advise, and train counterterrorism. didn't do the pakistan raid with 70 or 90,000 troops. we did the pakistan raid with a couple dozen troops. >> it's true now as a year ago, why on earth should they take part on any process at all. you will have a vacuum and you will probably have a civil war. so trying, giving your best shawt at making this work by having some leverage seems to me there's a pretty good argument. >> i think that this was a victory for the vice president, for joe biden. and a defeat for those who wanted to do, continue to do extensive counterinsurgency opations. >> charlie: we conclude this evening with the story of wild bill donovan,the man who founded the oss during world war ii joining me douglas wallace has written a book hi and ambassador who was an assistant to mr. donovan in the latter years of his life. >> he was franklin roosevelt's top spy master, and he was introducing the united states into a form of warfare, covert warfare, espionage, propaganda, psychological operations. things that conventional admirals and generals found deeply disturbing, they found his ideas deeply disturbing. >> charlie: afghanistan and the founding of oss when we continue. if you've had a coke in the last 20 years, ( screams ) you've had a hand in giving college scholarships... and support to thousands of our nation's... most promising students. ♪ ( coca-cola 5-note mnemonic ) every story needs a hero we can all root for. who beats the odds d cos out on top. but this isn't just hollywood storyline. it's happening every day, all across america. every time a storefront opens. or the midnight oil is burned. or when someone chases a dream, not just a dollar. they are small business owners. so if you wanna root for a real hero, support small business. shop small. captioning sponsored by rose communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. >> president obamaddressed the nation this evening on a prime time address about the war in afghanistan. he announced that the surge of 0,000 troops sent in late 2009 web withdrawn by september of 2012. he will thdraw 10,000 troops by the end of 2011 and the remainder by 2012. that would leave 70,000 troops in afghanistan. here's a part of what the present said. >> this is the beginning but not the end of our effort to wind down this war. we'll have to do the hard work of keeping t gains that we've made while we draw down our forces and transition responsible for security to the afghan government. next may in chicago we will host a summit with our nato allies and partners to shape the next phase of this transition. we do know that peace cannot come to a land that has known so much war without a political settlement. so as we have the afghan government and security forces, america will join initiatives that reconcile the afghan people, including the taliban. our position on these talks is clear. they must be led by the afghan governme, and those who want to be a part of a peaceful afghanistan must break from al-qaeda, abandon violence and abide by the afghan constitution. but, in part, because of our military effort, we had reason to believe that progress can be made. the goal that we seek is achievable, and can be expressed simply. no safe haven from which al-qaeda or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland or allies. we won't try to make ahanistan a perfect place, we will not police its seets or patrol its mountains indefinitel that is the responsibility of the afghan government, which must step up its ability to protect its people an move from an economy shaped by war toone that could sustain a lasting peace. what we can do and will do is build a partnership with the afghan people that indures. already this decade of war has caused many to question the nature of america's engagement around the world. some would have america retreat from our responsibility as an anchor of global security, and embrace an isolation that ignores the very rl threats that we face. others would have america over extended, confronting every evil that can befound abroad. we must chart a more centered course. like generations before, we must embrace amera's singular role in the course of human events but we must be as pragmatic as we are passionate, as stratic as we are resolute. when threatened, we must respond with force. but when that force can be targeted, we are need not deploy large armies over seas. when innocents are being slaughtered and global security in danger,e don't have to choose betweentanding idly by oracting on our own. instead we must rally international action, which we're doing in libya, where we do not have a single soldier on the ground, but are supportg allies and protecting the libyan people in giving them the chance to determine their own destiny. over the last decade, we have spent a trillion dollars on war. at a time of rising debt and hard economic times. now we must invest in america's greatest resource, our people. we must unleash innovation that creates new jobs and industries while living within our means. we must rebuild our infrastructure and find new and clean soces of energy. most of a after a decade of passionate debate, we must recapture the common purpose th we shared at the beginning of this time of war. for our nation draws strength from our diffences, and wn our union is strong, no hill is too steep, no horizon is i -- beyond our reach. america, it is time to focus on nation building here at home. >> charlie the reductions are faster than what the military commands on the ground has argued for. they have face the increasing pressure from congress and the american public over the cost, the length and the mission of the war. "new york times" columnist tom friedman, david brooks and roger cohen addressed that debate on our program last night. >> i was notn favor of the surge. i think we have four choices in afghanistan, we always had four choice, lose early, lose late, lose big or lose small. i prefer to lose early and small. there's no victory. >> charlie: that would recommend what policy. >> going down to the absolute minimum presence we need to maintain some kind of counterinsurgency. i think we've become enablers of just hugely bad behavior. bad behavior by pakistan, bad behavior by the afghan government. and this is what happens in all. we've done the same thing in the arab israeli center. we can arrest these guys and not those guys. let me make it simple, wre gone. the minute we're gone, you know just which tale back are goo and whicare bad and you will kill the bad one because your life will depend on it. because i'm tired of you telling me i can't