This has been a long but rich and rewarding day. Ofdo have another full day panels and discussions tomorrow, which will make a full twoandahalf day for this conference. This conference has been going on so long that barack obama was still president when we started. [laughter] imagine that. This conference itself is now part of history. For a final discussions today, we have to mini panels. Coverp panel here will all of asia outside of russia and china. We will start with robert of rinceton university. Comments onr some the reagan ministrations stance toward afghanistan. We will continue the conversation with the more broad look at the region as a whole, the greater middle east from india to yemen, how the administration understood or misunderstood it. I may interject with a question or two. We will do a pivot from the middle east to east asia for our final to discussions of the day. Jennifer miller of dartmouth college, no relation. Dr. Miller will discuss the u. S. Japan relationship. And clinton of washington will discuss the u. S. South korea relationship. That goes without saying thanks to the organizers and sponsors that have been tremendous. I will just dive into it. Among the numerous battles an waged,ag afghanistan should be understood as a central front. You cannot claim this distinction because it received the most attention, i think sustained deliberations only happened during the second term. Nor on the basis of the resources expended on it. Was extensivene and unprecedented. It should be understood in terms of the expectations and hopes that reagan and other policymakers affixed to victories there. No other battlefield held the globally symbolic ramifications attached to afghanistan, nor was any other anticommunist cause outside of Eastern Europe nearly as popular across the american political spectrum. The pursuit of victory limited tot diplomacy could achieve the detriment of soviets, americans, and afghanistan al ike. It appears when early on into the soviet invasion that the president policy realized breznev policy realized they had made a mistake. They made repeated inquiries about the possibility of talks in 1981 and 1982. Although soviet officials insisted on the cessation of u. S. Aid to the mujahedin and sought International Recognition of the government, the most serious entreaty of 1981 whenctober to allassador past day. He was struck by the communicate which offered to talk in a businesslike manner and without unnecessary polemics. He suggested that this should be taken seriously. In arecommendation farcical paperchase failed. It is a long and convoluted tale. Reagan did not actually learn of any of this until december. The entirety of november passed by. Afghanistan were unlikely to take wing. Hade and his adversaries run out the clock. It is unsurprising from all we know of the order interpersonal relations that afghanistan would divisionre issue of between them. This was more than a class of personalities. The soviet war and its influence animated combatants on both sides. The early Reagan White House was at least as susceptible as its predecessor to the popular notion that the soviet invasion constituted a drive to the persian gulf. Ev as theered brezhn longawaited inheritor of czarist schemes to inherit a warm water port. Aserstanding the invasion exactly about the soviet unions own sizable muslim opposition. He argued for limited talks on the issue, this ran into the following year. He was opposed vigorously by the National Security adviser. When the talks finally occurred in 1982, they were fruitless, and hague was out of office. The failure of u. S. The premises is unsurprising. Offer you ae to thesis that there was some lost possibility at that point. The factors apparent in this phase of the afghanistan ghtflict should broader li on the Reagan Administration. There was a deepseated skepticism toward negotiations with the soviet union in general and afghanistan in particular. Distrusted soviet entreaties. They believed that moscow was comparatively invulnerable to the domestic cost of counterinsurgency warfare. They fused czarist and totalitarian traits and pursued a hybrid adversary. The soviet union would therefore be able to lead along. War without facing any serious domestic opposition. This contraband much of the intelligence coming out of moscow and afghanistan where the United States maintained a quiet and the sea presence. Forward as hague waned, the nsc staff succeeded in reversing cork junction of the administration. , which didth nsdd 32 not mention afghanistan by name but did mention containing soviet control throughout the world. Pivotal 75 which was signed by reagan in january of 1983, this was more specific. To describe external resistance to the soviet imperialism as a Core National objective, and the language specific to afghanistan specify the need for keeping maximum pressure on the soviets. Thesis appeared in this document. The United States moved ever closer to a broader spansion of its aid pipeline to the mujahedin, which began to happen in 1983 and 1984. It is time to talk about george schultz, who is now on scene. Clark schultz and famously had a difference of opinion on nsdd25. He disputed some elements of 75, but he did not contest the call for soviet withdrawal from afghanistan. I dont believe that schultz embraced the imperial thesis. He recalled, we did not spend a lot of time thinking about why they did what they did. They did it. Explained the soviet invasion of 1985 as a manifestation of the brezhnev doctrine, which he described as what is mine is mine, and what is yours is a war grabs. He continued to engage his soviet counterpart in afghanistan, which ive been i find no significant talks for the remainder of the first term. The locus of the activity moved to the u. S. Un. The Reagan Administration was beginning to expand the struggle against the soviets on a number of other fronts. Reagans administration bickered about