Transcripts For CSPAN3 The Civil War 20160515

I would like to echo what bud said about events. He came up to where i live in dalton. I told since that since i am a georgia tech fan. If he was still coaching and george i was going to push him off the ridge. He had retired by then. Although i dont know that as much help. I was also interested in what kevin said this morning. The old lady came out she heard the pearl harbor and said to the end hes going to be with us this time . December 8, 1941. A reporter for the local newspaper went out to interview them about what they thought about the events of the previous day pearl harbor was the old fellas to himself up and said this never wouldve happened if Albert Sidney johnston had been killed at shiloh. Maybe its not just some of the College Students today who dont know its going on. It seems to run through. Of time. I did offer some remarks about the Atlanta Campaign of 1864. I want to put into context with you. That is what i think makes it very important. One of the two or three most important operations of the civil war. Lets look at what happened in 1863 and earlier. The confederate cause started downhill in 1861 with the launch of kentucky and mitch confederate history since then. Trying to reverse the downward course. It began with the loss of kentucky. In 1863 Confederate Army in virginia seems to be on a roll. He had one second manassas and had invaded maryland. He slaughtered burnsides army at fredericksburg. He had won the battle chancellorsville and in the summer of 1863 he was in pennsylvania. He fell back to virginia at the same time the confederates suffered a devastating loss in mississippi. A similar defeat in middle tennessee with rosecrans captured at chattanooga. They were chased back into georgia. So if you look at it from the perspective of someone just viewing the overall war it would seem like the union was now on a roll. Union armies were winning in virginia and tennessee. Only would have to do 1964 will be to follow up the victories they had won the previous year. The confederacy that had suffered staggering losses of gettysburg in vicksburg chickamauga Missionary Ridge actually staggering losses. Couldnt hold out much longer. During the winter the confederate authorities miraculous job Stephen Newton the loss for the cause. The manpower shortage. In the winter of 1863 to 64. Documenting how the confederate authorities rebuilt the Numerical Strength of the Confederate Army that winter. They expanded the conscript age exemptions for occupation it ended the practice of hiring substitutes. Draconian efforts to grab people and put them in the army. Sent some of his guards out of the theater. People came out of the theater and i stopped and asked why arent you in the army. The authorization to be on furlough. You have an authorization for exemption from service. And if the man did not they dragged him off to the conscript camp. The newspaper reported that the ladies and gentlemen. They did incredible job of rebuilding the army. The blockade running ships were coming into service. Bringing tons of supplies into the service. As of 1864 the confederates in many ways had repair the damage that they had suffered the previous year. From the point of view of federal authorities. The confederacy would just so topple over. And it march of 1864 lincoln named to you the success grants to command all the union forces. Grants Union Authority advanced a five prime campaign to wipe out the confederates pen them down everywhere and went them out. One of these efforts would be made in louisiana are along the gulf coast against mobile. Nathaniel banks would move east from new orleans to mobile along the gulf coast capture that city that not only was an important fort for the confederacy that was even more important was the real juncture because the only Railroad Line of communication between the east and the west of the confederacy at that time ran through mobile. If you capture mobile you have cut that. All the food that was grown in the Tombigbee River valley. A second restaurant, the shenandoah valley. Under general franz sigel. They could destroy a lot of the food that was grown in virginia. Supporting the civilian population there. The third thrust would come in southeastern virginia. General benjamin butler. Both were really auxiliary operations. The Main Operation would come in virginia from grant himself would direct the army of the potomac against robbery lee robert e. Lee. Grants favorite subordinate William T Sherman would lead a campaign into georgia. When all that began, the union effort had a problem. The campaign along the gulf coast had to be abandoned because earlier in the year the federals had gone to red river in louisiana. They continue to advance. By the time they got them out it was too late. The campaign in southeastern virginia under butler. Grant said picturesquely not accurately that was a battle strongly corked. It was defeated at newmarket on may 15. The corps cadets from the Virginia Military institute with a little help from