Recent elections have left the ruling RHDP in a comfortable political position but Tidjane Thiam s ascent in the PDCI has raised the stakes, Unless a yet-to-be-known actor has a spectacular political ascent, the 2025 presidential election will be a contest between the Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) on the one hand – the party has begun its recovery from three decades of sclerosis under the stagnant leadership of its former president, the late Henri Konan Bédié – and the Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP) on the other.
Moscow is intent on filling the vacuum as three Sahelian military regimes worry Paris and Washington by cutting regional ties, Announcing their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) without delay , the juntas ruling Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali have sent a shockwave through the regional bloc, which was already struggling to persuade them to restore civilian rule.
As the security threats multiply and international troops are forced out, the military rulers in the Sahel have equivocated about their commitments to restoring civilian rule
, The promise of electoral contests to restore constitutional and nominally civilian rule will be a key issue across much of West and West-Central Africa this year, and particularly in the continuing battle of wills between Sahelian military regimes and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The regime s split with the anti-French and pro-Russian Yerewolo – its biggest supporter – may have been provoked by links to Hizbollah, Fear of links to Iran and Hizbollah helped turn interim President Colonel Assimi Goïta s regime against its biggest domestic supporter, and to imprison its leader and harass other senior members of Yerewolo – Debout Sur Les Ramparts ( standing on the ramparts ), according to diplomatic sources.
The junta s seizure of this key northern city from the Azawad coalition could create more problems than it solves, The victory of Forces armées maliennes (FAMa) and its Russian Wagner Group allies over the Coordination des mouvements de l Azawad (CMA) for control of Kidal on 14 November is a useful political boost for the Bamako junta but not the military turning point that it claims. Most of the CMA s fighters have simply pulled back from Kidal to adjacent areas from where they will continue their insurgency against the junta and its army.