what there was by way of planning from departments. the e—mail sent from departments. the e—mail sent from dominic cummings and text messages, well, what messages he sent, it's clear that the civil contingencies secretariat had not been able to, firstly, provide it essential plan other than this action document or been able to obtain plans from the other departments and provide them to number ten. that was a serious error, was it not? the secretariat wasn't resource _ error, was it not? the secretariat wasn't resource to _ error, was it not? the secretariat wasn't resource to hold _ error, was it not? the secretariat wasn't resource to hold these - error, was it not? the secretariat l wasn't resource to hold these plans a resource to hold these plans across many departments. it was lead governing departments that were responsible not only for their own plans but for ensuring that the departments who would be supporting them on a risk area for which they were responsible had plans in place. the fact that cts were asking for plans and they were not being received was clearly an indication, as helen mcnamara set out, that the operational plan sitting behind this publish plan when not in the right shape. publish plan when not in the right sha -e. . publish plan when not in the right sha -e. , ., publish plan when not in the right sha-e. , ., ,., , shape. line departments had plans for their own _ shape. line departments had plans for their own internal _ shape. line departments had plans for their own internal governance, l for their own internal governance, how their own department should be reorganised or recalibrated to deal with those parts of government which, in the face of the crisis, would need to be managed. but there were no central overall plans held by the cabinet office or anywhere else saying, this is what we need to do, this is what we should do. to address this emerging crisis. ihia. address this emerging crisis. no, that's correct. _ address this emerging crisis. iifr, that's correct. departments would be required to have two sets of plans. my required to have two sets of plans. my letter to her head the department as a reminder to them, a few days later, a reminder of that. first is their own business continuity plans, managing their own operations, ensuring they can still provide the public services for which they are responsible, notwithstanding the impact of the crisis, so, being able to operate with 20% staff absences, etc. they are also required to have plans for their sectors and of course, those aren't operational in quite the same way but in support of lead department is required to hold the overall plan. the lead department is required to hold the overall plan.— the overall plan. the dhs c had no ilan the overall plan. the dhs c had no plan sector— the overall plan. the dhs c had no plan sector orally _ the overall plan. the dhs c had no plan sector orally for _ the overall plan. the dhs c had no plan sector orally for those - the overall plan. the dhs c had no plan sector orally for those areas l plan sector orally for those areas of the country, those areas of government for which it was responsible in the cabinet office had no plans or documents which coordinated the plans from the line departments, brought them together or refined them, don't they? ihia. departments, brought them together or refined them, don't they? no. and that is one of — or refined them, don't they? no. and that is one of the _ or refined them, don't they? no. and that is one of the lessons _ or refined them, don't they? no. and that is one of the lessons of - or refined them, don't they? no. and that is one of the lessons of this - that is one of the lessons of this period. that is one of the lessons of this -eriod. . ,. that is one of the lessons of this -eriod. . i. , ., that is one of the lessons of this -eriod. . , ., , ., ., that is one of the lessons of this -eriod. . i. , ., ., i. period. can you explain what you mean by no _ period. can you explain what you mean by no plan _ period. can you explain what you mean by no plan sector- period. can you explain what you mean by no plan sector orally? l period. can you explain what you i mean by no plan sector orally? lord sedwill you — mean by no plan sector orally? lord sedwill you know _ mean by no plan sector orally? lord sedwill you know far _ mean by no plan sector orally? ur'c sedwill you know far better than i is this position the department might say, we need to have a plan for how we recalibrate our staff, our working arrangements, how we set “p our working arrangements, how we set up a crisis response machinery in our own department and this is how we as department operate. it is also responsible for sector orally, in the case of the hse, the nhs or the care sector. ie, there is an additional responsibility to try plans across the wider parts of government in those areas for which that department is responsible. correct. and i think your example of the social care sector is particularly personal because of the fragment to me of that sector, the hfc had oversight over it but no direct control. it's provided a mixture of public, private, national, local, third sector, etc. it's a complex sector and aches that we might come back to this point. the contingency planning should have covered that sector even though it wasn't directly within departments responsibility. department for work and pensions to take a different example, would have a plan for continuing to be to pay benefits. in terms of this