the Confederate Army unit that happened to be there. It defeated sigel and drove them back down the valley. Granted virginia and sherman in georgia. Granted as but mention this morning. Grant ran into problems. By the end of the summer lee was pinned down in richmond with part of his army. Grant was pinned down there too. He found himself facing a problem when lead attached part of his army to the shenandoah valley. They marched into maryland the suburbs of washington. Burned chambersburg. Things are not going well in the late summer. That is why the Atlanta Campaign is so crucial. Sherman found himself in a situation in 1864 where hed come to change a lot of his views that he held about how to conduct a war. Fighting had long battles if somehow you could drive the enemy off the field your own army would be so battered that it could take which manages the victory. The result was as sherman wrote to one of his family members early in the year that if the result can be obtained without fighting i would do it. Sherman didnt want to fight at all. His opponent was Joseph E Johnston. The confederate officer who did a classmate of robbery lee. The confederate officer was Joseph E Johnston who was a classmate of robert e lee. Joseph e johnston was a perfectionist. He may have been too conscious of his reputation. If you didnt fight you could lose. Mary chestnut says in her wonderful book once before the civil war johnston had gone bird hunting with some friends. Although they walked along with the others blasting away and johnston never fired a shot. He was always wrong. The birds were too high or too low. The dogs were too far off are too close. At the end of the days reputation was still intact. He had missed a single time. That is sort of the way he liked to run battles. You have a campaign in which one general doesnt want to fight unless he is heavily certain he will win. And you can never be actually certain. The others do not want to fight all. The campaign in north georgia that year was a campaign of maneuver. You got a couple of maps in your handout. I dont propose to follow it in a lot of detail because we said we dont have time for that this morning. I question whether it be worth it or not. Just a very simple campaign. Johnston would take up a strong position and fortify it to make it even stronger. Sherman would come up and there would be a day or two of skirmishing. The skirmishers would determine how strong johnstons position was. They will march around usually to the west and come in through the south. The railroad that supply johnstons army. He would retreat 15 miles or so to the south. Take a strong position, fortify. Which are sherman. Wait for sherman. And so it went. New hope church, kennesaw mountain. Chattahoochee. It was not a campaign of battles. It was a campaign of maneuver. By this time the confederate authorities in richmond were becoming extremely alarmed with what was going on. On july 16, Jefferson Davis sent johnston of blood telegram. I desire to hear from you specifically as to the situation and your plans so i can anticipate events. Johnston sent a message that was so vague and some most meaningless. The enemy outnumbers me to one. My plan depends on the enemy. Not much of a plan. Im looking for a chance to fight and fortify the city. Incentive is a message suggesting that they remove the prisoners of war in andersonville which was 120 miles south of atlanta. What does that mean . Did it mean that johnston was contemplating retreating all the way down to andersonville . Davis was convinced that atlanta must be held for both logistical and political reasons. It was an election coming up in the northern states. On july 17, after a long time of thinking it over, davis sent an order to atlanta removing johnston from command. Well have time to get into all the details. There is a wonderful book where he covers this better than i have seen anywhere else. If you want a detailed discussion, which shows beyond any doubt that davis was justified in removing johnston from command, it is not fair to judge people by what happened later. Davis did not know a lot because johnston had not communicated with him. He was replaced with general John Bell Hood. In the next 10 days he fought three battles as sherman tried to get around to atlanta. He fought the battle of peachtree creek. Atlanta is at the center of that creek. On july 22 hood struck again east of atlanta against the flank of shermans army. On july 28 west of the city they fought battle at ezra church. The confederates were defeated on the battlefield. They did not achieve what could intended to achieve. Hood intended to achieve. But sherman had to stop his flanking movement. He said i cant guess his moves as i could johnstons. Johnston was an intelligent man who did intelligent things. [laughter] what sherman had learned left less of his army exposed. John dingell could planned to fight sherman around atlantic, it was pretty good. The problem was the execution of the plan. We dont know what wouldve happened if they afford as John Bell