on an medication describing what they say they believe happened leading up to this disaster. listen to a little bit of it to get a sense of what bp is putting out there today. we believe that bp and halliburton, working together, should have better identified and address the issues underlying the cement job. improve technical aassurance, risk management and personnel could have raised awareness and led to better decisions regarding acceptance and implementation of the cement proposal. you heard there a little bit of the way bp kind of criticized itself. some people saying essentially it s a slap on the wrist. so there are other investigations going on, which will pore much deeper and drill much deeper into the technicals of what went into the days leading up to this oil rig disaster. but ali, it s clear that many people are believing that the way bp has presented this has much more to do with public
he ran it. he cemented and they larry: pushed the wrong button? no, i think that he was in a hurry. and halliburton recommended they run 22 centralizers, and they ran four. and that caused him a problem because the tapered string of casing is seven inch, the bottom part of it was probably against the wall of the hole, and when they cemented, they didn t get a cement job all the way around the casing. he didn t know that. i don t understand why somebody didn t run a cement bond log. they had schlumberger on the location and didn t do it. okay. i ll conclude this pretty quick. but he didn t get a cement job on the casing. and so when he went in to now leave the hole for the
top to bottom. that wasn t the engineer s problem. he ran it. he cemented and they larry: pushed the wrong button? no, i think that he was in a hurry. and halliburton recommended they run 22 centralizers, and they ran four. and that caused him a problem because the tapered string of casing is seven inch, the bottom part of it was probably against the wall of the hole, and when they cemented, they didn t get a cement job all the way around the casing. he didn t know that. i don t understand why somebody didn t run a cement bond log. they had schlumberger on the location and didn t do it. okay. i ll conclude this pretty quick. but he didn t get a cement job on the casing. and so when he went in to now leave the hole for the
completion engineer, he then needed to take the 14.2 pounds per gallon mud which was holding 12,000 bottom hole pressure that he was circulating that out and replacing it with sea water. good procedure if you had a cement job. but had no cement job, then larry: the mud is from the bottom, right? no, the mud is from the top. larry: the mud is from the top? sure. you mixed it up. it s 14.2 pounds per gallon. and so he has that to keep the well dead. and but he doesn t know whether he has a cement job or not. larry: is halliburton play any part in fault here? i don t think so. from my and i ve had contact. i ve had calls with tony hayward and i have talked to others that have worked on the well. and, no, i don t from what i
completion engineer, he then needed to take the 14.2 pounds per gallon mud which was holding 12,000 bottom hole pressure that he was circulating that out and replacing it with sea water. good procedure if you had a cement job. but had no cement job, then larry: the mud is from the bottom, right? no, the mud is from the top. larry: the mud is from the top? sure. you mixed it up. it s 14.2 pounds per gallon. and so he has that to keep the well dead. and but he doesn t know whether he has a cement job or not. larry: is halliburton play any part in fault here? i don t think so. from my and i ve had contact. i ve had calls with tony hayward and i have talked to others that have worked on the well. and, no, i don t from what i