Provided extensive inaccurate information about the program and the effectiveness to the department of justice, the cia Inspector General, the media and the American Public. This conclusion is somewhat personal for me. I remember clearly when director hayden briefed the Intelligence Committee for the first time on the socalled iets at that september 2006 committee meeting. He referred specifically to a tummy slap among other techniques. He presented the entire set of techniques as minimally harmful and implied in a highly clinical and professional manner. They were not. The report demonstrates that these techniques were physically very harmful and the constraints that existed on paper in washington did not match the way techniques were used at cia sites around the world. A particular note was the treatment over the span of 17 days in august of 2002. This involves nonstop interrogation and abuse 247 from august 4th to august 21st. And included multiple forms of deprivation and physical assault. The description of this period first written up by the staff in early 2009 while senator rockefeller was chairman is what prompted this full review. The descriptions go far beyond that. They provided inaccurate justifications while the Legal Counsel was considering the legality of the coercive techniques. In those communications to the department of justice, the ci acclaimed the following. They would not be used with excessive repetition. They would have an opportunity to provide information prior to the use of the techniques. They were to be used in progression starting with the east aggressive and proceeding only if needed. Medical personnel would make sure that interrogations wouldnt cause serious harm and they could intervene at any time to stop interrogations. Investigation interrogators were carefully vetted and highly trained. And each technique was to be used in a specific way without deviation and only with specific approval for the interrogator and detainee involved. None of these assurances which the department relied on to form the legal opinions were routinely carried out. Important information was with held from policy makers. For example, foreign intelligence chairman bob graham asked a number of questions after he was first briefed in september of 2002. The cia refused to stonewall him until he left the committee at the end of the year. The cia in coordination with white house officials and staff initially with held information with the interrogation techniques from secretary of state colin powell and donald rumsfeld. There cia records that colin powell was not told about the program first. There were concerns that, and i quote, powell would blow his stack if he were briefed. Source email from john rizzo dated july 31, 2003. Cia records clearly indicate and definitively that after he was briefed on the cias first detainee, the cia didnt tell president bush about the full natu nature of the eits until april of 2006. Thats what the records indicate. They similarly with held information or provided false information to the cia Inspector General during his conduct of a special review by the ig in 2004. Incomplete and inaccurate information was used in documents provided to the department of justice and as a basis for president bushs beach in 2006 in which he publicly acknowledged the cia program for the first time. In all of these cases, other cia officers acknowledged internally, they acknowledged that information the cia provided was wrong. The cia also misled other cia white house officials. When Vice President cheneys council asked cia Council General scott muller in 2003 about the cias videotaping, the waterboarding of detainees, he deliberately told them that videotapes, quote, were not being made. He did not disclose that videotapes of previous waterboarding sessions had been made and still existed. Source email from scott muller. There many, many more examples in the committees report. All are boumted. The third set notes the various ways in which cia management of the program from the inception to the formal termination was inadequate and deeply flawed. There is no doubt that the Detention Interrogation Program was by any measure a major cia undertaking. It raised significant legal and tell us issues and involved significant resources and funding. It was not however managed as a significant cia program. In the custody of the first detainee, the cia had not identified and prepared a suitable detention site. It had not researched effective interrogation techniques or developed a legal basis for the use of interrogation techniques outside of the rapport Building Techniques where official policy was at that time. There is no indication the cia reviewed the own history. Thats just what held gerson was saying in 05 with coversive interrogation tactics. As the executive summary notes, the cia engaged in rough interrogation in the past. The cia had support a letter to the Intelligence Committee in 1989 and here is the quote. Inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers. That was a letter from john held gerson, cia director of Congressional Affairs dated january 8th. You are watching Andrea Mitchell reports. As Senate Intelligence chair, the outgoing chair, Dianne Feinstein continues to outline the conclusions of the democratic majoritys 5 1 2 year investigation into what they call is torture, enhanced interrogation of detainees under the bush administration. We go back to the senate floor. Interrogations themselves or ever operated detention facilities. As the cia captured or received custody of detainees through 2002, it maintains separate lines of management at headquarters for different detention facilities. No