Was a sophomore at George Washington university. Kt i was a freshman. Geoffrey my facts are wrong. She grew in stature and importance under nixon. Under president reagan, she was a contributing member of the National Security council. She has kindly conceded to moderate. And in that particular series, this is a third wind. This is the third one. And it is very happy to introduce kt. Thank you. Kt thank you. I want to add thanks to all of us from the nixonkissinger community, the importance of doing this. The documents are one thing but to hear from the people who made history is a great addition not only to the nations knowledge but the next generation of americans who will have to grapple. Sometimes with the very same issues. As geoff pointed out, this the third in a series. We covered to cover so far have been the reorganization in structure and sudden diplomacy and china. Five years of the Nixon Administration were a fruitful time in Foreign Policy, many called in the golden age of diplomacy. This one is going to focus on the vietnam war, negotiations and the paris peace accords. It was one of the biggest and most intractable problems that nixon faced when he walked in the door and took office. It is difficult today in 2014 to comprehend the vietnam war. The country had already was already on the edge because of the kennedy and Martin Luther king assassinations. The vietnam war exacerbated those tensions. And the draft meant every family was affected. We had over half a million american troops halfway around the world in a war we cannot seem to win but we do not know how to end. There were demonstrations across the nation. Young man burned their draft cards. Risking prison. Some fled to canada to avoid going to war. As the war dragged on, the antiwar sentiment crept across the country. Dividing family and friends. Lyndon johnson, who was the president , had no choice but to withdraw for reelection. As Vice PresidentHubert Humphrey read in his dead ran in his stead. In november 1968, Richard Nixon became president and inherited a fullscale war in southeast asia. The war went on to become one of the seminal events of the 20th century. Ultimately, 50,000 americans lost their lives. It shaped military leaders and leaders. Joining us today are the men who made history. They helped end the vietnam war and they helped hammer out the paris peace accords. I want to introduce william smyser. He served in germany with u. S. Forces. Including as a witness to the berlin crisis in 1961, the beginning of the cold war. He was an advisor in 1969 and became a Senior Member of kissingers National Security council. He was responsible for vietnam affairs. And was involved in the historic opening to china. After leaving in 1971, he served as political advisor and became deputy high commissioner for refugees and he is now a professor at georgetown university. Next is winston lord. He was one of kissingers closest advisers. He worked on every aspect of Foreign Policy including the opening to china, arms control negotiations, peace talks. Winston went on to become president of the council of Foreign Relations and assistant secretary of state and u. S. Ambassador to china in which he helped develop a diplomat relations. John negroponte was an officer in saigon in the late 1960s before joining the delegation. He was at the first paris peace talks. He went on to work on the nsc, and accompanied them on a trip to the soviet union. He later served as ambassador to honduras, mexico, and iraq. He was also an assistant secretary of state and secretary and most famously known as the first director of National Intelligence after the september 11 attacks. I want to turn to the effectiveness of the National Security staff. Kissinger established one of the most Successful Steps in history. That was very small by todays standards. In the kissinger era, there were probably 35 members and equal number of support staff. Compare that today to about 1700. The kissinger staff, they went on to dominate a generation of american diplomacy. As i mentioned, these men went on to other positions. I want to get back to the beginning and get the personal story from each of you. How did Henry Kissinger who was looking for the most brilliant people, how did he find you . Professor smyser i am not sure i was brilliant but i got to know him and i was doing graduate studies at harvard. Later when he came to washington to work on the National Security, he knew i was there and so he asked me to join him. Kt had you been in vietnam before . Professor smyser i had been with kissinger in vietnam when he went to vietnam at the request of lbj to see what the situation was. I was the control officer. Controlling Henry Kissinger was [laughter] an oxymoron. Professor smyser oxymoron. I didnt and tried to give the best possible introduction to vietnam including [indiscernible] and others. The point was that was where i first met him on vietnam. Kt the two of you were in vietnam before kissinger came in before next was elected and before nixon was elected and thats when you met him. That is correct. We were in saigon. I was recording officer and i carried a particular area and when henry came out, i was assigned the task of taking get to the northern part which is called in that is how i got to know henry and then i went to the paris peace talks as you mentioned and i was recruited. Kt i do not know if it destroyed not but theres a story when kissinger was in saigon, you had some incidents. John indeed. He was there as an advisor. On one of his last days there was november 1, the anniversary, there was a big parade and site in saigon and my apartment overlooks the parade route. I had champagne breakfast. And when henry came, dick brought him up to my apartment. When he got up there, he