do this and scratch my ear like that. >> afghanistan, i think we've ne our best with nation building. i don't know if we know how to establish a country anywhere in the world but we do kno how to builan army. from what i understand the building with security structure in afghanistan is a reason to be there and to partner with them to actlly make sure they have a functioning army. that is a reason to be there. so i would say, you can't just say, you know, you guys are manipulating us, we're handing off the problem to you, it's your responsibility paul if there's no capacity there. so i think capacity building would be a reason to stay. >> there's a reason to be that, build up the army and the police force. >> charlie: and governance. >> one way to guarantee that that police force or army will never function and nev stand on their own two feet is to make that open ended. i think yes, build it up but build it up asyou begin to move out and as you move out, say okay, now we're showing you the way, do it. we have a lot of influenc and it was desive during the terrorist period of the revolution over the egyptian army. you know, funded to the tune of 1.3 billion or whatever it is. that does not mean we have to be in egypt. >> charlie: we pretaped the conversation earlier this evening two hours before the president's speech in which we discussed the issues the president faced. joining me joe climb columnist for "time" magazine, joe hass, david ignatius, columnist for "the washington post" and james shinn former secretary of defense for asia he now teaches at princeton. here is thatonversation. give me some sense and i will begin with you joe because you're writing on this for "time" magazine of how the president arrived at the decision and the numbers and why. >> well, he did it a lot more efficiently than he did last time. >> charlie: gate -- by the way. >> in the end i think this was a victory for t vice president, for joe biden. and at the seat for those who wanted to do, continue to do extensive counterinsurgency operations, that is massive operations to protect the people like general petraeus who is leaving this july. in fact, a senior administration official said to me that as this battle moves from the south up to the southeast, in the more mountainous areas. petraeus' goal was to move it to the southeast and try and clear that area way he had kandahar. i was told by administration officials that will not be a counter insurgency, a full fledged counterinsurgency campaign. what they will try to do with reduced trps is to do counterterrorism, go after the bad guys and not try and protect large numbers of the population. >> charlie: so this time the president listened to vice president biden more than he did the military commanders on the ground. they wanted more time because they believe if they had more time they could do more damage to the taliban and therefore the negotiating process would be more favorable to them. >> i talked to petraeus two weeks ago and at that point he really expected that, you know, we think in terms of fighting seasons which, you know, in my mind last from the harvesting of the opium crop tohe harvesting of the marijuana crop. and petraeus didn't wt any troops, you know, pled back or withdrawn before november, december, when the marijuana comes in. and he wanted to keep, you know, a full cponent place next year so that he could do counterinsurgencand didn't get that. >> i was told the same thing that joe was. that petraeus and the her commanders wanted to get the troops. when they decided on this strategy back in december of 2009 after such a protracted discussion, he described it to his aids as proof of concept. let's see if this works in the field. i think now reviewing 18 months of experience, he is deciding that what clearly works is the counterterrorism side of this, the very kinetic, as they said in the militar operations using our groans, using the spial operations commandight raids of ways of really putting pressure on the taliban. the areas in southern afghanistan that were the center of this campaign are somewhat more secure than they were. there's clearly been a change there but i think there is concern when our troopso away, it may revert to what it is, that a permanent change hasn't haened. so i think the president rely is saying what seems to work is counterterrorism. he's using the fact that we just went in and killed osama bin laden in one of these very kinetic raids and saying let's claim victory and focus on the things we know work. >> charlie: you've been arguing for a long time that afghan was a wrong choice. this decision pleases you and you think it's the first step towards getting out of there and putting our focus elsewhere. >> it's a first step but it's a mini step. and while i probably disagr with joe and david, they didn't get all they wanted, i would still argue that the president is doing way too little too late. i do not believe that reducing 10,000 troops now or 30,000 troops over the next 15 to months is not nely enough. the basic fact remains we're spending too much and i have zero confidence that after another 15 to 18 months with these fairly high force levels, we will have put into place changes in afghanistan that will survive the connued draw down of america troops. if the concept -- people like me have argued all along, you don't need 90,000 troops or you don't need 70,000 troops to do that. if i were advising the president, i would say go down to 30,000 troops or 25,000 troops over this time period. go down to a minimal force to advise, to train, to carry out counterterrorism. you drew the parallel to the pakistan raid. we didn't do the pakistan raid with 70 or 90,000 troops, we did the pakistan raid with a couple dozen troops. we simply do not need this footprint in afghanistan which again i think will not succeed in transforming that country given the nature of our afghan friends, given the fact that pakistan will continue to provide a sanctuary and given the tenacity of the taliban. this is yet a ste in the right direction but i would have argued for something much more accelerated. >> charlie: what's going to happen with afghanistan. >> we'll continue to do training, you'll see statistics that the afghan forces are getting larger and stronger. the taliban will continue to be pushed back for another year, year and-a-half while u. forces still operate and strength. gradually afgnistan will revert to afghanistan. you'll see the taliban beginning to make some in-roads particularlyn the south and east where demographically we are akin to major of the people. here's the