A bit over two years ago, the United States experienced its greatest foreign policy defeat since Vietnam when the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) that we had brought to power in Afghanistan after 9-11 collapsed and the Taliban – whom we had deposed a full generation before – returned to power. The disgraceful rout was hailed as a “well-organized evacuation” and a “logistical miracle” by the administration and the media. (The tens of thousands of Afghans who had worked for us that were left behind could not be reached for comment). Since then, we have maintained an Afghan interest section in Doha Qatar that still speaks with Taliban representatives. However, we have no diplomatic representation in Afghanistan itself.
A bit over two years ago, the United States experienced its greatest foreign policy defeat since Vietnam when the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) that we had brought to power in Afghanistan after 9-11 collapsed and the Taliban – whom we had deposed a full generation before – returned to power. The disgraceful rout was hailed as a “well-organized evacuation” and a “logistical miracle” by the administration and the media. (The tens of thousands of Afghans who had worked for us that were left behind could not be reached for comment). Since then, we have maintained an Afghan interest section in Doha Qatar that still speaks with Taliban representatives. However, we have no diplomatic representation in Afghanistan itself.
In the past year we have been bombarded by stories about the military – particularly the Army, experiencing a recruiting crisis that has caused major shortfalls in manning the force. There are various reasons given for this recruiting shortfall. From pushback against the “woke” military by traditional military families to non-participation by normally liberal/progressive communities, the impact of the Afghan debacle and the mismanaged “Global War On Terror” (GWOT) conflicts of the first two decades of the 21st century to highly publicized veteran’s issues (suicide etc.), the involuntary separation of thousands of servicemembers who were reticent to take the COVID vaccine, changing demographics, competitive pay scales in the civilian workplace and cumbersome recruiting processes, the causes given for the recruiting crisis are legion and likely all true to some extent.
In the past year we have been bombarded by stories about the military – particularly the Army, experiencing a recruiting crisis that has caused major shortfalls in manning the force. There are various reasons given for this recruiting shortfall. From pushback against the “woke” military by traditional military families to non-participation by normally liberal/progressive communities, the impact of the Afghan debacle and the mismanaged “Global War On Terror” (GWOT) conflicts of the first two decades of the 21st century to highly publicized veteran’s issues (suicide etc.), the involuntary separation of thousands of servicemembers who were reticent to take the COVID vaccine, changing demographics, competitive pay scales in the civilian workplace and cumbersome recruiting processes, the causes given for the recruiting crisis are legion and likely all true to some extent.
Since early June the Ukrainian’s summer offensive has enmeshed itself in the Russian’s defensive belts and has made little headway. Observing the scene from afar, if I had to guess as to whether the Ukrainians will (a) be able to break through all the Russians defensive belts and conduct grand sweeping maneuver warfare that will reach Melitipol and eventually liberate Crimea. Or (b) they will continue to be stymied like General Model’s forces were in their attack on the Russian defensive belts in the northern part of the Kursk salient eighty years ago, my money would be on the latter, with the Russians being able to contain the Ukrainian’s offensive. The issue is that while the Russians may be able to hold off the Ukrainians, that’s not the same thing as defeating them. The Russian army has been savaged in the Ukraine with much of its offensive capability wasted in badly conceived and executed operations during the first few months of the w