Since early June the Ukrainian’s summer offensive has enmeshed itself in the Russian’s defensive belts and has made little headway. Observing the scene from afar, if I had to guess as to whether the Ukrainians will (a) be able to break through all the Russians defensive belts and conduct grand sweeping maneuver warfare that will reach Melitipol and eventually liberate Crimea. Or (b) they will continue to be stymied like General Model’s forces were in their attack on the Russian defensive belts in the northern part of the Kursk salient eighty years ago, my money would be on the latter, with the Russians being able to contain the Ukrainian’s offensive. The issue is that while the Russians may be able to hold off the Ukrainians, that’s not the same thing as defeating them. The Russian army has been savaged in the Ukraine with much of its offensive capability wasted in badly conceived and executed operations during the first few months of the w
If the war in the Ukraine has shown us one thing it’s that high intensity conflict over a prolonged period is still possible and it still produces large numbers of casualties. The US Army has not had to deal with sustained high casualty operations since the Vietnam war. Critically, the US has no experience replacing sustained casualties in high intensity combat since the advent of the All- Volunteer Force in 1972. Every conflict since Vietnam has either been too brief to stress the replacement system or of sufficiently low intensity that the volunteer force could still cope with the casualties incurred.
If the war in the Ukraine has shown us one thing it’s that high intensity conflict over a prolonged period is still possible and it still produces large numbers of casualties. The US Army has not had to deal with sustained high casualty operations since the Vietnam war. Critically, the US has no experience replacing sustained casualties in high intensity combat since the advent of the All- Volunteer Force in 1972. Every conflict since Vietnam has either been too brief to stress the replacement system or of sufficiently low intensity that the volunteer force could still cope with the casualties incurred.
The Ukrainian Nuclear war of 2023 and its Aftermath smallwarsjournal.com - get the latest breaking news, showbiz & celebrity photos, sport news & rumours, viral videos and top stories from smallwarsjournal.com Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday newspapers.
Putin may not have begun the war understanding that he was playing for existential stakes (his own survival in power), but he knows that he is now. His conventional forces have shown themselves to be surprisingly incapable and aren’t getting better fast enough. The impact of the war on Russia’s home front is increasing with Ukrainian strikes on Russian border towns like Belgorad. Additionally, Putin has just seen the first shots in what promises to become a drone “War-of-the-cities” like the Scud exchanges on population centers during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Even with government control of the media it’s getting harder to convince the Russian man-in-the-street the war is going well. The recent “Wagner” mutiny led by Prigozhin with its abortive march on Moscow is another clear indicator that many of Russia’s power elite are becoming increasingly restive under Putin’s leadership.