And such a date and to go down to core level and in some cases division level. Its pretty specific reports. I only copied one or two of them for the paper. There are about eight or nine. You may have looked at them, actually. Actually. One thing i just discovered last month, in a conference in australia, and it was published in publication in Australia National university, the australians found out through diplomatic intercepts that there were sources and can bharara which we know were a couple of soviet spies handing over top level intelligence reports australian senior armed forces, both on intelligence estimates and plans for operations in the philippines by the u. S. Those that agent communicated them apparently to moscow. Moscow then sent it to the Council General because the japanese were maintaining the charade that manchuria was an independent country and had diplomatic relations. The subjects have diplomatic they hand over to the japanese the intelligence reports that they generated and the operational plans. This is a rather startling piece of information. Matter of fact, the friend in australia sent me that article, sitting next to my desk now. Having seen these having looked through the gru and kgb volumes, nothing surprises me. Their intelligence was superb. They had folks everywhere telling everything. And so when people say, this is post home, forget it, with the russians, it wasnt. It brings to mind when the cold war ended and friends of mine went into the stuff in germany they had stuff they knew more stuff than we ever imagined. It was all irrelevant. Because they fell for utter reasons entirely. Shows you that you can have the best intelligence in the world and it doesnt make any difference at all. But i would not doubt that oft australian intelligence was not completely penetrated. German headquarters, eastern front, Army Headquarters were penetrated. It is incredible. The intelligence effort going on. Catch me at the evening, if you would. In the evening. All right. Time for lunch. Thank you very much. [ applause ] this sunday night on q a, Stanford Law School professor Deborah Rhode talks about her book the trouble with lawyers which looks at the Legal Profession in the United States, the high cost of law schools, and lack of diversity in the profession. I think we need different model of Legal Education, we need that includes oneyear programs for people doing routine work, twoyear programs as an option for people who want to do something specialized in the third year, and three full years for people who want full general practice, Legal Education, we now have. You know, it is crazy to train in the same way somebody who is doing routine divorces in a small town, in the midwest, and somebody who is doing mergers and acquisitions on wall street. We have this one size fits all model of Legal Education that is extremely expensive. The average debt level for a law student is 100,000. And that assumes that you can train everybody to do everything in the same way. Im licensed to practice in two states and i wouldnt trust myself to do a routine divorce. Sunday night at 8 00 eastern and pacific on cspans q a. The cspan cities tour, working with our cable affiliates and visiting cities across the country, this weekend were joined by Charter Communications to learn more about the history, literary life of Grand Junction, colorado. The mining of a certain mineral had a longterm importance in this part of colorado. All over the Colorado Plateau and here in ea mesa county, oue of Grand Junction, were surrounded by morrison rock. And within the morrison we find a lot of dinosaur bones, a lot of fossils, and thats really intriguing scientists for a long time, but the other thing that we also find in the morrison is a mineral, a rock called karne tight. Karne tight contains three different elements. It contains radium, which is radioactive and used by marie curie to help solve and fight cancer. It also contains venadium used to strengthen steel. During the buildup to world war ii, it was of extreme value. Karne tight contains uranium and uranium is up wione of the best sources for atomic power and weapons. Colorado congressman wayne aspenall was responsible for the Agricultural Department through his water legislation. He fought the battle to reserve water for western colorado by making sure that we got our fair share. How did he do that . Well, beginning in his state career, and then going on to his federal career, he climbed up the ladder of seniority and was able to exercise, i think more power than you might normally have. Certainly in the United States congress, where he was able to make sure colorado and western colorado would be treated fairly in any divisions of water. His first major success was the passage of the Colorado River storage project in 1956. See all of our programs from Grand Junction saturday at 7 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan2s book tv. And sunday afternoon at 2 00 on American History tv on cspan3. In this part of the conference on world war ii and the pacific, military historian d. M. Giangreco expresses allied lands for an invasion of hokkaido, the northern island. An invasion that was avoided when japan surrendered 70 years ago. Hosted by the institute for the study of strategy and politics, this is an hour. Next we have dennis giangreco, who is editor at ft. Leavenworth and written an excellent book on the invasion planning for the invasion of japan, and is also an expert on the casualty issue, and he has been tremendous support and assistance in organizing and making this a much better event, so were very appreciative of that. And now hes going to talk to you about the hokkaido myth. [ applause ] hi. Great to be here. Well, im going to start off with some interesting quotes that ive heard recently. Okay. Quote, the u. S. Navy mined the waters off northern japan to keep the russians from invading first. Quote, stalin was prepared to seize the northern end of hong shoe, his Armored Divisions would sweep down the island to tokyo leaving post war japan a divided nation like germany. Quote, there was nothing to stop the soviets from invading before the americans and seizing all of northern japan. Well, okay, much like fantasy football, alternate history, it can be an enjoyable diversiontre same old ground. What is interesting about these overheard quotes, though, is that they were all uttered as statements of fact by educator and serious historians. And while they and similar ideas have bubbled up for decades, virtually all of the comments were made within the last year during the runup to the 70th anniversary of the wars end. It is clear that both the soviet armys intent and capabilities are increasingly being blown way out of proportion by breathless individuals who have not bothered to closely read either of the works of the u. S. And russian scholars who have written on this subject, some of whom are with us here today, or the belligerence relevant war time planning documents and operational summaries. Complicating matters somewhat is the fact that two powers eyeing northern japan each conceived or at least considered a variety of options that differed in both, oh, scale and objectives. Yet are regularly mashed together as if they are single proposed operations. This afternoon, ill be giving you a brief overview of the plans of the United States and the soviet union and Imperial Japan for the seizure and the defense of the northern most japanese island of hokkaido. But first, ill give a little rundown of where these plans fit within the context of the endgame against japan. On october 3rd, 1944, the u. S. Army chief of staff general george c. Marshall rejected a proposal to adopt an attrition strategy in the pacific and slow down operations while awaiting russian entry into the war. Marshall believed that this path would arouse stalins suspicions that, quote, we are maneuvering to get them into the fight in such a manner that they will suffer major losses. The earliest plans had been for the u. S. Forces to invade japan sometime in 1947 or 48, but this had since been pushed up to the fall of 1945. And what marshall desired whoops okay. What marshall desired was a 12 punch, a soviet invasion of manchuria to tie up the massive japanese armies and the asian mainland, lets see if i can find the laser pointer here. There we go. This manchuria and armies really all throughout this area through here. Massive in scale. Anyway, to have manchuria the tying up the massive Japanese Forces there, followed by the beginning of u. S. Operations and the home islands and the fall. Two weeks later on october 16, 1944, there was a meeting in moscow with ambassador Avril Harriman and the u. S. Military mission chief Major General john ardene with stalin where he renewed his tehran conference pledge to join the war against japan and added that the soviet offensive operations could begin within two and a half to three months after the defeat of germany. This fit perfectly with the Strategic Thinking of the u. S. Joint chiefs of staff, and though it would not be formally codified until the conference the following year, this timetable would serve as the basis for all military to military coordination between the two powers and immediate jump in land lease deliveries to the soviet union. To launch an offensive so quickly after the forces defeated the nazis in europe, and not tip off the japanese thus prompting a preemptive strike against the highly vulnerable transsiberian railroad, the red army would have to depend to a large degree on americans to secretly supply much of the food, fuel, war supplies, and even the trucks to move them both before and during the offensive. Two days later on october 18, stalin presented a breathtakingly huge wish list of supplies which the United States moved immediately to fill under a secret expansion code named mile post of the land lease program. Soviet participation in the war was now linked to our vision of the endgames attrition phase and the first ships with mile post cargos arrived in far eastern ports before the end of 19 1944. Often frustrating military to military coordination was conducted in moscow and both sides agreed that if the campaign in manchuria was not quickly won, that the japanese would make every effort to disrupt the flow of supplies. At the conference in february 1945, the soviet navys commander in chief admiral Nicolae Kuznetsov asked king if we would provide protection once hostilities began. Kings response, u. S. Naval forces were already fully committed to supporting our own operations far to the south and that no escorts could be provided. The law proves straight between socklin and hokkaido, which is basically right through here. And that is the only route that remained ice free throughout the winter. U. S. Alternative was to help the soviets establish a modest amphibious capability before they entered the war by setting up a base at cold bay, alaska, which is, lets see, literally way up actually, here is cold bay. Cold bay is way the heck up here. No. Im sorry. Right here. This is cold bay. A little difficult to see the pointer from my angle. So anyway, cold bay, their sailers could quickly learn to operate the hundreds of u. S. Ships then believed to be coming to them under mile post. Admiral readily agreed and project hula ultimately trained some 12,000 soviet naval personnel who manned the 149 made in