civil contingency obligations upon that government. the complete absence of whole government plans dealing with the various parts of the country that would be impacted by this virus was a very serious flaw indeed, was it not? �* ., , not? indeed. and when we realised about a week _ not? indeed. and when we realised about a week later, _ not? indeed. and when we realised about a week later, as _ not? indeed. and when we realised about a week later, as you've - not? indeed. and when we realised about a week later, as you've said i about a week later, as you've said already, we had to take extraordinary action to ensure that plans and programmes with that kind were put in place and at speed. in an e—mail dated the 5th of march, 289989. mark sweeney, who was a director—general in the cabinet office says at a, i think secretariat role beyond theseus has three aspects, making sure the domestic, social and economic decision—making is are prepped and taken in a sensible way. so, mark sweeney appears to be saying, basically, there are a large number of extremely complex moving parts to this crisis and there has to be some way of preparing for bringing them together and enabling the decision—makers to draw the strengths together to make the best possible decisions. if we then go down to page two. we can see that mr sweeney says in the last line of that e—mail, privately, mark has called this meeting because he is concerned about a. are you mark? what was your concern about the absence of a proper mean by what these could be drawn together for these could be drawn together for the purposes of the decision—making? i was confident by that point that perhaps, almost certainly should have been earlier that cts and cobra machinery couldn't bear the weight of the whole of government effort thatis of the whole of government effort that is now required. in the form, wanted the whole cabinet secretary are essentially two, putting it bluntly drop everything and get into this. and that is why would have caught that meeting and i think that is what mark sweeney is referring to. . is what mark sweeney is referring to. , . is what mark sweeney is referring to. , ,, ., .,, ., is what mark sweeney is referring to. , ,, ., ., ., ., is what mark sweeney is referring to. , ., , to. this ecs and cobra are of course within the cabinet _ to. this ecs and cobra are of course within the cabinet office. _ to. this ecs and cobra are of course within the cabinet office. indeed. i within the cabinet office. indeed. the are within the cabinet office. indeed. they are a _ within the cabinet office. indeed. they are a party _ within the cabinet office. indeed. they are a party that _ within the cabinet office. indeed. they are a party that there - within the cabinet office. indeed. they are a party that there is - within the cabinet office. indeed. they are a party that there is a i within the cabinet office. indeed. | they are a party that there is a lot else to. their feelings or failings of the cabinet office, were they not. i wouldn't describe their failures. they did not have their capability and capacity to do what was required and of course, that is part of the cabinet office and its overall response. i accept that. they're very function was to be to respond effectively, speedily to any crisis that might befall in front of the nation. they are the government's primary crisis machinery elements. they could not cope with the crisis that they were confronted with.— cope with the crisis that they were confronted with. they could not cope with a crisis — confronted with. they could not cope with a crisis of— confronted with. they could not cope with a crisis of this _ confronted with. they could not cope with a crisis of this scale _ confronted with. they could not cope with a crisis of this scale by - confronted with. they could not cope with a crisis of this scale by that - with a crisis of this scale by that point. this was a once in a century event. they were essentially designed, as you've heard from other witnesses, to deal with more limited, more time crisis whether national security issues, floods, etc. at this stage it was clear this is a whole different magnitude. and beyond cc s's capacity and commitment.— beyond cc s's capacity and commitment. ., ~ ., ., beyond cc s's capacity and commitment. .. ~' .. . .. commitment. you know and you were of course the national _ commitment. you know and you were of course the national security _ commitment. you know and you were of course the national security advisor - course the national security advisor that the tier i risk course the national security advisor that the tieri risk in the government's own risk assessment process is a serious pandemic causing reasonable was because an area of 820,000 deaths. they knew that the most important and most serious risk of always this risk. why were they not ready? thea;r serious risk of always this risk. why were they not ready? they didn't have the capacity _ why were they not ready? they didn't have the capacity to _ why were they not ready? they didn't have the capacity to deal— why were they not ready? they didn't have the capacity to deal with - why were they not ready? they didn't have the capacity to deal with this - have the capacity to deal with this on their own at the scale. if i think about other issues that cc as an adult with, it is normal that they will support the government through the initial phase of the crisis. for example, the grenfell fire. much more limited issue. that was dealt with