Hood intended. They intended to attack piecemeal, one brigade at a time. They didnt communicate with each other. Unbelievable for people who did commanding military forces for more than three years. What general hood was doing was trying to use a week part of shermans line. He developed good plans to deal with it. The problem was the execution of those plans. At any rate, they all failed. In late august, when it looked like the fighting around atlantic was a stalemate. Sherman realized that something has got to be done. I cant just sit here firing artillery shells into the city. In late august, sherman took almost all of his army and went way out to the west of atlanta. Some 15 or 20 miles to the railroad in jonesboro. The last railroad. That supplied hoods army in atlanta. They can bungle to the tactical details of the battle. Units were lost in the battlefield. Wandering off. Sherman had possession of the railroad. Hood had to evacuate atlanta. That is when scarlett and rent and percy had to evacuate atlanta. It was burning. [laughter] this is what the union needed if lincoln was going to win. Lincolns armies were achieving success. They lost in louisiana. Theyve been defeated in the shenandoah valley. But in atlanta, sherman has won this great victory. It certainly made it not inevitable and almost inevitable that lincoln would be reelected and to the north would see the war through to a final victory with no compromise with slavery, no compromise with secession. In that sense, you can make the case that the Atlanta Campaign was one of the very decisive campaigns of the war. I call this topic a new framework. For understanding the Atlanta Campaign. If im going to deal with the new framework let me describe the old framework first. This is the way historians and others interpreted the Atlanta Campaign. Almost from the time the civil war ended down to about 1960 or 1965 or 1970. They like to write that sherman on the inside was absolutely brilliant. And driving back confederates. Sherman was per trade as the general who won the great victory. You can make a strong argument but you cannot make an argument that sherman did much of the battlefield himself. His strength was in logistics. Supplying the army. Theres an old saw in military history that people who dont know much about the civil war talk about battlefield tactics. People know little bit talk about strategy. People who really know about it talk about supplies and logistics. Without that, the army cannot do much of anything. Sherman was a master logistics. You should sit down and read his correspondence in the early months of 1864. When he is bringing his supplies forward. His armies in nashville and chattanooga. He had prefabricated railroad bridges sitting on flat cars on sidetracks and chattanooga. The train comes down, you can jump right off and up here the bridge and within a matter of days perhaps even hours shermans supply line back to chattanooga back in operation. That sort of thorough preparation for the campaign. On the battlefield, sherman was not a really great leader. He did not have a killer instinct. He hampered his campaigns by showing undue favoritism to the part of his force that he had previously commanded. Sherman amended three armies. The army of the ohio, the army of the cumberland and the army of the tennessee. Sherman commended the army of the tennessee. That was the part of his force to which he showed great favoritism. So much so that during one of hoods attacks on Atlanta Sherman did not send help to the army of tennessee because he thought the army of tennessee would be jealous. I wonder if some Union Soldiers pinned down of those trenches with bullets flying would really be jealous if other troops came in to chase the confederates away. I would suspect he would not be jealous. The attitude they took when the union army began taking in black troops. Would they object, if sambo should stop a bullet coming to me direct . I dont think they would be in the least bit jealous. On the inside, that is the established framework. Sherman was it really in general but his brilliance is confined to logistics. The confederate side is different. Because theyre all kinds of controversies on the confederate side. The Campaign Began the Confederate Army was commanded by Joseph E Johnston. He had a great reputation. When he joined the Confederate Army. If you work in atlanta as i did in the 1940s and 1950s. You would always hear that Joseph E Johnston was a brilliant general. If Jefferson Davis had just left him in command not only did he defeated sherman, but he wouldve pushed sherman back across the chattahoochee river and chased them through north georgia rounded amount of tennessee pursued them across kentucky even across the ohio river. Walking on the water, he was so great. Chasing sherman back. Back into indiana and michigan. Into hudsons bay. The pitiful remnants of shermans army wouldve surrendered there. Well, i have attitude growing up. When i get into graduate school i had the opportunity for the first time to read hundreds of