Relations with china, north and south korea and india and tensions in the region. Good morning. The Senate Armed ServicesCommittee Meets this morning to receive testimony on u. S. Policy and strategy in the asiapacific region. Im pleased to welcome our witnesses and panel. Viktor cha, the chair at international study, eric freedberg, professor of politics at princeton university, kelly help me. Magasman, and Ashley Tellis im having trouble with my enunciation this morning. Americas interests are deep and enduring. Thats why for the past 70 years, weve worked with our allies and partners to uphold a rules based order based on principles of free markets and open seas and open skies. The rule of law and peaceful resolution of disputes. These ideas have produced unprecedented peace and prosperity in the asia pacific. But now the challenges to this rulesbased order are mounting as they threaten not just the asiapacific region but the United States as well. The most immediate challenge is the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Kim jong uns regime has thrown its full weight behind the need for Nuclear Weapons and unfortunately the regime is making real progress. A north Korean Missile with a nuclear pay load capable of striking an American City is no longer a distant hypothetical but an imminent danger, one that poses a real and rising risk of conflict. For years the United States has looked to china, north koreas longterm patron and sole strategic al lie to bring the regime to the negotiate table and progress to a denuclearized peninsula. China is the only country with the influence to curb north koreas destabilizing behavior but china has repeatedly refused to exercise that influence. Instead it has chogen to bully south korea. In response to the align decision to deploy the thaad missile system, china has waged economic retaliation against south korea, which has inflicted real damage. The twist ed reality is china has aided and abetted north korea for decades. We must not and will not bargain over our alliances with south korea nor over fundamental principles of freedom of the seas. China has acted less and less like a responsible stake holder of a rulesbased order in the region and more like a bully. Its Rapid Military modernization, provocations in the East China Sea and continued militarization activities in the South China Sea signal an increasing disturbing pattern of behavior. U. S. Policy has failed to adapt to the scale and velocity of chinas challenge to the rulesbased order. And that failure has called into question the credibility of americas security commitments in the region. I believe there is strong merit for an asiapacific Stability Initiative which is similar to the European Deterrence Initiative pursued over the last few years. This would enhance pacific commands credible combat power through targeted funding to realign u. S. Military force posture in the region, improve praegs operationally important infrastructure. These are important steps taken as part of a new comprehensive strategy in the asiapacific that incorporates all element of national power. I hope witnesses will articulate an a. P. S. I. , apsi, strategy. Thank you to all the witnesses for agreeing to testify this morning. This could not come at a more critical time as the North Koreans have engaged in an aggressive schedule for tests in its nuclear and Missile Programs. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on whether they believe china can and will exert sufficient pressure on north korea. What is the administrations mayor Time Strategy to deal with unlawful and excessive maritime claims. How will it counter the narrative that china is the economic partner of choice and most important how will it balance cooperation and competition with china, especially given the importance of chinas cooperation and issues ranging from north korea to terrorism. Thank you for holding this important hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of witnesses on all of these issues and more. We have a housekeeping id like to say. All right, we just lost one. So well wait. Dr. Cha, welcome. Thank you chairman mccain and distinguished members of the committee. So there used to be a time when north korea and their actions were considered isolated acts by a lonely dictator who was harmless and just looking for some attention with really bad ha hair. I dont think people think that way anymore. Between 1994 and 2008, north korea did 16 Ballistic Missile tests and one nuclear test. Since january of 2009, they have done 71 missile tests, including four nuclear tests. The leader in north korea has made no effort to have dialogue with any other country in the region, not just the United States but that includes china, south korea, russia, absolutely no interest in talking. All of this translates to one of the most challenging strategic childrens for the United States and its allies and a very dark strategic cloud that is starting to dominate the skyline with regard to east asia. Having said that i think there are theres a Silver Lining to every dark cloud and in this case i think there are four that could help to inform an asiapacific Security Initiative as the chairman mentioned. First, the north korean threat provide opportunity for a closer coordination of policy between the next government and south korea, which will be elected may 9th and washington. New south korean government cannot afford ideological indulgences in a renewed engagement or surn shine policy. It would be