Morning. Senate Arm Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on u. S. Policy and strategy in the u. S. Asia pacific region. Im pleased to welcome today our panel of expert witnesses all with deep knowledge and experience in the region. Victor cha who is the Senior Adviser and chair at the center for strategic and international studies. Aaron friedberg kwho is professor of politics at princeton university, kelly help me magsamen, kelly magsamen, former Principal Deputy assistant secretary of defense and ashley tellis, senior fellow in to thea to thea having trouble with my anunsation this morning, apologize, senior fellow and to thea chair for Strategic Affairs at the car negatively endowment for International Peace and old friend of the committee. Americas interest in the Asia Pacific Region are deep and endearing and thats high for the past 70 years weve worked with our partners of free peoples and free markets, open seas and open skies. The rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes. These ideas have produced unprecedented peace and prosperity in the asia pacific, but now the challenges to this rules based order are mounting as they threaten not just of the Asia Pacific Region but the United States as well. The most immediate challenge is the situation on the north korea peninsula. Kim jongun has thrown his full weight behind his quest for Nuclear Weapons and his means to deliver them and ffrtly theyre making real progress. A north Korean Missile with a nuclear pay load capable of strike ang American City is no longer a distant hypothetical but an eminent danger, one that pose a real and risetion risk of conflict. I look forward to hearing from our Witnesses Today about u. S. Policy options on the Korean Peninsula. For years the United States has looked to china, north koreas longterm patron and sole strategic ally to bring the regime to the negotiating table and achieve progress toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We have done so for the simple reason that china is the only country with the influence to curb north koreans destabilizing behavior. But china has repeatedly refused to exercise that influence. Instead, china has chose tone bully south korea for exercising its sovereign right to defend itself from the escalating north korean threat. In response to the Alliance Decision to deploy the thaad Missile Defense system to the Korean Peninsula, china has waged a campaign of economic retaliation against south korea which is inflicted real damage. The twisted reality is that china is doing all of this to stop the deployment of a Missile Defense system which is only necessary because china has aided and abetted north korea for decades. I welcome the trump administrations outreach to china on the issue of north korea, but as these discussions continue, United States should be clear that while we earnestly seek chinas cooperation on north korea, we do not seek such cooperation at the expense of our vital interests. We must not and will not bargain over our alliances with japan and south korea, nor over fundamental principles such as freedom of the seas. As this behavior towards south korea indicates over the last several years, china has acted less and less like a responsible stake holder of the rulesbased order in the region and more like a bully. Its Rapid Military modernization, provocations in the east china sea, and continued militarization in the South China Sea signal an increasingly assertive pattern of behavior. Despite u. S. Efforts to rebalance the asia pacific, u. S. Policy has failed to adoopt to the dapt to the scale and vas loss sit of it the chinas rulesbased order. And that question has called into question the security in the region. The new administration has an important opportunity to chart a different and better course. For example, i believe theres strong merit for an asiapacific initiative which is similar to the European Initiative pursuit over the last few years. initiative would enhance pacific commands credible combat power through targeted funding to realign u. S. Military force in the region, improve operationally relevant infrastructure, Fund Additional exercises, preposition equipment and munitions, and build capacity with our allies and partners. These are important steps that should be taken as part of a new comprehensive strategy in the asia pacific that incorporates all elements of National Power. I hope our witnesses will describe their ideas about what an apsi, april see should fund and how they will ar tirk cue late an interagency strategy for the asia pacific. Thank all the witnesses for being here today and i look forward to your testimony. Senator reed. Thank you mr. Chairman for calling this hearing and thank you for the witnesses for agreeing to testify this morning. This hearing could not come at a more critical time as the north korean regime has engaged in an aggressive schedule of tests for its nuclear and missile programs. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on whether they believe china can and will exert sufficient pressure on the regime to denuclearize the region. Is a military strike something we should consider given the uncertainty gifg given the possible scope and retaliation from the regime . I would also like to hear whether there are feasible military options on the table and how we should coordinate those options with theallize in the region. We have heard from our allies and partners in the region that the administration has not yet arctic indicated a comprehensive asia strategy. What is the americas Maritime Strategy to deal with excessive and unlawful Maritime Claims . How will it balance our military presence with economic inning engagement to kaunter the narrative that china is the economic partner of choice . And most importantly how will it balance cooperation of china especially given the chinas cooperation issues relate willing to terrorism . Thank you for holding this important hearing, i look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses on these issues. Before i call on the witnesses we have a housekeeping. Id like to say whats that . We just lost one, so well wait. Dr. Cha, welcome. Thank you, chairman mc kane, Ranking Member and distinguished members of the committee. There used to be a time when north korea and their actions were considered isolated acts by a lonely dictator who was harmless and just looking for some attention with really bad hair. I dont think people think that way anymore. Between 1994 and 2008, north korea did 16 Ballistic Missile tests and one nuclear test. Since january of 2009, they have done 71 missile tests, including four nuclear tests. The leader in north korea has made no effort to have dialogue with any other country in the region, not just the United States, but that includes china, south korea, russia, absolutely no interest in talking. All of this translates to one of the most challenging strategic environments for the United States and its allies and a very dark strategic cloud that is starting to dominate the skyline with regard to east asia. Having said that, i think there are theres a Silver Lining to every dark cloud and in this case i think there are four that could help to inform an Asia Pacific Security Initiative as the chairman mentioned. First, the north korean threat provides opportunity for a closer coordination of policy between the next government in south korea which will be elected may 9th and washington. New south korean government cannot afford ideological indulges in a renewed engagement or sunshine policy. It could be unwise for a new south korean president on may 10th presumably in the aftermath of more north korean provocations and possibly a sixth nuclear test to declare that he or she is reopening the kay song industrial complex. This would only serve to further marginalize the strategic position as the new government would lose step with the United States, japan, and even china. The u. S. Is not adverse to engagement, however, for it to be effective such engaining meant must be used strategically and coordinated with an overall rok strategy for denuclearization. Second Silver Lining dhooz with try ang due gar coordination. It should welcome an early meeting with the u. S. President and south korea and japan. Presumably before president trumps scheduled trip to the region in the fall. The goal of Alliance Coordination should be a collective security statement among the three allies, the United States, japan, and korea, and that an attack on one constitutes an attack against all. The third Silver Lining relates to china. Beijing is unlikely to let off on the economic pressure on south korea over the thaad Defense System for, i think, at least another one or two financial quarters. This will hurt south korean businesses and tourism even more, but it should also spark serious thinking Strategic Thinking in the United States and south korea about reducing the rok easy economic depensd on china. Given the Energy Revolution in the United States and the removal of export restrictions, the two allies should think seriously about newbie lateral Energy Partnerships that could reduce south Korean Energy dependence on china and the middle east. Washington and seouls policy planning offices can Work Together to map out a south korean strategy for engaging india as well as as teeian countries. These new engagements should not be a temporary measure but a serious effort at creating new markets for u. S. Allies, products, production chains and investment. The chinese have proven with their coercion over the thaad issue that south koreas future welfare cannot be left in chinese hands. Finally, the United States should encourage new government in south korea to take a stronger stand in supporting public goods off the Korean Peninsula in neighboring waters, in particular, as part of a new engagement straj strategy, u. S. With the support of south korea could show stronger will to discourage further militarization of the South China Sea. This would win partners among other countries and be a distinctly positive platform for the United States and its allies in the region. Thank you very much. Thank you, dr. Friedberg, before we go to you we do have a quorum now. President i ask the committee consider a list of 5,550 pending military nominations approximately all these nominations have been before the committee that required length of time. Is there a motion in favor the report of these 5,550 military nominations to the senate. Move. Is there a second . The motion carries. Dr. Friedberg, welcome. Senator mccain, senator reed, thank you very much. Members of the committee i appreciate very much the opportunity to express my views on these