All of us from the nixonkissinger community, the importance of doing this. The documents are one thing but to hear from the people who made history is a great addition not only to the nations knowledge , to the history, but the next generation of americans who will have to grapple. As geoff pointed out, this was the third in a series. We covered the was to cover the ones we covered so far have been the reorganization in structure and sudden diplomacy in china. The five years of the administration were very fruitful and many called it the golden age of diplomacy. This one is going to focus on the vietnam war, negotiations and the paris peace accords. It was one of the biggest problems that nixon faced when he walked in the door and took office. It is difficult today in 2014 to comprehend the vietnam war. The country was already on the edge because of the kennedy and Martin Luther king assassinations. The war exacerbated those tensions. And the draft meant every family was effected. We had over half a million american troops halfway around the world in a war we cannot seem to win but we do not know how to end. There were demonstrations across the nation. Young man burned their draft cards. Risking prison. And some fled to canada to avoid going to war. As the war dragged on, the antiwar sentiment crept across the country. Dividing family and friends. Lyndon johnson, who was the president , had no choice but to withdraw for reelection. His Vice President , hubert humphreys, ran instead, but cannot escape the vietnam legacy. In november 1968, Richard Nixon became president and inherited a fullscale war in southeast asia. The war went on to become one of the seminal events of the 20th century. Ultimately, 50,000 americans lost their lives. That shaped a generation of military leaders and politicians. Joining us today are the men who made history. They helped and the war and the hammered out the paris peace accords. I want to introduce william smyser. He served in germany with u. S. Forces. Including as a witness to the berlin crisis in 1961, the beginning of the cold war. He was an advisor in 1969 and became a Senior Member of kissingers National Security council. He was responsible for vietnam affairs. After leaving in 1971, he served as political advisor and became deputy high commissioner for refugees and he is now a professor at georgetown university. Next is winston lord. He was one of kissingers closest advisers. He worked on every aspect of american foreignpolicy, including the opening to china arms control negotiations, peace talks. Weston went on to become president of the council of Foreign Relations and assistant secretary of state and u. S. Ambassador to china in which he helped establish diplomatic relations. John negroponte was an officer in saigon in the late 1960s before joining the delegation. He was at the first paris peace talks. He went on to work on the he later served as ambassador to honduras, mexico, and iraq. He was also an assistant secretary of state and secretary and most famously known as the first director of National Intelligence after the september 11 attacks. I want to turn to the effectiveness of the National Security council staff. Kissinger did establish one of the most Successful Steps in history. That was very small by todays standards. In the kissinger era, there were probably 35 members and equal number of support staff. Of which, i was one. Compare that today to about about 1700. The kissinger staff, they went on to dominate a generation of american diplomacy. As i mentioned, these men went on to very senior positions and subsequent administrations. I want to get back to the beginning and get the personal story from each of you. How did Henry Kissinger who was looking for the most brilliant people, how did he find you . Professor smyser i am not sure i was brilliant but i got to know him when i was doing graduate studies at harvard. Later when he came to washington to work on the National Security, he knew i was there and so he asked me to join him. Kt had you been in vietnam before . Have you met kissinger in vietnam . Professor smyser i had been with kissinger in vietnam when he went to vietnam at the request of lbj to see what the situation was. I was the control officer. Which is rather a loose term because controlling Henry Kissinger is not an easy thing to do. [laughter] an oxymoron. Professor smyser oxymoron. I did it and tried to give him the best possible introduction to vietnam including [indiscernible] and others. And the briefing from myself. But the point was that was where i first met him on vietnam. Kt the two of you were in vietnam before kissinger came in , before it nixon was elected and thats when you met him. That is correct. We were in saigon. I was a recording officer and i covered a particular area and when henry came out, i was assigned the task of taking get to the northern part which is called in that is how i got to know henry and then i went to the paris peace talks as you mentioned and i was recruited. In 1970. Kt i do not know if it is true or not, but theres a story when kissinger was in saigon, there was a few incidents. John indeed. He was there as an advisor. On one of his last days there was november 1, the anniversary, there was a big parade and site in saigon and my apartment overlooks the parade route. I had champagne breakfast. And when henry came, dick brought him up to my apartment. When he got up there, he realized he lost his wallet. He said what really bothered him was that he lost his white house pass. [laughter] winston we took him to a cabaret. Kt is this a story we can say . Is it a pg story . Professor smyser of course. Who would think i would tell anything that wouldnt be proper . The idea was he wanted to meet some characters that were not in political office. We took him there and he got up to the bar and a young lady of uncertain