letters and to diary entries and telegrams and other documents written at the time. Not things that were written after the war. There is a different picture emerges. Johnston appears not to be quite so good. After the war johnston and his if you look at the facts, it looks different. We dont have time to get into a lot of that. Let me give you an example. Johnston argued the best chance johnston is only second to leave. He may have been better than leave. If you just let him alone, he wouldve won the war. I had the opportunity for the first time to read a lot of these contemporary records and letters and reports and telegrams. I changed my mind. The problem with johnstons argument about the Atlanta Campaign is the facts keep getting away. Facts itok at the looks different. We dont have time to get into a lot of that. Let me give you an example. Johnston argued the best chance the confederates had was not to fight a headon battle against sherman but to fall back slowly, drawing sherman into the interior, picking off his men, and as you did this you would reduce the odds against the confederates. When sherman was deep into georgia, and his army had been reduced by casualties the confederates could turn and pounce on him and drive him back. Johnston maintained this conserved federate lives, and by the time they got to atlanta, the armies were closer in strength. He told davis it was art numbered he was outnumbered. People have an amazing ability to get around absolutes. Johnston was one of them. He had a statement that his army had lost 9972 men come a killed and wounded in may and june of 1864. 9972, killed and wounded. Infantry and artillery, may and june. He said no, he lost 22,750 men. Who is right . Take johnstons 9972 as a place to start. What about deserters . What about men lost to sickness . Infantry and artillery. What about the cavalry. What about the first two weeks of july . If you do all of that, make Reasonable Estimates for those who deserted, you can demonstrate his army lost at least 22,000 men. A lot of this has come out recently with a book by stephen hood on the lost papers of John Bell Hood. It changes a lot of things about atlanta. I wish i had had it when i was wrote that biography of the. He has found even more. If you look at the facts, like the casualties, the strength of the Confederate Army, the casualties of shermans off army. Hes lost 10 times as many men as i have. If johnston lost 900 9972, that would mean sherman had 90,000 casualties. He outnumbered johnston toone. Do you see what this leads . They just simply repeated what was in johnston is johnstons memoirs. You do that and things change a great deal. When i grow up, i started out with the idea over here joe johnston was fabulous. He was great. The greatest thing since grits. I got into all this stuff. He was the antichrist. Hes always wrong. I have been wrestling around with this for a large number of years. I hope its coming back to a balanced view. That johnston was right sometimes and wrong sometimes. To argue that he was right in the Atlantic Campaign is a stretch of the imagination. Hood on the other hand had been criticized in the traditional framework of the Atlantic Campaign. It appears now from an examination of the facts, a lot of this stuff that is in stephen hood book, that is a fascinating thing. How many of you read that . Hood died in 1879. He spent the previous 10 years or so collecting documents and information. Earlier he had taken a lot of them to richmond and washington to sell them as part of the archives. He left them there with William T Sherman who was a friend after the war. Sherman wrote a moving letter of condolences to hood after his wife died. It didnt arrive until hood had died but it is a moving document. Blood left those papers in washington with sherman. I found them when i was working on the book. I sit on the greatest disk greatest historian. In terms out, they closed up his house because they did not know what caused yellow fever. They didnt go back into the house until december. His children were young and had been scattered around. When they went back in the house they found this box of papers. Hood had no adult descendents. They found a collateral relative and sent the papers to him. He gets this box of papers. He left them to his son, who left them to his son, who lives in philadelphia, who is even more of a misanthrope recluse then i am. [laughter] he heard steve hood, who goes by sam, was trying to get information. He said ive got these papers you should look at. Sam didnt want to do it. He spent so much time. But he went to philadelphia and the guy said they are upstairs. He opened the box and in five minutes he came down and said these belong in a safe deposit box. There are literally hundreds of documents. Letters from Jefferson Davis. From William T Sherman. From robert e. Lee. From stonewall jackson. The emirate commission of a lieutenant general. Beautifully engraved documents. Beautiful documents. That is probably unique. There can only be one other. Kirby smith was the