the prospect for dialogue with the soviets, it looked ahead with an Ambitious Campaign to condemn the invasion. Throughout the 1980s, resolutions at the u. N. Passed by overwhelming margin condemning the soviet invasion. Only the soviet allies managed to vote in opposition. Within the u. N. And national media, the United States condemned the soviet union for atrocities in afghanistan including the controversial allegation that they were employing chemical weapons. This incensed the soviets. They told the u. S. To knock off to no avail. There was a broad and Public Campaign around the world directed into afghanistan. The early results disappointed the Reagan White House. Opposition that the vietnam war had gathered around the world as a counterpart that they were trying to reach. Can stand comparing the afghanistan outrage left them disappointed, making them feel there was yet another double standard in the world. Congress took the lead, and the Reagan Administration began to follow. Congress knew the example of the european parliaments in 1982 to be the first of several afghanistan days. The Reagan Administration responded belatedly but with some vigor. This photo was taken after a signing ceremony on march 10, 1982. Reagan is embracing a young afghan refugee. He praised a nation of Unsung Heroes whose courageous struggles is one of the ethics of ourtime epics time. Ofre were public observances afghanistan day in a number of u. S. Cities, drawing more than just the small afghan american community. European americans were interested and turned out for the event. Observation of this day the law offubsequent years fell in subsequent years. In moscow, this raised the cost ground to the u. S. This was the earliest evidence that the white house received soviet intervention more as a vulnerability. Efforts toesidential draw public attention to afghanistan engaged reagans own interests and said that these. Sympathies. He felt strongly about an issue after the next people affected by. As was the case with the pentecostals, so with the afghan refugees in that. He met. This is from january, 1986, when he met severely mutilated children from the war. He wrote in his diary that they mere ear babies. Babies. To Bring Congress into this. He was not acting alone. , who is, Charlie Wilson fairly local by the rest of United States standards, worked to expand the aid pipeline. He got an entire movie out of this. He is far from alone. James scott observed that the age of the mujahedin was the one issue that could unite congress. Cks of legislators who rose opposition to aid in other parts of the third world had very little to say. Liberals were happy to endorse on while opposing reagan other policy issues. This Strong Foundation of support was probably too much of good thing. Of a good thing. Acrimony,e internal it seems the objectives behind the aid pipeline received little strategic discussion. It does not seem to me based on the research that a very serious sustained discussion again before 1984. That donald ford of the nsc staff, an interesting figure who died young of liver cancer in 1986, may have been the main instigator. Policye, our present appears to be one in which means are seldom examined and basic against are only loosely defined. The contours of the reagan doctrine. He wrote, the notion of afghanistan should be a mirror. Afghanistan can be treated as a thesure point upon which soviets can be punished for misbehavior elsewhere in the world and on other issues. Thereafter, under mcfarlanes direction, the nsc staff worked to broaden support for the afghan cause, addressing media outreach, collaboration with numerous ngos, psychological warfare, and humanitarian assistance. Reagan made his famous doctrine speech in 1985, shoring up u. S. Support for the rebels. The next month, he convinced reagan to further expand assistance in the country. 166 recommitted the administration to forcing a withdrawal from the country. Intriguingly, if positive the resumption of arms control talks in geneva, it is important to signal we will oppose unacceptable soviet behavior in other fields. Something worth lingering on. Ofultz was a firm proponent aging the mujahedin. Aiding the mujahedin. He accepted the thesis that afghanistan constituted a Pressure Point upon the soviet union where it could be made to suffer in exchange for being intractable on other issues. Even though the residual nsc suspicion mark earlier years, i find evidence that it persisted into the final years of the Reagan Administration. A decision in 1987, in which schultz gave ground on one fundamental point on which the subunit agreed to death soviet union agreed to withdraw from afghanistan. He accepted a link between ending the aid to the mujahedin and the soviet withdrawal. Reagan walked that back. The United States held to that position later on. The geneva accords of the following year were included. Neither side elite event. Aid side continued to their favorite afghans. Congressional pressure limited the options available to reagan and schultz. Reagans afghanistan policy was under attack by both parties. The democrats regained the senate in 1986. The majority leader accused the reagan and menstruation of trying to sell afghan rebels down the river. Reagan observed of his conservative critics it is amazing how certain they can be little. Y know so dm i think they at least drive the menstruation to accelerate public diplomacy. Reagan invited several mujahedin leaders. In subsequent negotiations, schultz and his equity told them that any deal on afghanistan needed to make it by congress. Separately, and perhaps most critically, and questioning reagans support for the rebels, congress did not pose critical questions about the future of afghanistan after soviet withdrawal. I have a hard time thinking that reagan ever envisioned with drawing support from the rebels. The problem never confronted him. The soviet presence outlasted his presidency