good news, i do not assume al-qaeda will necessarily establish major foot holds in afghanistan. they've been absent for eight or nine years and i don't see that necessarily changing. so what i'm hoping in many ways afghanistan ultimately goes back to something like the a security it was inbefore where there's pakistan, afghanistan,ndia and others compete for influence. the locals compete for influence but i don't see it being central to the future of that area or necessarily central to the future of the united states. >> charlie: oes this feed this idea that the united states after strategic points leaves. >> at this trajectory it certainly does. >> charlie: is that bad for us. >> i think it's probably terrible for us. richard would you agree with me on that. >> the interesting thing about watching the speech tonight is to see if the presint talks about a vision of afghanistan beyond counterterrorism and beyond how many troops he's going to bring down. this war is eithegoing to end in a negotiated solution that involves the taliban and the government in some way as distasteful as that may be or it's going to end in a retreat. presumably the president and most foreign policy people agree that a negotiated solution will achieve at least our minimal goals is preferrable to a defeat. so the question is, will speech have many so pointers or some indicators as to what that negotiated end point's going to be and is he prepared to leave enough troops on the ground so the taliban can be kept at the table. >> i think that the thing that he can'tay, but that they believe or at least they hope is that they're going to leave the afghan nation in a strong position so you need a couple years to prevented the taban from coming in and taking over kabul. the 10% who are there aren't from the south. ists on patrol with the ana last december and they needed translators to talk to people to talk to afghans. >> charlie: doe that make sense? >> i makes sense to the extent -- >> charlie: to the majority of the population. >> yes but it makes sense to this extents. at you know the northern alliance gave the taliban a pretty gd tuss in the past with them being trained and equipped by us, is hope is that you have a stabilized, you know, non-civil war. it's like threading a needle but i think that's the best hope that we have for anything resembling stality there. >> you know charlie, i would say to counter rich's argument. the reason this was slower than rich or many people would like is one good aspect is it confound the expectations of the taliban. it was plead in that region whn president obama initially announced he would begin to draw down his troops in july 2011, that we were getting out in july 2011. that was widely felt and president karzai began scrambling around, the pakistanis began scrambling around and this confound that. 're not getting out right away. in fact there is this graduate process to 2014. so taliban have been getting beaten up. a reporter i respect who knows that part of the world has keptly reported based on taliban sources that they've been taking a beating. if they know that this fight going to continue for another year, two years, some longer period than expected, there's some more reason for them to get into this negotiating process. i think that's the other thing. >> charlie: if that's true, why didn't he leave them all on the ground and follow the command -- >> would have liked to leave them alone. to quote secretary of defense gates, presidents are responsive to public opinion and the country -- >> charlie: it's a decision borne out of politics and public opinion. >> to finish this thought about negotiations. the president, i think, although he is continuing to have troops in the field increasingly believe he wants to drive this toward some negotiated settlement. we have secret talks under way with the taliban. they've tually been somewhat more promising than people thought. we should keep that in our minds thinking about the speech tonight. >> there's also a milary rationale for it and that is counter insurgency works best in very highly populated areas that are flat, are that have pretty easy train kandar is like that. we don't know if it's going to work in the long term but it has a better cnce in working in places like that, places like baghdad and so on. as jim can tell you, it is really violent terrain with not nearly as many people. it's much much harder to do counterinsurgency there and so therefore there's a rationale not to do it there. >> i hold out very little hope for negotiations the idea you're going to come up with a power sharing scheme that's going to be acceptable i thinis a long shot to put it generously. those sort of situations never work. but the first question, even if i'm wrong on whether it would work and all these thing, the question i ask is it worth it and speaking personally i would say no. the id that the united states in this moment in history is spending $2 billion or over $120 billion a year. the defense dollars are going into afghanistan given the fact that pakistan will continue to provide a sanctuary. given all the needs we have demoally, schools, infrastructure, the deficit. given all the challenge we have internationally and specifically the asia pacific. that's where history's going to be happening not on the plains of afghanistan. this is misdirected and misguided. we can't do everything. we as a country have to decide what are the most important things we can achieve. i would say this is themerican defense policy and the reason i'm disappointed with the president's speech by going from 100,000 say to 90,000, we're still going to be spending over hundreds of billions of dollars next year in afghanistan. this continues the strategic i believe misalignment and distraction that is undermining american foreign policy. >> charlie: in the end you believe they're unable to achieve the objectives that they have set out. >> i think we could achieve similar objectives with about one quarter the effort. that again is what strategy's about. strategy's about relating resources and interest and i simply do not believe for this level of effort we will get anything commiserate with it. i'm not arguing withdrawal, don't get me wrong but i would go with what i think is a defensible and susinable posion in modest residual amican force in afghanistan, there to train, there to advise and there to carry out counterterrorism. >> i'm not so sure peace accord has such dmal prospects. i think it's certainly going to be very difficult. but is certainly going to, it's preferrable to a retrea soviet style. so the