only other men who held all of them. Ive used his papers in chapel hill. I dont think ive seen them again. I dont think they are there. We will say it is unique. How is that for good serious scholarship . If it sounds good, say they are unique. Including 12 or 15 page day by day account of the medical doctor who attended hood after his leg was amputated. Why is it detailed . I would tell you what it said but you a breakfast this morning and you dont want to know. It proves he was not using drugs. The doctor records i gave him morphine after the leg was amputated at night to help them get to sleep. Then he writes for the first time he went to sleep without morphine and there is no more mention of it. That goes against the slander that hood used drugs. Now you have proof. It shows what a great historian steve is. But the point im getting at, if you go into this and look at this from some point of view rather than the traditional one, the one based on the memoirs of johnston, of sherman, the postwar recollections. Not looking back, looking at the time for word. Instead of looking at the fall of atlanta from 1865, look at the Atlantic Campaign from january, 1864. It will look quite different. What it looks like is that johnstons long retreat to atlanta with the the confederates in a position, desertion, casualties in johnstons army, weakening morale, correspondingly increasing morale in shermans army, less casualties in shermans army. Johnston retreating into the heartland of the confederacy, down to atlanta, this crucial rail center. Crucial manufacturing. Government offices. This is good strategy . This is a Brilliant Campaign . Most historians now who deal with the Atlantic Campaign from the way it looks at the time will see it differently. I would go so far as to label johnstons campaign in georgia in 1864 one of the great failures, great military failures of the civil war. If you change your view of johnston you need to change your view of sherman and hood. If johnston was such a failure does that mean sherman was a bad general because he took so long to capture atlanta . If johnstons campaign failed, does that put hood in a position where situation was hopeless . And hood may have held it longer than johnston would have . I would say again i think they were two major results of that change of command. It saved Joe Johnstons reputation. He had not lost atlanta. Hed not sure any birds. The second thing it did was it enabled the confederates to hold atlanta for 23, maybe a month longer than they would have. Steve is nodding his head. The great brains agree on that read thats a good time to quit. The great brains agree. That is a good time to quit. I hope i have given you something to think about. [applause] ok. We got started a little late. If you have any questions . [inaudible] yes. I admire your work and your emphasis on the western he enter. Theater. I also oh steve davis some money. He owes me some money. You mentioned, your evidence is good about the overrating of johnston. In terms of the specific examples, if the casualties were worse, wouldnt that make the hoods policy that much more full hearty if he had less resources . If the army was in that much worse shape . You could make the argument hood was dealing with a much weaker army than he thought. He makes the argument that hood was trying to run the army of tennessee likely had run the army of Northern Virginia in 1862, which was a strategic aggressiveness but also a tactical defensive stand. Lee fought on the defensive, tactical and. Strategically he was maneuvering his army around in it offensive manner. The problem with johnston is it is so passive. If he is sitting in trenches waiting for sherman to attack, and sherman is not going to attack, this fails. Good [inaudible] [inaudible] hood did not say lets find some fortifications and charge area. We are going to attack into that gap. The confederates concentrated what was a slightly superior force against the federals on the south side. The attack was to be an national with the right hand of the confederate line moving into that gap. They would swing to the west. Other units would come beside them. They would have a confederate line of battles perpendicular to the union line. The general that was to go into the gap and swing to the west swung to the northeast. He lost control of its. It. He didnt get them back under control. He didnt find they were out from control for several hours. Hood was sending his part of his army out to block the road going by ezra church. The next day, july 29, another part of hoods army was to clean around the federals and attack from the west. Stephen d. Lee discovered the federals already had the road. Instead of notifying hood he decided to launch an attack read this is not what hood plans. That is what i meant when i said the problem here is the execution of these plans. What would have happened if they were carried out as hood intended, we can never know. Church has a high opinion. Even as it was they came close. You can argue casualties weekend hoods chances hoods