in cobra by cscs. but the response was then handed over to the response was then handed over to the department for communities and local government as the department. a crisis of the scale, one would expect the same to happen because cc s need to retain capacity in case there is a concurrent crisis. it isn't the case that cc s would be expected to run this all the way through, one would expect it to move to a lead department and of course, cobra was chaired by the lead secretary of state, by this stage it became clear and should become clear that to me, as well as others earlier, in the end this is my responsibility. that we needed to reinforce their machinery at the centre of government in order to deal with the crisis of the scale and speed. deal with the crisis of the scale and speed-— and speed. lord sedwill, with res-ect, and speed. lord sedwill, with respect. it — and speed. lord sedwill, with respect, it wasn't _ and speed. lord sedwill, with respect, it wasn't an - and speed. lord sedwill, with respect, it wasn't an issue - and speed. lord sedwill, with respect, it wasn't an issue at| and speed. lord sedwill, with - respect, it wasn't an issue at this ecs and cobra knocking out a run the whole crisis or run it all the way through. in the beginning stasis of the crisis, the machinery of government dealing with crisis was unable to cope with the very tier i risk which had been enjoying for years to be able to address. it had no real whole government plans, it failed to understand that there was an absence of control, that the virus would inevitably come and there would be no practical means of stopping it. none of those issues were addressed on a machinery designed. were addressed on a machinery desiined. . , , were addressed on a machinery desiined. . . . , .. designed. the crisis machinery would not have realised, _ designed. the crisis machinery would not have realised, at _ designed. the crisis machinery would not have realised, at the _ designed. the crisis machinery would not have realised, at the time, - designed. the crisis machinery would not have realised, at the time, the i not have realised, at the time, the people involved would not had realised at that time. and i think, i don't know whether you want to come onto this, you might want to come onto this, you might want to come onto this, you might want to come onto lessons learnt later. i would draw some of those, some other lessons as well about preparedness going into this crisis and capability going into this crisis which certainly in the government as a whole didn't appreciate as a whole. .. a whole didn't appreciate as a whole. ., a, . ., whole. on the 13th of march to submitted _ whole. on the 13th of march to submitted the _ whole. on the 13th of march to submitted the advice - whole. on the 13th of march to submitted the advice of - whole. on the 13th of march to submitted the advice of the . submitted the advice of the prime minister recommending the changes to the machinery of government. was that the advice which recommended the installation of meetings daily at 9:15am. and also the setting up of what we felt with the ministerial implementation groups, the forward groups dealing with health, general public saved economic and business response and international. there is an e—mail between i think yourself and the deputy private secretary to you, to a 5996. page two. we can see there an e—mailfrom mr cummings saying, we need a 15 number ten meeting and cab room chaired by me or lee. then he goes on to say that that morning's meeting had involved a lot of people baffled about policy and unable to make decisions or even knowing he was in charge of key policy areas. you respond to this suggestion for mr cummings as to who is going to chair this meeting on page one. middle of the page, ok, fine for mark sweeney, but we are not running a dictatorship and the prime minister is not taking nationally significant decisions with no ministers, no experts so no scientist. if necessary i will take over the slot and chair a daily meeting myself. my char concern have been generated more by issues of process rather than substance? mr cummings was plainly concerned that there needed to be properly run and managed an effective meeting to get on top of this terrible crisis. his. on top of this terrible crisis. no, it wasn't about _ on top of this terrible crisis. iirr, it wasn't about process, it was about making sure that decisions taken were taken with the right input. as you see, i had completely forgotten i had written this e—mail, but it expresses pretty pungently my view of our collective government. was it in your mind when you've recommended this change of machinery of the government to the prime minister that the devolved administrations could play a proper role in the crisis response and engage with the united kingdom government at these meetings, or at least part of some of these meetings?— least part of some of these meetins? . . , . , . meetings? that was a very important to me. meetings? that was a very important to me- one — meetings? that was a very important to me- one of _ meetings? that was a very important to me. one of the _ meetings? that was a very important to me. one of the things _ meetings? that was a very important to me. one of the things i _ meetings? that was a very important to me. one of the things i made - meetings? that was a very important to me. one of the things i made a . to me. one of the things i made a priority of cabinet secretary was strong relationships,