2nd of march there was, a _ reflection. thank you. on the 2nd of march there was, a cobra, _ reflection. thank you. on the 2nd of march there was, a cobra, the - reflection. thank you. on the 2nd of march there was, a cobra, the first | march there was, a cobra, the first one chaired by the prime minister. do you believe that the prime minister should have chaired earlier cobra meetings, in terms of giving a greater impression that the crisis was being taken seriously, or are you agnostic on this issue? mat you agnostic on this issue? not uuite you agnostic on this issue? not quite agnostic. _ you agnostic on this issue? iirrt quite agnostic. in an ideal world the prime minister or another minister who was not the secretary of state for health, this is not a personal comments about matt hancock, simply about the role as we discussed earlier, should have chaired it, buti discussed earlier, should have chaired it, but i do believe that the prime minister cheering it on monday the 2nd of march was wiser. page five paragraph two. the chair invited the government chief medical officer and the chief scientific adviser to provide a situation update. the cmo said the contact tracing for the source of infection for the last two cases in the united kingdom had not been successful and that in both france and germany there not sustain community transmission. so this is the 2nd of march, it is about a week or ten days after lockdown has been imposed for the first time in the ten municipalities in italy. there have been cases within the united kingdom since the beginning ofjanuary, the 30th and 31st of january, and cobra, the primary crisis response body for the primary crisis response body for the united kingdom is being told contact tracing for the last two cases have not been successful and there is sustain community transmission in france and germany. did you, experienced cabinet office minister as you work, understand that in effect containment had been lost? that the virus was here and was spreading?— lost? that the virus was here and was spreading? yes. there was an action plan — was spreading? is; there was an action plan published was spreading? iezs there was an action plan published the was spreading? i2; there was an action plan published the following day. you have referred to it earlier, the coronavirus action plan. we will come to this in a different context later in the course of your evidence, a document publication to which all the devolved nations had contributed. at page ten on paragraph 3.9 there is set out the broad strategic approach that the united kingdom government, contain, detect early cases, follow up contain, detect early cases, follow up close contact, prevent the disease taking hold in this country for as long as is possible. if it does take hold, slow the spread in the country. it cobra, which was sited of course in the publication of this action plan, consider the degree to which containment had already been lost? that the virus was in the united kingdom and it was spreading, there was sustain community transmission, therefore that a strategy based in part upon containment was a failed strategy? i think it is fair to say that there was the dawning of realisation that the spread of the disease would mean that moving from contain delay was becoming more and more imperative. certainly on my part, and i'm sure on others. did certainly on my part, and i'm sure on others— certainly on my part, and i'm sure on others. , ., , , ~ ., ., on others. did anybody think to ask themselves — on others. did anybody think to ask themselves what _ on others. did anybody think to ask themselves what is _ on others. did anybody think to ask themselves what is the _ on others. did anybody think to ask themselves what is the point - on others. did anybody think to ask themselves what is the point of - themselves what is the point of publishing are sole strategic document on a basis which may simply not turn out to be correct? i document on a basis which may simply not turn out to be correct?— not turn out to be correct? i think it was the — not turn out to be correct? i think it was the case _ not turn out to be correct? i think it was the case at _ not turn out to be correct? i think it was the case at that _ not turn out to be correct? i think it was the case at that time. - not turn out to be correct? i think| it was the case at that time. there was a growing realisation, but it was a growing realisation, but it was not universal. this was a document agreed by all four governments into which a degree of close working had gone. this was the plan overall as had been drawn up in the weeks and days beforehand, so i think it is fair to say that in laying out is how the governments sorts and plans to approach the pandemic that it was right to show our work and, pandemic that it was right to show ourwork and, as pandemic that it was right to show our work and, as it were. fin pandemic that it was right to show our work and, as it were.- our work and, as it were. on page four of paragraph _ our work and, as it were. on page four of paragraph 1.1, _ our work and, as it were. on page four of paragraph 1.1, there - our work and, as it were. on page four of paragraph 1.1, there is - our work and, as it were. on page four of paragraph 1.1, there is a i four of paragraph 1.1, there is a reference to the united kingdom being well prepared to respond in a way that offers substantial protection to the public. that turned out not to be the case. certainly we were not well enough prepared, no. certainly we were not well enough prepared. ne— prepared, no. going back to the cobra document _ prepared, no. going back to the cobra document of— prepared, no. going back to the cobra document of the - prepared, no. going back to the cobra document of the day - prepared, no. going back to the - cobra document of the day before, on page five, paragraph three. continuing the cmo said interventions to delay the spread of the virus must not be implemented too early in order to ensure maximum effectiveness. sage was looking at social distancing measures and exploring measures that hong kong and singapore had utilised. as it happened, you are well aware that on the 12th of march the 1st countermeasures were ordered to be imposed, there was an order that those displaying symptoms of coronavirus had to isolate for several days. what was cobra's position in relation to the cmo's suggestion that infection—control measures perhaps of that type, isolation, self isolation, possibly hand washing, possibly social distancing, should not be imposed too early to ensure maximum effectiveness. was there are debates about the good sense or otherwise in that proposal? mat about the good sense or otherwise in that preposal?