realized he lost his wallet. He lost his white house pass. [laughter] professor smyser we took him to a cabaret. Kt is this a story we can say . Is it a pg story . Professor smyser of course. The idea was he wanted to meet some characters that were not in political office. We took him there and he got up to the bar and a young lady of uncertain background came up to meet him. And rather clutched him tightly. And he turned to me and said i think i have been discovered. [laughter] professor smyser that was a pretty thorough briefing. Kt i do not know how you will top that one. Winston i was working in the pentagon in 1968. The first person kissinger asked to join him in 1969 was him to help rearrange the system which we talked about in another form of. Moore asked him. I was interviewed by henry for half an hour and it went pretty well. I started out with moore doing 2 things. One was, putting it under the nes system. We would put together the agenda is, the briefings, and the implementation and decisions after the meetings. The other was a mini policy planning staff for we sent him memos looking to the future and ring ticket. Playing devils advocate. The idea i was doing that the first year on the staff in 1969, i sent henry several memos some which were critical. This is the point that henry does like yes men or yes women. I caught his attention to these memos. In february of 1970, i was very fortunate because i did not have expertise like these guys on the vietnam, others on china, others on the middle east. He wanted one person with him at all times with these developments so we could have a global perspective. The impact with relations on china and russia and on. I got to participate in all of these initiatives. And i was with the real experts. Professor smyser henry said he has the fastest anpen in the west. Kt let us state the stage for history. When nixon took off we were in war. What was the context . Why were we in vietnam . Professor smyser the french wanted us to be in there and we did not want to be as involved as they wanted to. They asked us to drop an atomic bomb when it was surrounded by vietnamese troops. Eisenhower refused to do that. He said we are not going to get involved with the war. We were very cautious, particularly under eisenhower, about anything that had to do with indochina. Then john kennedy became president. Kennedy felt even though he didnt want to drop a bomb either, he was more ready to practice what they called warfare. Counterinsurgency. One of his ideas was vietnam was the place to practice. To practice what he thought was going to be the new american doctrine, which would win these wars and counterinsurgency was the thing. Kt where were we when president johnson was in office . What happened . Professor smyser by the late 1960s, it became clear that counterinsurgency could not win the war. The North Vietnamese kept sending troops in and counterinsurgency couldnt defeat them because we didnt have the means to do that. So we had to send in american truce. Kt you were in saigon at the time. John i was there from 19681969. What you had was hanoi decided in 1964, maybe late 1963 to overthrow. They couldnt win the war just by political means alone and they had to ratchet up the level of violence. Lets have no doubt about it, it was to reunify the country. They introduced North Vietnamese troops. By the time we left, the administration from johnson to nixon, we had 510,000 troops. Winston it was more than that. About 550,000. John there was Something Like 10 regular divisions in vietnam. This insurgency in 1969 evolved. Largescale escalation. Kt thats mission creep. It started as a small scale counterinsurgency. Professor smyser i would call it mission escalation. John it is also a demonstration. The North Vietnamese, poor as they were, we are prepared to go to just about any less to achieve their objectives. Kt what was happening in the United States at the time . 1969 he comes into office, what was nixon thinking when he took the oath of office about vietnam . Winston there was some foreshadowing in an article he wrote that suggested opening in china and also asia generally and after vietnam. No matter how it came out, we were going to look like we lost or one or in between. During the campaign he gave suggestions of a strategy, no actual secret plan, which people seem to think happened. He didnt say that. When he got into office, it was the most urgent issue he had to face. It was clear that he was up between this tremendous domestic turmoil and this escalating threat and american involvement in southeast asia. He was caught in between his desire to get out and the intransigence in the military power of North Vietnam. Yet a real dilemma. You got to the context he inherited in judging how well he and kissinger did. It was a very tough challenge. The first thing they did was to reissue a memorandum to all of the agencies, gathering every conceivable type of information that we could from the state department, the cia, the pentagon, the military development every conceivable aspect we could collect information. I was in charge of helping to collect at this. I was orchestrating it. One of the people i worked with went on he went on to become a real job or not. He was a hawk at the time, he went on to be a dove later. We assembled that in order to have nixon and kissinger make up their minds on what kind of strategy they wanted to pursue. They probably had ideas before the study. All of the information helped to shape it. One option they had, look, the democrats did this. Kennedy and johnson, its not our fault. We are just going to get our prisoners back and get the hell out. Nixon rejected that because our position in the world of sacrifice and credibility of america and its allies and