chances. They came not by carrying out hoods plan but by the way in which they screwed a lot of that. I hope that answers your question. Somewhat. You are not quite convinced. Buy the book. [laughter] i have. Sounds like you may need another copy. One followup, in terms of eventually you look at him at seven pines, what he tried to do at cast fill. I dont know he was afraid to shoot that pigeon or whatever it was until he had the perfect time. The same thing happened in terms of exit houston execution and luck. Cassville, johnston had taken advantage of a place with a fort to kingston. He figured sherman would use both roads. He did. The main part of the army would go down to kingston and johnston would go to cassville. It got mixed up that day because hood, John Bell Hood who was supposed to command the attack, discovered as he was deploying to make the attack there was a union force behind and to the right rear and right flank of his group. He decided to fall back. Johnston said there was no enemy force there. We know today there was. A small party of union cavalry. They had blundered on the wrong road. Therefore there were union troops out there. Hood wisely decided not to make the attack, not knowing what to go for. I reread that portion of your dissertation from 67 under dr. Wiley. I want to credit richard as having been one of the first people since the centennial to turn the head on the old arguments, richard wrote in his dissertation it can now be said with certainty there was enemy cavalry off to hoods flank. Moreover the argument in favor of hood has only amplified. Reread the section of castells decision. Two divisions were on hoods flank on the morning of may 19, and actually installing, causing that was the only time during the whole campaign Union Calvary served sherman well. So we won the fight. One of the things i didnt get into, massive misuse of cavalry during the campaign. Almost total misuse of it. There are some documents by sam hood from Union Soldiers who were out with that group out there. You might just out of interest ask yourself what would have happened if they have been ordered to make an attack and discovered there was a union force of unknown strength behind it. Would he have gone ahead and made the attack . It raises severe questions. One more. This is beyond the scope of your talk. Everything is beyond the scope of my talk. Would you give us an insight about the options hood faced ap had to choose after after the fall of atlanta. He had essentially 2. He could remain in front of sherman. It would be difficult. If nothing else, the terrain becomes less and less favorable. South of macon it is essentially flat all the way to key west. It would have been hard to dodge and duck behind mountains and bridges. It was not a very appealing option. Sherman could have gone in any of three directions. He could have dropped back to the chattahoochee river and gone down the right bank of the river, and cut the confederacy off from all available am a and mississippi. It would have been a total disaster. Hoods other option was to do what he did. I would suggest a lot of the problems he ran into was the problem of not the idea but the execution of the idea. Somebody, i havent found out who, it was approved by Jefferson Davis, herded away his cavalry. They will replace them with forest, which was fine except it took 2. 5 weeks to get there because they couldnt hurry. So they sit there in north alabama. It was a whole reinterpretation of this thing about the confederates. Johnston is looking a lot worse than he traditionally has. Sherman is not looking quite so brilliant. Hood is beginning to look a little better. Thank you, folks. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] are watching American History tv all weekend on cspan3. Like us on facebook. Monday, while visiting a technology fair, we spoke with fred upton from michigan. We interviewed innovators from ford, a new type elegy and spectrum issues. Look where we are today in terms of communication, job creation. We are working on legislation and we will see the fcc free up more spectrum that will enable these devices to be built and used it and communicating. Putting in the legislation encourages taking look at how you build the road to the future. Need for your technology to be working better . Our focus has been on making your device as useful as possible in the car in a way that lets you keep your hands on the wheel in your eyes on the road. Ford understands there is great demand for core spectrum for unlicensed use. We are working on a sharing solution. We are working with our colleagues in the department of transportation. Next on American History tv, a holocaust survivor recalls her familys experience after hungry annexed romania. They imposed antisomatic laws. They were confined to a ghetto. They were transported to the auschwitz concentration camp in poland. They were forced to perform hard labor. Museums part of the firstperson series. Its a little over an hour. 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