unwise, for example, for a new south korean president on may 10th, presumably in the aftermath of more provocations and possibly a sixth nuclear test to declare he or she is reopening the industrial complex. This with only further serve to marginalize south koreas strategic position as the new government would lose step with the United States, japan and even china. The u. S. Is not averse for interkorean engagement, however to be effective, it must be used strategically and coordinated with strategy. Second has to do with trilateral coordination. The United States should welcome an early meeting with the u. S. President and south korea and japan, presumably before President Trumps scheduled trip to the region in the fall. The goal of Alliance Coordination should be a collective security statement among the three allies, the United States, japan and korea and that an attack on one constitutes an attack against all. The third Silver Lining relates to china. Beijing is unlikely to let off on the economic pressure on south korea over the thaad Defense System for i think at least another one or two financial quarters. This will hurt south korean businesses and tourism even more but it should also spark serious Strategic Thinking in the United States and south korea about reducing the r. O. K. s economic dependence on china. The two allies should think seriously about new Bilateral Energy partnerships that could reduce south Korean Energy dependence on china in the middle east. Washington washington and seouls policy offices can Work Together to map out a strategy for engaging india, as well as asian countries. The chinese have proven with their coercion over the thaad issue that south koreas future welfare cannot be left in chinese hands. Finally, the United States should encourage new government to tack a stronger stand in supporting blackgoods off the peninsula in neighboring waters. In particular as part of a new engagement strategy, the u. S. With the support, south korea could show willingness to this would win partners among countries and be a distinctly positive platform for the United States and its regions. Before we go to you, we have a quorum. I ask the economy to consider the list of 5,550 military nominations. Is there a second . All in favor say aye. The motion carries. Dr. Freedberg, welcome. Senator mccain, senator reed, thank you very much. I thank you for the opportunity to press my views on this important subject. Eye like to try to make three main points. First as senator mccain has indicated, i dont think the United States has a coherent, integrated National Strategy for the asianpacific region and lacks a strategy for dealing with an increasingly powerful and assertive china. What we have are the remnants of a Strategy First put in place over two decades ago, some respirational goals and aspirational goals and policiep. The goal of beijing strategy has become increasingly clear, to create an order thats very different from the one weve been trying to build since the end of the cold war. And, third, just because beijing has a strategy doesnt mean it will succeed. China has many weaknesses and liabilities, we and our allies have many strengths, but i do think weve reached the point where its essential that we reexamine our goals, review our strategies and adjust our policies accordingly. And the start of a new administration would naturally be the time to attempt such review. It simply becomes more difficult as time goes on. Let me try to expand on each of those points. When the cold war ended, the United States set out to expand the gee grabbing scope of the western liberal economic and institutional order by integrating the pieces of the former soviet union and former soviet empire and accelerating the integration of china, a process that had begun a few years before. As regards china, the United States pursued a twoprong strategy, on one hand seeking to engage china across all domains, economic in particular but diplomatic in others and at the same time working with our allies and partners and maintain being our own forces in the region to preserve a balance of power that was favorable to our interests and the security of our allies. And the goals of that policy were to preserve stability, deter the possibility of aggression while waiting for the engagement to work its magic, the u. S. Hoped to tame and ultimately transform china, to encourage its leaders to see its interests as lying in the preservation of that order and set in motion processes that would lead to the economic and political liberalization of that country. As in europe, so also in asia, our ultimate aim was to build a region whole and free, an open liberal region in an open liberal world. Since the turn of the century, its become increasingly apparent, that this approach hasnt worked, at least not yet. Engagement has not achieved its intended results, chan is far stronger and richer but more repressive domestically than at any time since the cultural revolution, it imposes costs on other chris, including ours and its external behavior has become increasingly assertive, even aggressive most notably but not entirely in the mayor time dough pa main. In the meantime, balancing has become more difficult for us and for our allies because of the growth of Chinas Nuclear capabiliti capabilities. So second, what accounts for this recent shift in chinese behavior . The short answer is beijing as increased assertiveness is driven by optimism and arrogance on the one hand and also deep insecurity. For