what it would do to our world position. The other was incredible escalation trying to force North Vietnam to be more reasonable. I think nixon and kissinger felt Domestic Support for the war would not be under those circumstances. They chose a Middle Passage which they felt was a way to get an honorable and into the war. It consisted of two Main Elements into supporting elements. One was to successfully turn over to the South Vietnamese this would take several years, training and supplies and would have them take in the u. S. Would be able to withdraw successes segments. They had to realize they had a sense of urgency. Above all, it would maintain support and the United States of continuing involvement. People can see the proverbial light at end of the tunnel. Second main element was negotiations. We stayed aside and had to be done secretly in order to be possible success. Theres no other way to get others involved, propaganda exercises so had to be a secret. Supporting elements was china and russia. The 2 major patrons. To improve relations with them to isolate psychologically hanoi. At least the urge hanoi to be reasonable. At that use military pressure when required especially with North Vietnamese provocation. And the one flaw in this and nixon and kissinger understood there was a certain tension between gradual u. S. Resolve. Unilateral withdrawal. And negotiations. Because you could argue that the North Vietnamese knew we were getting out anyway and they might be Strong Enough to take on the south of themselves. They would sit back and wait another negotiate seriously. Kt leverage he mightve had was not there . Winston it was not any better off than without an endless involvement. Secondly, we planted hope to get the vietnamization to get the training to tackle the North Vietnamese and the vietcong and hanoi would be forced to negotiate and we were forthcoming go that and they can see over time. Kt you were there . John can i mention two points. One with regard to the position. Dr. Kissingers book on the via vietnam negotiations dedicated among others to general abrams. There is an important point. In 1964 when lbj had to choose the next commander, the next american commander, he had to choose between 2. Regrettably, he chose moreland. Moreland took emphasis on the americans doing the fighting. He stuck to that right to the end of his command. As abrams came in and his view of how to fight this war, it was nicely with that henry and kissinger approach of training the South Vietnamese troops to fight. The reason i think vietnamization is so important is a principal that is and others in the future. What we did in afghanistan and what we are doing in iraq. The second point although winston was not there and dick there were secret negotiations. And they never got very far. They did get so far as to achieve a halt at the end of 1968, in october of 1968 and they ended up getting a seat at the table with the vietcong and the South Vietnamese. Prior to that, we had been conducting these talks unilaterally. Kt we are talking about North Vietnamese as South Vietnamese who are the other groups . Professor smyser they were all controlled by the same group. The Chinese Communist party which had been developed before world war ii and at one point, had cut ties with the u. S. They were groups that wanted to fight against the west in order to make it truly independent. And so they were people who would normally been our friends but because the french were also allies, we could very well work with the vietnamese to make vietnam independence, because that would be a loss against the french. Working with allies in europe and working with countries that actually wanted to be our friends in asia. It was a very difficult situation. In the best thing to do was just to work with our friends in europe and tried to help our friends in europe achieve some kind of peaceful settlement for their war with independent people are those seeking independence. It was never quite right and never worked quite a the way we wanted it to work. It was one of the problems. It was one of the real problems that we faced because we were stuck between people who wanted to be our friends and whole we wanted as friends but two were fighting each other. One of the most difficult situations in National Politics and input a bunch of people underscore me. It is worthwhile to look at this as a situation of equitably incredible difficulty for the management of foreign affairs. John to underline his point the North Vietnamese always acted out the charade and had no troops, it was all vietcong and a civil war. Their rationale was we undermined elections which have been agreed upon. They had a right to challenge on this front. The fact is that in this was not a civil war primarily. It was more vietnamese invasion and the vietcong were in alarm of that invasion. An arm of that invasion. Kt will you talk about another part of the decision nixon made was to have negotiations . You were already negotiating publicly in geneva. In paris and that was going nowhere . John we were negotiating publicly and privately and we had some secret talks. And we reached an agreement that just on the eve of the president ial election in 1968, a pattern that repeats itself for years later. The greatest pressure to reach some kind of agreement was before our election on a bombing halt exchange and we would stop bombing in exchange for them lowering the intensity of their attacks on South Vietnamese cities. We also agreed the South Vietnamese parties which represented at the peace talks which is what led to what for many people was an absurd discussion for many people on the shape of the table . How to shape the negotiating table in order to reflect the 2 opposite views . We felt of the viacom