I am the archivist of the United States. It is a pleasure to welcome you today to the william g. Mcgowan theater in washington. And a special welcome to our cspan audience joining us from around the country and around the world. Today, we have the latest in an ongoing series of Nixon Legacy Forums. Which we cosponsor with the Nixon Foundation and the Nixon Library. When asked about his library when it was first being played planned, president nixon said i have insisted that the Nixon Library and birthplace be not a monument to the career of one man, but a place where visitors and scholars will be able to recall the events of the time i served as president and to measure and wayeigh the policies my administration pursued. I hope the Nixon Library and birthplace will be different, a vital place of discovery and rediscovery, of investigation, of study, debate and analysis. Those words will be our touchstone as we begin a major renovation of the permanent exhibit at the Nixon Library this year. Except for the recently opened watergate exhibit, the nixon museum has been relatively unchanged since it opened in the summer of 1990. Over the past four years to mother have been many changes in many is in the techniques and technologies. And in the volume of material now available. It will be an exciting and exhilarating exercise in bringing in the 37th president into the 21st century. Todays Nixon Legacy Forum is 29th in the series. The premise is simple. Bring together men and women who worked on various projects for president next and, reunite them with papers they wrote, and talk about what it was like working in the nixon white house. The documentation at the Nixon Library, regarding the opening of china, the papers and tape recordings are particularly rich. These forums are not intended to be the definitive of any history of any subject. They are meant to be the Building Blocks in history. They are a unique opportunity to provide firstperson for current and future scholars and citizens who want to understand how the nixon policies were really made and how history really works. Dean acheson named his papers famously titled his memoirs president at the creation. We are present, ill be it for decades removed at the creation , of the most momentous events in the last century. Todays forum is a case in point. At the opening of china. Few events are as dramatic as the transformation of what he has called chinas angry isolation and to restore americas relations with the worlds most populous nation. America and the world were transfixed with vivid images of the week that changed the world when president nixon went to china in february 1972 and secretary of state clinton recently remembered renting a small tv set so she could watch the coverage in her room at the yale law school. She said that calling the week that nixon went to china the week that change the world is an understatement. Todays distinguished panelists all worked at the Nixon NationalSecurity Council and helped prepare the momentous transformation of it. Ron walker, the chairman of the board of the richard Nixon Foundation, will introduce todays distinguished moderator and panelists. Please welcome ron walker. [applause] morning, everyone. The panel is going to come out. It is my pleasure to welcome everyone along with david. It is nice to see all these lovely faces out there. Those of us on the white house staff in the 1970s remember a young lady named Catherine Troy of. She was on the nse council at 18 years of age. She worked at night during the residence briefing into the next morning. She would ride her bicycle from George Washington university to the white house and worked in the situation room. She went on to serve in the National Security post or for president ford and president reagan. In 1984, she wrote secretary of defenses memorandum, the uses of military war. She received the departments highest civilian award for the work she did during the reagan administration. Today, she is a fox news security analyst and she hosts the foxnews. Com. Defcom 3. She will introduce the panel. Which is in us which is a distinguished one, i might add and all my friends. Thank you, ron. [applause] ron walker is much too modest to mention it, but he played an essential role in nixons opening to china. He did all of the advance work and was Ground Breaking in every way. It was the first time a prime time president ial trip the first time American People saw china in a generation and the first time a handful of americans had been to china. Ron is not part of this panel today, but if you want a real behindthescenes look to nixons trip to china, you can read the book rons wife wrote. China calls by ann walker. Thank you. This is part of a series of panels about nixon. It was five years that nixon was in office and this was considered one of the most fruitful times in American Foreignpolicy. Really the golden age of American Foreign policy, certainly of the century. The last forum focused on how the National Security council was organized. We will have future forms and we will have future forums, and they will focus on arms control of the soviet union, and arms control and the u. N. Peace accord and a final forum on the Lasting Legacy of the nixonkissinger era. As the archivist said, it was a transformational event. And i want to introduce you to the gentleman who helped make it happen. Winston lord joined the nsc staff at the beginning of the Nixon Administration during he was one of henrys closest advisers and he works on every aspect of American Foreignpolicy. He was in and out of kissingers office several times a day. He helped plan kissinger secret trip to