background came up to meet him. And rather touched him tightly. And he turned to me and said i think i have been discovered. [laughter] professor smyser that was a pretty thorough briefing. [laughter] kt i do not know how you will top that one. Winston i was working in the pentagon in 1968. My boss was a man named nmoore he had asked me to go with him. I was interviewed by henry for half an hour and it went pretty well. I started out with moore doing 2 things. In the executive Office Building across from the white house. One was, putting it under the nes system. The agendas, briefing and implementation. The other was a many policy planning staff where we sent him memos, look into the future and playing devils advocate. The first year i was doing that, in 1969, i sent henry several memos some which were critical. This is the point that henry does not like yes men or yes women. As long as your arguments are well put forward, he would respect them. I caught his attention to these memos. In february of 1970, i was very fortunate because i did not have expertise like these guys on the vietnam, others on china, others on the middle east. He wanted one person with him at all times with these developments so we could have a global perspective. For example, the impact with relations on china and russia and on and on. I got to participate in all of these initiatives. And i was with the real experts. Professor smyser henry said he has the fastest pen in the west. [laughter] kt let set the stage for hicks three four history. When nixon took off we were in took office we were in war. , what was the context . Why were we in vietnam . Professor smyser the french wanted us to be in their there and we did not want to be as involved as they wanted to. They asked us to drop an atomic bomb when it was surrounded by vietnamese troops. Nixon refused to do it. We were very cautious particularly about anything that had to do with china. Then john kennedy became president. Kennedy felt that even though he didnt want to drop a bomb either he was more ready to practice what they called warfare. I cant remember counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency. One of his ideas was that he anon was a Perfect Place to practice. What he thought would be the new american doctrine, which would win these wars. Kt where were we went president when president johnson was in office . What happened . Professor smyser by the late 1960s, it became clear that counterinsurgency could not win the war. Because the North Vietnamese kept sending troops in it and in. And counterinsurgency couldnt stop them could not defeat them. So we had to send in american truce. Kt you were in saigon at the time. John i was there from 1964 to 1968. What you had was hanoi decided in 1964, maybe late 1963 to after the overthrow, that they couldnt win the war just by political means alone and they had to ratchet up the level of violence. Lets have no doubt about it, it was to reunify the country. They introduced North Vietnamese troops. By the time we left, the administration transitioned from johnson to nixon, we had 510,000 troops. Winston it was more than that. About 550,000. John there was Something Like 10 regular divisions in vietnam. This insurgency in 1969 evolved. Into largescale escalation. Kt it started as a small scale counterinsurgency. Professor smyser i would call it mission escalation. Because there were a lot of people. John it is also a demonstration. That the North Vietnamese, poor as they were, we are prepared to go to just about any less to any length to achieve their object. Kt what was happening in the United States at the time . 1969 he comes into office, what was nixon thinking when he took the oath of office about vietnam . Winston there was some foreshadowing in an article he wrote that suggested opening in china and also asia generally and after vietnam. No matter how it came out, we were going to look like we lost or we were in between. During the campaign he gave suggestions of a strategy, no actual secret plan, but he did not say that. When he got into office, it was clearly the most urgent issue he had to face. It was clear that he was under tremendous domestic turmoil and in an escalating threat in american involvement in southeast asia. He was caught in between the desire of many in the u. S. To get out and the military powers. He and kissinger had a real dilemma. Future historians and young people have got to remember the context he inherited. In judging how he and kissinger did. It was a very tough challenge. The first thing they did was to reissue a memorandum to all of the agencies, gathering every conceivable type of information that we could of state department and political departments, the cia and what was going on, from the pentagon on the military developments, every conceivable aspect we could collect information. I was in charge of helping to collect this. I was orchestrating it. One of the people i worked with went on he went on to become and was responsible for leaking the pentagon papers. We assembled that in order to have nixon and kissinger make up their minds on what kind of strategy they wanted to pursue. They probably had ideas before the study. But all of the information helped to shape it. If you like, i could tell you the options. One option they had, look, the democrats did this. Kennedy and johnson. It is not our fault. We are just going to get our prisoners back and get the hell out. Nixon rejected that because our position in the world of sacrifice and credibility of america and its allies and what it would do to our world position. The other was incredible escalation trying to force North Vietnam to be more reasonable. I think nixon and kissinger felt Domestic Support for the war would not be maintained under those circumstances. They chose a middle path, which they felt was a way to get an honorable