by several weeks. Rebelse of the shortcomings was not fully available. Countryerests in the waned. Reagans war in afghanistan although sometimes rationalized by a thesis of a russian drive to the gulf was never primarily about securing soviet withdrawal. Had it represented the threat that the early reagan team believe, they should have responded more seriously to early inquiries about the soviet withdrawal and not cared as much about two soviets left behind in who this evidence left behind. Policy defined u. S. Toward the conflict as a means to demonstrate to the soviet union the cost of unacceptable behavior in the world. Schultz and reagan believed that a soviet withdrawal would be noticed elsewhere, particularly Eastern Europe. Helpless in the face of the polish crackdown, the Reagan Administration chose to challenge the brezhnev doctrine in the minds of afghanistan. Mountains of afghanistan. While afghan relief and aid attracted support throughout the western world, americans felt a special sympathy. Perhaps because of the lingering grievance in vietnam, but more from reagans success in defining afghans in ways congruent to americans. Sometimes deeply hostile to the west, the mujahedin enjoyed a level of american seem never remotely near it by the contras. The righteousness of their cause in pursuit of outright victory. Domestic politics of the afghan dynamic withique theress trying to outdo administration. Hardened by their cheapness today, the reagan achievements, the Reagan Administration were trapped by success. Provedt in afghanistan historically fleeting. After the reagan era, pursuit of victory came abandonment. Indifference. The afghans could continue to fight amongst themselves, and hardly anyone cared, for a while anyway. [applause] thank you. Great paper. We are well aware of Charlie Wilson. Host the Charlie Wilson share in afghan studies. Thank you to the organizers for creating what has been a really interesting occasion. I want to preface this talk by saying this is very early days for what is possibly going to be a project i have not decided. I would say this paper focuses more on the Global Politics aspect rather than reagan as a individual,gure, and im not going to be discussing at length individual members from the state department or nsc as has been the case with other papers. I am more interested in the International Situation that confronted reagan at the time he came to the presidency. I am particularly interested in the importance of the idea in place of southwest asia in Foreign Policy. I find this interesting because of the way it amalgamated different regions of the global south i were frequently discussed in isolation. Includes south and central asia, the persian gulf, and east africa and the middle east. It is this massive region, largely united in american policymakers minds as a place of islam. What is intriguing is that it necessary to factors that influence a wider range of countries. Countries that have not been considered together as a common area. I think it is important that we consider the invasion of afghanistan and revolution of iran together and think about thishese events impacted region as a whole. I am interested in how these two andts affected afghanistan pakistan, iran, and india. The thing that is interesting about this region is that throughout reagans presidency, the entire region is obligated by a series of economy movements. I want to pose a couple of questions. I dont think this paper has answered, it is more posing questions. This perhaps prevented reagan and his administration from dealing with afghanistan effectively. Point that i will be focusing on is this question of National Sovereignty and territorial integrity of state in the region of southwest asia. Iran,rd yesterday about the idea of khomeini being this terrible figure. Reagan favored in iran that existed as a nationstate on the without middle east iran. Is i think this idea of southwest asia is important as a precursor to discussion in the 1990s of the class of civilizations. Clash of civilizations. I dont want to say there is a direct correlation. I think it is important because some of the ethnic groups we see coming to the four of discussion fore of discussion come back after 9 11 and today with discussions of isis. The interest in southwest asia resulted from two specific concerns, containing soviet influence and preserving western oil access after the context of the Energy Crisis of the 1970s. Less than a month after soviet troops entered afghanistan, carter declared the region now threatened by soviet troops is a great strategic importance. Thanontains more two thirds of the worlds exportable oil. It brought the soviets within 300 miles of the indian ocean. This situation demands elective effort to meet the threat to security. This speech emphasized the need for cooperation with local states and the need to prevent access to the persian gulf. Reagan reiterated this policy. He indicated the need to contain and rollback soviet influence and preserve u. S. Alliances in southwest asia. The director pointed out that unstable governments, inefficient economies, and the persistence of traditional creatects opportunities for soviet expansion. The scarcity of resources, oil, increasing terrorism, uncertainty of political success , and reticence on the part of western countries all contribute to the unstable international environment. He goes on, for these reasons, the 1980s will pose the greatest challenge for our survival since world war ii. The reagan and menstruation pursued administration the efficacy of the u. S. Central command was predicated on the continued stability of the region. U. S. Concerns regarding southwest asia was integrity of the states comprising a strategic region. Postcolonial nationstates that share internationally recognized borders. U. S. Strategy was to maintain the same map of southwest asia in the 1980s that existed in the 1970s. Circumstances, w