china in july 71. He went on to become president of the Foreign Relations assistant u. S. Secretary of state and u. S. Ambassador to china. Next is dr. Richard solomon who was a university of michigan professor. When kissinger tapped him to join the staff in september 1971. He had a phd from mike ullman motter, m. I. T. He accompanied Henry Kissinger on numerous china trips. He was a senior scholar at the prestigious rant corporation and spoke fluent mandarin and he accompanied kissinger and general hag on numerous china trips and he was in nixons 1972 trip to china. He held senior positions and in the state department, service and asked her to the philippines, written numerous books, and remains one of americas leaving experts. He is now the senior fellow of the rand corporation. Ok. Next is ambassador nicholas platt. Unlike our other analysts, he was not on the National Security council staff. Nick was a Career Foreign Service officer. And one of these state department seniors finally just scientologists sinologists. He was also on the nixon trip. He was the staff assistant to then secretary of state william rogers. He went on to hold senior positions at the department of defense and after leaving government he dealt extensively with the chinese through the last 40 years. Finally as admiral Jonathan Howe , who was a young commander on kissingers staff. He was one of the only military officers on the staff and the only naval officer. Then a lieutenant commander, he spent most of his time at sea as a submariner. He went on to a very distinguished career in the navy. Became a fourstar admiral. He was also president george h. W. Bushs National Security advisor. These are very distinguished men who continue to be on the forefront of americas Foreign Policy going forward. Id like to get right to it. I want to ask each of you how you happened to be associated with henry specifically. How did henry find you . I was a Foreign Service officer originally, and i was working in the pentagon in 1968. The first person that kissinger asked to join him was the head of the policy planning staff in the pentagon where i was working, a man named lloyd helper. So, he asked me to go with him. I had a quick interview with kissinger so i guess i passed. The first year, i was on a mini policy planning staff. He was sending memos to henry. Many were criticizing what he was doing and that is why i got his attention. Also running the nsc system. Then i became a special assistant in february 1970. Dick, how did henry find you . I was recommended by the council of Foreign Relations. David rockefeller had arranged a fellowship program. In march or april of 1971, i was recommended to kissinger because he was taking scholars or recommend these from the council on as a matter of fact, it was the second year of that program. I got a letter in the spring of 1971, before the secret trip saying that i would be welcome to join the staff for a year as an academic in that context. I was teaching the summer of 1971 at michigan in preparation for taking the years leave. The years leave. I was shocked as the world was when president nixon got on television and announced a that kissinger had already been to china secretly. Immediately, i started getting phone calls from my colleagues in the state department. Boy, are you lucky. You will be in the middle of a lot of interesting things. I showed up at the end of the summer. From that point on, i became a member of that team. It worked out well enough so that i was asked to stay beyond the first year and ended up working for kissinger and thence and then for five years. How did henry find you . I was thrown together with henry. When we were coordinating the papers for the next entry of nixon trip, secretary rogers asked me to pull the papers together. I had been working with the secretary and i had some idea how to do this and i had in working on china. I brought over the papers to discuss them with henry himself. Henry was very anxious that we all be singing from the same sheet of music. I was showing him our sheet of music to make sure it was the same as his and it was. That was how we met. What about you . I had just finished two years of graduate school. Law and diplomacy. I took kissingers last course that he taught at harvard on National Security. That was a large seminar. He did not know me from that. I had orders to be on a submarine. To be xo of a submarine. I got a phone call from the navy saying come to washington. We cant tell you why. Just come. Dont go back to new london now. So i came, obviously, and that turned up to be an interview with hague and kissinger, etc. I was worried about wanting to go back to submarine and started bargaining. This is only going to be a year . When they finally brought me over, they said this could be two years. So for the half years four and a half years later, i got back to the navy. I had an enjoyable experience. Some professors, unbeknownst to me, were advisers on my thesis etc. And had written to kissinger and said this is somebody you ought to have. Really . I never saw the letter. They never said anything to me at all. It was totally out of the blue. That was the reason they learn ed who i was. Excellent. I would like to start off now setting the stage for the historical record. Where was the United States in the late 1960s . Do you think now about china, it is hard to think about a time when china was not an essential player in the world of politics and with the United States. But that was not the case in 1968 when nixon ran for president , nor in 1969 when nixon took office. Set the stage for the historic perspective of the situation. Here we are 