emd end to the war. It consisted of two Main Elements into supporting elements. One was to successfully turn over to the South Vietnamese this would take several years, training and supplies and would have them take in the u. S. Would be able to withdraw successes segments. They had to realize they had a sense of urgency. But above all, it would maintain support in the United States for continuing involvement. People can see the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel. We were reducing our presence, and therefore, they would support ongoing efforts. The main element was second negotiations. We will get into that, but it had to be done secretly in order to be possible success. Theres no other way to get others involved, propaganda exercises and tears so they had to be done secretly. The supporting elements was china and russia. Chinas 2 major patrons. To improve relations with them to isolate psychologically hanoi. At least the urge hanoi to be reasonable. So that they could get on with their relationships with us. And finally, to use military pressure when required especially with North Vietnamese provocation. And the last point i will make that is the one flaw and they understood that, next and and kissinger at the time, was that there was a certain tension. Gradual u. S. Resolve. Unilateral withdrawal. And negotiations. Because you could argue that the North Vietnamese knew we were getting out, anyway, and they judge that the South Vietnamese could never be Strong Enough to take them on themselves. Kt the leverage that you might have thought was not there . Winston it was not any better off than without an endless involvement. Secondly, we planted hope to get the vietnamization to get the training to tackle the North Vietnamese and the vietcong and hanoi would be forced to negotiate more reasonably. They could see that over time, they cannot prevail. Kt you were there . John can i mention two points. One with regard to the position. I knows that notice that dr. Kissingers book on the negotiations was dedicated among others to general abrams. There is an important point. In 1964 when lbj had to choose the next commander, the next american commander, he had to choose between 2. Regrettably, he chose moreland. Moreland took emphasis on the americans doing the fighting. He stuck to that right to the end of his command. It is abrams came in and his view of how to fight this war, it was nicely with that henry and kissinger approach of training the South Vietnamese troops to fight. The reason i think vietnamization is so important it is a principal that is and that to carry over into the future. What we did in afghanistan and what we are doing in iraq. The second point i wanted to make is that although winston was not there and dick, there were secret negotiations. And they never got very far. They did get so far as to achieve a bombing halt at the end of 1968, in october of 1968 and they ended up getting a seat at the table with the vietcong and the South Vietnamese. Prior to that, we had been conducting these talks bilaterally with North Vietnam. Kt we are talking about north the enemies, the South Vietnamese, the vietcong, who are all these groups . Professor smyser they were all controlled by the same group. The Chinese Communist party which had been developed before world war ii and at one point, wanted to close ties with the United States. They were groups that wanted to fight against the west in order to make it truly independent. And so they were people who would normally been our friends but because the french were also affects, we couldnt very well work with the vietnamese to make vietnam independent because that would be against the french. We were stuck with working with our allies in europe or working with countries that actually wanted to be our friends in asia. It was a very difficult situation. We finally decided that the best thing to do was just to work with our friends in europe and to try and help our friends in europe achieve some kind of peaceful settlement for their war with independent people are or those seeking independence. It was never quite right and never works quite the way we wanted it to work. It was one of the problems. Because we were stuck between people who want to be our friend and whom we wanted as friends, but were fighting each other. One of the most difficult situations in international politics, it is worthwhile to look at this as a situation of incredible difficulty for the management of foreign affairs. John to underline his point the North Vietnamese always acted out the charade and had no troops in South Vietnam. This was all vietcong and a civil war. Their rationale was we undermined elections which have been agreed upon. Therefore, they had a right to challenge of us on this front. The fact is that in this was not that this was not a civil war primarily. Kt will you talk about another part of the decision nixon made was to have negotiations . You were already negotiating publicly in geneva. In paris. And that was going nowhere . John we were negotiating publicly and privately and we had some secret talks. And we reached an agreement that an agreement just on the eve of the president ial election in 1968, a pattern that repeats itself for years later. The greatest pressure to reach some kind of agreement was before our election on a bombing halt exchange and we would stop bombing in exchange for them lowering the intensity of their attacks on South Vietnamese cities. We also agreed the south the enemies parties would be represented at the peace talks which is what led to what for many people was an absurd discussion for many people on the shape of the table. How do you shape the negotiating table in order to reflect the 2 opposite views . We felt that the vietcong should not be viewed as a separate party and the South Vietnamese government wanted to be vi