_ that proposal? not at that cobra, no, that i recall. _ that proposal? not at that cobra, no, that i recall. there _ that proposal? not at that cobra, no, that i recall. there was - that proposal? not at that cobra, no, that i recall. there was i - no, that i recall. there was i believe an understandable respect for the cmo, as i mentioned earlier, sir chris is a very distinguished epidemiologist and dedicated public servant, and the view, the broad scientific consensus at that time was that to impose measures which we now know of as lockdown would have tested the patience of the public, that there would not have endured for a long and therefore they needed to be applied atjust the right time. to be applied at 'ust the right time. . .. . to be applied at 'ust the right time. , ., , ., to be applied at 'ust the right time. , .,, ., ., . to be applied at 'ust the right time. , ., ., . ., time. this was not a reference to lockdown because _ time. this was not a reference to lockdown because it _ time. this was not a reference to lockdown because it is _ time. this was not a reference to lockdown because it is measures| time. this was not a reference to i lockdown because it is measures for social distancing, exploring measures. i social distancing, exploring measures-— social distancing, exploring measures. ~' . social distancing, exploring measures. ~ . ., measures. i think the reference to both hon: measures. i think the reference to both hong kong — measures. i think the reference to both hong kong and _ measures. i think the reference to both hong kong and singapore - measures. i think the reference to | both hong kong and singapore was clearly a reference to east asian jurisdictions that had very, very tight measures. mat jurisdictions that had very, very tight measures.— jurisdictions that had very, very tiuht measures. ., , ., ~ ., tight measures. not 'ust a lockdown, correct? not _ tight measures. not 'ust a lockdown, correct? notjust. _ tight measures. notjust a lockdown, correct? notjust. so _ tight measures. notjust a lockdown, correct? notjust. so the _ tight measures. notjust a lockdown, correct? notjust. so the cmo - tight measures. notjust a lockdown, correct? notjust. so the cmo told i correct? not 'ust. so the cmo told cobra correct? not 'ust. so the cmo told cow that — correct? notjust. so the cmo told cobra that whenever _ correct? notjust. so the cmo told cobra that whenever these - correct? notjust. so the cmo told - cobra that whenever these measures for social distancing where, they should not be imposed too early and cobra accepted the proposition? shat cobra accepted the proposition? git the time, yes. cobra accepted the proposition? at the time, yes. page _ cobra accepted the proposition? at the time, yes. page six. _ cobra accepted the proposition? at the time, yes. page six. there - cobra accepted the proposition? at the time, yes. page six. there is - cobra accepted the proposition? at the time, yes. page six. there is a l the time, yes. page six. there is a reference to _ the time, yes. page six. there is a reference to next _ the time, yes. page six. there is a reference to next steps, _ the time, yes. page six. there is a reference to next steps, the - the time, yes. page six. there is a reference to next steps, the chairl reference to next steps, the chair said the government has much response must be guided by science, protecting the vulnerable and that's cobra would meet on a regular basis. i was no debate on the merits or efficacy of specific measures, perhaps of the type that the chief medical officer had had in mind? tic medical officer had had in mind? iir> such measures were put to cobra at that time. i think that the cmo, i can't obviously know what all his thinking was, but i think the cmo was preparing us for the need for such measures in the future, rather than listing the sorts of measures that needed to be implemented with rapidity later. that needed to be implemented with rapidity later-— rapidity later. bluntly, why did no one on cobra — rapidity later. bluntly, why did no one on cobra say _ rapidity later. bluntly, why did no one on cobra say to _ rapidity later. bluntly, why did no one on cobra say to the - rapidity later. bluntly, why did no one on cobra say to the chief i one on cobra say to the chief medical officer, it is obvious containment is lost or is about to be lost, this fatal virus to which there is no vaccine is here and is spreading. what in practice needs to be done to prevent the spread of the virus throughout this population? i think it was the case that we accepted the broad view at the time that from the cmo and others, that there was a limit to what could be done to contain the spread and the reason there was a limit was that lockdown measures or analogies measures were unprecedented in their application in the uk, and the public, as i mentioned would not enjoy them for long. the argument that the time was such measures may well be required, but we have to be careful not to introduce them too early because that will only mean that they will have to be lifted and that they will have to be lifted and that will lead to a second wave. i’m that will lead to a second wave. i'm sor to that will lead to a second wave. i'm sorry to interrupt. going back to the reference to the chief medical officers— the reference to the chief medical officer's advice to cobra, i can't remember, whether that passage was put to— remember, whether that passage was put to sir— remember, whether that passage was put to sir chris and whether he accepted — put to sir chris and whether he accepted it was a fair reflection