individual or defense was in charge of the detention and Interrogation Program until january 2003. By which point more than 1 3 of detainees identified in our review had been detained and interrogated. One clear example, a flawed cia management was the poorly managed familiarity referred to in the report bite code name cobalt to hide the actual name of the facility. It began operations in september of 2002. The facility knew few formal records of the detainees they kept few formal records of the detainees housed there and untrained cia officers conducted frequent and unsupervised interrogations. Using techniques that were not and never became part of the cias formal enhanced Interrogation Program. The cia placed a junior officer with no relevant experience in charge of the site. In november 2002, an otherwise healthy detainee who was being held mostly nude and chained to a concreed floor died at the facility in what is believed to be hypothermia. By the cia officer was Inspector General, cias leadership acknowledged they had little or no awareness of operations at this specific cia detention site. Some senior officials believed erroneously that enhanced interrogation techniques were not used there. The cia in the june 2013 response to the committees report agreed that there were management failures in the program. But asserted that they were corrected by early 2003. While the study found that management failures improved somewhat, we found they persisted until the end of the program. Among the numerous management shortcomings identified in the report are the following. The cia used poorly train and nonvetted personnel. Individuals who are deployed in particular interrogators without relevant training. Due to the redactionses to the report, and its a clear fact. They are problems of a serious nature. These included histories of violence and abusive treatment of others. It should have called into question their employment with the United States government let alone their suitability to participate in a sensitive cia action program. The two contractors that cia allowed to develop, operate, and assess the interrogation operations conducted numerous inherently governmental functions that never should have been outsourced to contractors. These contractors are referred in the report in special pseudohim ins. Swag art and dunbar. They developed enhanced techniques that the cia employeded temploye employed. They had the most significant detainees using the techniques including the waterboarding of abu, Khalid Shaikh mohammed, and al nashiri. They provided the official e val yaugdss of whether detaineess psychological states allowed for the use of the enhanced techniques, even for some detainees, they themselves they had interrogated. Evaluating we have been watching chair Dianne Feinstein highlighting the conclusion of the devastating majority report on torture against detainees after 9 11. The key takeaways, enhanced techniques were deemed not effective. Extensive inaccurate information was given to policy makers and management of the program was inadequate and deeply flawed, i point many do not contest in the early stages. The program far more brutal. The report said they acknowledged to lawmakers and the americans. He served as Deputy Director of cia. He joins me now. You were first appointed Deputy Director under bill clinton and a 32year veteran. You object to what you claim is cherry picking by the senate investigators. I want to give you a chance to have your say. I think what they have done here is go through 6 million pages of do you means and find the things that support the case they want to make. As i had a brief opportunity to look at it, it seems to me thats the principal flaw in the methodology. Also i think there two other major problems with the report. They never interviewed any of us who had anything to do with this program. I know the chairman cited transcripts, but they had an opportunity to talk to people who upon ran the program. Many were not under investigation by the department. They passed that up. No serious reporter or historian would do that. The next big problem is they dont know how analysis works. They will take a case and say all you learned from this detainee was a name of someone. It turns out that thats what you need. Thats the piece of information that fits with Something Else that creates a picture and allows you to take down an operation. The briefing that they gave to reporters early this morning on an embargoed basis not to be release and when i asked that question, they said that the same information and the same dots could have been connected without the torture techniques. I read that and i hesitate to use that term. We were trying not to torture people here. Lets go to your point. They will find reports somewhere. For example, take the second wave attack on the United States that we prevented. They will find a report that said, and this is a case from the report. They will say well, at some point a foreign Intelligence Report told you that there is going to be a second wave attack. After 9 11. What else did you need . Thats all we had. What does that mean . Who is responsible for it. We went to the detainees and i can take you through the details and the short version is yes, there is such a plot and i cant run it because i am in captivity. I know who would. A fellow in pakistan. We find that guy and indeed he is training 17 people to come here in an operation. We didnt know that. Their mistake is to think that it is simpler than it is. One of the cases they cited, he was giving up information including the name of Khalid Shaikh mohammed and his code name in the al qaeda operation under bin laden before he was interrogated. It was only after he gave up the name that he was subjected to 2 1 2 weeks of 247 waterboarding. 