russia. this is just over 90 minutes. . well, good afternoon. my name is frank rose and at bookings we are delighted to have such a large audience for our topic today, the politics of the new start treaty and strategic modernization. this is this first in a series bookings plans to host on the future of u.s. nuclear weapons policy over the next year, so i look forward to seeing you at our future events. now, by the end of the obama administration, fragile bipartisan had advanced over nuclear policy. under this fragile consensus the obama administration and congress agreed that the united states would modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent, but would also support effective and verifiable strategic nuclear arms agreements like new start. that said, regardless of your views of arms control and modernization, i think there is broad agreement that that fragile consensus may be falling apart. there are a number of factors that are probably contributing to this. some expert
my name is frank rose and i am a senior fellow here in the policy program in the foreign policy program at brookings, and we are delighted to have such a large audience for our topic today. the politics of the new start treaty and strategic nuclear modernization. this is the first in a series of public events brookings plans to host on the future of u.s. nuclear weapons policy over the next year. so i look forward to seeing you at our future events. by the endme of the obama administration, a very fragile bipartisan consensus had emerged between congress and the executive branch over nuclear policy. under this fragile consensus, the obama administration and congress agreed that the united states would modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent but would also support effective and verifiable strategic nuclear arms control agreements like new start. that said, regardless of your views on arms control and strategic modernization, i think there is broad agreement that that f
good afternoon and welcome to the brookings institution. here at the fellow foreign policy program. senior fellow here in the foreign policy program. at brookings. we are delighted have such a large audience for our topic today. the politics of the new start treaty and strategic modernization. this is the first in a series of to hostrookings plans on the future of u.s. nuclear weapons policy over the next year. i look forward to seeing you at our future events. by the time, by the end of the obama administration, a very fragile bipartisan consensus had emerged between congress and the executive branch over nuclear policy. consensus fragile the obama administration and congress agreed that the united states would modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent but would also support effective and verifiable strategic nuclear arms control agreements like new start. said, regardless of your views on arms control and strategic modernization, i think there is broad agreement that tha
bookings we are delighted to have such a large audience for our topic today, the politics of the new start treaty and strategic modernization. this is this first in a series bookings plans to host on the future of u.s. nuclear weapons policy over the next year, so i look forward to seeing you at our future events. now, by the end of the obama administration, fragile bipartisan had advanced over nuclear policy. under this fragile consensus the obama administration and congress agreed that the united states would modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent, but would also support effective and verifiable strategic nuclear arms agreements like new start. that said, regardless of your views of arms control and modernization, i think there is broad agreement that that fragile consensus may be falling apart. there are a number of factors that are probably contributing to this. some experts believe the cost seeshted with strategic modernization is just unaffordable. others believe
policy. under this quote, fragile consensus, the obama administration and congress agreed that the united states would modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent but would also support effective and verifiable strategic nuclear arms control agreements. . it s been a number of factors that are contributing to this. some experts believe the cost associated with strategic modernization are just unaffordable and other experts believe russians violation of arms control agreements like the inf treaty has raised serious questions about the efficacy of the us remaining in the new start treaty. other experts believe the current modernization program is far in excess of what it is necessary to maintain effective deterrence. some experts believe the trump administration s approach to arms-control is undermining the consensus. in our discussion today i d like to explore three broad questions. first, what was specifically agreed to back in 2010 with regard to new start in strategic organiz