2014, a world that has been totally transform ed since the era of the nixon initiative. We are almost half a century away from president nixon making first moved to establish contact with the chinese. Today, the soviet unions history. In china is approaching certainly number two, if not number one in the world economy. It has emerged, risen as an International Force in no small measure because of the opening that president nixon and chairman mao initiated. Lets go back to what the world looked like when the soviet union and china had allied themselves. Eurasia, from Eastern Europe to the Pacific Ocean was controlled, dominated by a hostile alliance. It was a fundamental threat to american security. And that threat persisted. It was certainly one of the motivations for the vietnam war involvement. As the 1960s progressed, there were signs of real tension between moscow and beijing. And mr. Nixon who was at that point, of course, out of office and would have been aware of these tensions. He was very much aware of the degree to which the vietnam war had undermined Political Support for the Lyndon Johnson administration. It got so bad that president johnson decided not to run for a second term. In the second half of the 60s, mr. Nixon anticipating that he might run for office, but how can i prevent my administration from being entrapped in the vietnam quagmire . He made a trip through asia in 1967 and he wrote a really fascinating article in the journal of Foreign Affairs that hinted not only the desire to get out of vietnam the title of the article was asia after vietnam but he hinted that it was important to draw china into the International Community so this was very much in his head. He was saying, how do i construct a policy to deal with this situation . The brilliance of what he put together was he could see the tensions between the two communist states. He thought that might be the basis for splitting the alliance. And he was looking for a way to accelerate or gain some leverage on getting out of the vietnam situation. As he prepared to run for office, he was talking publicly about he had a secret plan to end the vietnam war. He did not mention china but there was frankly a little more than gaffawing on the michigan side, that nixon had a secret plan to get out of vietnam. But he did. It was a breakthrough in, i would say, International Politics of the 20th century. What finally transpired, the breakthrough to improve relations with china and all that followed fundamentally transformed the political dynamic of the cold war, certainly to americas advantage. It but the soviet union on the defensive and made the position for the engagement that played out for decades, not only after mao, but afterward. When you are on the National Security council, you are already kissingers assistant. Did they talk to you about this . Did you know that that was in nixons mind from the beginning . Yeah. I got fully briefed when i became the special assistant in 1970. But, as we will get to later in , the first week of nixons term, he sent a memo to kissinger saying, lets get in touch with the chinese. Let me follow up on my deck has on what dick has said. In addition to the foreign scene there is also the domestic scene , that nixon inherited. Troops in vietnam, tension with the soviet union no contact with , 1 5 of the worlds people, and at home, you had riots and people being disillusioned with executive power and particularly the vietnam war. So the first impulse, i think the most broad impulse of nixon opening with china was to show the world and the america people that we will not bogged down in vietnam, that our diplomacy could force despite incredible contests that he had inherited and break out of the mall the mold. He knew that any exit from vietnam would be messy and ambiguous. He thought if he opened with china, this huge country, the drama and the importance of dealing with that giant who put would put in perspective, the rather messy exit from vietnam from vietnam. Lets not underestimate the broad Strategic Value in what he did with the American Peoples morale. But more specifically, number one, he wanted to improve relations with the soviet union. The best way to do that was to get their attention by going to china. Number two, he wanted help in ending the vietnam war. As you suggested. Figuring if he opened with china and with russia, they would see it was being somewhat isolated by two big patrons, that they should open up bilateral relationships with us. He also over time those are his objectives. On the chinese side, they are concerned that the polar bear, their northern neighbor, they saw brezhnev declare the brezhnev doctrine and open up czechoslovakia. They were concerned about the soviets. Secondly they were totally isolated because of the cultural revolution. They with screw all but one of their ambassadors from abroad. They withdrew all but one of their ambassadors from abroad. Here is a classic case where both sides achieved their goals essentially. Within weeks of the secret trip and nixons announcement, moscow agreed to a summit meeting with nixon as well. They had been dragging their feet for a year or two that. We had the berlin agreement. We made major breakthroughs with the russians. It did help us put pressure on vietnam, but that was a much longer operation. Certainly in terms of american diplomacy, it showed that we were a major act on the world stage again. It enhanced nixons popularity. It achieved our major objectives. The Chinese Concern got some security against the soviet union and they broke out of their isolation. They knew if we opened up with them, then japan, which had been hold