roughly the first 15 years or so after the end of the cold war, china followed the wisdom of dung xio ping, that china should avoid confrontation, build up power and advance possibly toward eventually reestablishing a china as a position of power in the region. Thanks began to change in 2008 with the onset of financial crisis and these changes have accelerated and become institutionalized. Basically the financial crisis caused chance strategists to conclude that the United States was declining more rapidly than had been expected and that china was therefore able to ride more quickly than it had hoped. At the same time, however, the crisis also deepened the chinese leaderships underlying concerns about their prospects for sustaining Economic Growth and preserving social stability. So china is behaving more assertively both because its leaders want to seize the opportunities presented to them by what they see as a more favorable external situation and because they feel the need to bolster their legitimacy and to rally Domestic Support by courting controlled confrontations with others whom they can present as hostile, foreign forces, including japan and the United States. The chinese actions arent limited to pursue being its claims and trying to extend its zone of effective control in the maritime domain. Long its land frontiers, beijing has also unveiled a hugely ambitious set of Infrastructure Development plans, the socalled one beltone road initiative. Chineses leaders have begun to articulate their vision for a new order, a system of infrastructure networks, regional free trade area, new rules written in beijing and mechanisms for political consultation, all with china at the center and the United States pushed to the periphery, if not out of the region altogether. In this vision u. S. Alliances would either be resolved or drained of their significance, maritime democracies would be divided from one another and relatively weak and so if in the 20th century the United States tried to make the world safe for democracy, in the 21st china is trying to make the world safe for authoritarianism or at least trying to make asia safe for continued communist party rule of china. And theyre trying to coordinate all the instruments of policy to achieve these ends. Military domain, building up both conventional, modernizing their Nuclear Forces in order to deter possible u. S. Intervention and to raise questions about the continued viability of our security guarantees and also developing other instruments, law fair, little blue men maritime militaryia Island Construction to advance towards their goals, create facts without provoking confrontation. Economically theyve been using the growing gravitational pull of their economy to draw others towards them and also theyve become increasingly open in using economic threats and punishments to try to shape the behavior of others in the region, including u. S. Allies, as dr. Cha mentioned korea and also the philippines. And china has been engaging in what chinese strategists refer to as Political Warfare, attempts to shape the perceptions of both leaders, elites and publics by conveying the message that chinas growing wealth and power present an opportunity rather than a threat to its neighbors while raising questions about the continued reliability and leadership capacity of the United States and i think its important to note also that china is waging Political Warfare against us, holding out the prospect of negotiation on trade and on north korea, which i think is now going to be again part of that process, even as they work to undermine and weaken our position in the long run. So finally and very briefly how should the United States respond . As i stated at the outset, i think the time has come for a fundamental reexamination of our strategy towards china and toward the asiapacific and entire euro asianpacific policies. And weight the possible benefit costs and risks. A useful model will be the sol airium project, a review of approaches to deal with the soviet union that was undertaken in 1953 during the recall months of the ice en eisenhower administration. Obviously congress cant do such an assessment itself but it might wish to consider mandating such review as it did in requiring a general statement of National Security strategy in 1986 and the quadrennial defense review in 1997. Im afraid my clock isnt work being so im sure that ive already gone over time. I cant claim to have conducted such an exercise myself but id like to close with just a few thoughts about some of the issues that it might address and perhaps some of the conclusions to which it might lean. First and most basic is what is it that we are trying to achieve, if an asia whole and free is out of reach at least for now and if a region reshaped according to beijings vision would be threatening to our interests and to our values, as i think it would be, how should we define our strategic goals . Part of the answer here i think is likely that we will need to rededicate ourselves to defending those parts of the asian system that remain open and liberal, including our allies, the rules to which they abide and the comments that connects them. Its sometimes said that in order to accommodate chinas rising power and avoid conflict, we will need to compromise and thats certainly true but theres some issues where it will not be possible to split the difference and we need to be clear about what those are. In the economic domain if we dont want others to be drawn increasingly