83 instances to the point where he passed out and had to be revived. Something that the cia did not disclose and was disclosed by notes taken by the medics. Thats a complicated case and i cant drill down into the details in the period that was described before enhanced interrogations, he was receiving techniques that were at that time to be standard like sleep deprivation. They were later declared enhanced techniques. He provided an enormous amount of information including, for example, a photographic identification after interrogation. One of the 9 11 plotters was someone who led us to Khalid Shaikh mohammed, the architect of 9 11. You will find different views on this. Senator feinstein is describing the conditions in Detention Centers described as a dungeon, code named cobalt. It was in afghanistan. The cia led several detainees to suggest that they would not leave alive and he would only leave in a coffinshaped box. Thats the cia cable from caution 12, 2002. According to another cia cable, officers also planned to cremate him should he not survive his interrogation. Source cia cable july 15, 2002. After the news and photographs emerged from the United States military detention of iraqis at abu ghraib, they held a hearing on the matter on may 12th, 2004. Without disclosing details of their own Interrogation Program, the cia director testified that cia interrogations were nothing like what was depicted at abu ghraib, the United States prison in iraq were abused by american personnel. This was false. Cia detainees described as a dungeon were kept in complete darkness, constantly shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. The u. S. Bureau of prisons personnel went to that location in november 2002. According to a cia email told officers they had never been in a facility where individuals are so sensorydeprived. The source is cia email, sender and recipient redacted, december 5th, 2002. Throughout the program, multiple detainees subject to interrogation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues, including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia and attempts at self harm and mutilation. Still on the floor after more than an hour. She just mentioned you and said there was misleading information from you directly about the conditions in some of these facilities. I want to give you a chance to respond. She was comparing what the cia program was. There is no comparison. Abu ghraib was a break down in the chain of command among low level military people. Everyone condemns what happened. This program was carefully designed, legally approved on four occasions by the Justice Department. Briefed to these committees at a time when they were enthusiastic about it. At one point when we stopped this, we did stop this program when the Justice Department obviouslied a little bit in their opinion. I recall senator rockefeller saying dont be riskaverse. That was the as months fear we were dealing with at the time. This program was briefed to the white house. We didnt hide anything here. Abu ghraib was a different situation we all find appalling. Let me ask you about that. What they told us today when we were up there for the briefing and i want to get your response, the briefings to the republican and Democratic Leaders as well as the Intelligence Committee chairs and house and Senate Majority and ranking, those eight people were given cursory briefings and not told the details and the president of the United States himself, george bush was not told until the Inspector General said in 2006, you should tell the president. I dont know whether he was briefed by the National Security adviser or the Vice President verbally, the cia memos dont indicate that george bush was fully briefed. The White House Legal Council in great detail and our assumption has been and there is evidence to demonstrate this and the president was briefed by them. He said as much in his memoire and your other point was that the full committees were not briefed. Yes, the full committees were not briefed and that was at president ial direction. I think one of the things that if there was anything i regret, its that we didnt brief the full committees. We didnt have permission because of the covert action programs. We were directed to brief the intelligence leadership. I can tell you these briefings were detailed. We did not hold anything back here. They were free to ask any questions they wanted to ask and answered in detail. I know that your colleagues have along with you posted something on the wall street journal website which is a long rebutt rebuttal. Suggesting that the Senate Intelligence report on detention and interrogation is a missed opportunity to deliver a study of important questions the committee has given us instead of the onesided study marred by fact and interpretation and a poorly done and partisan attack that has been the most to protect america after the 9 11 attacks. One of the rebuttals that has been posted. The ci, a called them a crucial pillar of Counter Terrorism methods to capture terrorists, hoping to thwart thoughts and advancing analysis of the target. We agree. We have no doubt that the cias Program Saved lives and played a vital role in weakening al qaeda. When asked about the value of detainee information and whether he missed from the one operator, he told members i miss it every day and we understand why. Thats part of the response. You say it was done properly. The details indicate there were two psychologists and subcontractors paid 80 million and they didnt know about terrorism