usa mind sweepers, subchasers, frigates, assault craft and large floating workshop workshops. Here boris popov address sailers during the transfer of an admiralable class mind sweeper in may 1945. With this as background, we can now take a look at the individual proposals and plans of the soviet union, the United States and Imperial Japan. First, the americans. U. S. Planning for the 1945 and 1946 invasions of japan was begun in 1944. Early scheme of operations was released for comment on the very day that allied forces fought their with a ashore on normandy and was approved for the joint chiefs of staff on june 30, 1944. It offered four possible areas that might be seized and subsequently serve as the required stepping stone that would bring groundbased Fighter Aircraft within striking distance of, quote, the industrial heart of japan, which was tokyo and canto and surrounding canto plain. The 12 Division Force the 12 division assault on kyushu operation olympic was quickly chosen as the best option since it was in line with the Central Pacific drive of admiral chester nimitz and the swing up from new guinea into the philippines. One of the areas briefly considered as a stepping stone to tokyo was the northern most japanese home island of hokkaido. Whoops. Im just buzzing through here too fast. Even though it was recognized early on by the planners, that its remote location, quote, not favorably located with respect to Logistical Supporting bases offered numerous liabilities. Control of hokkaido, its proponents rightly maintained would be of major importance when the soviet union and accordance with the agreements made in moscow and at the previous big year previous years big three conference at tehran, entered the war as its seizure would simplify and protect Sea Communications with our new pacific ally. Hokkaido pentagon planners originally believed that the ten Division Operation in the southeast portion of the mountainous island would provide, quote, excellent potential ties for large scale installation of landbased aircraft. By 1945, a more full examination of the regions brutal weather had convinced them otherwise. The invasion timetable had been refined and now called for the tokyo area to be invaded in march, 1946. Which meant that the new supporting bases in the initial invasion operation had to be constructed and made fully operational during the worst of the winter months. The annual snowfall in hokkaido and more specifically in the sappporo plain here, where all the air Field Construction was going to be or would have been. Not only averaged more than 25 feet, but its winters high mean temperature hovering at the freezing mark results in a continual process of partial melting and refreezeing. With this fundamental problem understood, hoe kid yeskkaido w switched from a preliminary operation to one that might be launched if japans resistance continued after the capital had fa fallen. Planners envisioned scenarios calling for landings as early as july 1946 that would that depending on objectives would have either four infantry and one Armored Division or eight Infantry Divisions and no Armored Division if the northern tip of honshu was include d. Naval force requirements for whichever, if either, operation was chosen, centered around support and bombardment groups totalling, lets see, 18 mostly essex class carriers, both of the new midway class carriers, which were envisioned to have deployed by that time, lets see, seven light carriers, 19 battle ships and battle cruisers, 63 escort carriers, 18 of which were part of the group to supply direct air support, and 315 destroyer type ships as well as the normal armada of mind sweeper support and assault vessel vessels. It was a standard fullup invasion and amphibious operation. The eight division, the eight Division Operation would see five of the formations employed on the honshu side of the str t strait, and three against, quote, heavily mined and strongly fortified areas across the way in hokkaido. The five Division Strike would have the same coastal positions, but also target the sporo plain. And this is why one of the two Armored Divisions was slated to take part in this operation. Yet even this larger commitment on hokkaido would result in only the southern third of the West Virginia sized island being captured. After, quote, a difficult operation involving numerous Amphibious Assaults and reduction of fortified areas and the seizure of narrow corridors between the low land areas, a defensive line would be formed in the narrow neck, just above sappo sapporo. Which was a heavily industrialized city. Before the fall of 1946, any imperials forces making a last ditch fight of it on honshu would be cut off from yet another Resource Area and the remaining troops on hokkaidos forbidding north would be left to their own devices. It was planned a core of three disk division would hold the captured territory. No invasion of hokkaido or ho h honshu was part of soviet war planning until the potsdam conference. During a meeting that david had mentioned earlier, high level meetings in the kremlin premiere josef stalin expressed interest in seizing the island and asked his most senior field marshall, zukov, pictured with stalin, how much force he would need to accomplish such a task. Zukovs reply, four field armies, formations and fielding an average i want to stress that. An average of six combat divisions meant so many troops would have to be siphoned off for such an adventurous move that the long planned invasion of manchuria would itself be put at risk. And there were also there was also the question of how the men and equipment would actually get there since the u. S. Effort to help the soviets devel