important subjects. In the Time Available id like to try to make three main points. First, as senator mccain i think has already indicated, i dont think the United States currently has a coherent integrated National Strategy for the asianpacific region, in particular it lacks a strategy for dealing with a increasingly powerful china. What we have instead are the remnants of a Strategy First put in place over two decades ago. Some aspirational goals and a set of policies and programs intended to achieve them that are now in vaifr varying states of disrepair and are largely disconnected from one another. Second, china does have such a strategy, not only for the asia pacific, but for the continental domain along its land fron tears. The goal of beijings strategy has become increasingly clear in the last few years is to create a regional youre operation order thats very different from the one weve been trying to build cincinnati the end of the cold war. And third just because they have a strategy doesnt mean it will succeed. China has many weaknesses and liabilities, we have mg strengths. But i think weve reached a point where we reexamine our goals, adjust our goals accordingly. And the start of a new administration would be such a time to attempt a review. It gets difficult as time goes on and more issues accumulate. When the cold war ended, the United States set out to expand the Geographic Scope of the western liberal economic and institutional order by integrating the pieces of the former soviet union and the former soviet empire and by acc sell rating the integration of china a process that begun a few years before. As regard to china they pursued a twoprong sfraj on one hand seeking to engage chinaa i across all dough mains, economicing in particular but others. And at the same time working with allies and partners in the region to prevev a balance of power that was favorable to our interests and to the security of our allies. And the goals of that policy were to preserve stability, to deter the possibility of aggression while waiting for engagement to work its magic. The u. S. Hoped in effect to tame and ultimately to transform china to encourage its leaders to see its interests as lying in the preservation of that order and to set in motion processes that would lead eventually to the economic and political liberalization of that country. As in europe, so also in asia, our utility aim was to build an open region in an open and liberal world. Since the turn of the century its become increasingly apparent that this approach hasnt worked, at least not yet. Engagement has not achieved its intended results, china is is far stronger and richer but its more refresesive domestically than any other time. It imposes costs on other countries, including ours, and its external behavior has become increasingly assertive most notably but not entirelily in the maritime domain. And meanwhile, balancing has become more difficult for us and for our allies because of the growth of chinas military capabilities. So second, what accounts for this recent shift in chinese behavior . The short answer to that question is that beijings increased assertiveness is driven by a plichl of optimism and arrogance on the one hand and also deep insecurity. For roughly the first 15 years or so after the end of the cold war, chinas rulers followed the wisdom of ping who advised in 1990 twhaun china should hide its capabilities and buy its time, avoid confrontation, build up all the elements of its National Power and move cautiously towards reestablishing china as a power in the region. Things began to change in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis and these changes have accelerate and become institutional liesed since 2013 with the succession of xi jinping to top parties in the state. Basically it caused them to conclude that the utilities was declining more rapidly than had been expected and that china was therefore able to rise more quickly than had been hoped. It was time for china to step up to become clearer in did he fining its core interest and more assertive in per sure them. At the same time, the crisis also deepened the chinese leaders underline concerns about their prospects for sustaining Economic Growth and preserving social stability. So china sa behaving for assertively both because its leaders want to sees the opportunities presented to them and because they feel the need to bolster their legitimacy and to rally Domestic Support by courting controlled consultations with others whom they can present as hostile Foreign Forces including japan and the United States. Chinese actions arent limited to pursuing its claims and trying to extend igts zone of effective control in the maritime domain. Along its land fron tears beijing has also unveiled a hugely ambitious set of Infrastructure Development plans, the socalled one belt one Road Initiative which aims to transform the economic and strategic gee graph fife eurasia. Chinas leaders have begun to articulate their vision for a ueurasia order. A system of networks, regional free trade areas, new rules written in beijing, and mechanisms for political consultation all with china at the center and the United States pushed to the periphery if not out of the region altogether. In this vision, u. S. Alliances would either be dissolved or drained of their significance, m